46 Fla. 166 | Fla. | 1903
Lead Opinion
This case was argued before Division B but there being a difference of opinion among the members of that division was referred to the court for decision.
I. Burton was the master mechanic in the shops of the Florida Central and Peninsular R. R. Co. in Fernandina, and Sylvester a mechanic employed in the shops. The day before Burton was killed a difficulty had occurred at the shops between union and non-union men. Butterfield, a State witness, testified that on the evening before the killing, Burton taxed Sylvester with being concerned in this difficulty. This Sylvester denied, and Burton replied “it is a damned lie; he did have a hand in it.” The defendant’s counsel thereupon asked the witness “do you know whether he did or not?” Objection to this question was sustained by the court and this ruling is assigned as error.
It was competent for the State to introduce evidence of this difficulty between the defendant and the deceased as tending to show the relations existing between them and the animus or motive which may have influenced each in the difficulty of the following morning which resulted in Burton’s death. But this would not warrant an examination into the merits of that controversy or into the truth or falsity of such charges or counter charges as may have been there made, and evidence upon this-point was properly excluded. People v. Thompson, 92 Cal. 506, 28 Pac. Rep. 589; Williams v. State, 69 Ga. 11, text 31; Commander v. State, 60 Ala. 1; McAnnally v. State, 74 Ala. 9; Bohlman v. State (Ala.), 33 South. Rep. 44; Martin v. Commonwealth, 93 Ky. 189, 19 S. W. Rep. 580; Commonwealth v. Silk, 111 Mass. 431; Pinckord v. State, 13 Tex. App. 468; State v. Sorter, 52 Kan. 531, 34 Pac. Rep. 1036.
II. The second assignment of error is based upon the refusal of the Circuit Judge to permit the defendant to ask a witness, Holden, upon cross-examination, whether a conversation with the defendant to which he had testified oc
III. A short time before Burton was killed, as a result of their differences of the evening before, Slyvester by Burton’s order was discharged from the machine shops where he was employed. Hernandez, foreman of the shops, testified that Sylvester came to him to ask why he was not permitted to work, and that he seemed to be excited. Upon cross-examination, after showing that Sylvester had a family whom he supported by his labor, the defendant’s attorney asked the witness the following question: “Was his manner any different from that of other men with families dependent upon them suddenly losing a job?” Objection to this question was properly sustained by the court. It was competent to ascertain what the manner of the defendant was, as that it showed chagrin, or anger, or apprehension (Higginbotham v. State, 42 Fla. 573, 29 South. Rep. 410 ; Mitchell v. State, 43 Fla. 584, 31 South. Rep. 242), for this would aid in determining his state of mind and the motives which actuated him in his subsequent conduct. But how his manner would compare with the witness’ idea of how other men would appear who had suddenly lost employment is not relevant nor material.
IV. A witness, Milliss, testified that he had heard part of a conversation between the defendant and Burton on the evening before Burton’s death. He was asked to state what he heard, and this was objected to on the ground that he had not heard the whole conversation and could not testify to only a part. This objection was without merit. Meacham v. State, 45 Fla. 71, 33 South. Rep. 983; Williams v. Keyser, 11 Fla. 234, S. C. 89 Am. Dec. 243.
VI. Wells, a witness for defendant, who testified to the shooting of Burton by the defendant, was asked by the defendant’s counsel whether he saw Sylvester backing' at any time. His reply was “I never saw him.” The defendant’s counsel thereupon asked him “did you not testify at the coroner’s inquest that you saw Mr. Sylvester backing away when Mr. Burton was shaking his finger at him ?” and “did you not at the coroner’s inquest at Fernandina, immediately after the shooting ,of Burton, testify in words following: T seen Mr. Sylvester backing away and Mr. Burton shaking his finger in his face and following him?”’ Objection by the State to these questions was sustained, and upon this ruling are predicated the sixth and seventh assignments of error.
