*1 “The explained: by ultimate assessments made the instant com- ...”). may question on merits in this case plaint. be as appropriately characterized one sum, In Shreiber asks us infer a a personnel policy.’ ‘federal When federal damages remedy under Bivens for retaliatory civil is the victim of a servant protec- violation his Fifth Amendment ex discharge demotion or because he has tions process equal of due protection rights, ercised his First Amendment what agent charged an IRS auditing legal remedies are to him?” Id. available tax returns. decline to do We so because 380-81, 103 at S.Ct. 2404. we believe that Congress’s gov- efforts Schweiker, plaintiffs argued ern relationship taxpayer between the a Bivens action should inferred pro- be and the taxman indicate that Congress has
vide
with additional
them
remedies be- provided what it
adequate
considers to be
they
cause
had been denied benefits for
remedial
for wrongs
may
mechanisms
Schweiker,
constitutional reasons. See
487 occur in the course of
relationship.
Court,
U.S. at
tutional can in violation neither case
separated from resulting the harm
the denial the statutory right.” Id.
427-28,
Further,
dealing with suit against agents IRS assessments,
alleging wrongful “jeopardy” Appeals Court of for the Tenth Circuit
found no distinction between Bivens ac-
tion plaintiffs based on Sajid violations of SYED, Appellant L.
First or Fourth rights, Amendment compared to one alleged based on viola- INC., corpora- HERCULES a Delaware plaintiffs process tions of rights due tion; Incorporated under the Fifth Hercules Income Amendment. See Nation- Assoc., Commodity al & Barter Protection welfare plan; 1532. The Incorporated, Court found that Bivens ac- Hercules tion Disability should not be of the inferred Plan Administrator of Plan claims because the remedies No. 99-5472. wrongful jeopardy assessment were af- (“This forded statute. See id. reason- of Appeals, United States Court a Bivens [denying action for a violation Third Circuit. equally Fifth appli- Amendment] Argued Jan. grounded cable to the claim on allegations of wrongful jeopardy assessments here un- Filed May der the First Fourth Amendments.
In light of the remedies afforded else-
where, recognize we decline to First
Fourth Amendment remedy Bivens based
on the allegations wrongful jeopardy *2 (Argued), Wilmington,
John M. Stull DE, Appellant. Potter, two (Argued), provides
Kevin R. Shannon
definitions
total disability,
Corroon, LLP, Wilmington,
applies
one that
first 24
Anderson &
months
after
DE,
period”
the “elimination
Appellee.
another
applies
thereafter. The Plan states:
*3
BECKER,
Judge,
Chief
Before:
During
period, normally
elimination
BARRY,
Judges.
ALITO and
Circuit
months,
and the first 24
months
payments, you
are considered
THE
OPINION OF
COURT
totally
if you
disabled
are not able to
perform your job. You must not engage
ALITO,
Judge:
Circuit
in
work
wages
during
for
or profit
injured
in
Sajid Syed (“Syed”)
his back
this time.
1992,
January
working
while
as
chemical
receiving
monthly
After
payments,
Hercules,
(“Hercules”).
operator for
Inc.
you are
totally
considered
disabled for
under
Syed brought
this action
ERISA
long
you
as
as
are not able
engage
to
in
502(a)(1)(B),
1132(a)(1)(B),
29 U.S.C.
any employment
wage
profit
him
alleging that Hercules denied
disabili-
you
reasonably
which
qualified by
ty
company’s
benefits
em-
owed under
education,
training,
experience.
ployee
plan.
benefits
addition to dam-
App. at B24.
Syed
ages,
requested
imposition
paying
Syed
After
benefits to
for almost
against
sanctions
failure to
Hercules for
years,
two
Provident Life and Accident
provide him
plan
pursu-
with the
document
(“Provident”),
Insurance Co.
the Claims
ant
written request,
required
to
as
Fiduciary
Syed
under
asked
502(c),
1132(c).
