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Synalloy Corp. v. Newton
326 S.E.2d 470
Ga.
1985
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*1 time he executed Lee at the undue influence over that Dean exercised that, time at the show circumstantial evidence the will. There that will, exercising such force duress Lee Dean executed To the her for his own. substituting will destroyed agency, his free she Lee initiated evidence shows that contrary, the uncontradicted telling her without will, to Peters’ office drove her drafting the will out her destination, with Peters about and conferred their subscribing witnesses to be Moreover, appeared Lee presence. he exe- Although present Dean was when own free will. acting of his room, did not will, side of the far cuted the she was seated evidence of Thus, slightest not the we find that participate. influence, concluding erred in otherwise. superior court undue denying reasons, erred in ad- superior court foregoing For the probate. Lee’s mission of will Weltner, J., concur, except All the Justices

Judgment reversed. who dissents. Decided March

Rehearing 28, 1985. denied March Fowler, Jr., Fowler, appellant. for & Larkin M. Short III, appellee. for McCalley, Kirbo & Thomas Kirbo al. v. NEWTON et 41336. SYNALLOY CORPORATION Weltner, Justice. (formerly Augusta employees Synalloy Corporation

Former among Company) alleging, things, Chemical filed suit tort other (BNA), Synalloy exposed beta-napthylamine negligently them dangers expo- and failed to warn them of the carcinogen, known Williams, employed by plaintiffs, sure. Two of the Newton and were employed Synalloy prior plaintiff to 1971. The Samuels was BNA plaintiffs relationship between None oí1the learned physical for cancer until at which time suit was injuries. mental

Synalloy summary judgment, claiming supe- moved County because the exclu- jurisdiction rior court of Richmond lacked provision of sive was the the Workers’ Compensation Act, OCGA 34-9-280. The motion was denied. The affirmed, Appeals holding pre-1971 Court of had against Synalloy, post-1971 employ- common and that law tort action injuries fall jury ees were entitled to a determination whether the Corp. v. within the definition disease. Newton, granted We certio- rari to examine Appeals’ interpretation the Court of of OCGA 34-9- (3) (F) lists five criteria met which must be before disease which is incurred as result of to some harmful substance will be deemed an disease. OCGA § (b) provides that workers’ claims for occu *2 pational diseases year must be within “the inju one after last exposure” rious to the substance. contends that workers’ the is exclusive the employees. agree. available to We

It is axiomatic that legislature the com- intended that workers’ pensation be exclusive an employee who suffers an oc- cupational disease, 34-9-289, OCGA and the State Board of Work- Compensation claim, ers’ be hearing the sole tribunal OCGA § (3) (F). Although claim coverage comes within the of the Act, it does not is always compensable. follow that it Nowell v. Stone Railroad, Mountain Scenic (as

An from an stemming disease defined Act) is however, within the coverage compensable, of the Act. It is not disability. without a — upon very claimants seize circumstance instance have all statutory five elements combined create compensable they claim to insist that have a tort action under provisions 34-9-289, of OCGA “An em- providing part as follows: ployee who disability any occupational suffers from death disease not listed in any Code 34-9-280 shall not be deprived of common Because, say, under existing law.” it cannot be estab- they presently lished that all requirements meet of subparagraph (F), have, therefore, supra, they right a common law of action. First,

With disagree. quoted over, this we language is held 1 (F) occupational diseases, provided employee’s dependents Other or the prove (or Compensation first satisfaction the State Board Workers’ the medical board, controversy 34-9-311) if the matter is referred to it under Code Section of the following: (i) performed A direct causal connection between the work conditions under which the disease; (ii) exposure by That the disease followed as a natural incident reason employment; (iii) employee may That the disease is not of a character to which the had substan- exposure employment; tial outside of the (iv) general public That the disease is not an which disease life to exposed; (v) appear origin That the disease must have had a risk connected with the consequence. and to have flowed from source a natural purposes partial subparagraph, hearing For the of this loss of due to noise shall be considered an disease.

