134 P. 599 | Utah | 1913
On tbe 29tb day of December, 1897, all of tbe plaintiffs above named, as partners doing business as snob, obtained judgment in tbe circuit Court of tbe United States in and for tbe district of Utab against all of tbe defendants above named. On tbe 12tb day of June, 1906, an action in tbe name of all of tbe plaintiffs as partners was commenced on tbe judgment aforesaid against all of tbe defendants. Separate demurrers were filed by tbe defendants, wbicb were overruled, and tbey then filed sepa,rate answers in wbicb tbe only defense tbat is material bere was tbat tbe action was barred by tbe provisions of Comp: Laws 1907, section 2874, wbicb provides:
“An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of tbe United1 States, or of any state or territory witbin tbe United States,” must be commenced “witbin eight years.” Plaintiffs replied tbat tbe defendant Obristopberson was absent from tbe state of Utab for “more tban one year after said cause of action bad accrued and prior to tbe commencement of tbis action.”
Nearly two years after tbis action was commenced all of tbe plaintiffs above named, except George D. Sweetser and J. Howard Sweetser, filed an application in wbicb tbey set forth tbat at and prior to tbe time tbe judgment upon which tbis action is based was obtained all of tbe plaintiffs were coparteners and were doing business as such, and tbat thereafter, and before tbis action was commenced, tbe said George D. Sweetser and J. Howard Sweetser died leaving tbe other four as tbe surviving members of tbe said copartnership, and further alleged tbat tbe four named are tbe sole owners of said judgment as surviving partners as aforesaid. Pursuant
Proceeding now to a consideration of the only serious question in the case, namely, the defense that the action is barred by our statute of limitations, we remark that the court found that the action in question was commenced 8 years and 165 days after the entry of the judgment upon which it is based, and that the defendant Christopherson was absent from the state of "Utah during that ime for “a period of not more than 164 days.” The court, however, held that the action was not barred and entered judgment against all of the defendants for the full amount of the judgment, including interest. The defendants appeal and insist that the district court erred in holding that the action upon the judgment was not barred by the provisions of he statute we have referred to and in rendering judgment against them. Upon the other hand, plaintiffs contend that the action is not
“An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner satisfied.”
That section has been in force in this state continuously since .some time prior to 1888. It constituted section 3706 of Comp. Laws 1888, and was thereafter carried into the Revised Statutes of 1898 as section 3490. The section is an exact copy of section 1049 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
It is conceded that the judgment in question was not appealed and that no motion for a new trial was ever filed. In other words, it is conceded that the judgment was never assailed in any way by any one. Plaintiffs contend that notwithstanding that fact the judgment did not become final until the time for an appeal had passed, namely, until six months from the time of its entry, while the defendants insist that the judgment became a final and enforceable judgment immediately upon being rendered' and entered as provided by law, and hence 8 years, plus 165 days, had elapsed when this action was commenced. The question that. we must determine,, therefore, is, When did the statute of limitations begin to run on the judgment in question ?
Counsel for plaintiffs contend that the foregoing question is determined in their favor by the Supreme Court of California in the case of Feeney v. Hinckley, 134 Cal. 467, 66 Pac. 580, 86 Am. St. Rep. 290, and that in view that our statute (section 3490, supra) is a copy of the California statute upon which the California Supreme Court bases its decision in the case just referred to we should follow that decision. If the case just referred to is to be followed, then this opinion should end right here, since no distinction can be drawn between the principle involved in this case and in the California case referred to. The case of Feeney v. Hinckley, supra, was decided in November, 1901, many years after section 3490, supra, was in force in Utah. We are there
“An action is pending in a court, thought judgment has been recovered therein, as long as such judgment remains unsatisfied.”
To the same effect are Gates v. Newman, 18 Ind. App. 398, 46 N. E. 654; Ulshafer v. Stewart, 71 Pa. 174; Wright v. Nostrand, 94 N. Y. 45; Chapin v. James, 11 R. I. 89, 23 Am. Rep. 412; Ex parte Howland, 3 Okl. Cr. 142, 104 Pac. 927, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 840; Day v. Holland, 15 Or. 464,
Section 3490, supra,, therefore, belongs to that class of statutes wherein it was sought to declare and make certain an existing rule of practice or procedure rather than to create a new one. Moreover, when other provisions of the Cbde, which have a bearing upon the subject, are kept in mind and are given proper force, it, in our judgment, is conclusive that neither in adopting the rule at common law nor by what is said in the statute was it intended to declare that, although actions be pending after judgment, they are necessarily pending for all purposes. In our judgment actions remain pending after judgment only for the purpose of enforcing them and to institute the proceeding provided by law to reverse or to modify them. Por the purpose of - enforcing the judgment, it is just as much final immediately after its rendition and entry in the court of original jurisdiction, unless it is expressly otherwise provided by some statute, as it is after an appeal is terminated. For the purpose of res judicata or estoppel this may, however, not be so. If this distinction be kept in mind, no difficulty will be encountered in applying the remedies incident to the enforcement of judgments.
