18 Vt. 305 | Vt. | 1846
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The only question in the present case is, whether the plaintiffs’ title was such, that the policy is binding upon the defendants.
The only defect in the plaintiffs’ title, here insisted upon, is in the deed from the Bennington Iron Company to Lyon. There is no doubt, I apprehend, that this deed, as a legal conveyance, is wholly defective. It would hardly be necessary to go into detail, in pointing out its defects. It is not a deed under the seal of the corporation, nor by the President of the corporation, nor in pursuance of any vote of the corporation. It will hardly be contended, that a corporation can convey their land, except in some of these modes. It is therefore not worth while to take time here, to determine what is the proper mode of executing such a conveyance ; as, in every view, this is manifestly defective as a formal conveyance of legal title.
There can be no doubt, then, that the corporation would, in equity, be compelled to convey to the plaintiffs. They are the equitable owners of the land in fee simple. And all the authorities concur in the point, that an equitable title, at common law, is as much an insurable interest in buildings, as a strictly legal title. The estate is but one; and it is indifferent, whether the assurance is in the name of the legal or of the equitable owner; an insurance in the name of the trustee will enure for the benefit of his cestui que trust. All, that is required, is, that it be truly represented to the insurers. But to them it is unimportant; the extent of the plaintiffs’ interest is the same, in both cases; so, too, the lien of the company will be as effectual upon this equitable, as upon a legal-estate ; for they must, at all events, pursue it in equity, it being a right not capable of being enforced in courts of law.
We think it very clear, that this defect in the title does not avoid the policy, under the act of incorporation of the Insurance Company, which provides, that all policies upon buildings, when the insurance is general, shall only be binding, when the assured has an unincumbered title “in fee simple,” but, that when he has any “less estate therein,” the same shall be void. The incumbrance, in this case, was properly represented, and the assured in fact had no. less estate in the premises than a fee simple, excepting the incumbrance. What is meant by “ less estate,” in the act, is, an estate of less duration, as an estate in fee tail, for life, or years, or at will. We think, therefore, that the estate was a fee simple, within the just and reasonable interpretation of this act.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
Note by Redfield, J. I have not deemed it of much importance, in preparing the opinion in this ease, to go into the' general law of insurance, in