Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc.

work, filing 60-day period for mechanic’s lien

notice of intention to hold

commences, the subcontractor finishes when for which it was hired. It is undis- task completed

puted that Newton the task for lifting pan- concrete wall

which it was hired — position els into October 1993. The —on

60-day filing a of intention period for notice lien commenced on that

to hold mechanic’s notice of inten-

date. Newton recorded its January

tion to hold mechanic’s lien on days completing its work. after timely

Newton’s mechanic’s lien was not

filed, precluded and foreclosure of the lien is

as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION judgment trial court’s in favor Complaint to Foreclose on its Newton REVERSED, hereby Lien

Mechanic’s

this cause is REMANDED with instructions findings enter of fact and conclusions of

law on Riddle’s counterclaims.

SHARPNACK, C.J., DARDEN, J.,

concur. Sword,

Diana SWORD and Carl

Jr., Appellants-Plaintiffs, HOSPITALS, INC., Alliant Health

NKC

System, Inc. Norton’s Children’s d/b/a

Hospital, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 10A05-9408-CV-322. Appeals

Court of of Indiana. 31, 1996.

Jan.

Rehearing Denied March Wilson, Mattox,

Derrick H. Mattox & New Albany, appellants. Rose, P.S.C., Gary, M. &

James Weber Louisville, Kentucky, appellee. OPINION BARTEAU, Judge. appeal

Diana and from the Carl Sword summary judgment in favor of NKC Inc., Inc., Hospitals, System, Alliant Health (hereinafter Norton’s Children d/b/a Kentucky Hospital”), hospital. “Norton ISSUE dispositive We consolidate and restate the appeal issues raised on as: be held liable Whether acts of trial court erred in deter- 2. Whether the mining that the failed to demon- Swords strate that their resulted from the anesthesiologist. actions of an

FACTS light The facts taken in a most favorable to the non-movants are as follows. The Swords Louisville, Hospital in selected Norton Ken- tucky facility in which Diana as the medical labor, During would deliver their first child. epidural anesthetic which Diana received Luna, by Dr. an anesthesi- was administered ologist at Norton Dr. Luna first attempted a catheter into Diana’s to insert neck, upper spinal cord near her but was Dr. Luna then administered unsuccessful. by inserting the catheter into the anesthetic spine in her lower back. Diana’s delivering healthy baby, after her Soon headaches, began experiencing sensi- Diana noises, tivity light and numbness and loud in her back.

DISCUSSION summary judgment proceedings, summary judgment party moving for apparent held liable under the doctrine genuine there are no issues must show that agency. that the movant is enti of material fact and judgment as a matter of law. Once tled to Apparent Agency no issue the movant establishes that Hospi argue that Norton The Swords exists, summary party opposing of fact negligence of liable for the tal should be held

