Defendant Charles Edward Sweeney, Jr., appeals his conviction for Murder. 1 Defendant was sentenced to 60 years. We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal because the longest single sentence exceeds 50 years. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4; Ind.Appellate Rule 4(A)(7). We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.
Background
On May 28, 1991, the victim, Danny Guthrie, left his family to go fishing with defendant. Guthrie did not return home that evening and his wife assumed that he decided to camp over with defendant. The next morning defendant called to see if Guthrie wanted to check the trout lines. Guthrie’s wife informed the defendant that Guthrie never returned home and the defendant told Guthrie’s wife that he brought Guthrie home between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m. the previous day. After several unsuccessful attempts to obtain more information from defendant, Guthrie’s wife called the police. On May 29, 1991, Detective Kramer, the lead investigator, and other police officers questioned the defendant at his home. However, no arrest was made and Guthrie remained missing.
In February, 1992, defendant was investigated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for placing a pipe bomb under Detective Kramer’s police car. 2 After being charged for these offenses, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office on June 26, 1992. Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to placing the bomb under Kramer’s ear, agreed to implicate all others involved in the bombing and also to disclose the wherea- *92 bout of Guthrie’s body and any information relating to the cause of Guthrie’s death. 3 We summarize defendant’s story as communicated to federal authorities as follows. 4
According to defendant, on the return trip from the fishing expedition, defendant agreed to give Guthrie approximately 150 marijuana plants in exchange for a saddle. Immediately after arriving at defendant’s home, defendant explained to Guthrie where the marijuana plants were located and provided Guthrie with a shovel, two buckets, and a 9 mm gun for protection. Defendant claimed that he then went to play bingo at the Sellersburg Moose Lodge and did not see Guthrie again that evening. 5 The next day (May 29, 1991), after Guthrie’s wife claimed that Guthrie never came home, defendant alleges that he went to look for Guthrie and found him dead with a gunshot wound to the head. He also found the 9mm gun that he had given Guthrie the day before with one round missing and an empty shell casing a foot or two south of Guthrie’s body. Because defendant did not want the police to discover the marijuana, he dragged Guthrie’s body to a ditch located behind a trailer and buried the body with sweet lime and covered it with dirt and trash. He then threw the shell casings in a creek, and placed one shoe 6 and a pair of sunglasses in the burn barrel by his trailer. Defendant also buried the gun in an ammunition can near his home, but at a later date retrieved the gun and had it in his possession for personal protection. Defendant told the authorities that eventually the gun was seized from him in the State of Utah as a result of a routine traffic violation. At all times, defendant proclaimed his innocence. 7
■ On July 1, 1992, the police obtained a search warrant for defendant’s property and located Guthrie’s body in the area described by defendant. An autopsy was performed on the body on July 2, 1992, and the medical examiner positively identified the body as that of Daniel Guthrie. The examiner also retrieved the bullet that caused Guthrie’s death. The bullet and the 9mm gun that was confiscated from defendant by a Utah police officer was sent to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearm Laboratory. The Bureau confirmed that the bullet that killed Guthrie had been fired from the 9mm gun belonging to the defendant.
On August 10, 1992, Judge Donahue in the Clark Circuit Court issued a warrant to arrest the defendant for the murder of Guthrie. On October, 8, 1992, upon the State’s request, Judge Donahue issued a writ of habe-as corpus ad prosequendum (a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is referred to in this opinion as a “Writ”) so that the State could obtain temporary custody of defendant. At that time, defendant was incarcerated in federal prison in Louisville, Kentucky 8 and was scheduled to be sentenced that very same day by Judge Barker in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. 9 The defendant was transported to Clark County shortly after the Writ was issued. On October 22, 1992, defendant filed a Motion to Quash the Writ, *93 and a healing was held on the motion on November 10, 1992. The focus, of the hearing concerned whether the State had jurisdiction over the defendant. Defendant argued that before he was sentenced in federal court, the State could have sought temporary custody of him through the use of the Writ, but once defendant was sentenced, the State was obligated to follow the procedures set forth in the Interstate Agreement on Detain-ers (referred to in this opinion as the “IAD”). 10 In order to avoid conducting a trial and then having a higher court decide that the trial court had no jurisdiction over defendant, Judge Donahue decided that the safer approach would be to return defendant to federal prison and proceed appropriately. Consequently, Judge Donahue granted defendant’s motion and ordered that the Writ be held for naught and declared void.
On April 22, 1993, the State dismissed charges against the defendant, and defendant was sent back to federal prison in Kentucky. The State refiled charges on March 30, 1994. On August 1, 1994, upon the State’s request, Judge Donahue granted another writ of ha-beas corpus ad prosequendum so that the State could obtain temporary custody of defendant. At this time, defendant was being held at the Federal Correctional Institution in Manchester, Kentucky. For the second time, deféndant was transported to Clark County. In response, defendant filed a Motion to Quash the Writ on September 13, 1994, and on October 3,1994, Judge Donahue held a hearing on this matter. Once again, defendant contended that the IAD was the exclusive means of obtaining temporary custody of defendant. Additionally, defendant argued that the circumstances surrounding the issuance of both Writs were identical and that because the issue had been litigated, the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estop-pel applied. Judge Donahue denied defendant’s Motion to Quash the Writ, relying on the fact that defendant’s custody status had changed since the first Writ was issued.
A jury trial was conducted on November 14, 1995, and defendant was found guilty the murder of Guthrie. The trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years to be served upon the completion of his federal sentence of 210 months.
Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion
Defendant raises the following claims on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the second writ of habe-as corpus ad prosequendum; (2) defendant was denied his statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to suppress defendant’s pre-trial statements; (4) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the handgun; (5) defendant was denied the right to cross-examine witnesses; (6) the trial court erred in denying the defendant credit time for pre-trial detention; (7) the trial court failed to articulate the reasons for sentencing defendant to a term of years consecutive with his federal sentence and used an improper factor to enhance defendant’s sentence; (8) the trial court refused to admit certain statements provided by defendant; (9) the trial court refused to allow testimony concerning other possible reasons for the death of the victim; and (10) the State failed to establish the corpus delicti for the Murder.
I
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the second Writ. As discussed in Background supra, defendant’s motion to quash the first Writ was granted. In defendant’s motion to quash the second Writ issued against him, defendant argued that because both the first and second Writs were identical, the issue had been litigated in the hearing on the first Writ. As such, the doctrine of res judicata applied to bar enforcement of the second Writ. We disagree with defendant.
*94
“The principle of res judicata prevents the repetitious litigation of that which is essentially the same dispute.”
Wagle v. Henry,
In his motion to quash the first Writ, defendant argued that the IAD provided the exclusive means by which the State could secure his presence for trial and that a Writ was not available for this purpose. Our statute authorizing Writs provides that it may be used to seek the presence for criminal trial in state court of a defendant “who is confined in a federal prison.” Ind.Code § 35-33-10-5. The record indicates that at the time the first Writ was issued, defendant had not yet been sentenced on federal charges and was being held On behalf of federal authorities in a Kentucky state correctional facility. -Our review of the record indicates that the trial court concluded that, under these circumstances, the defendant was not confined in a fedéral prison within the meaning of the Writ statute. See R. at 527-28. The trial court granted the motion to quash the first Writ because, not yet having been sentenced on federal charges (albeit guilty thereof) and not being confined in a federal prison (albeit in custody for federal offenses), only the IAD and not the Writ procedures were available to the state to secure defendant’s presence for trial. (The mutual availability of IAD and Writ procedures is discussed in part II, infra; it is not essential to do so here.) However, we hold that the trial court made no determination that the Writ procedures would be unavailable at some future time should defendant be sentenced and confined in a federal prison. (This is in fact what happened). As such, in granting defendant’s motion to quash the first Writ, the trial court only held that the Writ was not available to secure the presence for trial of the defendant given defendant’s custody status at the time the first Writ was issued. This is clear from the trial court’s findings and conclusions denying the motion to quash the second Writ:
4. It is unclear from the Order of November 10, 1992, the grounds upon which the Writ was quashed. No Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law were entered. During the argument on the Motion in 1992, some argument was had relating to the custody status of the Defendant. At the time of the Motion in 1992, the Defendant was not housed in a federal prison. When the 1994 Writ was issued and served, the Defendant was housed in a federal prison at the Federal Correctional Institution in Manchester, Kentucky.
5. I.C. 35-33-10-5 requires that the Defendant be “confined in a federal prison or other institution” before a Writ of Ha-beas Corpus Ad Prosequendum may issue.
6. In light of the general nature of the 1992 Order quashing the Writ, and in light of the Defendant’s change of custody status since 1992, the issue now facing the Court cannot be said to have been litigated and determined previously. It cannot be said that the 1992 Order determined that a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum would forever be an improper means of securing the attendance of a Defendant in federal custody. On this basis, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estop-pel do not bar litigation of the issues raised by the 1994 Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum and the Defendant’s Motion to Quash.
(R. at 85-86.)
Because the trial court’s determination to grant the motion to quash the first Writ was a function of the defendant’s custody status at the time the first writ was issued,
res judicata
did not preclude the trial court from reaching a different determination after defendant’s custody status had changed.
See Matter of a Search Warrant,
II
Defendant claims that he was entitled to have the murder charges against him dismissed because the State violated the anti-shuffling provision.of the IAD. In general, the IAD prohibits the transporting of defendants back and forth between jurisdictions. Defendant contends that by being transported back and forth between Indiana and Kentucky (as described in
Background supra),
the anti-shuffling provision of the IAD was violated. Defendant’s argument is correct if in fact the IAD is applicable in this ease.
See generally State v. Greenwood,
Analyzing defendant’s claim requires a discussion of two Indiana statutes — Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4 (1988), adopting the IAD, and Ind. Code § 35-33-10-5 (1988), providing for Writs. While the statutes are separate and distinct, they have similar purposes in that both set forth procedural safeguards for securing the presence of a prisoner in Indiana who is located in a foreign jurisdiction.
12
See
generally United States v. Kenaan,
A
We begin with a brief discussion of the history and function of both the IAD and the Writ. Although the origins of the IAD date back to 1948, the statute was not adopted by the federal government until 1970. The statute was created to solve several problems which arose from the use of detainers. Although the IAD does not define a detainer, the congressional record provides that “[a] detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.”
United States v. Mauro,
As a result of the problems created by the use of detainers, the federal government and all the states that adopted the IAD determined that the primary purpose of the IAD would be to “provide for expeditious disposition of all outstanding charges which may affect the conditions or duration of imprisonment and treatment,” and also to prescribe procedures by which a state may obtain a prisoner incarcerated in another state. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C.A., pp. 1395-1398 (1976 ed.), Art. I.
See Mauro,
The central provisions of the IAD are contained in Articles 3 and 4. Article 3 establishes a procedure by which a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged can demand a speedy disposition of the charges. If the prisoner makes such a request, the prisoner must be brought to trial within 180 days after the prisoner causes to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court written notice of imprisonment and request for final disposition of the charges. Article 4 provides the means by which a prosecutor can obtain temporary custody of a defendant in order to dispose of outstanding charges. Under Article 4, the prisoner must be brought to trial within 120 days “of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state.” If the prisoner is not brought to trial within the allotted time periods or the prisoner is returned to the “sending state” without bringing the prisoner to trial, the charges will be dismissed with prejudice. This is often referred to as the “anti-shuffling” provision.
The statute providing for Writs is less complex than the statute providing for the IAD, but is deeply rooted in history. The Writ 15 has origins dating back to the first Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 81, § 14 (1789), 16 and it has always served as a means by which to bring a prisoner from a foreign jurisdiction to another jurisdiction for criminal prosecution of outstanding charges. 17
Although § 14 did not expressly state that the courts could issue ad prosequendum writs, the Court in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, Ex parte Bollman, [8 U.S.] (4 Cranch) 75,2 L.Ed. 554 (1807), interpreted the words “habeas corpus” as being a generic term including the writ necessary to remove a prisoner in order to prosecute him in the proper jurisdiction wherein the offense was committed. Carbo [v. United States], 364 U.S. [611], 615, 81 S.Ct. [338], 341,5 L.Ed.2d 329 [ (1961) ] *97 (emphasis omitted). Since the time of Ex parte Bollman, the statutory authority of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to secure the presence, for purposes of trial, of defendants in federal criminal cases, including defendants then in state custody, has never been doubted.
Mauro,
In
Mauro,
the Supreme Court elaborated on three main differences between detainers and Writs.
Mauro,
The decision of whether to use a detainer or a Writ to obtain custody of a prisoner only arises when the prisoner is confined in a federal prison; Writs are not available with respect to prisoners incarcerated or confined in other states. 19 Ind.Code § 35-33-10-5.
B
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the Writ statute, and not the IAD statute, was controlling. Upon the State’s request, the Clark County court is *98 sued a Writ on two occasions. There is no indication that a detainer was ever lodged against the defendant nor is there any indication that the State intended a Writ to serve as a detainer.
The facts of this case are similar to the facts of one of the cases disposed of by the landmark decision in
Mauro.
In holding that dismissal was not appropriate, the United States Supreme Court held that “a writ issued by a federal court to state authorities, directing the production of a state prisoner for trial on criminal charges, is not a detainer within the meaning of the [IAD] and thus does not trigger the application of the [IAD].”
Mauro,
Although the watershed decision rendered in
Mauro
set forth that Writs are not detainers which invoke the application of the IAD, it is notable that
Mauro
dealt exclusively with Writs issued by federal courts. However, “[t]he decision in
Mauro
has been followed regardless of whether the writ emanated from federal or state court.”
McLemore,
Pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-33-10-5, courts in Indiana have statutory authority to issue Writs to secure the presence of prisoners in federal custody for purposes of criminal prosecution. The State requested the issuance of a writ both in 1992 and in 1994, but never requested that a detainer be lodged against defendant. The trial court found, “No evidence has been presented that the State of Indiana ever filed a detainer so as to trigger the requirements of the I.A.D. In the absence of such proof, the I.A.D. simply does not apply.” (R. at 87.)
Defendant, however, claims that “the IAD is the exclusive means to secure the presence of a defendant for purposes of prosecution.” Br. of Appellant at 14. Defendant’s contention is clearly mistaken. First, Indiana has definitively denominated two methods of securing the presence of defendants who are in the custody of foreign jurisdictions — the IAD pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-33-10-4 and the Writ set forth in Ind.Code § 35-33-10-5.
20
Second, as we discussed
supra,
the Writ has continued to be accepted as a proper procedure for securing the presence of prisoners for criminal prosecution.
See Mauro,
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Writ statute and not the IAD statute was applicable in this ease. Consequently, the anti-shuffling provision of the IAD was never implicated and defendant was not entitled to dismissal on that basis. 22
III
Defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial under U.S. Const. Amend. VI, 23 Ind. Const. art. I, § 12, 24 and Ind.Crim.Rule 4(C). 25
A
When reviewing a claim for a violation of the right to a speedy trial, we ordinarily begin our analysis with Crim.R. 4. This is because “Crim.Rule 4 generally implements the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to a speedy trial, thereby establishing time limits and providing for discharge in the event that limits are exceeded.”
Bridwell v. State,
A-l
The State contends that Crim.R. 4(C) does not apply because defendant was incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction at the time the present charges were filed. Instead, the State contends that the IAD applies for purposes of speedy trial rights and relies on
Brown v. State,
In
Brown,
the defendant was charged in Indiana and was released on bond. Two days later, defendant was arrested in Kentucky and served approximately a one year sentence before being returned to Indiana. We concluded in
Brown
that the IAD, rather than Crim.R. 4(C), governs the speedy trial rights of a defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction.
See Williams v. State,
533
*100
N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (Ind.1989) (“Ind.R.Cr.P. 4 does not apply when the IAD statute is applicable.
Brown v. State
(1986), Ind.,
Heflin
stated that “it is irrational to extend the application of Criminal Rule 4(B) to a defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction.”
Id.
at 124 (citing
Smith v. State,
A-2
We now look to see whether the State complied with Crim.R. 4(C) and brought defendant to trial within one year. The one year period begins with the date criminal charges are filed against the defendant or with the arrest of defendant, whichever is later. Crim.R. 4(C). “If a defendant seeks or acquiesces in any delay which results in a later trial date, the time limitations of the rule are also extended by the length of those delays.”
Isaacs v. State,
Defendant was charged in August of 1992, and on October 8, 1992, the Clark Circuit Court granted the first Writ. Defendant was transported to the Clark Circuit Court and arraigned on November 9, 1992. 26 Defendant being brought to Indiana is equivalent to an “arrest” and thus the one year period for determining a violation of Crim.R. 4(C) commences on November 9, 1992. 27 After the court granted defendant’s Motion to Quash the Writ, the State dismissed the charges on April 22, 1993. In *101 holding the State responsible for the time elapsed between defendant’s “arrest” and the dismissal of the charges, 165 days is charged to the State.
On March 30, 1994 the State refiled the charges against the defendant and was granted the second Writ on August 1, 1994. The defendant was transported to Clark County on August 15, 1994. Dismissing and refiling charges does not reset the speedy trial clock — it merely tolls it for the actual days between dismissal and refiling.
Hornaday v. State,
The Court of Appeals refused to accept the interlocutory appeal on February 6, 1995, and the trial date was thereafter set for April 11, 1995.
30
On March 28, 1995, the defendant, along with the State, filed a joint motion seeking to continue the trial indefinitely and attributing the delays to defendant. The trial court granted the motion. The State is not charged with any time between the November 15, 1994, filing of the motion for a continuance and March 28, 1995, because of defendant’s concession that all delays would be attributable to him.
See Spann v. State,
On June 6, 1995, the trial court set the jury trial for October 3,1995. Defendant did not object to this trial date nor did defendant at this time request a speedy trial. On July 14, 1995, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for a violation of Crim.R. 4(C) (R. at 234) and a hearing was held on this matter on September 11, 1995. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant contends that the filing of a motion to
*102
dismiss was a request for a speedy trial. We have held before that a motion to dismiss for a violation of the right to a speedy trial is an assertion of a defendant’s right.
Crawford,
B
We next turn to whether defendant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial under the Indiana and United States Constitution. In reviewing claims of speedy trial rights, Indiana and federal courts apply the analysis established in
Barker v. Wingo,
The defendant was first charged on August of 1992 and eventually brought to trial on November 14, 1995. As stated in part A-2
supra,
the State was charged with delaying the trial for 256 days. Because defendant was brought to trial within one year as prescribed by Crim.R. 4(C), the length of the delay was not unreasonable.
See Lee,
Defendant must assert his right to a speedy trial before claiming a constitutional violation. Our review of the record suggests that defendant did request a speedy trial on several occasions. However, we also recognize that on one occasion defendant waived his right to a speedy trial after filing a joint motion for a continuance and that on several occasions was the protagonist of the delays by engaging in the following actions: (1) filing several other motions for continuances; (2) seeking an interlocutory appeal; and (3) filing a Verified Petition for Mandamus and/or Prohibition. Additionally, when the trial date was set on June 6,1995 for October 3, 1995, defendant did not object to the trial date nor did defendant at that time request a speedy trial. Defendant’s attempts to assert his right to a speedy trial were insufficient.
We do not find that the State unreasonably delayed the trial. As discussed earlier, after the trial court granted the motion to quash the first Writ, the State dismissed the charges against defendant. Thus, a majority of the delay (165 days) that was charged to the State related to the skirmishing over the *103 first Writ. The only other delay charged to the State was 91 days attributable to the time between re-arresting defendant and defendant’s motion to continue the trial date. We do not find that the State engaged in any actions with the purpose of delaying trial.
The final factor in the
Barker
test, prejudice, is assessed in light of the three interests which the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Barker,
The only prejudice which defendant asserts that he suffered was an impairment of his defense. Defendant contends that he suffered a “presumptive prejudice” as described in
Harrell v. State,
As none of the Barker v. Wingo factors point in defendant’s favor, we conclude that defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial under either the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. I, § 12, of the Indiana Constitution.
IV
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements provided by him regarding the location of the victim’s body. Defendant presents three reasons supporting his claim: (1) defendant was not advised of his Miranda rights and the State failed to present evidence that defendant waived his Fifth Amendment rights; (2) defendant was provided with use immunity for the statements; and (3) defendant’s trial counsel were ineffective for giving him the impression that he had use immunity.
As detailed in Background, supra, defendant was charged with two federal crimes which could have resulted in a sentence of a minimum of 30 years to a maximum of life imprisonment. The federal officials offered defendant a plea agreement whereby they would recommend a sentence reduction if defendant'would provide the federal officials with certain kinds of information, the most relevant to this case being the location of Danny Guthrie’s body. After this proposal was made, defendant’s attorneys telephoned the Clark County prosecutor to advise the prosecutor of the agreement which had been offered by the federal officials, and asked if the prosecutor would give the defendant “use immunity” for any statements which were provided. What happened next is disputed. Defense counsel testified that, based on the fifteen minute telephone conversation, it was absolutely clear that a use immunity agreement existed. One of the attorneys advised defendant that any statements he made regarding the whereabouts of Guthrie’s body could not be used against him in a criminal prosecution. Defendant then provided federal officials and a Clark County detective 32 *104 with his recollection of the events leading np to Guthrie’s death. These facts are provided in Background, supra.
A
Defendant contends that because the State failed to advise him of his Miranda rights, the statements he provided regarding the location of the victim’s body were inadmissible. The record reflects indisputable evidence that defendant was in federal custody and indeed was not advised of his Miranda rights. However, under the circumstances of this case, we find that it was unnecessary for defendant to be advised of his Miranda rights.
In
Miranda v. Arizona,
B
Defendant next contends that even if the Miranda warnings were unnecessary under the circumstances of this case, the statements which defendant provided were inadmissible because they were made under the belief that the State had granted him use immunity. The trial court determined that there was a misunderstanding between the defense counsel and the State and that in fact no use immunity existed. We agree with the trial court’s finding.
Use immunity is a procedural tool utilized by prosecutors to encourage or force reluctant witnesses to testify. Under Ind. Code § 35-37-3-3 (1988), only the prosecutor may request immunity for witnesses in criminal prosecutions and only the trial court may grant such immunity.
See Lucas v. State,
In
Rihl v. State,
“... he indicated he would prosecute Mr. Sweeney if he was able to obtain independent information which would justify the prosecution. Now my understanding of that portion of the conversation would have been that we had the use immunity agree *105 ment.... He did manifest an interest in prosecuting, but my understanding was it would be on the basis of discovering evidence other than that might come out of a statement from Mr. Sweeney.” (R. at 608.)
On the basis of this conversation, defense counsel informed the defendant that he had use immunity for anything he said concerning the Guthrie incident. However, defense counsel did advise the defendant that this agreement was not in writing but that it was clearly his understanding that an agreement existed.
34
We agree with the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor’s statements do not suggest that he was offering defendant use immunity. The prosecutor was stating just the obvious — ’that he would have to discover more evidence to corroborate defendant’s statements rather than just solely rely on information provided by defendant. In Indiana, in order for a confession to be introduced at trial, the State must produce corroborating or independent evidence of the corpus delicti.
35
Johnson v. State,
The record reflects no court approval or supervision of the asserted use immunity agreement.
See generally Everroad v. State,
G
Defendant finally contends that, if he was
not
entitled to
Miranda
advisements and if use immunity was not granted, at least he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We analyze claims of ineffective assistance of counsel according to the two-part test established in
Strickland v. Washington,
Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on the fact that his counsel failed to obtain a writing or recording of the grant of “use immunity.” As set forth supra, Ind.Code § 35-37-3-3 (1988), indicates that a prosecutor must make a request for a witness to be granted use immunity and only the court can grant such a request. The record suggests that this procedure was not followed. However, we acknowledge the possibility that in some counties, familiarity and trust between the prosecutor and defense attorneys is such that at times informal agreements are entered into. 36 Indeed, in *106 this case, the defense attorney testified as follows: “[I] advised [defendant] that we did not have this in writing, but I had talked with the Prosecuting Attorney, it was clearly my understanding that’s what the agreement was,....” (R. at 611.) However common it may be for attorneys to engage in this informal practice of negotiating agreements, we cannot approve extra-judicial “use immunity.” In fact, we presume that the legislature’s mandate of court supervision for matters relating to “use immunity” and “plea bargaining” was designed to avoid the situation which has arisen here — a misunderstanding over whether a use immunity agreement exists. For this reason, we assume, without deciding, that counsel was deficient for failing to obtain an agreement in writing.
The “constitutional guarantee of counsel under the Sixth Amendment has been construed to include four rights: the right to counsel, the right to effective assistance of counsel, the right to a preparation period sufficient to ensure a minimal level of quality of counsel, and the right to be represented by counsel of one’s own choice.”
