This is а zoning case. Plaintiff-appellant brought suit in the District Court “to set aside and declare invalid the Zoning Regulations promulgated by the Zoning Commission [of the District of Columbia] on May 12, 1958, and for othеr purposes.” Defendants-appellees moved for summary judgment and plaintiff-appellant filed a cross motion for similar i-elief. After considering the pleadings, affidavits and other materials offered, the District Court granted the motion of defendants-appellees. This appeal followed.
It appears that plaintiff-appellant purchased in 1956 three adjoining lots in the 700 block of 8th Street, N. E., in the District of Columbia. At that time these lots were zoned “First Commercial.” Contemplating commercial use, plaintiff caused the existing buildings — which werе residential — to be demolished. 1 The lots are now unimproved. The Zoning Regulations promulgated May 12, 1958, designated the area in which plaintiff’s lots are located as “R-4,” a classification in which only certain types of residential construction are permitted. On February 20, 1960, plaintiff filed an application with the Zoning Commission, along with several other property owners, requesting that the 700 block of 8th Street, N. E., be re-zoned as commercial. This request was denied by the Commission on March 22, 1960. Thereafter plaintiff asked for an open hearing on his application. Such a hearing was granted on September 7, 1960. Later in September the Commission denied plaintiff’s request for re-zoning. On October 17, 1960, plaintiff filed his suit in the District Court, alleging that the zoning оf plaintiff’s property as residential was unlawful, and has caused, and will continue to cause, irreparable harm and damage to him.
In this court plaintiff-appellant’s primary cоntention is that appellees failed to comply with the statutory requirements as to notice of public hearing on proposed zoning changes. Hence, he alleges, thе Zoning Regulations of May 12, 1958, were illegally adopted. The governing statute, Section 3 of the Zoning Act of 1938, D.C.Code § 5-415 (1951), was quoted and construed in our decision in Castle v. McLaughlin,
Appellant’s second point is that after the hearings were held substantial changes were made in the zoning proposаls originally put forward. He relies on the Castle case, supra, as calling for the granting of injunctive relief in such a situation. But appellant’s reliance on that case is misplaсed. There the original proposal would have upgraded the zoning of Castle’s property. Castle and his neighbors attended the public hearing and expressed support for the proposal. No suggestion was made at the hearing that Castle’s property and its surrounding area should or would be downgraded. However, when the regulations were issued they provided for the downgrading of the area. In the present case, plaintiff did not attend the public hearing and makes no showing as to what occurred there. The regulations-as promulgated on May 12, 1958, adopted, the original proposals mentioned in the published notice with respect to plaintiff’s area, namely, to convert the area to the “R-4” classificаtion. Plaintiff says, however, that the R-4 classification as originally proposed in 1957 would have imposed no requirement of a floor area ratio or limitation of lot occupancy. The final regulations, he says, impose limitations in both respects on properties in Zone R-4. 4 Even assuming that these limitations represent substantial changes in the original proposals, plaintiff makes-no claim that they were not fully aired at the public hearing. The very purpose of a zoning hearing is to explore subjects such as these. In the Castle case, of course, the record showed that there was no discussion at the hearing of the possibility of downgrading the area in which Castle lived. Plaintiff has made no allegation of that sоrt in the present case. 5 He thus cannot rely on the Castle *677 decision as grounds for relief. Nor has he presented a material issue of fact justifying trial.
Plaintiff’s remaining contention is that the change in the zoning classification of his property — and the failure of the Commission to undo that change on his petition for rezoning— was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. He claims to have relied on the original “commercial” classification when he demolished the existing buildings, and contends that he has a vested right in the zoning classification which existed at the time of his purchasе. But it is clear that no such vested right exists, and that the scope of judicial review of alleged hardship in individual cases is a narrow one. As we said in Lewis v. District of Columbia,
“The necessity and desirability of zoning and city planning can no longer be subject to debate. Uncontrolled, haphazard development causes blighted neighborhoods, with their residents deprived of the аmenities of decent living and of the environment which breeds good citizenship. Accordingly, Congress has given considerable discretion to the Zoning Commission for the establishment of a cоmprehensive zoning plan, so that the public welfare may dominate the development of the capital city.
“In reviewing the exercise of that discretion, ‘It is not the function of the court to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission even for reasons which appear most persuasive. A suit to declare a zoning order void is not an appeal on the mеrits of the issues presented to the Commission at its hearing.’ Wolpe v. Poretsky,79 U.S.App.D.C. 141 , 143-144,144 F.2d 505 , 507-508. ‘The action of zoning authorities, as of other administrative officers, is not to be declared unconstitutional unless the court is convinced that it is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the * * * general welfare.” [Citing cases] If the question is “fairly • debatable,” the zoning stаnds.’ Leventhal v. District of Columbia,69 App.D.C. 229 , 230,100 F.2d 94 , 95.”
On the present record we think the District Court properly denied relief. Its judgment will accordingly be
Affirmed.
Notes
. The complaint says that plaintiff had the buildings “torn down to establish а parking lot on the said three lots, with the intention to use said property for other commercial purposes if the occasion domanded.”
. See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia on S. 3361, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 82-83 (1938), at which Senator Overton said, among other things:
“Now, the objection is made that the Commission does not have a record of the property owners in the vicinity, and the names and addresses and so forth, in order to give that notice. How would it be to have just some general provision and say, in addition to the notice by publication, such additional notice as the Commissioners may deem proper? That would carry out that thought, without making it absolutely ironclad, so that it would bеcome less a technical provision that the violation of any particular provision of it would jeopardize the regulation we adopted. That would be an instruction to the Zoning Commissioners to give additional notices. We have got to trust somebody in government, you know,”
. While we reiterate that “landowners and the public must be told as clearly and fully as is rеasonably possible what is proposed by the zoning authorities,”
. The regulations as finally adopted contain the following definitions:
“Floor area ratio: a figure which expresses the total gross floor area as a multiple of the area of the lot. This figure is determined by dividing the gross floor area of all buildings on a lot by the area of that lot.
* * * * *
“Percentage of lot occupancy: a figure which expresses that portion of a lot lying within lot lines and bililding lines which is occupied or which may be occupied under these regulations as building area." (Emphasis in original).
Plaintiff says that the new regulations impose on the R-4 zone a floor area ratio of .9 and a lot occupancy ratio of 40%.
. Moreover, there is, of course, a presumption in favor of the regularity of agency proceedings. See Lumbermen’s
*677
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm.,