672 N.Y.S.2d 454 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1998
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ingraham, J.), entered January 30, 1997 in Otsego County, which, inter alia, upon reconsideration, granted summary júdgment to defendant and dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff thereafter moved for summary judgment which was initially denied upon Supreme Court’s determination that the above-quoted provision in the deed was “invalid as vague and unenforceable”. Upon plaintiff’s successful application for reargument, Supreme Court adhered to its prior decision denying plaintiff summary judgment yet, upon searching the record, granted summary judgment to defendant. This appeal followed.
Although the Statute of Frauds was not the basis upon which Supreme Court awarded summary judgment, we find that the doctrine supports the dismissal of this complaint. Clearly applicable to land purchase options (see, Scutti Enters. v Wackerman Guchone Custom Bldrs., 153 AD2d 83, 87, lv denied 75 NY2d 709) it provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] contract for * * * the sale, of any real property, or an interest therein, is void unless the contract or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged” (General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]). While it is undisputed that the deed was not signed by defendant, plaintiff contends that the defect can be overcome by a letter written and signed by defendant, dated November 5, 1993, in which she explains to a third party as follows: “I am sending you a detailed list of the money I have invested in the
In our view, this letter is insufficient. While “the requisite memorandum * * * may be pieced together out of several writings, it is imperative that the separate writings together refer to the same subject matter or transaction and unequivocally establish all the essential elements of a contractual relationship * * * such as price, terms, parties and a description of the subject matter” (Bordeau v Oakley, 185 AD2d 417, 418). Although the letter contains many of the requisite elements, merely mentioning an unspecified deed relating to an unidentified agreement to sell a parcel of property in the future does not, in our opinion, sufficiently establish an unequivocal reference to the property sold by plaintiff to defendant in 1989 (see, Conway v Maher, 185 AD2d 570, 572). Having failed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, we need not address those issues pertaining to the scope of the subject provision or any defense raised in relation thereto.
Mercure, J. P., White, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.