The defendant’s first contention thereunder is that the questions were proper as laying a predicate for the impeachment of the witness. When the objections were made in the court below, the trial judge asked the attornéy for the defendant if he desired to impeach his witness and he said he did not, but merely to refresh his memory. We need not determine whether the defendant would by this be es-topped from now contending that the questions should have been permitted for the purpose of impeachment. Previous statements of one’s own witness contradictory of his present testimony can be introduced to impeach him only when the witness proves adverse, and then only for the purpose of nullifying his present damaging testimony, and not as evidence of the facts narrated in the earlier statement. The witness in this case had not proven hostile. He did not say that he saw both parties to the affray when just before the shooting Burton was shaking his finger at Sylvester, which would give his statement, that he did not see Sylvester
The further contention of counsel upon these assignments is that the questions were proper for the purpose of refreshing the memory of the witness. Authorities may be multiplied holding that where a witness has by his testimony surprised the party calling him he may be interrogated as to previous statements made by him which conflict with his present testimony, the reasons given being that the witness’ memory may be refreshed and he be led to the truth or to an explanation of the seeming conflict in his statements, that the party calling him may explain to the jury his reason for calling the' witness, or that the effect of his present testimony may be neutralized. The latter grounds are pertinent only to cases where the witness’ testimony is prejudicial, and rest on much the same reason as the right to impeach by proving the former statements of the witness by other witnesses. These have no application to the case at bar where the witness was neither unwilling nor adverse
The right to direct the attention of the witness to his former statements for this purpose does not abrogate other rules of evidence which may be applicable to the examination. One of those invoked by the State Attoreny in his objection to this question is that it was leading. Cases may be found sustaining the right in such an examination to state or hand to the witness his former testimony, but this is usually done in dealing with an adverse witness who may be treated as if on cross-examiflation. Fitzpatrick v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 20, 38 S. W. Rep. 806; Carpenter v. State, 51 S. W. Rep. 227; Spaulding v. Chicago, St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co., 98 Iowa, 205, 67 N. W. Rep. 227; State v. Hughes, 8 Kan. App. 631; State v. Wright, 112 Iowa 436, 00 N. W. Rep. 000. Here the witness did not appear to be of feeble mind or failing memory demanding strong aids to his recollection (Coxe Bros. & Co. v. Milbrath, 110 Wis. 499, 00 N. W. Rep. 000; Bashford v. People, 24 Mich. 244), but testified clearly and positively to what he saw, nor was he an unwilling witness. It was, therefore, a proper exercise of the discretion reposed in the trial judge to refuse to permit this leading method of examination without at least first ascertaining whether the mind of the witness could be directed to his former statement by some less suggestive means. Bashford v. People, 24 Mich. 244; People v. Lyons, 51 Mich. 215, 16 N. W. Rep. 380; Billings v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 70 Vt. 477, 41 Atl. Rep. 516; Arnold v. State, 5 Wyoming, 439, 40 Pac. Rep. 967; Velott v. Lewis, 102 Pa. St. 326; 1 Thomp. on Trials, sec. 401 (3).
There was another objection to the method of examination here pursued. Its sole legitimate purpose was to recall to the witness the truth of the case. Even if circumstances were shown where it was proper to place before the witness the former testimony given by him, it should have
VII. The next following nine assignments of' error question the propriety of the action of the trial court in permitting the State Attorney to show by cross-examination of a defendant’s witness, Ficklin, that he had come from Charleston, S. C., without subpoena upon request of counsel for the defendant, and that counsel paid, his fare. Such action on the part of the witness is not of course conclusive evidence of any undue bias in the prisoner’s favor such as would affect his credibility, for he may have been animated in this conduct by the highest principle, but it was a circum
VIII. Another defendant’s witness, Newstub, who had come in the same way from a distance to testify, and who stated on cross-examination that he took no more interest in this case than he would in any other affair, was then asked. “do you mean to tell the jury that it is possible for you, not taking any interest in the case, to ■ come over and testify whether you have been summoned or not?” Objection to this question as tending to prejudice the jury against the witness was overruled. The question merely served to point the inference of bias drawn by the State from the witness’ willingness to voluntarily appear, and to give him an opportunity to explain his attitude in the case if the inference was unfounded. We find in this no error.
IX. The same witness on cross-examination was interrogated as to whether he had not a short time before the trial been discharged from the machine shops of the railroad company for drunkenness and disorderly conduct. He admitted being discharged upon that alleged ground, but denied its truth, saying that two of his companions were guilty and not himself, though all were fined in the mayor’s court for the offense; and claimed that the real reason for his discharge was the discovery by the railroad officials that his testimony upon this trial would be favorable to the defendant. On the following day, after several other witnesses had testified, he was recalled to the stand as a witness to character and upon cross-examination was asked, “are you riot the same witness who testified yesterday, and who in cross-examination denied that you were discharged for being drunk, are- you that same Newstub?” The pros
X. There was- no error in permitting the detective Fitzwater, summoned as a witness for the State, but not placed upon the stand, to remain in the court room during the trial.