judgment specific forth' facts indi must set Luna, Luna is despite fact that Dr. Dr. cating issue in dis that there is contractor, the doc independent under an non-moving party pute. If the fails to meet apparent agency. Many courts have trine of burden, summary judgment in favor of this recognized liability upon either or such based moving party appropriate. Pierce v. is arising spec of two theories under both One-Franklin, (1993), Ind.App., Bank NA agency, in eases confus apparent ter of some N.E.2d trans. denied. analysis. misapplying the ing the two and Hornstein, A. Damned D. Janulis & See If Further, party moving for sum Do, Hospitals’ You You Don’t: Damned If mary judgment designate to the trial must Physicians’ Malpractice, 64 Liability for parts the matters included in the court all of 689, The first Neb.L.Rev. 696-702 it relies for the motion. The record on which commonly theory is referred to as ostensible opposing party designate must to likewise (Sec upon agency, and is based Restatement of fact the trial court “each material issue ond) Torts, 429, § which states: of party precludes asserts which employs an contrac- One who summary judgment and the evidence rele which perform tor to services for another 56(C). Any vant thereto.” Ind.Trial Rule accepted in the reasonable belief that of a factual issue doubt as to the existence being by the the services are rendered against moving party, should be resolved servants, subject employer by to his construing properly all facts and asserted by liability physical harm caused the non- reasonable inferences favor of supplying negligence the contractor in (1991), Group, Inc. movant. Cowe v. Forum services, though to the same extent as such Ind., 630, 575 N.E.2d employer supplying himself were them byor his servants. Hospital Norton The Swords seek hold Luna, negligence Dr. hable for the is'commonly theory referred to The second anesthesiologist practices who medicine at agency by estoppel, predicated on and is parties dispute not Norton The do (Second) § Agency, 267: Restatement Dr. Luna was not an of Nor represents that another is a serv- One who Hospital, practiced medicine at Nor ton agent thereby causes a ant or other Hospital ton as an justifiably rely upon person third Hospital’s granted Norton The trial court apparent agent care or skill of such summary judgment motion for based subject person to the third hospitals may law that not be held Indiana by the lack of care or skill of harm caused independent con liable for the appearing one to be a servant or other doctors. Iterman v. Baker tractor if agent as he were such. also, (1938), 308, 15 214 Ind. see adopt invite us to either of these The Swords Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Phil South Bend provisions and find that Norton Restatement 387, Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d trans. lips may Dr. Luna’s Hospital be held liable for denied; Ross v. Schubert 180 Ind. alleged negligence. we decline to While 623, dismissed, reh’g App. 388 N.E.2d provisions at adopt either of the Restatement denied; Huber time, may find that the Swords state this we 127 Ind. Protestant Deaconess against a claim Norton under exist- 864, trans. App. ing Indiana law. Norways Sanitorium Fowler recognizes ap Indiana the doctrine of Ind.App. trans. denied. issue, parent agency and follows the rule that we revisit this The Swords ask by Hospital may principal be held liable a third Norton and consider whether principal Supreme of one whom the tor doctors be traced to our Iterman, agent. holds out as its Court’s decision 214 Ind. Therein, recognized N.E.2d 365. the Court agency relationship, ap- Like an actual that, jurisdictions hospitals while other held parent agency by is also initiated a man- accountable for contractor doe- However, principal. ifestation neghgence apparent agency, tors’s under required by manifestation is one made approach such an was viable Indiana principal to a third who in turn is prohibited hospital because Indiana statutes instilled with a reasonable belief that an- corporations practicing medicine. princi- other individual is an pal.... being The essential element there right surgery medicine and communication, must be some form of di- personal under a hcense the state is a indirect, by principal, rect or privilege. delegated, It cannot be and a instills a reasonable in the mind belief of corporation, person, or other unlicensed party. the third may engage practice the of medicine (1984), Hope Lutheran Church v. Chellew by employing one who is licensed to do the Ind.App., (citing 460 N.E.2d things practicing pro- which constitute (1979), Downing Ind.App. Stuteville v. holding fession. ... There are cases that 197, 199, 629, 631; Man, Burger 391 N.E.2d corporation estopped denying from Products, (1976), Paper Inc. v. Jordan Inc. physician agent, is its and that it is 295, 312, 821, 832, Ind.App. 352 N.E.2d physician’s neghgence, for the liable where (1973), Storm v. Marsischke corporation diagnose has contracted to 842). 136, 138, Ind.App. 304 N.E.2d or treat diseases. Supreme long ago Our Court established that estoppel only An can arise where the party may principal third hold hable for claiming injury it has acted to his without neghgence apparent agent. of its knowledge full of the facts and without an represents Where one to another that a equal opportunity to know the facts. It person designated agent, is his servant or knowledge cannot arise out of lack of of person rep- and induces the to whom such law, equal opportunity since all have an therein, resentations are made to confide law, presumed to and are know and he acts the behef that such rela- complaint charges know it. The exist, tionship may does fact an action corporation diagnose contracted to and neghgence, be maintained for the servant’s ailments; plaintiffs negli- treat that it was although relationship master and of gent performing the contract. The de- servant did not exist. corporation fense is that the made no such (1882), Hall Growcockv. 82 Ind. 203-04.1 power contract it no to make because had Still, applied no Indiana case has ever estoppel deny corpora- it. An would apparent agency doctrine of and found that a right illegality.... tion the to assert hospital may bé held hable sus- for estoppel There can be no on such a basis. patient tained as the result of the corporation legally Since the could not neghgence independent of an contractor. medicine, practice appellee was bound hospitals’ against Indiana insulation liabili- to know that treated him was not whoever ty neghgence independent acting corporation. for the of contrac- for the posits independent Seavey, 1. The dissent that "a cannot be W. Agency § Handbook on the independent Law deemed an and an contractor "employee” However, While and "servant” have in the same breath.” At 17. as we connotations, variant modem case law tends Trucking noted in Burkett v. Crulo Co. virtually synonymous to treat words as Ind.App. 355 N.E.2d 261: plaintiff] agency applications. Although [the servants, Employees, and con- "agent” "independent seems to view and con- tractors, categories per- as well as other mutually descriptions, tractor" exclusive sons, circumstances, may, proper in the are not. An contractor agents. Seavey agent. example attorney described as Professor clas- An is the well be representing sifies all as either servants or non- a client. added). designates type (Emphasis the latter as a servants 316-17, Hosp., Okla. Francis 214 Ind. at Smith St. words, 279; App., Court concluded v. Tacoma other the Herman 676 P.2d Adamski could not hospitals that because 579 P.2d Wash.App. Gen. law, patient no could medicine under Indiana Hosp., Inc. Mem. Vanaman v. Milford reasonably that those who were conclude (1970),Del., 272 A.2d 718. hospitals were the hos- practicing medicine in parallel in This not without Indiana. employees. This rationale stood pitals’s has Health Ind. Sloan Metro. Council shield, hospitals liability protecting from as a 1104, 1106-09, recog App., we profession- health care hospi shielding for nized that the rationale hospitals hire as als whom negli liability employees’s for their tals from contractors. time, that gence and found has eroded over However, statutory changes sub- cases Herman n holding corporations sequent opened have Indiana hos- Herman malpractice of could held liable for the not be liability pitals potential for employee physicians longer is no viable. hospitals’s physicians practicing within fa- corporate Indiana now hold entities statutes cilities, and have eroded the foundation for acts hospitals such as liable insulating hospitals liability. from such We employees. Ind.Code 23-1.5-2-1 no reason law or now find there is under Sloan, 23-1.5-5-2; I.C. 516 N.E.2d at 1106- hospitals policy for shielding 09; (1981), v. Ind. Estate Mathes Ireland agents, negligence of their and instead denied; App., reh’g see justifying liability. several such find reasons also, (1993), Dominguez Ind.App., Vogler v. Herman, jurisdictions in other As noted denied; 56, denied, reh’g 624 N.E.2d hospitals have found that be held liable Yaney Hosp. by Yaney McCray v. Mem. contractor Thus, (1986), Ind.App., 496 N.E.2d 135. situations, in and doctors certain the ratio patients rationale could not of /ierrocm-MRat See, doing a new nale behind so is not idea. agents reasonably conclude that doctors are (1995), e.g., Houghland App., 119 v. Grant hospitals they in or servants of 422, 563; Sycamore v. N.M. 891 P.2d Gilbert hospitals practice because cannot (1993), 511, 758, Ill.Dec. 156 Ill.2d 190 622 in law medicine —is now without foundation 788; v. New York Blood