He
ERISA
29 U.S.C.
undergo
independent medical evalua-
sought
also
redress for Hercules’s failure
tion in February 1994
determine if
he
adequate
him
give
written notice of the
totally
was
disabled under the latter defi-
claim,
reasons
the denial
his
as
Joson,
nition. Dr.
performed
who
the ex-
503,
required by
ERISA
U.S.C.
reported
amination March
Syed appeals
1133.
the District Court’s
Syed
heavy
could not do
but that he
grant of
summary judgment
favor of
“sedentary
light”
could do
work. App.
Hercules
all counts. We affirm.
Syed
longer
at A4.
no
qual-
Because
would
discharged Syed
Hercules
on March
ify for benefits after the 24-month period
31, 1992,
March
of a
part
effective
(cid:127)
lapsed,
Syed
Provident notified
that his
Following
reduction
force.
his termi-
benefits would be terminated
as March
nation, Syed
a claim for long-
submitted
31,1994.
See id. A6-7.
term
benefits
under
Hercules
Syed appealed the decision to terminate
(the
Incorporated Income Protection Plan
his disability
benefits
Provident’s
“Plan”).
approved
His claim was
on June
Committee,
upheld
previ-
Syed began receiving
bene-
App.
Syed
ous decision. See
at A19-20.
1,1992.
April
fits
retroactive
appeal
renewed his
to the
Commit-
are payable
Benefits
the Plan
28, 1994,
July
tee on
27 and October
each
totally
when worker becomes
disabled
updated
time including
reports.
medical
and remains disabled for six consecutive The ERISA Committee
its final deni-
sent
Syed
months.1
App.
at B21. Because
Syed
al of
benefits to
letter dated No-
receiving
24, 1995,
was under 62 when he started
1994. On February
vember
benefits,
eligible
he was
to receive benefits
copy
docu-
requested
plan
disabled,
long
totally
for as
as he remained
ment that was effective as of the date he
up
age
began
at B22.
receiving
id.
The Plan
benefits. Hercules sent
period,
ceiving
1. This six-month
known as the "elimi-
benefits less
three
months after
period,”
apparently
imposed
nation
by
workplace
accident.
Syed’s
began
Provident
case. He
re-
period
time
“Summary
document for
relevant
Plan
entitled
him document
(SPD).
judgment
granted summary
at B15-32.
and therefore
App.
Description”
on this count. Like-
in favor of Hercules
6,1996
February
Syed filed suit
—one
wise,
refused to remand
the Court
the initial
months after
year and eleven
for an
to the
administrator
out-
on March
denial of
the al-
appeal
administrative
of-time
the final
after
three months
year
one
because
leged violation of ERISA
dated November
Provident
letter from
adequately
31 letter
set
Hercules’s March
thereafter, he
a motion
Shortly
filed
bene-
denying
forth the reasons
seeking recovery
summary judgment
fits.
502(a)(1)(B),
under ERISA
*4
502(c)
to pro-
§
for failure
under
sanctions
appeal.
arguments
makes
on
Syed
four
a
response
to
Plan
duce the
document
First,
claim
contends that his ERISA
he
§
remedy
under
and
request,
written
governed
employee benefits should be
for
notice
provide
to
written
for failure
of limita-
Delaware’s
of benefits. Her-
termination
reasons for
actions,
one-year
for contract
not the
tions
summary
a cross-motion for
cules made
work,
out
la-
arising
for claims
money
Syed owed
claiming that
judgment,
bor,
performed.
services
Sec-
personal
the Plan.
made under
overpayments
ond,
Hercules,
as Plan
he maintains
Syed’s mo-
denied
The District Court
Administrator,
subject to sanc-
should be
Fidu-
gave
Claims
tion. As
Plan
failing
provide proper
to
disclo-
tions
exclusive,
deny
ciary the
discretion
502(c).
