*1 527 tо conclude that the absurd injury. the cause apply intended that different rules would have legislature single it included in a of action when causes to different of time for the limitation provision aсtions. personal injury and I affirm the
Accordingly, would permit However, on adopt to amend accrual, including the time of her husband’s of the cause excusing delayed circumstances dissenting oрinion. A.2d Joseph SYMBULA, Estate of J. Edith Administratrix Deceased, Symbula, in her right, Appellee, Sales CORPORATION and Johns-Manvillе JOHNS-MANVILLE Inc., Fiberglas Owens-Corning Corp., Raybestos-Manhattan, Insulations, Industries, Inc., Inc., Nipolet Corp., Forty-Eight Corp., Pittsburgh Corning Corp., Corp., Arm- GAF Celotex Inc., Industries, Inc., strong Company, H.K. Cork Unarco Co., Co., Inc., Eagle-Picher Indus- Porter Southern Asbestos Inc., tries, Corp., Delaware Asbestos Rubber Amatex Inc., Inc., Garlock, Pacor, Corp., Corp., J.P. Keene Fiberboard Inc., Turner-Newall, Ltd., Stevens, Appellants.
Supreme Court
Argued March 1987. *2 Joseph McGuirе, Krusen, W. John Patrick Kelley, Evans Byrne, Philadelphia, for appellants. Greitzer, Miller, Martin Jonathan Philаdelphia, W. appellee. NIX, C.J., LARSEN, FLAHERTY,
Before McDERMOTT, and ZAPPALAand HUTCHINSON PAPADAKOS, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT FLAHERTY, Justice. appellee,
The Edith Symbula, filed survival actions the Court of Cоmmon Pleas Philadel- on 24,1979, husband died alleging on January phia exposure to asbestos 1976 as a rеsult of September sold, appellant manufactured, supplied by products more two Inasmuch as than companies. asbestos filing death until the these from the date of elapsed of Common actions, the Court in effect at by the statutes of limitations Pleas to be barred question, time оf the death actions, 12 wrongful death governing govern- limitations P.S. § actions, The Court of Common 12 P.S. ing rule” “discоvery appli- Pleas further thus, were not cable, and, that the statutes allegedly lacked period when during tolled to the cause of her husband’s death. knowledge as Court, Pa.Super.541, *3 in part, holding that (1985), and reversed wrongful rule to death survival applies discovery the to 27, 1978, the effective commenced after June limitations, 42 statute Pa.C.S.A. Code of date Judicial for 5524(2) two-year filing period (establishing a both § actions), provided such actions wrongful death and survival prior to that date. effеct already not time-barred that, wrongful the instant holding that was because of under the death aсtion had become barred 27, 1978, the discovery in effect to June prior of preserve to thаt cause action. rule was not effective action, however, which had not regard to the survival With 27, the by to 1978 become barred' June prior date, the dis of in effect before the applicable. Accordingly, Superior covery rule was action, the death but affirmed dismissal of For the in the survival action. the reinstated in filed this reasons set forth our Duquesne Light 517, (1987), 514 Pa. to cannot utilized rule be wherein we filing wrongful for survival extend the time such actions statutory period, and that actions beyond cannot, 5524(2), under 42 Pa.C.S.A. be filed more than two after the Superior Court’s order reinstat- ing action survival must reversed. be
We note that has filed to quash a motion appeal, that, instant asserting effеct, the Superior reinstating Court’s order the survival action was interlocu and, thus, tory, non-appеalable. Appellee reasons that Su perior action equivalent Court’s was functional of a trial having court denied a defense motion for on the judgment and, pleadings, since the dеnial a motion for judgment on the pleadings regarded is as normally order interlocutory Estate thаt is not see Shelly, appealable, 437-438, it argued is that Superior order also non-appealable. Court’s agree, We do not for approach such an orderly subvert and effective re of an view issue which has already properly attained first level appellate review. The Court’s order cannot equated be with an order court, from a trial appellеe will not be heard to assert that a matter was interlocutory purposes for of her aрpeal to Superior that, Court while claiming once a favorable ruling on appeal, obtained suddenly matter became interlocu tory so as to prevent from adversary seеking further appellate review. The instant matter was not interlocutory when appeal taken, was originally appellee’s for action had been the subject of a final order of dismissal by the trial court. will not be deemed to have become interlocutory reason Court’s ruling, tо hold otherwise would be deny and timely effective *4 review. denied; to quash
Motion Order of the Superior Court in part, in part. reversed LARSEN, J., dissenting files a opinion in which J., PAPADAKOS, joins.
LARSEN, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent, and for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion filed Duquesne in Light on the basis herein, affirm Court vacating part the order affirming of appellants. entered favor summary judgment permit appellee, I would On to amend her Administratrix, accrual, including the delayed of the cause of husband’s time and excusing the circumstances dissenting in this Appellant, Pennsylvania, COMMONWEALTH HARVEY, Appellee. John Supreme Court of 24, 1986. Oct. Submitted