135 Me. 501 | Me. | 1938
After a verdict for the plaintiff this case is before us on an exception to the refusal of the presiding Justice to direct a verdict for the defendant and on a motion by the defendant for a new trial. As the motion raises the same question for our consideration as does the exception, the exception is regarded as waived.
The plaintiff, who was a tenant in an office building owned and operated by the defendant in Portland, was injured by the sudden starting of the elevator while she was in the act of alighting at the
The essential facts are not in dispute. The defendant claims that as a matter of law the operator of the elevator was not negligent, because the accident was due to the intervening act of a third person for which the defendant was in no way responsible.
The circumstances under which a defendant will be held liable in spite of or because of the intervening act of a third person were recently considered by this Court. Hatch v. Globe Laundry Co., 132 Me., 379, 171 A., 387. The rule laid down in that case as applied to the case now before us would seem to be that this defendant would be liable if the operator of its elevator foresaw, or ought to have foreseen, that the young boy might do what he did in this instance, and if, by the exercise of reasonable care, such wrongful act could have been prevented. The determination of this question was one of fact for the jury. It is not necessary to discuss again the long line of authorities bearing on this subject. Such differences as seem to arise are not so much with the rule as with its application.
Counsel for the plaintiff call attention to the case of Jones v. The Co-Operative Association of America, 109 Me., 448, 84 A., 985, which seems decidedly in point. The facts of the case are al
A case which shows the same general trend on the part of this Court is Clapp v. Cumberland County Power Light Co., 121 Me., 356, 117 A., 307, which holds that it was a question of fact for a jury whether the defendant in operating a street car was responsible for the failure to protect a passenger in alighting against the consequences of another passenger’s wrongful act in giving the signal to the motorman to start the car.
The evidence in the present case indicates that the operator of the elevator took no precautions as he relinquished control of the lever to guard it, nor did he give any warning to the young boy who was with him as to the danger of interference with it. Whether he should have anticipated such intermeddling and was negligent in not taking precautions against it were questions of fact for the jury-
Exception overruled.
Motion overruled.