N.E.2d Mondello Sloan, policy. 516 or N.E.2d at Program Blood New York Center — Greater (1992), 219, 19, 80 N.Y.2d 590 N.Y.S.2d 604 Under the nature health care services 81; v. Health Mainte McClellan reasonable, today, entirely possible it for a is (1992), Organiz. Penn. 413 Pa.Su nance prudent representa- person to conclude from 128, 1053, denied, per. appeal 604 532 A.2d by hospitals tions and made the doctors 664, 985; Independent Pa. 616 A.2d v. Chase professionals pa- health care that service (1991), Mass.App.Ct. 31 Practice Ass’n Inc. hospitals’s tients facilities are within 661, 251; Baptist Hosp. 583 Mem. hospitals. or servants of the As the (1991), Tex.App., 822 Sys. v. Smith S.W.2d Supreme recently Court of Wisconsin noted denied; Center, 67, Reg’l reh’g Med. Orlando 24, (1992), in Port Kashishian v. 167 Wis.2d Inc., (1990), Fla.App., v. 573 Chmielewski 277, reh’g denied: 481 N.W.2d 876, Alicea review v. New So.2d [Hjospitals increasingly themselves hold (1990), Seminary Theological Brunswick advertising public expensive in out 119, 900, aff'd, N.J.Super. 581 A.2d 128 N.J. offering rendering quali- campaigns and 218; 303, Washington 608 A.2d Street v. ty only pick up 690; health services. One need (1989), Hosp. D.C.App., 558 Center A.2d daily newspaper page to see full half 667; Wyo., 764 v. Hill P.2d Sharsmith extolling the medical vir- advertisements Pamperin Trinity Mem. hospital quali- 848; tues of an individual Shepard Wis.2d N.W.2d ty prepared that the .App. health care Providence 89 Or Sisters of 500; any areas. to deliver in number of medical Emerg. v. Coastal 750 P.2d Brown Serv., Ga.App. hospitals spent have 354 Modern billions themselves, marketing nurturing aff'd, 257 Ga. S.E.2d dollars S.E.2d image consuming public alleged with the that who was to be was are full-care modern health hospital, facilities. or and that expenditures All of plaintiff these have but one justifiably acted in reliance purpose: persuade in those need of hospital, the conduct of the consistent with medical services to obtain those services at ordinary prudence.2 care and A essence, specific hospital. hospitals plaintiffs injuries for liable if the business, big competing have become with knew, plaintiff known, or should have each other for health care dollars. allegedly negligent profes- health care sional is an Id. Wis.2d N.W.2d 282. Hos- pitals represent public often claim, support of their the Swords professionals health they provide care point demonstrating rep evidence various patients superior employed their to those Hospital resentations Norton made concern by competitor hospitals, in an effort to at- ing expertise caring its expectant patients tract and the revenue derived from many hospitals, mothers. Like Norton Hos hospitals them. profit Because stand to pital aggressively marketed its services to representations their concerning quality public. Hospital Norton stated bro provided by of services those hired to treat chures that its Women’s Pavilion is “the most patients, employees either as technically sophisticated birthplace in the re contractors, hospi- it would be anomalous gion.” case, particular R. 228. And to this escape liability tals to if those same health Norton advertised that it offers: professionals care delivered services below [Ijnstant specialized equip- access to the standards, minimally accepted let alone the facilities, ment and physician as well as to heightened degree quality represent- often specialists every pediatric area of medi- hospitals’s ed advertisements. See surgery. Every maternity pa- cine and Pamperin, 423 N.W.2d at 855. private tient has a room avail- full hospitals may We therefore find that team, ability special anesthesiology aof appar- held liable for the of their experienced exclusively and dedicated agents, notwithstanding ent the fact that the patients. OB are contractors. For a added). (emphasis R. Hospital Norton to be held liable for the made similar claims in other advertisements professional a health care under the doctrine And, as well. See R. one brochure apparent agency, plaintiff must show that: stated acted or communicated di- rectly indirectly patient in such a in- Women’s Pavilion medical staff person manner that only physicians region would lead a reasonable cludes the in the professional specialize exclusively to conclude that the health care in who obstetrical an- (Second) Torts, Center, § Reg. 2. The Restatement 429 does Med. Inc. v. Chmielewski Fla. require upon App., that a third act in reliance 573 So.2d review Arthur v. St. representations principal of the in order Hosp. N.J.Super. Peters And, liability. establish while the Restatement A.2d Mduba v. Benedictine (Second) Agency, § 267 does include reliance A.D.2d 384 N.Y.S.2d 527. liability, as element of Illustration 3 to that supra, adopt As noted we have declined to Restatement section indicates that reliance is not provision either Restatement and instead have to the essential cause of action. That illustration applied existing Indiana law on the doctrine of is as follows: apparent agency. espoused by Supreme As our Growcock, necessary requirement L, store, T, Court in it is a department contracts with as an upon that a third "act[] [the belief that give independent contractor to medical atten- store, agency] relationship in fact does exist...." patrons appearing tion to T as an Therefore, analysis Ind. at 203. our includes the of D. D is liable for medi- requirement that the Swords demonstrate that by cal care rendered T. they justifiably upon acted in reliance Norton Many jurisdictions have found that under either Hospital’s representations. provision patient may We leave to our Su- Restatement hold a hos preme reconsidering pital showing patient Court the task of the reli- liable without that requirement light upon representations by hospital, ance in the rule of Growcockin relied made alleging negligence part provisions contemporary in cases of the Restatement often emergency on physicians. e.g., jurisprudence. room Orlando Serv., Emergency immediately Brown v. Coastal They avail- esthesiology. are Ga.App. 354 S.E.2d day are unit 24 hours a able within the 164). Dr. That epi- aff'd, 361 S.E.2d administering 257 Ga. experts continuous anesthesiology Norton practiced Luna dural anesthesia. independent contractor does Hospital as an added). cite (emphasis The Swords R. 232 Hospital from for' Norton not shield they and claim that these advertisements law. negligence as a matter of Dr. Luna’s rep- upon Hospital’s justifiably relied Norton concerning expert its staff of resentations Causation particu- anesthesiologists, and obstetrical challenge obstetrical the trial representations that its also lar its The Swords anesthesiology finding members were ex- the affidavits sub “team” court’s Hospital’s mo administering epidurals response exact to Norton perts in mitted —the allegedly summary judgment Diana’s in- failed to estab procedure which caused tion for Further, argue that a rea- fact jury. genuine of material Swords issue lish rep- negli alleged from the Luna’s person would conclude to whether Dr. sonable exists as by injuries. Norton gence resentations made caused their Hospital pro- anesthesiologists Norton Hospital argues appeal, on as it did Norton patients agents. vides to are its summary judgment, that the its motion representations made Whether any expert adduce evidence failed to Swords Hospital concerning its obstetrical Norton negligence caused the stating that Dr. Luna’s a reasonable anesthesiology team would lead sup- allegedly sustained. Diana that Dr. Luna was person to conclude this, Hospital points to Diana port of Norton Hospital, and whether the agent of Norton deposition in she stated that Sword’s ordinary pru- care and Swords exercised that examined her attrib- none of the doctors repre- justifiably relied dence and symptoms epidural re- her she uted Hospital, of Norton sentations ceived while at Norton by a material fact to be resolved issues of Hospi- responded to Norton The Swords considering all of the circum- jury after summary judgment with the tal’s motion for in evidence. stances Dr. and Dr. Milan. affidavits of Davidson patient where the Absent a situation that, in his affidavit states Doctor Davidson’s physician or where the by his own directed Dr. Luna’s care fell below the stan- opinion, patient makes an selection required by physicians adminis- dard care there, physicians he will use while to which tering epidural. R. Doctor Milan’s an 98. reputation of the itself it is the symptoms of that “Plaintiffs affidavit states Also, rely. unless he would pain headaches are consistent low back and put manner on no- patient the is some accompa- spinal fluid which with the loss pro- of the independent the status tice of epidural the the nied the insertion of might expected whom it be fessionals with region back.” R. cervical of the Plaintiffs contact, it would be natural to come into Hospital argues that the doc- 100. Norton people that these are for him to assume testimony do not establish tors’s affidavit ap- hospital_ the “Such employees of negligence alleged Dr. Luna’s caused than the speak much louder pearances injuries injuries, only are Diana’s that her private contractual ar- of whatever words spinal fluid. Norton with a loss of consistent physicians rangements the have Hospital concludes that the Swords into, entered unbeknownst have genuine issue of failed to demonstrate that hospi- attempt the public, in an to insulate exists, and that it therefore is material fact any, liability negligence, if tal from for the law. judgment to as a matter of We entitled physicians.” of the disagree. Hosp. 156 Sycamore Mun. Gilbert v. not the doctors’ affidavits do 511, While Ill.Dec. 622 Ill.2d 190 Dr. expressly state that Luna’s 788, Peters (citing Arthur v. St. 794 testimony 443, 447; injuries, the 575, Diana’s N.J.Super. caused 405 A.2d 169