unchanged recognized then diseases when all of the from the time i.e., amend- name, “listed.” were identified (without limiting category, generically defined, ment such another added thereby by undertaking expanded coverage to “list” each disease quoted included). genesis p. 103, which the See Ga. portion § 34-9-289. of OCGA (F) merely Second, a checklist of circumstances is not subsection compare potential

against tory, symptoms, his medical his- claimant each (F) contrary, experience. subsection To the and work “occupational part description large disease.” of the term is Thus, (iii) (F) provides is not of a “That disease subsection when exposure employee may have had substantial character which the particular employment,” held refer to the it cannot be outside the exposure possible employee, of that and of the of a named ailment employee spe- given in circumstances not related to to a disease contrary, employment. is the “character” To the cific controlling. which is very provides example, inasmuch This case an excellent (BNA) beta-napthylamine

disability flowing would employee may have had “not of a character to be disease employment.” Further, under the outside the substantial *3 (F) (iv) assuredly provisions it is is the case that a disease of subsection stemming disease of life to to BNA “not might general public exposed.” analyses Similar be is (F). subparagraph other constituent elements of drawn from the Hence, As- it as diseases the General is seen that sembly Compensation Act into a com- has converted the Workers’ not — pursuing plex every employer pute any portion every jury of worker tort action and dis- issues wherein — might resisting a claim statutory descrip-

of of the five elements of the pro- interpret nullify goal of tion. To so ducing it would the statute and disability, independent job-related of fault. stated benefits for Appeals pre-1971 employees, held As for the Court employment, their at the termination of and that claims had accrued relief, had not were entitled to seek tort as 1971 amendment passed time. been at that respectfully disagree. At

With this conclusion we such time which, law, there shall combine cre- co-exist elements action, vested, is be ate a cause of thereafter cannot be diminished that cause of action deemed to and

by legislative time, act. Before that ultimately might however, when combine to cre- the elements which yet inchoate, deline- the cause action are a new statute ate ate any cause of shall mature after its effective date. action which 462) (1982). (297 Corp., Hart v. 250 Ga. 397 SE2d Owens-Illinois question pre-1971 Hence, em- becomes when did the claims ployees vest?

In Georgia, a cause of action tort does not vest until three ele- (1) (2) ments person reasonably exist: learns or injured; and injury; reasonably should have of the learned and learns should Seitzinger’s, Inc., King learned of cause of the v. injury. (287 252) (1981). App. SE2d Because the 1971 amendment compensable enacted before the of any injury, occurrence statute as amended must pre-1971 be exclusive for the employees. Thus, plaintiff has a common action tort. Synal- While workers’ compensation is the exclusive loy’s employees, disability. can plain- be no claim without As no yet disabled, tiff (b) (1), has become as required by OCGA 34-9-281 none has at this time a workers’ claim.

We in occupational note that legislature disease cases the has al- one-year lowed for period of limitations between disability, likely restrictive, many too for in cases a cause of action will be presents barred before arises. That substantial consti- questions. tutional See Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470 place But here for such an excursus. Judgment concur, Clarke, reversed. All except Justices Smith, Gregory, JJ., who dissent. Justice, dissenting.

Gregory, I disagree analysis with the the judgment majority opinion respectfully dissent.

Appellees Corporation are former of Synalloy who sued in seeking alleged tort damages injuries suffered when ex- posed (BNA). carcinogen, beta-napthylamine de- fended in part on a contention com- suit was barred because workers’ pensation laws provided remedy. Summary judgment exclusive sought ground on this but was denied the trial court. Appeals Newton, Court of Synalloy Corp. affirmed. granted Certiorari was con- because our

cern with the interpretation provisions Compensation the Workers’ Act. OCGA 34-9-280 thru 292. §§ complaint August filed Richmond Superior *4 Court, plaintiffs alleged they the three employees Synalloy were of or predecessor during years time, through During 1949 1972. that Synalloy alleged, manufactured and the chemical BNA used Synalloy which knew or should was cancer causing have known agent affecting urinary system. the bladder They alleged and also that plaintiffs appreciate did not know or of BNA until on or dangers Synal- about allegations negligence November 1981. Several of of loy specified were proximate injuries and claimed to be the cause of damages Synalloy summary suffered. filed a motion for judgment