XI. Hall, a defendant’s witness called to testify to Burton’s reputation as a dangerous man, testified that some months before Burton’s death he left the machine shops in which he was employed on the day that Burton became master mechanic in charge of them, because he thought it would be unpleasant for him to remain. He was then asked “in what regard?” for the purpose apparently of showing that he was unwilling to work under Burton. Objection to this question was sustained. This ruling was correct, as the reputation of the deceased can not be shown by the relations exxisting between him and another and the unwillingness of the other to work under his direction.
XII. The next two assignments of error are predicated upon the refusal of the court to permit the defendant to ask a State witness, Acosta, what he “talked” to one Glensinger, and what he told Glensinger he was going to testify in the case. Glensinger in connection with the detective Fitzwater had been active in procuring evidence for the State, and it
XIII. The twenty-fourth assignment of error, which questions the right of the State to inquire as to the manner of one whose conduct is under examination because it calls for the opinion of the witness, is disposed of by what has been said under the third assignment. Higginbotham v. State, supra; Mitchell v. State, supra.
XIV. .In his argument to the jury the assistant counsel for the State, in commenting upon the testimony of the witness Ficklin who had come from Charleston to testify, without subpoena, said that the witness was a friend of the defendant whose testimony was unworthy of credence .and the action of the witness was sufficient to authorize the jury to disregard his testimony; that furthermore, another witness, Newstub, had said he was going to lie for the defendant, that Newstub was a witness just as Ficklin was (he also had come from a distance to testify for defendant); that both were friends of the defendant, and the jury could infer from Newstub’s testimony what weight they ought to give the testimony of Ficklin. This comment of counsel was objected to by the defendant, and the objection overruled. We have already seen that the circumstances mentioned were properly admitted as evidence to be considered in determining the credibility of the witnesses, and it follows
XV. In this connection we will consider the fortieth assignment, like the last based upon statements made in argument by the counsel assisting the State in the prosecution. The only exception properly presented by this assignment is the one just discussed, as the assignment alleges error in refusing to grant a new trial because of the argument complained of, and the only ground of the motion for a new trial based upon this is the twenty-fourth, “because the court erred in overruling the objections of the defense to the language of John L- Doggett, of counsel for the State, in his argument to the jury and to which exception was taken.” The remarks quoted in the preceding paragraph are the only ones objection to which was overruled.
Under this assignment, however, the defendant in his brief complains of objectionable remarks made by counsel in argument, where his objections were sustained and coun
The State had offered testimony that the defendant had been discharged from a previous employment in Cummer’s mill because of an attempt made there to kill a man. This was ruled out. In argument the counsel for the State started to comment on the occurrence as illustrating the character of the accused. This was objected to, and the trial judge sustained the objection, rebuked the language of counsel, instructed him not to comment on defendant’s character, and instructed the jury not to pay any attention to this comment. Counsel apologized for his language, and then pointing to the defendant said “well, gentlemen, I am not allowed to comment on the character of the defendant, but if I were I could-,” when he checked himself and passed to a more legitimate line or argument. This was undoubtedly improper, but when counsel recollected himself before giving any intimation of what he could do if permitted, and without further objection being made or becoming necessary by opposing counsel, and with the instruction of the court upon the subject fresh in the minds of the jury, we should not regard it as constituting reversible error even if we were compelled to give the defendant the benefit of whatever appears in the bill of exceptions, though not assigned as error.
The counsel assisting the State, in another part of his argument, conceived that the counsel for defendant had charged him with unprofessional, conduct and with being employed in the case by the F: C. & P. R. Co. He denied the truth of both charges, and addressing the jury as “my friends” said that they knew him and knew that he would prosecute any case only in a hightoned and proper manner,
XVI. The twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth assignments of error are based upon exceptions to the following parts of the charge given by the court: “A defendant must himself be reasonably free from fault in the inception of the difficulty in which such homicide may be committed.” “No one can by his own act provoke a difficulty with his adversary, and, having provoked such difficulty, act under the necessity produced by this difficulty and kill his adversary and justify such homicide under a plea of self-defense;” “in other words, if one with hatred and malice in his heart against a particular person provoke a difficulty with that person by act, words or otherwise, and then in such difficulty kills that person, he can not justify the act, although in the progress of such difficulty there exists a necessity to kill in order to save his life or preserve his person from the imminent danger of great harm, and
These assignments are argued together by the defendant. His first and principal objection to the charges in question is that there was no evidence of aggression on the part of the defendant upon which to predicate them and they tended unjustly to lead the jury to believe that the defendant had provoked a difficulty which was really forced upon him. The evidence for the State was to the effect that on the afternoon before the difficulty Burton and the defendant had a dispute as to whether the latter had been engaged in a fight occurring in the shops that morning, and Burton told the defendant he could not work for him any more. The next morning while at work the defendant was informed that he was discharged by Burton’s order, whereupon he left the shops, procured a loaded pistol, purchased some additional cartridges for the pistol which he put loose in his pocket, then returned to the shops, went up to where Burton was and a few words were exchanged, the first of which testified to by any of the spectators of the difficulty was the lie given by the defendant to Burton. Burton replied “By God, it’s so,” shaking the finger of his left hand in the defendant's face while his right hand was at his side. The defendant thereupon drew his pistol and shot Burton five times, killing him. We do not deem it necessary to demonstrate by argument the fact that this testimony will support the theory of original aggression by the defendant upon which the charges were founded.