17 However, symptoms party that Diana’s are consistent with cannot be deemed an juror spinal independent loss fluid reasonable could and an contractor in the same underlying conclude that her resulted from the breath. The rationales are differ epidural. Summary judgment in opposition aborted is ent stand in to an one appropriate jury where a reach specifically, general could differ other. More the rule undisputed conclusions from principle ent facts. is liable the torts of his Peoples Savings grounded Bochnowski v. agents agency Fed’l & is on principles. not (1991), Ind., 282, Rather, liability Loan 571 N.E.2d 285. Ev tort is based employ on an ery er-employee relationship. available inference must be resolved in Dallas Moser Swords, Inc., non-moving party. Transporters, favor Ensign, 594 N.E.2d Buick, GMC, Perry v. (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Stitzer 454 This is as it should Ind., 1282, 1286,reh’g system 637 N.E.2d denied. be. our of tort based doing, upon fault, so we find that Dr. Luna whether if a is to be held liable another, the standard caused the breached of care and then acts of should alleged injuries power issue of right Swords’s have to control the other’s by jury. fact material to be resolved citing conduct. Id. 457 Prad Bitzer v. Summary ziad, 593, judgment inappropriate. (Ind.Ct.App.1991), 571 N.E.2d 596 right Such trans. denied. exists where