178 covered under OCGA plaintiffs of were contending the claims (3) (F) as tort actions be and therefore could not remedy. In con- the exclusive compensation provided since workers’ follow, counsel, motion, any might which appeal nection with the produce a were able to very undertaking, conferred and helpful in a plaintiff, There it disclosed undisputed of facts. statement Newton Samuels, Roger in 1972. James his began David Williams, em- C. Jr. was days in 1970 and Jesse employed predecessor and its Synalloy prior for a time ployed period of In the Geor- to 1972. BNA from 1949 sometimes manufactured necessary precau- that the Department Public Health determined gia BNA, of in 1972 the Na- in but being production tions were taken Synalloy Occupational Safety and Health notified tional Institute of as it would BNA was not safe the method manufacture of manufacturing BNA. Synalloy recommend. Within a week ceased Safety began Health Occupational 1977 the National Institute of danger of notifying former program this suit BNA. Thereafter was filed. I exclusiveness workers’ regarding first turn to issue

compensation plaintiffs. as a for these cov- claim is Synalloy points are when a out that occasions compen- it by compensation ered workers’ is a claim without but Baird, App. Co. sability. Manufacturing Blue Bell Globe 105) (1941); v. Stone Mountain Scenic Rail- Nowell (1979). road, Synalloy particularly Kerr-McGee in Silkwood v. points publicized opinion to the much (10th 1982), part, 104 SC 615 Corp., reversed 667 F2d 908 Cir. by hypothetical case of point vividly made there causing pain and suffer- a worker who hit his thumb with a hammer by ing no be covered but loss time. The accident would be There and a common tort suit would barred. such an would be award in a workers’ claim because compensable. result seem to would be As hard However, some, ap- is probably everywhere. though the rule even gov- plied majority, principle would hold it not the statutory con- peculiar erns this We have matter of case. before us provision struction the limited field of diseases. governing disease cases exclusiveness is OCGA 34-9-289: Georgia chap- subject an to this employer employee

“Whenever ter, disability liability for the or employer under this article any way in- employee death of employ- curred in the of or because of such course liability civil place ment shall be exclusive and in and all other to his whatsoever at common law or otherwise to such *5 personal kin, representative, spouse, parents, any next of or guardian, employee any others. An disability who death occu- suffers from pational disease not listed in Code deprived 34-9-280 shall not be § rights existing common law under (Emphasis supplied.) law.” briefly To understand this provision legis- one must consider the history. lative The Code of compensa- 1933 excluded from workers’ tion all coverage except resulting diseases those from an accident. Ga. 1933, Code 114-102. covered, Accidents were but diseases were not. § The Code made no distinction ordinary occupa- between diseases and tional All provision diseases. were excluded. There was a an limiting employee suffering from an rights “accident” to the under afforded 1933, compensation workers’ law. Ga. Code 114-103. Those affected by diseases were left might whatever remedies be available elsewhere. rapid

The growth industrial II World War focused attention on harmful “elements, metals, effects endured from use of by-products” process. L., chemical Morgan, the manufacturing “Occupational Diseases Under the Georgia Compensation Workmen’s Act,” 8 Mercer Law Review 333 The new legislature added a chapter to the existing compensation workers’ in 1946. It code under the workers’ umbrella certain enumer- occupational (1) ated They diseases. poisoning were limited to four: (2) (by certain agents); by exposure diseased x- condition caused rays (3) substance; asbestosis; (4) or radioactive silicosis. remedy given for occupational the four diseases was made the exclu- remedy. sive All existing common law reserved under laws were 1946, for diseases not p. listed. Ga. L.

In 1971 category the Code was amended add another occu- pational diseases, beyond provision It original four. was a broad occupational which included those where diseases could (It prove all of the elements: is now following (F) (i ii).) thru

“(a) A direct causal connection between the conditions under (b) disease; is performed work that the fol- disease exposure lowed as a natural incident of of the employment; reason (c) may the disease is a character to which the (d) exposure employment; had substantial outside of the the disease is not general pub- an disease of life to (e) is exposed; origin lic that the appear disease to have had in a risk connected with the employment and have flowed that source as a natural consequence.” pp. provision governing in the changed exclusiveness was not occupational