§
required
ERISA
sure as
benefits,
District Court re-
claims for
Third, Syed
that Hercules violated
argues
502(a)(1)(B) claim under
§
Syed’s
viewed
by failing
provide
§ 503
ERISA
both
in accor-
standard
the abuse
discretion
his
reasons for
denial of
specific
Rubber
and
Co.
dance
Firestone Tire
by neglecting
any
to name
additional
Bruch,
109 S.Ct.
U.S.
material or information
would
(1989);
Abnathya
see also
pant imposes personal 502(a)(1)(B): Statute ERISA that Hercu- contended ure do so. Limitations SPD, rather sent him improperly les B60, this appeal con chief issue Policy, App. Insurance see However, ap limitations that is cerns the statute of request. response claim for benefits under plicable operative the SPD was the Court held that 502(a)(1)(B).2 Unfortunately, No action to damages recover for tres- not provide a statute of limi- pass, regain does no action to possession of chattels, brought personal suits tations ... no action based benefits, to recover and the a promise, ... brought shall be after new, general expiration federal statute of limitations of years from the accru- set in U.S.C. out does the cause of such action. in this situation.3 circum- Under these 10, § tit. DelCode Ann. (emphasis stances, generally turn courts to the most added). Delaware also has a more analogous state statute of limitations. See covering DelCostello v. International Bhd. Team- disputes, provides: sters, 151, 158-60, S.Ct. U.S. recovery No action for upon claim of (1983). Although 76 L.Ed.2d this Cir- wages, salary, work, or overtime for la- cuit has not decided which state statute or personal bor performed, services ... applicable to ERISA other 502(a)(1)(B),4 every other circuit to ad- such labor or services dress the issue has the statute performed ... shall after the *5 limitations a state contract action. See expiration year of one from accruing the Digital Harrison v. Health 183 F.3d of action on cause which such (11th 1235, Cir.1999); v. Daill action is based. Sheet Metal Workers’ Local 73 Pension 10, § Ann. tit. 8111 (emphasis DelCode Fund, (7th 62, Cir.1996); 100 F.3d 65 added). case, In this the District Court Armco, 650, (8th
Adamson v.
44 F.3d
652
8111,
applied
v.
relying Mitchell
E.I.
Cir.1995);
Foods,
Hogan v.
969 F.2d
Kraft
641,
Dupont Denemours &
310 A.2d
Cir.1992);
145
v.
Meade
Pension
(Del.1973).
642
Comm.,
Appeals & Review
966 F.2d
Mitchell,
In
Supreme
the Delaware
(6th Cir.1992);
v.
Held Manufacturers
(now 8111)
applied
Court
Leasing Corp.,
Hanover
912 F.2d
challenging
the denial of benefits
(10th Cir.1990);
County
Pierce
Hotel
a disability
plan.
under
wage
Mitch-
See
&
Employees
Restaurant
Employees
ell,
Delaware Code
establishes
was
in 1973
decided
gener-
1974),
limitations
ERISA was not effective until
a promise.
al actions on
application
predecessor
See
Goldman
8111’s
Braunstein’s,
(Del.
240 A.2d
pre-ERISA
strong
context is
evidence of
1968).
provides:
Section 8106
close relationship
to the ERISA claim
plenary
suggested
2. We
previously
exercise
review
4.We have
over
District
in dicta that
applicable
Court's choice
Jersey
the New
state statute of limitations for
County Alleghe-
See
limitations.
Nelson
apply
a contract action would
to claims under
(3d Cir.1995).
ny, 60 F.3d
502(a)(1)(B),
but we have never
squarely decided the issue. See Connell v.
provision,
prescribes
four-year
This
Trustees Pension Fund
Ironworkers Dist.
period, applies only
limitations
ing
to claims aris-
Jersey,
Council
New
156 n.
ofN.
Congress
under acts of
enacted after De-
(3d4
cember
1990. ERISA was enacted much
earlier.
employment
also Sorensen v. have been earned had
contin-
See
asserts.
ued. See id. Since
bene-
Corp.,
Overland
already “earned”
his
(D.Del.1956) (“The
through
pe-
fits were
year statute has a
one
Hercules,
employment
riod of
Rich does
It was intended to
comprehensive sweep.
argument
support
employer-
out
arising
all
bar
apply
should
here.
