264 F. 593 | 6th Cir. | 1920
While the instant case was unusual in its facts, we have more than once sustained convictions of violation of the statute in question upon proof no more cogent than was presented here. Turner v. United States, 259 Fed. 103, 170 C. C. A. 171; Mayer v. United States, 259 Fed. 216, 170 C. C. A. 284; Rooks v. United States, 263 Fed. 894,
“A party is not entitled to sit silent until after the verdict and then insist that it shall be set aside because of a failure on the part of the trial court particularly to specify in its1 charge some matter to which its attention had not been suitably called.” Ill. Central R. R. Co. v. Skaggs, 210 U. S. 66, 72, 36 Sup. Ct. 249, 251 (60 L. Ed. 528).
A witness for defendant testified that defendant’s “reputation was good, and on that reputation he would give the defendant’s evidence on oath full faith and credit in a proceeding in which he was interested.” On cross-examination by the district attorney, he stated, without objection, that defendant “had the reputation of being a gambler”; and upon an inquiry by the court said that he did not know, whether defendant had “any reputation except as a gambler.” The court then asked this question, “Then I understand you to say to the court and jury that a man that has no reputation other than a professional gambler is a man of such character as you would believe him on oath?” to which the witness answered, “I would believe anything lie told me. I never heard his word questioned.” This examination was also had without objection or exception at the time. But after the court had refused to permit an inquiry on redirect examination, whether witness had ever heard “of this defendant being in the whisky business,” the latter’s counsel, after stating that he wanted to go into the subject of defendant’s “being a gambler,” excepted to the questions asked by the court on that subject and the refusal to permit the witness to answer the question propounded on redirect examination.
“To constitute tbe carrying on of the business of a retail liquor dealer, as I have said to you before, in eases like this it is not necessary for a man to have a room, a bar, a brass rail, and a man behind it with a white apron on, and cut glasses on the shelf in the rear of the bar, and beautiful red bottles of different hues and tastes, and arranged that way with a large mirror reflecting everything. That is not necessary to the carrying on of the business of a retail liquor dealer. But if you believe from this evidence that this man was called to the telephone, and believe what the government witnesses said about telephoning, and that he responded and furnished these people with whisky, that is to say, that he took money for it, as the government witnesses say he did, he was carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer. If he had no whisky in his room, but he was called and went to Gayoso avenue, or somewhere else, and bought whisky, and paid for it himself, and furnished it to those people who called for it in the hotel, and took money for it, he was carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer, and you must determine whether the government has proven that state of facts, or such a state of •facts as would warrant you in finding he was carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer.”
Eater the jury was told, with considerable elaboration, that they were the exclusive judges of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. On exception being made to the portion of the charge above quoted, the court said:
“What I have tried to tell you, and what I now say to you, is; You look to this whole case, taking into consideration every particle of this ■ evidence, and if you believe that this man was carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer, find him guilty; and you can look to all the circumstances, where he bought the whisky, that he paid for it himself and carried it up there, and that he had a number and was called, and he responded to the call and responded with a bottle of whisky to the party calling- — take into consideration that he took money for the whisky, and say whether or not he was carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer.”
This last-quoted statement, also, was excepted to; but error is not assigned upon it, nor is it referred to in the brief of defendant’s counsel. This charge is criticized as not only invading the province of the jury, but as “losing sight of the offense inhibited by the law, which was carrying on the business”; and the argument is made that the evidence clearly shows that the entire transaction was “only one of accommodation, and not one of contract, or barter and sale.” But, as we have already said, the testimony, if believed by the jury, would support a conclusion of guilt under the applicable law.
The criticism that the court lost sight of the offense for which defendant was on trial, as well as the merits of the errors assigned upon
“The point is, Was he furnishing whisky and taking money for it under such circumstances that you believe ho was carrying on the business of furnishing whisky to those people who called him?” .
And again, following comments on the testimony of the telephone girl at the Gayoso Hotel regarding telephone calls and the results thereof, including defendant’s appearance with three quarts of whisky (presumably just before the arrest), the court said:
“Was that a matter of accommodating a friend, or was that conduct more in keeping with a man doing the business of selling whisky?”
In our opinion the charge, taken as a whole, does not contain reversible error.
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly affirmed.
15 Sup. Ct. 628 30 L. Ed. 704.