“The right to bring an action upon a judgment at any time after its rendition, until it is barred by some statute of limitations, though the plaintiff retains the power to collect it, if he can, by execution, is almost universally conceded, and such concession has not, so far as we are aware, been attended by any such abuse of the privilege conceded as-calls for legislative interposition.”
The abuse here referred to is the one sometimes alluded to of bringing successive actions upon the same judgment. To the same effect is 2 Black on Judgments, sec. 958.
But, entirely apart from these authorities, our statute (Comp. Laws 1907, see. 3307) clearly contemplates the enforcement of judgments given for the payment of money immediately after they are entered, since it is there provided that an appeal from a “judgment or order directing the payment of money does not stay the execution of the same unless a written undertaking be executed on the part of the appellant by two or more sureties to the effect,” etc. Again, section 3320 provides for restitution in case a judgment is reversed or modified on appeal after its enforcement, and also affords protection to the purchaser under execution sales in such cases. It is idle, therefore, to contend that in this state the enforcement of judgments is or was intended to be held! in abeyance by what is said in section 3490; since it manifestly was not intended that the provisions of that section are alone controlling simply because they in some respects are contrary to other statutory provisions relating to the enforcement of judgments. A judgment in this state is therefore not suspended or superseded unless and until that is accomplished in accordance with our statute relating to that subject.
In a much later case than Feeney v. Hinckley, namely, McKennay v. Horton, 151 Cal. 711, 91 Pac. 598, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 661, 121 Am. St. Rep. 146, that court enforced a judgment immediately after its rendition notwithstanding the objection made that such could not be done because the time for appeal in that case had not yet expired. It may well be asked, How was it possible for the Supreme Court of California to sustain the enforcement of the judgment of the lower court unless it regarded the same as final and enforceable and received it as evidence to prove its own existence? The judgment in that case at least was enforced, although an appeal was permissible at the time it was enforced. If, therefore, a judgment may be enforced before the time for an appeal has elapsed, it must be done upon the theory that it exists as a final and enforceable judgment and that its existence may be established by the production of the judgment roll. In other words-, the judgment may thus be used as evidence to prove its own existence. It may be contended, however, that in the later California ease the judgment was by a statute made enforceable forthwith. But such, as we have shown, is in legal effect also the case under our statute. There is no difference in principle between the right of immediate enforcement of a judgment and its actual enforcement. There is therefore no difference in principle between the later California case and the one at bar, or, for that matter, between the judgment in the California case
But it is further contended by the plaintiffs that this court is committed to the doctrine laid down in the case of Feeney v. Hinckley by the results reached in Howe v. Sears, 30 Utah, 344, 84 Pac. 1107, and in Vance v. Heath, 42 Utah, 148, 129 Pac. 365. There is absolutely nothing in Howe v. Sears that in any way supports the California doctrine. Indeed, if the facts in Howe v. Sears are kept in mind, the decision is at least negative authority in favor of the defendants. For example, if in that case this court had intended to follow the doctrine laid down in Feeney v. Hinckley, then no argument was required to show that the statute of limitations had not run in that ease for the reason that confessedly the action would not have been barred for nearly, if not quite, six months after its commencement in any event. Nor is there anything said in the case of Vance v. Heath contrary to the conclusions reached here. Indeed, the latter case is in perfect harmony with our present conclusions. What is held in the Vance Case is that a judgment may not be used as evidence of estoppel or res judicata with regard to any particular fact or facts involved in the litigation pending an appeal or so long as the time for one has not expired. There is nothing said or intimated in that ease that a judgment is not a final and enforceable judgment immediately after it is rendered, nor that it cannot be used as evidence to prove its own existence so long as it is not sought to use the judgment as evidence to establish an estoppel or res judicata.
In view of what has been said, therefore, the court erred' in its conclusion of law and in entering judgment against the defendants. Under the undisputed evidence the action was not commenced until eight years and 165 days had elapsed, and therefore the right to maintain it was barred when the present action was commenced.