The Act
relationship.
bars
employee
‘salary’, and it
^wages’,
claims for
likewise
Shaw,
Superior
the Delaware
any other
and to
‘ben-
applies
‘overtime’
apply
employ-
refused to
8111 where an
corporate-officer
efits’
employer’s
an action-under the
ee
The
‘ben-
relationship.
word
employment
voluntary
policy.
group accident insurance
embracing
all advan-
and covers
efits’ is
Shaw,
385. The
employment.”).
tages growing out of the
injured
workplace injury
in a
which result-
permanent
disability.
ed
total
The
dealt with a similar
Eighth Circuit
employer argued
8111 should
Armco, 44 F.3d
Adamson v.
issue in
coverage
to the claim because
(8th Cir.1995). There,
Court had to
arose out
stat-
six-year
Minnesota’s
choose between
relationship.
(relying
id.
general
governing
con-
ute
Mitchell). The Court dismissed defen-
two-year
and the state’s
disputes
tract
argument
summarily.
id.
dant’s
wage
claims.
(“That contention of the defendant is with-
wage-claim
The Court reasoned
merit.”).
Instead,
out
the Court
of limitations was the most analo-
two-year
Delaware’s
statute of limitations
gous
appellant’s
to the
*6
personal
injury
claims. DelCode
uniformly
had
because Minnesota courts
immediately
§
It
not
is
clear how
broadly to cover all
that
applied
statute
case,
distinguishable
Syed’s
from
Shaw is
damages arising
out of the
re-
pointed
and Hercules
out
Adamson, 44
at
lationship. See
Nonetheless,
meaningful distinction.
be-
conclusion,
its
the Court
support of
explain
cause the Shaw Court failed to
law in
pre-ERISA
noted that
Minne-
§why
apply,
we find
should
two-year
of
sota had
statute
to more persuasive.
Mitchell
unpaid
of
benefits.
limitations to cases
Shakopee
id.
Kohout v.
Found-
(citing
§
Although Syed’s
Co.,
ry
281 Minn.
tent with the of ERISA. We there agree fore with the District Court Syed urges impose the Court by § governed 8111 and provide Hercules failing sanctions on was thus barred. pursuant the Plan document to a written arguments persuaded We are not 502(c) request. provides support advanced the dissent comply administrator must position request plan partic for information from a ordinary benefits is more ipant personal within 30 days face liabil claim, subject contract than to a discretion, ity, day at the Court’s $100 claim for “other benefits ... from the date of the refusal. 29 U.S.C. services,” subject labor or *7 1132(c). The District Court did not Noting to that the Mitchell court refusing abuse its discretion in to order provid- at plan described the issue there as Hercules, against sanctions and we affirm benefit,” “fringe argues the dissent on grant summary judgment the ... “Syed’s nothing has little or issue. performed to do with work or services or benefits....,” fringe Syed at but sent the on March Dissent Hercules SPD First, 22, 1995, February 24, simply response this is not true. to his squarely prior employ- request complete copy based on his written for “a ment. In order to under the of LTD Plan document as of qualify long effective “a disability plan, regu- App. Syed term he had to be March 1992.” at A28. con- lar, non-represented full-time tends that different document was in (Dissent Wage Pay- 5. We note view also that Delaware’s of the dissent's reference 3) Pennsylvania Wage Pay- footnote to the (WPCA), ment and Act Collection Del.Code Law, ment and Collection seq., 43 P.S. 260.1 el 1101-1115, §§ Ann. tit. defines ''benefits" statute, has a see 43 Pa. "compensation as other than § 260.9a(g), we to Cons.Stat. Ann. wish make to, wages, including, but not limited reim- express regarding it clear that we no view health, expenses, welfare bursement or statute of limitations that would claim such as if a retirement benefits....” Del.Code Ann. tit. Syed's were in Penn- 1109(b). Although does WPCA not note, however, sylvania. We that we have provide statutory remedy for the denial of governed by are held some benefits, quite clearly its definition encom- and others the WCPL's Syed passes disability sued to Unisys Corp., not. are See Gluck (3d recover here. of denial injured lished that written notice time he was at the effect Specifi- claim must: his benefits were denied. the time to the insurance cally, points he every claimant who has been provide to long-term disabili- to fund Hercules’s used written no- denied a claim for benefits (LTD). App. at B35-72. ty plan setting tice forth in manner calculated the claimant: to understood LTD re- A of the SPD and comparison (1) or reason reasons material differences between the veals no denial; complains he two documents. (2) Specific pertinent to reference verify “whether the defini- was not able based; the denial is provisions which on official disability tion of based (3) or some internal language, description