It is also contended that the charge should have been so framed as to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether he was in fault. ' The general charge of
It may be observed that the language of these instructions is quite broad, and cases may arise where, in order to present the question fairly and fully to the jury, some definition should be given of what constitutes such provocation of a difficulty as would deprive one of the right of self-defense as a justification for homicide. The evidence in this case, however, did not demand special instructions upon these points. The theory of the defense would acquit the defendant of any agency in provoking the quarrel, and the State introduced no evidence of an ambiguous or doubtful act-of provocation by the defendant of such character as to require a carefully qualified instruction to prevent injustice to him. Nor were such instructions requested by the defendant.
XVII. The thirtieth to the thirty-eighth assignments, which relate to charges requested by the defendant and refused by the court, are argued together by counsel and will be so 'considered by us.
The first, third, fourth,' fifth, sixth and ninth of these charges numbered respectively 2, 5, 6, 7, 18 and 22, are objectionable in that they ignore the necessity for a belief of danger on the part of the defendant as an element in the defense of self-defense based upon apparent danger, and authorize acquittal when reasonable grounds for such belief exist, whether the defendant entertained the belief or not.
A belief in his danger as a motive for his action is the very basis of self-defense where" the danger is only apparent, not real, and such eminent writers upon criminal law as Bishop and Wharton emphasize this to the point of regarding an honest belief as sufficient whether reasonable or not to the ordinary mind, provided it be not the result of negligence. Our law has qualified this by adding that the belief must be founded upon such appearances as would in
The general charge given by the court instructed the jury as to the necessity of a belief of danger by the defendant, and this would have tended to correct the error in the charges as framed, but the fact that error in a charge may be neutralized by other instructions given does not make it error for the court to refuse to give the faulty instruction.
These instructions are also defective in not containing the qualification that the defendant must not be the agressor at fault in originating the quarrel, which was, in Padgett v. State, 40 Fla. 451, text 457, 34 South. Rep. 145, held sufficient ground for refusing similar instructions.
It may be added that practically the whole of these several instructions, in so far as they are correct, were fully and fairly covered by the general charge of the court, except as to the point that one threatened by another has a legal right to arm himself for self-protection. If instruction upon this point was asked as a basis for the contention that the defendant when he armed himself was acting within the law, it had no support in the evidence introduced, as this showed that he armed himself by concealing a pistol upon his person, in violation of law. If, on the other hand, it was made a basis for the contention that the defendant would not in arming himself for self-protection become so far the aggressor
The second, seventh and eighth instructions refused, numbered respectively 4, 20 and 21, were sufficiently covered by the charge given by the court, which was characterized by great fullness and fairness in treating of the defendant’s case.
XVIII. The thirty-ninth assignment is based upon the refusal of the court to give to the jury an instruction that the voluntary appearance of witnesses without subpoena does not in any way impugn their truth or affect or tend to impair their credibility. This is disposed of by what has been said in paragraph VII of this opinion.
