115 Misc. 311 | N.Y. App. Term. | 1921
On March 25, 1920, the parties entered into a written agreement whereby the plaintiff, leased to the defendant an apartment for the term of two years beginning October first, .the date of the expiration of the term granted in a previous lease to the defendant. The rent reserved in the ■ old lease' was $1,300 per annum and under the terms of the' new
The learned trial justice has held that the defendant cannot interpose the defense authorized by chapter 136 of the Laws of 1920, that the rent is unjust and unreasonable and that the agreement under which the same is sought to be recovered is oppressive for the agreement in this case was made prior to the time when the statute went into effect, but he has given judgment for the defendant upon the ground that the lease was procured by duress.
The courts have hitherto decided that chapter 136 of the Laws of 1920 has no retroactive application to leases made prior to the 1st day of April, 1920. Paterno Inv. Corp. v. Katz, 112 Misc. Rep. 242; affd., without opinion, 193 App. Div. 897; 78th Street & Broadway Co. v. Rosenbaum, 111 Misc. Rep. 577. The recent decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Petra, 230 N. Y. 429, has not affected the authority of these cases. It is true that the Court of Appeals has held that the legislature had the power to take away the remedy of the landlord to enforce an expressed or implied obligation of the tenant to surrender possession at the expiration of the term, even though in a sense the obligation of a contract is thereby impaired, but it has not intimated that the provisions of chapter 136 of the Laws of 1920 were intended to be applicable to leases made before the passage of that act, or that the
It follows that the judgment in favor of the defendant can be sustained only if he has proven that he is entitled to be relieved of the obligations contained in his written agreement because that agreement was obtained by duress on the part of the landlord.
The defendant’s evidence shows and the trial justice has held that on March 10,1920, the defendant was notified, together with other tenants of the landlord, that the plaintiff required possession of their respective apartments on September 30, 1920, the date of the expiration of the leases under which they held possession. The defendant was informed that the landlord was ready to give him a new lease for a term beginning on that date at a rental of $2,500. The tenant objected to paying an increase of more than ninety per cent over the existing rent but he was informed that unless he signed a new lease, the landlord would rent the apartment to another tenant. The plaintiff allowed the defendant ten days to see whether he could obtain another apartment upon terms that would be more satisfactory but the defendant was unable to find other suitable apartments and thereupon signed the lease. At that time he was in ill health and feared that the landlord would compel him to leave the premises at the expiration of his original lease. The tenant took no steps to disaffirm the lease prior to October first, but merely refused to pay the rental in advance on October first when by the terms of the lease the first month’s rental became due. Even at the trial he was unwilling to accept a cancellation of the lease and to make a promise that he would leave the premises within sixty days. No evidence was presented that the rent agreed upon in the lease was
It .would appear from the dissenting opinion in the case of People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, supra, that the Court of Appeals was agreed that the defense of duress could not be sustained under such circumstances, but as the actual decision in that case was based upon the sufficiency of the pleadings and in any view of the case the pleadings in that case were insufficient I have preferred to consider the question anew as presented by the actual proof in this case.
In March, 1920, when the negotiations for the lease were initiated and the lease actually executed, the. landlord had a legal right to inform the defendant that unless he signed a new lease at an increased rental he would rent the premises to a new tenant at the expiration of this tenant’s lease. The threat express or implied that the landlord would exercise his lawful right to regain possession of the premises at the expiration of the term then in force, constitutes no duress, for duress can never be predicated upon a threat to enforce legal rights by lawful means. McPherson v. Cox, 86 N. Y. 472; Dunham v. Griswold, 100 id. 224. The learned trial justice recognized the authority of these decisions, but held that the duress in this case was not predicated uppn the threat of the landlord to enforce his legal right to compel the tenant to surrender the apartment at the expiration of his existing term, but was based upon the helpless condition of the defendant in view of extraordinary condi
I am unable to see how under these circumstances the claim of duress can be sustained. The landlord had the right to confer upon any party he desired a promise of possession of the premises at the expiration of the defendant’s term. The law of supply and demand created a condition where the landlord could
Judgment should, therefore, be reversed, with thirty dollars costs and judgment directed for the plaintiff for the amount demanded in the complaint.
Mullan and Burr, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, with thirty dollars costs.