SPD A additional mate- language, Appellant’s necessary unwritten.” rial information for the written or policy, argument perfect lacks merit. claim and an Br. 20. This claimant 31, 1994, why the March letter material or in- example, explanation For such A6, benefits, App. see necessary; and denying formation is disability of total quotes the definition (4) information to the Appropriate as SPD, App. at see page found at if steps participant to be taken exactly the definition is same B24. This his or beneficiary wishes submit her disability definition of total found claim for review. B43, LTD, App. at thus 3 of the see page 29 C.F.R. 2560.503-1®. that the two-tier belying Syed’s assertion previously held that We not did exist definition forth disclosure obli 503 sets SPD, at 22. The affi- Appellant’s Br. see gations “the Plan” and that it does not Hill, Employ- Director of Douglas davit of obligations establish those en Hercules, clear that ee makes Benefits through sanctions forceable allegedly refused the document Hercules 502(c). Retire See Groves Modified Syed pursuant his March to send Plan, (3d 80S F.2d Cir. ment was, fact, executed request 1986). termination letter does Where a it was effec- (although until October 1995 regula comply with the 1990). July Because retroactively tive limits tory the time requirements, LTD are identical in all the SPD and the appeal bringing an administrative are not respects dispute, material to this Dis- claimant. against Ep enforced properly impose trict refused right v. Environmental Resources Man Hercules under against sanctions agement, Inc. Health and Welfare 1132(c). 502(c), 29 U.S.C. *8 Cir.1996). (3d Thus, 335, 342 remedy § for a violation of 503 is re § ERISA 503 plan mand to the administrator so the pertinent § provides, ERISA full gets claimant the benefit of a and fair every employee part, that Home review. See Weaver v. Phoenix shall: Co., Ins. Mut. notice in provide adequate writing beneficiary or whose participant 31, 1994, The March letter from claim for benefits under the has Syed began quotation with a Provident denied, setting been forth the the Plan’s definition of total disabili from denial, reasons for written in such Next, at A6. the letter ex ty. App. See manner calculated to be understood plained Syed’s being that benefits were participant. Dr. because the results of Jo- terminated 1133(1). medical dem independent § evaluation Pursuant to sec- son’s U.S.C. tion, longer totally Syed that was no Secretary of Labor estab- onstrated disabled the term defined in the have also concluded that a state contract Plan. at A6-7. The letter on App. went limitations is most analogous to jobs identify Syed 502(a)(1)(B) several which §a is, indeed, claim. This qualified given present physi- would be resounding chorus. cal App. condition. See A7. Provident here, however, The rub is this. The Syed stated that could submit a request majority “Delaware, concludes that in es- decision,
for reconsideration of the accom- sence, has two statutes of panied by Syed’s documents from physi- disputes,” contract specifically § 8106 and cian. Lastly, See id. letter noted that one, § course, and must select- be any information to be considered in con- ed. The majority then § selects an appeal nection with would have to which relates to wages, claims “for salary, days received within 60 receipt work, or overtime personal labor or short, the letter. See id. Provident performed services ... or for any other fully complied with regu- such labor or latory requirements for notice under being services” as specific” § “more ERISA has not raised and, thus, analogous any genuine issue to a claim of material fact to the contrary. denied Accordingly, we affirm benefits under the Dis- grant trict the statute summary judgment traditionally Court’s used contract, as to claim Delaware for breach promise, U.S.C. breach of actions. agree While I that specific,” 8111 is simply “more it BARRY, Circuit Judge, concurring apply does not that ERISA dissenting. benefits were wrongly denied. agree While I with much the majori- ty’s I opinion, cannot agree with the con- Delaware courts restrict 8111 and its clusion that' the most state stat- one-year statute to work services which ute of limitations for a already have performed been apply is found in Delaware’s It is promise 8106 to a of compensation for issue, alone, and that I issue work or services be performed. dissent. action, words, § 8111 in other is based on performed the services rather
First,
than on the
clear,
notes,
it is
as the majority
original
promise while the
action
every
circuit which has addressed this
based
the underlying promise
re-
issue has
the statute of limitations
spect
yet completed.
to services not
contract
action as most analo-
Braunstein’s,
Goldman
gous to an
ERISA claim for the
denial
(Del.1968);
we,
Brown
notes,
benefits. As
v. Colonial
majority
also
too,
(Del.Su-
suggested,
dicta,
Chevrolet
A.2d
albeit
Moreover,
per.Ct.1968).1
the state statute of
limitations for a con-
tract
work or
per-
action would
services which have
claims under
502(a)(1)(B).
formed have been
See Connell
described
the ease on
Trustees of
the Pension Fund
majority primarily
the Iromvorkers Disk
relies as
*9
Council
Jersey,
Northern New
“fringe”
Dupont
118 F.3d
benefits. Mitchell v. E.I.
of
(3d Cir.1997).
(Del.
Moreover,
156 n.
Denemours &
1973).
district courts too numerous to
fringe
typi-
mention
for
Claims
benefits are
action,
1.
majority acknowledges,
As the
selecting the
limitation on the
cause
federal
of
the
appropriate
'closing
gap’
by
limitations
is a matter
federal court
the
is
left
Con-
federal,
state,
law,
gress
and thus
body
our task
in order
fashion
predict
not to
supplement
which statute
law
the
common
the federal statu-
Supreme
Digital
might
toiy
Delaware
an
cause of action.” Harrison v.
select for
Plan,
Rather,
(11th
borrowing
ERISA claim.
Health
"in
the
F.3d
1238-39
impose
a time
v.
Int’l Bd.
Team-
e.g.,
Com-
Jenkins
Local 705
governed by
8111.
cally
Plan,
713 F.2d
252-53
72 sters Pension
Corp.,
American Mirrex
pass v.
(7th Cir.1983);
Hogan
(D.Del.l999)(claim
see also
F.Supp.2d
Kraft
Foods,
Cir.
8111);
by §
unpaid
governed
bonus
1992)(“[The]
interpreta-
claim involves the
Bracken,
Industries,
Inc. v.
SCOA
contract[.]”);
annuity
tion of the
Meade
(Del.l977)(claim for
year-end
A.2d
Comm.,
Appeals and Review
Pension
“wages”
gov-
and
equivalent
bonus was
(6th Cir.l992)(“[T]he
F.2d
Plan at
8111).
§by
erned
this case constitutes
written
issue
case,
Mitchell,
the Su-
pre-ERISA
benefits].”);
[for
contract
John-
of Delaware determined
preme Court
Amer-
son v. State Mut.
Assur. Co.
Delaware’s Disabil-
action under
Mitchell’s
(8th Cir.l991)(not-
ica,
§ 8111.
governed by
Plan was
ity Wage
by
policy governed
that life insurance
however,
had
Disability Wage
The
money
pay
“is written
promise
eligibili-
requirement
and
one
one
condition,
death,
if a
accidental
specified
year of continuous ser-
ty
least one
future”).
in the
occurs
—“at
benefit,”
“fringe
was a
vice.” The Plan
Here,
Jenkins,
as in
it is
Plan
which
Court,
to Mitchell
which accrued
said the
Syed’s claim for
will dictate the outcome of
had
the one
simply
she
worked for
because
unpaid disability benefits.2 There
sim
“performed.”
“work” had been
year —her
concluding
ply no reasoned
basis
Mitchell,
A.2d at 642.
employer
fringe
given
benefits
arising from
employee,
i.e. “benefits
however,
claim,
has
or noth-
little
...
per
labor or
services
performed
ing to do with work or services
formed,” should be stretched
include the
fringe
everything
to do
benefits
has
very
pension
different
and health benefits
disability based on an
benefits
that is
governed
plan
an ERISA
sub
analysis
the Plan doc-
interpretation and
ject
The ma
interpretation.3
to contract
uments,
required in a
analysis
akin to the
rejoinder to this is not
jority’s two-fold
claim:
of contract
traditional breach
majority
The
persuasive.
point
misses
action to
brought
The
[claimant]
hardly
by stating
startling proposition
due him
allegedly
benefits
recover
“Syed’s
squarely
claim was
based on
employee pension
bene-
terms
“hardly startling”
his prior employment,”
clarify
fit
course,
and to enforce
Syed,
had
and/or
because
that Plan. The
rights
under the terms of
an
an
to have
that,
plan and
employee pension
Beyond
majority’s
benefit
claim.
citation
preemption
...
are in written form.
case—a
predecessor
to one
Jersey, not Dela
Each
the Plans contain extensive and
emanated from New
proposition
that ERISA
governing
and conditions
ware—for
detailed terms
fringe
participants
all
“often” termed
rights
and duties of
disingenuous.
category
is somewhat
the fund.
statute,
Pennsylvania
plans
has a similar
It
bears
that ERISA
in-
also
mention
Law,
parties
employment relation- Wage Payment
volve
outside the
43 P.S.
Collection
members,
ship
family
such as
insurance
Greyhound
seq.
Ferguson
§ 260.1 et
administrator,
company, and
Trust,
Disability
Retirement and
as well a
that reason
(W.D.Pa.l985)(rejecting
wage
use of
squarely
fit
within
8111. See Har-
does not
statute —and other statutes
limitations —as
rison,
(noting that
166 Therefore, we of hold wage contract insurance. of limitations for two-year statute to a statute of limitations analogous claims as more claim.”); 502(a)(1)(B) six-year stat- plaintiffs than the to Nikaido v. applies Co., dis- contract 42 governing limitations Ins. F.3d ute of Centennial Life Armco, Inc., 44 (9th Adamson putes. Cir.l994)(using “limita- California’s cert, denied, (8th Cir.), 516 U.S. F.3d 650 disability poli- specifically tions statute (1995). 133 L.Ed.2d 116 S.Ct. general cies” rather than breach con- courts have not that Minnesota Conceding tract where ERISA Plan contained statute whether claims had determine occasion in- provision similar California’s under an ERISA employee benefits code); Duchek v. surance Blue Cross claims, Adamson Court wage Nebraska, F.3d Blue Shield doubt,” cited “hardly but found the issue (8th Cir.l998)(applying Nebraska 649-50 “hardly conclu- in doubt” support to action for benefits Insurance Statute cases pre-ERISA involving only sion ERISA). put As the Duchek Court but for claims not it: benefits, salary increases unpaid vacation to characterize [I]t would be anomalous “adjustment all benefits.” 44 fringe this suit a contract action then as support. Hardly ringing F.3d 653. generic contract borrow Nebraska’s me, is, thus, clear, at least It rather limitations contract 8106’s statute of specific Nebraska section insur- analogous to an ERISA actions more ance laws contractual permitting than that the denial of benefits claim for question. limitation in Moreover, in our search found in 8111.5 F.3d 649-50. statute, are not analogous we most concluding that majority, after reviewing the two necessarily limited Syed’s claim within 8111’s statute comes might appro- us. It well be presented to limitations, recognizes does that that therefore, to consider Delaware’s priate, conclusively issue because the resolve the three-year statute of limitations for claims of limitations must not be selected statute policies, insurance alleging breach of policy.” national “inconsistent with labor con- Other circuits have Del. C. is, indeed, quite It clear that a state’s state statutes are the cluded that similar of limitations for ERISA claims statute