Sweet v. SpenceSweet v. Spence
The action is on a note made by the defendants for $522.87, dated February 29th, 1856, payable to Jeremiah Miller or bearer, one year from date with interest, and transferred by Miller to the plaintiffs. On the trial the execution of the note by the defendants was admitted by their counsel, and it was admitted that the note came to the plaintiffs’ possession after it was due. The counsel for the defendants then stated the grounds of their defense as contained in the answer, to which the plaintiffs’ counsel objected, upon the ground that the facts stated in the answer did not constitute a defense. The court sustained the objection, and the defendants excepted. The defendants then offered to prove each and every allegation in their answer, except the allegation that the plaintiffs were not the owners of the note—no question being made by them of that fact—for the purpose of having submitted to the jury, under the charge of the court, some or one of the several questions of fact, mentioned in the offer, which the court overruled and the plaintiffs’ counsel excepted. The court held that the answer did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense, and directed a
But there is another question, to me more difficult to determine, and that is, whether these defendants can take advantage, as a defense of usury in the note in question, of the usury in the transaction between Miller and A. B. Neal & Co. It does not appear that they (Neal & Co.) had any agency in obtaining the note in question of the defendants, or that they had any knowledge of the fact; nor is there any thing in the answer showing that these defendants had any knowledge or notice of the usury in the transactions or agreement between Miller and Neal & Co. The case, so far as the question of usury is involved, as between the parties to this action, stands thus: Miller held the note or notes against Neal & Co. which was overdue and infected with usury. These defendants voluntarily, and without the agency or knowledge of Neal & Co., gave to Miller the note in question, the consideration of which was the transfer by Miller to them, at the same time, of the note or notes of Neal & Co. Miller was a party to the usury, and therefore cannot plead ignorance that the whole consideration of the note taken of these defendants was void and inoperative.
Without deciding whether the answer shows a usurious agreement between Miller and the defendants, yet the whole consideration of the note was illegal and void. Neal & Co.’s notes were entirely worthless in the hands of the defendants or in the hands of any one else. Miller knew it, or was bound to know it. But whether he knew it or not, the law so adjudges, and decides that the promise of these defendants contained in their note, upon which the present action is brought, was without any legal consideration to uphold it. This is on the assumption that the facts stated are true. The defendants offered to prove them, and were not permitted. If they had proved them, they would have been entitled to the verdict of the jury. We think the judge at the circuit
Johnson, J. concurred.
Smith, J. dissented.
New trial granted.
Welles, Smith and Johnson, Justices.]