1971 Act. Common law remedies were still available for spe- diseases not It is four listed. obvious the amendment prior cific in- diseases Act did not undertake to meeting remaining diseases, but those elude (c) Particularly illuminating One can above. is criteria five criteria. well curred imagine oc- the harmful element disease where job part part The combination and in elsewhere. on the yet exposures bring harm, this would fail about two qualify occurred if “substantial employment.” been re- have not Common law remedies outside placed by It is for such a disease. remedies OCGA 34-9-289. “not listed.” *6 bring legislature cer- it, was to Thus, I the intention of the as see compensa- occupational all,

tain, under the but not diseases specifically occupational is one disease tion umbrella. Unless named, only if it laws comes under the workers’ it (3) (F). rec- I § As read meets the five criteria OCGA disputed de- If the fact finder ord, fact about this. issues of compensa- met, is workers’ case a termines the criteria have been tion proceed may proceed not, forum. If the case and must in that case I it was not error a law tort would hold as common action. deny summary judgment and that the to to trial court Appeals correctly part of trial court’s Court of order. affirmed (F) par- majority not refer to the The hold that subsection does interprets opinion employee. Instead, a ticular ailment of named the subsection to pos- identify which a disease must characteristics way. I sess. do not read it that “occupational means those statute first states that disease” (3). Reading on, one finds five dis- diseases listed. OCGA 34-9-280 eases (A) (B) by by exposure poisoning, name, disease caused listed (E) (C) (D)

X-rays substances, asbestosis, silicosis, or radioactive (Added 2489.) byssinosis. by p. Then the sixth “(F) occupational provided .” an item on the list is other diseases. . things prove Among employee can of five criteria. existence employee “[a] an is be- which tween the conditions under which the work is must show direct causal connection

performed dis- employee . . ease. .” That means must show that connection particular show, his natural incident of the “[t]hat case. He must the disease followed a

exposure employment. .” . . reason of the particular employee is not This directed ailment of this general characteristics a disease. (F) provide

If is construed characteristics which disease possess interesting disease, in order to be an it is to con- specifically sider whether the diseases listed as diseases (F) qualify sug- specifically I could under if had not been listed. gest employee to which asbestosis is disease of a character exposure employment. so, If have substantial outside asbestosis would not necessary qualify have the characteristics as an (F). I proper inquiry disease under But believe the is whether given employee exposed has employ- been to asbestosis outside his ment. An poisoning employee “may Consider arsenic. have had employment substantial outside” arsenic in general his so, If if poisoning already occupa- sense. had not been listed as an (F). is, tional qualify point disease would not proper under inquiry particular should be whether or not this had sub- stantial outside employment in this case.

I am led to this conclusion for the additional reason stat- provides ute for general elsewhere characteristics which must attach employer order to render an for compensation. occupa- liable An “listed,” tional only “occupational disease not must be it is an dis- “. ease” if it . . due to causes and conditions which are charac- trade, peculiar particular teristic occupation, process, or employment (ex- in which the employee exposed to such disease eluding public diseases of life to ex- general posed). (3). Furthermore, ...” liability there is only if, disease arose out of and in employ- the course of the “[s]uch ment which the employee employer, under such engaged contracted while the engaged, was so and has resulted a hazard characteristic of in excess of the hazards such attending employment general. ...” OCGA 34-9- *7 (b). apply These limitations to all including listed diseases sub- (F). section reaching

2. In the conclusion Workers’ Compensation the Act is not bar Ap to the tort actions court of the trial and Court Williams, peals separately dealt with the claim of and both of Newton 1971, whom employment Synalloy prior terminated their with the year of the amendment the disease statute. OCGA § (F). Samuels was the the employed after effective date of amendment. The courts ap below held that the amendment did not ply pre-1971 employees. clearly The rationale used was that so v. Synalloy is, set forth in Hall Corp., FSupp. That relationship employees the employers between and is one of contract. view, compensation Under this grafted the workers’ laws are onto the compensation contract. Whether there is coverage workers’ is deter by in mined the law effect the during employ term of the contract of ment. Laws enacted after the termination of the contract are not part of the approach contract. result of this the pre-1971 employees governed by compensation are ex workers’ law as it prior isted provision to the 1971 amendment. There was no at that (3) (F), time such now found in OCGA 34-9-280 and therefore no bar to a common I not law action. would follow this view. To do in legislature helpless provide so would render the harmful sub- for those who suffer delayed disability employment during after termi- before termi- until with stances provided employment. of Unless the

nation nation be afforded afterward. of none could employers, relationship as that rela- and I view the by tionship laws, as one of status is affected workers’ rather than contract. compen- in workmen’s used the term ‘contract’

