In а jury trial in Superior Court, Aroos-took County, the plaintiffs recovered general verdicts against the Masonite Corporation (Masonite) for damages resulting from the purchase of hardboard siding. On appeal, Masonite argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts against it. We disagree and affirm the judgments of the Superior Court.
The plaintiffs in this action are seven married couples from Fort Kent who purchased and installed on their respective residences hardboard siding manufactured аnd sold by Masonite. Within a short time of installation, days in one case, weeks in several other cases, and months in the remainder of cases, the plaintiffs experienced difficulties with the siding. Some of it stained and lаter warped, buckled, and swelled. With the passage of time, many of the problem boards developed rot, delaminated at the lower edges, swelled over the nail-heads, and became unsightly in apрearance. The degree of these symptoms varied from home to home and from season tо season. Masonite denied liability, and the plaintiffs subsequently instituted this action.
In an eight day trial, the jury was presented with several theories of liability — breach of implied warranty of merchantability, strict liability, and negligent fаilure to warn that the siding was dangerous. A general verdict was returned in favor of all the plaintiffs.
On appеal, Masonite maintains that there was no evidence that a defect existed in the siding at the time it left Mаsonite’s control. Thus, it argues, the evidence was insufficient to support any of the plaintiffs’ theories. It further asserts that there was no evidence of bodily injury or damage to property other than the Masоnite siding to support the strict liability theory, 14 M.R. S.A. § 221 (1980), and that there was no evidence of bodily injury to support the fаilure to warn of a dangerous chattel theory, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965).
Because neither party requested special verdicts under M.R.CÍV.P. 49(a) or a general verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories under M.R.Civ.P. 49(b), wе are unable to ascertain upon which count or counts the jury based its verdicts. We must therefore sustain the general verdict if the evidence is sufficient to support any of the alternative theories of recovery submitted to the jury.
Depositors Trust Co. v. Farm Family Life Insurance Co.,
11 M.R.S.A. § 2-314 (1964) sets forth six minimal quality standards of merchantability:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must at least be such as
(a) Pass without оbjection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are оf fair average quality within the description; and
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods аre used; and
(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged and labeled as the agreemеnt may require; and
(f) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
There was ample evidence from which the jury could rationally find that the siding, at the time it was sold, was not fit for the ordinary purposes for which siding is used.
*1041 The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Gus Currie, both a chemist and building apprаiser, tested samples of problem and non-problem siding from homes of two of the plaintiffs. He also сonducted an on site examination of the properties of all the plaintiffs. From his test results, Dr. Currie cоncluded that the problem siding was made from green, unseasoned wood which enabled it to absorb morе water than it should have. He opined that the staining was caused by the extraction of pigments from the siding аnd that the buckling and warping resulted from the freezing of the moisture in the siding during cold weather. His examination of the plaintiffs’ properties negated other possible causes of the difficulties experiencеd with the siding such as inadequate ventilation and excessive levels of humidity. Although Dr. Currie did not chemically analyze samples from buildings of five plaintiffs, his physical examination of their homes ruled out other possible causes. From this the jury could reasonably infer that siding purchased from the same company, at approximately the same time, and which suffered the same problems, also possessed the same defeсt.
Evidence which additionally supports the breach of implied warranty of merchantability theory includes: testimony that, at the time of purchase, the Masonite siding was wrapped in its original packaging; evidence of the relatively short lapse of time between purchase and installation of the siding and product failure; and, testimony of carpenters that the siding was properly installed. A reasonable viеw of all the evidence together with all justifiable inferences drawn therefrom, when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, amply supports a finding of breach of implied warranty of merchantability.
See Blackman v. Jackson,
Beсause we find the evidence sufficient to support the breach of implied warranty of merchantability, we do not reach, and express no opinion on, the questions whether strict liability, 14 M.R.S.A. § 221 (1980), requires damage other than to the defective product itself or whether breach of a duty to warn of a dangerous chattel, Restatement (Second)- of Torts § 388 (1965), requires bodily injury.
The entry is:
Judgments affirmed.
All concurring.