166 Ind. 25 | Ind. | 1906
—This action was brought by appellees in the circuit court of St. Joseph county, to contest the will of George W. Swygart, deceased, for the reasons that (1) the testator was of unsound mind, (2) the will was unduly executed, (3) the execution of the will was procured through undue influence, and (4) because of material alterations in the will since the death of the decedent. The venue of the cause was changed to Laporte county, and thence to Porter county, where a trial by jury resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of appellees. Appellants filed joint and several motions for a new trial, alleging 173 grounds or reasons therefor, which motions were overruled, and exceptions duly saved.
The ruling of the court in denying appellants a new trial is the only alleged error assigned.
This court in the case of Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wood (1888), 113 Ind. 544, 553, pertinent to this point said: “In determining whether* an injured person is growing better or worse, a non-expert witness must necessarily express an opinion, for, as the cases we have cited hold, the fact is one that can not be described by any other than an expert witness. Any witness of ordinary intelligence may be able to state that a sick or wounded person has grown worse or has improved without being able to give an acurate description of his condition, and this brings the case fully within the authorities. Undoubtedly, the facts on which the conclusion rests may he asked for on cross-examination, but the opinion is not incompetent merely because the witness can not adequately state the grounds on which it rests, although the failure to do so may, perhaps, weaken its probative force.”
him.” Appellants objected on the ground that the opinion sought was not limited to the facts and appearances detailed to the jury. The question is unskilfully framed, but we think was intended to elicit the opinion of the witness upon the facts gathered from his acquaintance with and observation of the deceased for ten years, and detailed to the jury in his previous testimony, and that the rule invoked by appellants was not violated. Specification forty-six is very similar, but the question was in better form and the objection untenable. Kenworthy v. Williams (1854), 5 Ind. 375; Rush v. Magee (1871), 36 Ind. 69; State, ex rel., v. Newlin (1879), 69 Ind. 108; Stumph v. Miller (1895), 142 Ind. 442.
Before being divorced from his first wife he acquired the habit of using intoxicating liquors, and occasionally drank to excess. This habit grew, and during the last ten years of his life there was scarcely a day that he was not more or less under the influence of liquor, and he often became helpless from intoxication. During the last five years of his life he kept whiskey at his bedside and whenever awake during the night would drink, and usually drank the
During the last ten years of his life he became quite feeble; he used a cane, tottered, and shuffled his feet in walking. He was irritable and would fly into a rage over the most trivial things. He was very profane and would use shockingly indecent and obscene language at any place and in any presence. His memory became poor and his conversations incoherent; and he would frequently go about muttering to himself about his money and his children, and thereby often become greatly excited and enraged. He had no pride in his personal appearance, and would go about the house and upon the street with his face, shirtfront and clothes besmeared with tobacco juice. He rarely took a bath, and would not wash his face unless urged to do so by his housekeeper. He would chew a quid of tobacco awhile, then take it out of his mouth and put it in his vest pocket to be chewed again. He would spit tobacco juice over the floor, carpets and on his bed. During the last five years of his life he had little regard for cleanliness or decency, and when able to go to the closet or out of doors he would frequently urinate in his bed, on the rugs, carpets and floor of the sitting room and parlor, and would frequently go past the water-closet in the house to urinate in the kitchen sink, and his conversations were generally characterized by incoherency and contradictory statements.