XIX. During a portion of the argument for the defendant and of the closing argument for the State the State Attorney absented himself from the court room. The closing argument for the State was made by counsel employed by the State Attorney to assist him in the case, but at whose instance or at whose expense is not shown. In the case of Thalheim v. State, 38 Fla. 169, 20 South. Rep. 938, it was held that private counsel might be employed to aid the State Attorney in a prosecution, but the case should not be surrendered to the exclusive management of counsel privately employed, but should be conducted by and under the supervision of the public prosecutor. In this case at the time of the State Attorney’s absence from the court room the whole of the evidence in the case had been introduced, and the State’s theory of the case developed in the opening argument made by the State Attorney to the jury. The argument of the other counsel could best be- controlled, in case of need therefor, by the court rather than by the State Attorney. No objection was made to the absence of the State
XX. The last assignment of error is based upon the refusal of the court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial because the jury were not drawn nor venire issued according to law as shown by the affidavits attached to the motion for a new trial. The only ground of the motion for a new trial which questions the regularity of the organization of the jury is the first, as follows: “Because as appears from the answers of the jurors on their voir dire the jury was not drawn from the body of the county as required by the order of the court, but practically from one precinct in the county, to-wit: the precinct of Mandarin.” This was supported by affidavits of the defendant and his attorneys that they were informed that forty-two of the fifty jurors summoned in the case were from Mandarin precinct, and that the prosecuting attorneys had great personal influence in that precinct. The deputies of the sheriff, who summoned the jury, filed affidavits that only eighteen of the jurors came from that precinct, and the answers of the jurors themselves as given on their voir dire, and upon which the motion was based, show only three more than that number to be from Mandarin or its vicinity. The motion, therefore, is not supported by the evidence upon the point even if a panel constituted as charged in the affidavits of the defendant would be illegal. Moreover, the facts disclosed by the examination of the jurors on voir dire, were of course then made known to the defendant and his counsel, and if they disclosed ground of objection to the panel, the defendant should have availed himself of it before verdict. Revised Statutes, section 3937; Steele v. Malony, 1 Minn. 347; 12 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 424.
The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of the jury, and the judgment of the court below will be affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — The thirtieth and thirty-second assignment of error are based upon exceptions taken to the refusal to give the following instructions: No. %. “A person whose life or limb has been threatened by another has a right to arm himself to protect his life or limb from anticipated injury. He is not compelled to keep away from where his adversary is if he has lawful business where he is likely to meet his adversary. He has no right to arm himself for the purpose of hunting down his adversary or killing him, but if he arms himself for self-protection and meets his adversary and such adversary makes an overt demonstration calculated to induce in the mind of a reasonable, cautious man a belief from the circumstances by which he was surrounded that his life or person is in imminent danger unless he fires the fatal shot, then he has a right to use the weapon with which he has armed himself for self-protection, and if he does so and kills his adversary, the killing is excusable.”
No. 5. “If you believe from the evidence that on the
The testimony for both the State and the defense showed that on the morning of the homicide the defendant was notified that he was discharged by order of the deceased, and that he thereupon left the shops where he was employed, but .subsequently returned armed with a pistol which he had procured while away, and there was testimony tending to prove every fact hypothesized in the refused instructions.
The fact that defendant armed himself and returned to the shops where he had reason to know the deceased would be found was one of the most incriminating circumstances proven against him. According to his testimony he armed himself for self-protection only, fearing the deceased would attempt to carry out his threats -of the day before, and went to the shops not for the purpose of provoking a difficulty with the deceased, but to get certain .tools which he had left there, and to get his travelling card stamped and the money due him for work in the shops. He had a right to an instruction from the court that if the facts so testified
The twelfth instruction given on behalf of defendant was practically the same as the fifth refused, except that it omitted the words “or for other lawful purpose,” required the defendant to believe that his “life or limb was in danger,” and omitted the words “and from these circumstances as they appeared to the defendant Sylvester, in the light of the evidence must be adduced the excusing belief of the existence of imminent danger to his life or person.” Although the court in its general charge instructed the jury that the defendant must not only have had reasonable ground to believe, but that he must have believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm in order to justify the killing on the ground of self-defense, there was nowhere in the charge a suggestion as to how the jury were to ascertain the existence or nonexistence of the belief. The latter portion of the fifth requested instruction was pertinent and material because it told the jury how they were to ascertain whether the belief existed or not, to-wit: from the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant in the light of the evidence, and this part of the instruction, together with all that I have included in brackets, was copied almost literally from the opinion in the case of Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 South. Rep. 837. There is not a suggestion in the testimony tending to show that if reasonable ground existed for exercising the right of self-defense, the element of belief on the part of Sylvester was lacking. On the contrary, he testified to his belief on that subject, and there was nothing whatever to contradict it. It may be said, therefore, that there was • no issue between the State and the defendant as to the fact of actual belief, but only as to reasonable ground, and such being the case the court should have given the instruction asked, even though it be construed as requiring rather than authorizing the jury to find or infer the belief from the ex-
The matters sought to be presented under the fortieth assignment of error are not properly before the court because not assigned as error. Besides, some of the argument of counsel now asserted to have been harmful and improper
Upon other questions discussed in the opinion, while I do not agree to all that is said regarding some of them, I concur in the conclusions reached.