REVERSED. parties’ relationship typical is that of a em ployer employee. Therein lies the basis CHEZEM, J., concurs. agent’s negligence may that an rule RUCKER, J., opinion. dissents with imputed principal. be On the other hand, relationship between an employer RUCKER, Judge, dissenting. independent quite and an contractor is differ majority “hospi- I dissent. The concludes who, independent ent. “An contractor is one tals held liable for-the exercising employment, [ ] apparent agents, notwithstanding their according certain work his contracts do fact that the contrac- being subject own methods and without Op. at I agree tors.” cannot because the employer except the control his as to clear, unequivocal, in this state is law and of product work.” of his Furr v. Review Bd. of long duration exceptions that absent certain Div., Employment Indiana Sec. 482 N.E.2d here, employer may relevant not be 790, (Ind.Ct.App.1985). 794 this Because of held liable for the of his inde- acts long employer lack of control we have pendent employees. Daugherty contractor employer held that of an Engineering Corp., Fuller Serv. generally not contractor is liable for the torts (Ind.Ct.App.1993), See, Peabody e.g. of that contractor. Hale v. P. Corp., Ind.App. v. & B. Smith Company, Ind.App. Coal (1979); Zimmerman v. Baur, Ind.App. 39 N.E. (1894). recognize I that the law is not a jurisdiction In the rule hospital this that a phenomenon proper static and in a case a physi the is not liable for act of its may depart court from the doctrine of stare surgeons in was first cians and announced plain in order to and obvi- decisis vindicate Baker, Iterman v. Ind. remedy principles ous of law or to continued suggest That case seemed to injustice. such However we have no case if hospital could not be held liable even us. before negligent physicians allegedly or sur dispute geons employees hospital. This