In 1893 or 1894 he employed a deputy sheriff to sell some personal property, which he had taken on a chattel mortgage. He went with the officer whom he knew well, attended the sale, and directed the officer to apply to him the following morning for the costs. The next morning he declared he did not know the officer, had never seen him
In 1898 be ordered a man to make some repairs on four or five buildings and directed him to shingle a particular bouse first. Tbe scaffolding was built and tbe roof taken off tbe bouse, when be ordered this man to stop and go and paint a tin roof on another bouse. Before tbe painting was half done be ordered tbe man to stop and go and repair a cistern, and when be bad procured tbe materials and half finished tbe cistern be was ordered elsewhere, leaving tbe four jobs unfinished, without any occasion for so doing. He ordered a plumber to do some repairing, and then stopped him before tbe work was completed, denying that be bad given tbe order. He ordered a tenant to change a partition fence, then stopped tbe work, denying that be bad ordered such change. He ordered insurance on buildings already fully insured. He rented a farm for one year by written lease, wbicb but a few days before be bad leased in writing for tbe same time and upon tbe same terms to another man. He ordered work done for him at a hardware store, and when done and ready for delivery be denied tbe order, and refused to accept or pay for tbe work. He contracted 500 bushels of corn to a dealer and delivered 56 bushels, and then never delivered any more, called for bis pay, or spoke of what bad been delivered. In 1898 be requested a neighbor to procure a tenant for one of bis farms, and a few days afterwards declared be bad never mentioned tbe subject and could attend to bis own business. In 1900 be requested a d.ealer with whom be was acquainted to buy some firewood and sent him to tbe farm to inspect it, but two hours later denied that be bad ever talked
In 1896, while going home intoxicated, he fell upon an iron fence and hurt his head severely. When taken into the house by a neighbor he declared that this neighbor who assisted him, and with whom he was well acquainted and on friendly terms, had knocked him down with the intention of robbing him. In 1892 he was induced by a stranger to buy a “gold brick,” of a man disguised as an Indian, for $7,500; and on discovering the fraud, at once and frequently after-wards, declared and seemed to believe that his son Edward was a party to the scheme. He also declared and seemed to believe that his son John and other members of the family had entered into a conspiracy to defraud him, and had prompted the “gold brick” swindle, all without any evidence to justify such suspicion.
During the last ten years of his life the burden of his conversation was his money, his property and his children, and the manner in which he would dispose of his property. His children were all men and women of respectable standing, and treated him as kindly and affectionately as he would permit them to do. He lamented the fact that none of the family lived with him. He talked occasionally of his first wife—sometimes saying she was a good woman and helped to earn his property, and again that she was a spendthrift, recklessly extravagant and a strumpet, when in truth she was a good woman and of frugal habits. In
During the last ten years of his life he was very suspicious of every one, and especially of his children. He imagined they wanted to rob him, and had no affection or respect for him, hut cared only for his property. He, often declared his children had no claims upon him, and that he would give his property to some public institution, or to found a hospital or orphan’s asylum; and at other times, that if he could convert his property into money he would burn it. He talked frequently about wills, and said that he had made various dispositions of his property. He
In 1899 he deeded to his son John a house and lot in South Bend of the value of $15,000, and about the same time deeded to a trustee property in South Bend and Elk-hart of the value of $15,000, with directions that the net income of the property should be paid to his daughter Lillie during life, and at her death the property was to go to his sons John and Edward and to his daughter Eva, if they should survive her. At the same time he deeded to a trustee a like amount of property in South Bend and Elk-hart, the income of which was to go to his daughter Eva during her life, and if she died childless the property should at her death go to John, Edward and Lillie, if they survived her, but if she left children the property should go to them. These were the only provisions ever made for his daughters Lillie and Eva.
On July 13, 1900, he made the will in suit, by the provisions of which he gave his eldest daughter Clementina, who was the mother of one child and in poor circumstances and had never received anything from him, $5,000, and no more. He gave his daughter Ella, who was the mother of five small children, and a widow wholly without means, the rent and income from two houses in South Bend of the value of $9,000, during life, and at her death the property to go to John and Edward. He gave to his housekeeper a house and lot of the value of $4,500. He gave to a grandnephew, residing in Pennsylvania, whom he had seen but once, $5,000; and all his other property of the value of $140,000, he gave equally to his sons John and Edward, both of whom were in good circumstances. On September 28, 1901, he made a codicil revoking some minor legacies not above mentioned. On September 14, 1901, he was stricken with paralysis, and six months after-wards he suffered a second stroke from which he died about one week later, on March 29, 1902.
There was manifest impariment of the testator’s mind and the presence of delusions. His mental infirmity was almost invariably disclosed when he talked about his children, his property, and the disposition of his estate after death. The unnatural provisions of his will may reasonably be attributed to his deranged and failing intellect, and otherwise can not be fairly- explained. The verdict of the jury can not be disturbed on the weight of the evidence.
All other alleged errors embraced in appellants’ motion for a new trial have been waived. There was no error in overruling the motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed.