The libelants, seamen on the small British schooner The Frank and Willie, shipped on board at New Brunswick September 15, 1890, for a term of six months, to be returned at St. Johns. On the first voyage to New York, upon discharging the schooner, a seaman
It is unnecessary to refer to the numerous and diverse cases cited by the libelants’ counsel in the elaborate brief presented. The observations of Mr. Justice Story in the case of Emerson v. Howland,
“Are easily reconcilable when the circumstances of each case are carefully examined. In all cases a compensation is intended to be allowed which shall be a complete indemnity for the illegal discharge, and this is ordinarily measured by the loss of time and expense incurred by the party. It is presumed that after his return home, or after tiie lapse of a reasonable time for that purpose, a seaman may without loss engage in the service of other persons; and, where this happens to be the ease, wages are allowed only until lus return, although the voyage may not then have terminated.”
Fee v. Orient, 36 Fed. Rep. 509, 44 Fed. Rep. 430.
If such is the rule even in the case of an illegal discharge, or in case of the willful neglect of a seaman in a foreign port, as in Farrell v. French, Blatchf. & H. 275, much more should this rule govern in a case like the present, whore no personal fault can be imputed to the owners, as between them and the seaman, in respect to the large damage claim for which the vessel was arrested, and the consequent breaking up of the voyage.
The claim and the lien here sought to be enforced are mostly not for wages strictly, because, after discharge on the breaking up of the voyage, there is no further service to the ship. Still compensation in damages for the breach of a maritime contract may he given so far as the facts justify it. But even at common law such damages are not allowed to compensate for voluntary idleness. A shipment by seamen for a time named, instead of for the voyage, is moreover by its very nature not an absolute engagement for the time specified. It differs materially from ordinary time contracts on land. The seaman is hound to the particular ship only. He cannot be transferred to service on another ship without his consent. The loss or disability of the ship, therefore, of itself terminates the contract. There is no difference in this respect between a seaman’s time shipment and a shipment for the voyage. Every such shipment in either form is legally liable to be broken “up before completion by sea perils, or other incidents of commerce and navigation, and whenever the general interests require it, under the special cir
There is no evidence of any improper conduct on the part of either the owners or the master; and, aside from the provisions of the articles above cited, the vessel is not liable to seamen for wages or for damages, when the voyage is broken up under such circumstances, beyond provision for the return of the seamen to their homes, and the payment of wages to that time, in the absence of proof of further damage. Hindman v. Shaw,
