*1 state. But size of a dis limits of the the mere territorial logical for distinction. trict furnishes reasonable cause enterprise in is the character institution and If rights. legal volved which must determine its status and corporate agency necessary governmental this insti state, opinion that the act tution are of the we to, against the above referred which certain suits authorizes provides trial," procedure state and would control In place the determination proper trial. present action, however, purposes and functions govern the State Land clearly Settlement Board are nature, provisions mental and, therefore, their the usual respect code to venue must control in determin ing proper place of trial.
The order is affirmed.
Plummer, J., J., Finch, P. concurred. petition
A rehearing this cause was denied the District Appeal July 6, 1929, Court of peti- and a by appellant tion to have the cause heard Supreme in the Court, District Court Appeal, Supreme denied August 5, Court on 1929. present
All the Justices concurred. Appellate District. 3741. No. Third [Civ. June 1929.] SWITHENBANK, Respondent, LEE W. CHARLES al., WOOD et *2 Nelson H. C. for Respondent. G. Bradford for
A. FINCH, P. J.This is an action per- property. sonal The defendants Charles W. Wood and appealed, judgment-roll Lena alone, plain- parts interlocutory which award the decree tiff the increase of certain lambs “from August during 26, 1926,” the same and the wool therefrom period, and also the livestock from increase of other following facts: July 16, 1926. The court found the
April Mary 16, 1921, and others leased Jane Swithenbank ranch, together the Swithenbank with the livestock personal property thereon, the defendant Charles expiring for July 16, W. Wood a term 1926. Plaintiff agricultural had no The property. interest ranch is provided land. rental $1600 year year first and at the rate remainder $1700 personal term for both the property. real and provided that at the of the term Wood was premises to leave a stated number of kinds different concerning livestock, Feb- controversy. which there is no ruary 14, 1922, Mary and, Jane Swithenbank died estate, settlement of her plain- there was distributed to the “an undivided tiff one-twelfth interest in and to” the leased property, personal. both real and Prior *3 of the term other owners all sold their interest personal property to expiration Wood. to Prior Wood “requested plaintiff to execute a new of lease real and said personal property but . plaintiff . . refused to execute such expiration After the of term the owners, plaintiff, than the leased their interests in the land de- fendant Charles Wood, W. Wood and D. Ernest join plaintiff August 16, therein. 1926, mu- exchange sale, conveyed tual bills of the defendant Wood plaintiff sheep to the 117 of the and of the lambs and plaintiff conveyed to thereof, Wood the remainder “to be and per classified determined pur- said lease. . . . The pose parties of delivering and intent said in exchanging and bills of sale said was to ownership establish the of of each parties, respectively, sheep said in said and lambs in num- ber, rather in During than undivided fractional interests.” preceding month the owners of the negotia- land “were ting with each other for partition, division, sale said or of ranch, part . and relating . . of . . . transaction exchange plaintiff said bills of sale between said de- plaintiff Charles Wood, fendant W. said stated to said sheep defendant that said segregated not be or would separated partition until a ranch. ... No sale or of said segre- sale nor of said ranch has been had.” “No gation division or said has been made as determined in or “Plaintiff said otherwise or at all.” did sixty 1926, days July nor within 16, within from and days July request sixty 16, 1927, or and after demand premises, possession plaintiff’s interest in lands or said any any or serve plaintiff at time demand nor did said upon either quit premises or notice said said defendants of them.” “that from and
As conclusions law the court found April dated after the date of the of said lease 16, 1921, plaintiff defendant Charles W. Wood possession real and in common of the been as tenants property personal described said lease” that as hereinbefore is entitled stated. Appellants’ only because contention is premises possession plaintiff’s failure demand of the days sixty within after the the term to hold terms of for another entitled under the the lease plain award the full therefore it error to part pro any livestock, of the increase tiff delivery kind viding for the of a stated number of each premises. livestock the surrender of the Section provides: of the Code of Civil Procedure subdivision upon agricultural tenancy “In cases lands, all where possession has over and tenant held retained more days sixty of the term than without quit by any or notice to demand landlord landlord, any be, successor in estate of his if there he or by permission holding be deemed to be land- shall landlord, any in estate of his if lord, the successor there hold shall be entitled to under the terms of the be, and year.” full for another
“Holding in view of the circumstances over outlined *4 presumption prima the statute establishes re this facie year upon formerly another terms the lease for the newal by may existing, presumption be rebutted evidence (Cowell party lease.” v. by Snyder, either to the- offered 920, 923]; 297 Pac. Ambrose 291, Hyde, Cal. v. 171 [152 557 Pac. 555, Cal. 64].) 145 [79
345 plaintiff! refused the term the the Before the Wood. After in the land to his interest cotenants join his plaintiff refused to the of the lease provided The lease Wood. of a lease to in execution the al answer in advance.” “quarterly payment of rent willing ready, been leges: all times “The at defendants pay now offer to pay and do have offered to able and in said provided rental plaintiff share of the said his pay offered allegation implies defendants that This 17, July commencing quarter in the rental advance payment. accept such refused to 1926, plaintiff and that exchange of the mutual term A month after the end It can Wood. place plaintiff and between bills sale took war was not" matter of law that the court not be held as a held presumption that concluding in ranted end of permission plaintiff possession with and that by the facts stated overcome the term was possession “in as tenants were plaintiff and the defendants in personal .property the real described in common of thereof. the term the lease” from and after the being uphold judgment, appeal necessary If finding judgment-roll alone, the on the in common as tenants the defendants so fact, misplaced finding among treated may be (Collins Ramish, 360, 182 366 of law. v. Cal. conclusions Co., 550]; Pac. Stanward v. Yellow Taxicab 75 Cal. [188 App. 902].) “Every pre 96, 102 Pac. intendment and [241 sumption contradicted or inconsistent rec with the appeal indulged in the orders and must be favor of ord superior (2 852; Jur. Philbrook judgments of courts.” Cal. 739]; 104 Vin 195 Cal. Pac. Platner v. Randall, [231 cent, 24].) Cal. Pac. [229 is affirmed. J., (R. L.),
Plummer, J., Thompson concurred. rehearing petition for a this cause was denied A Appeal July 5, 1929, and the follow- District Court ing opinion rendered thereon: petition Appellants have filed a
THE COURT. Referring finding quoted rehearing. opinion *5 346 part relating
the effect that the the transaction to of exchange “plaintiff parties of bills of stated sale the the segre to said defendant be sheep Wood that said would not gated separated or partition ranch,” until a sale or of said petitioners say: foregoing “In it is evi finding view of the dent that the part refusal execute a on the of to upon just new the prior lease or the old to requirements did not laid take the out of case the down in Civil subdivision section the Code of 1161, of Procedure.” eviden finding referred of a mere to is tiary fact, responsive any does not to issue in the ease. appear par that the defendants to that the consented or agreed ties upon postponement segregation separation ranch. the until the a sale or It was province within the to exclusive the court trial determine evidentiary together whether such fact, the presumption defendants, relied evidence by the .the contrary to the weight. greater was of the Petitioners .that the evidence is insufficient to contend prior overcome such presumption. originating In a case the Code, enactment relating of section 1945 of the Civil presumption arising the from the the tenant receipt the of rent the lessor after the term years the of a parties the to a lease for had a conversation occupation about premises, future term, end of the lease was executed. possession, paying continued in The tenant the same rent as He testified that before. he “refused to make newa jury court instructed if found the facts year as stated herein the' lessee became a tenant year. reversing Supreme In Court said: parties, think the conversation of the “We had years, disagreement and their during defendant as term which the to the thereafter gone remain, jury should to the for the purpose of ascertaining how or for what term the tenant was there- If, here, hold. ... after to the evidence offered part of the defendant went to show that he expressly had accept a term of one that fact tend would destroy presumption to overthrow mere drawn from subsequent payment of rent—that he was to continue to thereafter space hold year,” one (Skaggs v.
347 Tenant, Elkus, Landlord and 45 160; Cal. Underhill 1031.) 98; sec. C. J. agricultural construing
In relating a statute o£ leases lands, upon which provisions similar to of section is appellants meáning article “The of that rely, it is said: remain simply to the lease That, parties this: if both silent and after the inactive for the of one month space *6 presumed of the both be shall acquiesced in, tacitly to, consented a renewal year. whatever application lease for another has party clearly when either his intention not announced has full to renew the lease on the same terms or for a par- purpose of is not a the law contract force unwilling rule of contract, merely to establish a ties in the evidence, presumption, prem- their intention (Ashton Realty Prowell, La. 328 ises.” Co. v. [115 579].) South. expressly
After landlord renew has accept rent tendered lease and has refused to at the ex piration term, new applied the term thereof be on a certainly law, it held, cannot be as a matter of that the ten thereafter, language “holding ant is section 1161, by permission of the landlord.”
Rehearing denied. District, Appellate First Division Two. 6676. No. June [Civ. 1929.] Respondent, E. B. HOFFMAN BAILEY, al., H. et J.