analogous most applica- only long will be borrowed “so as limi- supply appropriate period tion time of state statute’s would See, Ins. e.g., Lang v. Aetna tations. (10th Cir.1999) policy.” impede effectuation (“Our County Employees Pierce Hotel and Res- analo- duty ... is to choose most Employees taurant Health Trust v. Elks statute of limitation. While gous state Cir.1987); Lodge, 827 F.2d upon claim is a based plaintiffs (“In Jenkins, contract, precisely upon based see also it is more passing passing, and be- claim that based on state statute he should I note in it, parties have not discussed registered employer cause the have been to receive provides a §8106 also higher wages). 8106 has also Section on a Delaware based statute”. "aclion[s] provide the found to limitations for provision courts have 8106/ claim, a claim "based on federal RICO Williams, disputes. See Johnson v. General Teamsters statute.” Creamer (Del.Su- 728 A.2d Local Union per.Ct.l998)(concluding that lower court's (D.Del.1984). indisputably sought §of fireman line-of- use 8106 where based on a statute —ERISA—and because the duty disability pursuant to stat- simply apply, § 8111 does not more based was not ute as an "action on statute” arguably appropriate candi- 8106 is more erroneous); clearly Co., v. Haber Elec. Vassallo statute of limita- date for (Del.Su- tions for this reason well. plaintiffs per.Ct.l981)(applying *12 167 determining appropriate consider this unfortunate result. See limitations, Johnson, (“Either of the court must statute be 942 F.2d 1266 Con- cognizant underlying of examine the ERISA, gress, by amending or the Mis- of nature the federal claim as well as the Legislature souri is free to modify the policies majority, involvedThe statute of limitations. Until such legisla- one-year finding while 8111’s action, hold, tive required we are consis- “short,” limitations and while choos- law, tent with Missouri that plaintiff ‘s ing policy to discuss the behind claim to enforce defendant’s written prom- ERISA, simply concludes that it “cannot ise for payment money governed say” one-year limitations is by limitations.”).' ten-year that policy. inconsistent with That conclu- One final Supreme note. The sion is so clear to me. Delaware instructed that when a Dela- ERISA, enacting “Congress sought ware court inis doubt as which of two protect the interests of participants control, statutes limitations it should plans by regulating Sacks, choose the longer. See v. Sonne plans pro- administration of such (Del.1973). Indeed, we, 196 viding participants beneficiaries ourselves, recognized principle variety compliance remedies assure to. a diversity dealing with an 8106 and Harrison, with the framework.” dispute. v. Lindsey M.A. Zec- 1239; 183 F.3d see also Held v. Manu- Sons, Inc., (3d cola & 26 F.3d Leasing Corp., Hanover 912 F.2d facturers we, course, Although are not Cir.l990)(“The 1197, 1202 principal instruction, bound to follow that sensible purpose of is to protect employees’ choosing the concededly applicable longer rights to under a plan.”). covered period of limitations would not say While I cannot applying l’s further the federal behind (which, one-year statute of limitations it bring but would into Delaware line with all remembered, claim) must be bars of the other in which substantially states so as to impede unreasonable the effectua- longer statutes of limitations are applied policy, surely tion of federal I cannot say period one-year applica- deemed Congress’s that we are furthering clearly ble I respectfully here. dissent. goal by concluding stated that Delaware’s employees have much period shorter
time within which to file claims for the
wrongful denial of benefits than employees virtually every Perhaps other state.6 Legislature obliged
the Delaware
will feel
Broth,
Meade,
e.g., Carey
period);
(apply-
v. Int’l
Elec. Workers
966 F.2d at
Local 363 Pension
201 F.3d
46-47
fifteen-year
period);
Ohio’s
limitations
(2d
six-year
Cir.l999)(applying New York's
Wright
Telephone
v. Southwestern Bell
period); Lang,
limitations