There is no of were principal. under the agent imputed be to the was so because statutes then existence, corporation, e.g., Perry, or other unlicensed Green v. “a engage of (Ind.Ct.App.1990), person, Jack not [could] Ward Chevrolet, Mikel, by employing one who is licensed Inc. v. N.E.2d 350 medicine practicing which constitute (Ind.Ct.App.1988), things And this is do the trans. denied. corporation apparent. profession.... could Since so whether is actual or medicine, hospital’s summary judgment in the appellee legally practice him treated favor. was bound know that whoever acting corporation.” Iter

was not

man, N.E.2d Because of the at 370.1 23-1.5, commonly §

enactment of Ind.Code Corporation

referred to as the Professional (Act), underlying rationale of

Act of 1983 Act,

Herman has been eroded.

applies providers, among health oth care

ers, provides pertinent part corpora “[a] professional employees perform tion whose Greg RICKEY, Appellant- James scope employ of their services within the Defendant, authority apparent their to act for ment or corporation is same as hable to the extent 23~1.5-2-6(c). § employees.” its I.C. Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. STATE of Council, 516 v. Metro Sloan Health No. 91A04-9502-CR-41. (Ind.Ct.App.1987), we determined “the public pronouncement Act stands as Appeals Indiana. Court concerning corporation’s policy vicarious employee-physi for the acts of its Feb. Id. at also Tarr v. cians.” see Jablon

ski, (Ind.Ct.App.1991), reh’g 569 N.E.2d 378

denied, (determining prop trans. denied corporation

osition under Herman that malpractice

could not be held liable for viable). physician longer is no hospital clear held

It is now performing physician

liable for the acts of a premises. hospital’s on the Howev-

services

er, recently as we reaffirmed Weaver

Robinson, (Ind.Ct.App.1993), 627 N.E.2d 442 Kennedy

rejected grounds, on other v. Mur- (Ind.1995),

phy, 659 is so employee

only physician where the is an hospital is aware that physician providing devi-

the care has practice. normal Id. case

ated from this dispute is no that Doctor Luna was

there indepen- as an

employed Norton could not therefore

dent She hospital’s agent, ap-

have also served otherwise,

parent or because she was not over whom the exercised except product of [her]

control “as Furr, 482 N.E.2d at 794. Under the

work.” negli- of this Doctor

settled law state Luna’s contractor can not

gence I imputed to Norton therefore affirm the trial court’s

dissent would Also, Yaney by Yaney proposition as matter of law. Iterman has been cited generally not liable for the McCray Hosp., Ind.App., that a medical Memorial on its of doctors staff because (Ind.Ct.App.1986). contractors doctors considered

Case Details

Case Name: Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc.

Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals

Date Published: Jan 31, 1996

Citation: 661 N.E.2d 10

Docket Number: 10A05-9408-CV-322

Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.