“The courts have speaking they of mar- term when have used that sation cases much as riage agree parties marriage, employment, like in In ‘contracts.’ relationship, do the law dictates but once to enter legal marriage rights And, in within liabilities. them their and impairment having nothing contract, the to with the limitations do may rights change liabilities, time dur- law those ing terminated, relationship it has been but even after sometimes working stopped example, the em- as, ployer has for after the injury. Education, v. Bd. [Cits.]” McAllister because of an Kearny, Super. 217, 212, A2d Town 79 N.J. Supreme approach rejecting North Carolina contract Co., P. 297 N.C. 636 in Stevens & Court observed Wood SE2d J. (1979): parties fixed traditional contract law the “Under expect a at court employment time the One would therefore contract entered. theory apply following the time the the law effect at begins. injury, however, contract In cases of accidental jurisdictions is that well-established rule this and other despite injury, governed claim is at the time the law effect radically changed between the forma- the fact that the injury.” tion of the contract the date of recognize difficulty encountered fixing Many occupa- injury cases tional diseases are caused a date certain when the occurred.

by exposure substance over to deleterious many apparent long period years. time, At a harm, often first there is no symp- gradually, damage time, Often but over accumulates. gradually appear finally disability in. When was the toms sets happen? of this did The resolution done? When the accident employer employee are sub- dilemma is statute. “Where the ject chapter, to this the disablement or death result- *8 ing from an treated as the occurrence disease shall be death, accident; or, in the of his case provided by dependents his shall be entitled to (a). chapter.” OCGA 34-9-281 pre-1971 employees the 1971 would hold the are bound post-1971 employee. rights

amendment as is the dies are The same and reme- They may proceed in tort unless the criteria afforded all. (3) (F) met, in which event the lies in compensation. I am authorized to state that Justice Clarke and Justice Smith join this dissent. February 27, Decided

Rehearing denied March Fulcher, Reed, Flagler, Obenshain, Harper, Hanks & Duncan D. Wheale, Reed, William C. for appellant.

Daniel Craig, appellees. J. PROPERTIES, ROLLESTON v. SEA ISLAND INC. al. et (327 489) SE2d Justice.

Bell, appellant action, Rolleston declaratory filed this seeking and injunctive alia, relief and damages grounds, on the inter that the appellees, through means, the construction of seawalls and other had interfered with to recreational easements well as ease- ments of ingress egress parts to certain of Sea Island. He also alleged that, erosion, accretion, due to avulsion, he was the owner of the soft sand beach between his lots and the Atlantic Ocean. The trial court held that the latter issue by jury, was to be decided but granted summary judgment appellees on the other issues. Rolleston appeals, and we developed affirm. The present record case con- largely sists of the and transcript record from the cases Goodyear Bank, (276 30) v. Trust Co. (1981), Ga. 281 SE2d v. and Rolleston State, 245 Ga. 576 Most facts relating to this case are set out in opinions, those we will therefore supplement them in present necessary case where to address a particular issue. Bruce,

1. Relying on Smith v. 241 Ga. 133 (1978), Rolleston property claims that as a owner on Sea Island he is entitled to a recreational easement portion soft sand beach. Rolleston acknowledges that in our Goodyear decision Bank, Trust Co. supra, 284-285, distinguished we Smith v. Bruce, supra, Goodyear, owner, and held Sea property Island had not been conveyed a recreation easement to the soft sand beach. however, argues, supra, Rolleston Goodyear, distinguishable present from on ground case the reservations contained plats, the Blanton and Torras although applicable Goodyear case which expired was decided in provisions 1982 under the

Case Details

Case Name: Synalloy Corp. v. Newton
Court Name: Supreme Court of Georgia
Date Published: Feb 27, 1985
Citation: 326 S.E.2d 470
Docket Number: 41336
Court Abbreviation: Ga.
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