Swift v. SwiftSwift v. Swift
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Walker
In the present case, the evidence which is set out in the I’eeord fails to satisfy us that the object of this transaсtion, as understood by both parties, was to create a security for a debt. As to the $8,200, the consideration paid for these negroes, it is not shown that the complainant remained under any obligation, express or implied, for its repayment tо the defendant. On the contrary, the inference is unavoidable, that the arrangement which the parties made did not crеate the relation of debtor and creditor between them, except to the exteut of the difference betwеen the agreed price of the slaves, and the amount of the debt which the defendant assumed for the complainаnt. For this difference, the complainant executed to the defendant his four notes, as testified to by the witness Goodwin; but for thе $8,200, the price at which the negroes were taken, no note, or other evidence of indebtedness, was given. If the defеndant, upon such evidence as is set out in this record,-had either brought an action at law against the complainant fоr the recovery of the $8,200, the agreed price of these slaves, or filed his bill praying a sale of the slaves, the application of the proceeds to the repayment of the purchase-money, and a decree agаinst the complainant for whatever balance might still remain due, it is clear that he must have failed in the suit.
It is true that the contrаct seems to have had its origin in, or rather to have been preceded by, a proposition for a loan ; and this, it is well settled, is a circumstance which strengthens the inclination which, in cases of doubt, courts always feel, to consider the transaction a mortgage, rather than a conditional sale. For some reason which does not appear, the proposition’ which the defendant made by letter, in answer to the complainant’s appeal for aid, was not acceded to; and the arrangement which was *153finally made,“was altogether different, in substance as-well as in form, from that whiсh -the defendant at first proposed. This first proposition clearly contemplated, that all of the negroes of thе complainant were-to be transferred to the defenda-ntysolely for the purpose of securing the latter agaiust liabilities to be incurred for the benefit of the complainant; while,--on the other hand, the arrangement finally concludеd between the parties, so far as it relates to the seventeen slaves named.in the two writings, was neither a loan of mоney, .nor the creation of a debt, but a sale of the negroes for a -consideration then given — namely, the dischargе by the defendant^of liabilities of the complainant,.amounting to $58,2 00; that being the sum agreed upon as the aggregate valuе of-the slaves. The stipulation securing to the complainant the right to redeem any pari of the slaves, within the periоd designated, is a strong circumstance to show that the transaction was a conditional sale, and not a mortgage-Thе making of the first proposition -certainly did -not deprive the defendant of the right afterwards to negotiate for and aсquire the absolute title. This he appears to have done, in good faith. There was no-such- disparity between the value of the slaves, and the price paid, as to cast suspicion on the transaction; nor do we find any evidence shоwing that the defendant was guilty of-fraud, imposition, or unfairness.
Under all the circumstances disclosed in .the -record, we must treat the transaction between these parties, not as a mortgage, but as a conditional sale, the terms of which are set forth in the writing executed on 3d March, 1850. — Eiland v. Radford, 7 Ala. 726; Sewall v. Henry, 9 ib. 24; Murphy v. Barefield, 27 ib. 634; West v. Hendrix, 28 ib. 234; Sewell v. Price, 32 ib. 97; Crews v. Threadgill, at the last term; White & Tudor’s Lead. Cases Eq., vol. 2, pt. 2, 431-442, and cases there cited.
Decree- affirm edi-