United States v. McCutcheon,
In this case, although federal charges had been filed, the State had not yet filed charges for the murder of Guthrie. Consequently, defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and, thus, his right to the effective assistance of counsel had not attached when he provided statements regarding the location of Guthrie’s body.
See United States v. MacDonald,
V
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress a handgun obtained through a warrantless search. As described in Background, supra, defendant said he provided this gun to Guthrie and initially buried the gun after finding Guthrie dead. Defendant said he later retrieved the gun for protection. This gun was seized by a Utah police officer. Laboratory testing revealed that defendant’s gun was the weapon from which the fatal shot was fired to kill Guthrie. We have reviewed the evidence and affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment
37
protects persons from unreasonable search and
*107
seizure and this protection has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mapp v. Ohio,
We believe that the circumstances of this ease demonstrate that the police officer was well within the bounds of his authority to search and seize defendant’s handgun. In support of this finding, we provide the specific facts which led up to the seizure as testified to by Officer Barney. 38
Officer Barney pulled defendant over for making an improper lane change on Interstate 70. While defendant was pulling over, Officer Barney noted that “the driver [defendant] appeared to lean over as though he was putting something under the seat.” (R. at 931.) After coming to a complete stop, “defendant jumped out immediately” and came back to the officer. Officer Barney found defendant to be very nervous and shaking. In light of observing defendant place something underneath the seat, Officer Barney also became nervous. In response to questions posed by Officer Barney, the defendant denied having either firearms or narcotics. Defendant did not respond to Officer Barney’s request to look in the vehicle. At some point, the defendant opened the trunk of his vehicle, and while rifling through a suitcase said, “see, there’s no guns or drugs.” (R. at 933.) At this point, Officer Barney observed two loaded handgun clips. As a result, Officer Barney returned to his car and ran a cheek on defendant’s personal history and the vehicle. After learning that defendant had an extensive criminal record, the officer searched defendant’s vehicle and found a handgun on the passenger’s side of the vehicle in the location where he had earlier observed defendant reaching. Defendant was charged with having a loaded firearm in the vehicle and for being a restricted person in possession of a firearm.
Officer Barney was justified in stopping defendant’s vehicle.
See Walker v. State,
Even assuming, without deciding, that defendant’s consent to a search of his trunk was not a consent to a search of his entire vehicle, the facts demonstrate that Officer Barney had valid reasons for searching defendant’s vehicle without a warrant. An officer is permitted to search for weapons when “he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”
Terry v. Ohio,
VI
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in quashing his subpoena duces tecum 39 directing Dr. Handy, a pathologist who performed the autopsy on the victim, to produce “all documentation, notes, articles, etc. of [her] investigation of the epidemiology and manner of death in fatal gunshot wounds in Jefferson [sic] County Kentucky, 1982-1989.” (R. at 380.) Defendant claims that the quashing of the subpoena denied him the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses.
“The decision to enforce, modify, or quash a subpoena duces tecum is a question for the trial court and will not be disturbed unless the decision is clearly arbitrary.”
Turpin v. State,
In the hearing on the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum, the court determined that the subpoena was too broad and not relevant to this case. Additionally, the court advised defendant that “if [the witness] testifies you’ll have the right to cross examine her as to her methodology and how she arrives at certain opinions and conclusions and so on and so forth.” Defendant has presented us with no reason why the unavailability of Dr. Handy’s research prevented defendant from effectively cross-examining her. As such, we find the trial court’s decision to quash the subpoena duces tecum to have been reasonable.
See Small v. State,
VII
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him credit time for pretrial detention. As discussed supra, defendant was serving a federal sentence when he was brought to Indiana to face pending criminal charges. On two separate occasions, defendant was detained in the Clark County Jail before being convicted for the crime of Murder. The trial court determined that because defendant was incarcerated for some other crime by some other court, he was not entitled to credit for the time served in Indiana. We affirm the trial court’s decision.
*109
Ind.Code § 35-50-6-3 (1988)
40
establishes the credit time that may be earned by a defendant. There are two criteria to consider in determining whether a defendant has a right to pretrial credit: (1) pretrial confinement (2) which was a result of the criminal charge for which sentence is now imposed.
Cohen v. State,
The facts of this case are substantially similar to the facts in
Smith v. State,
VIII
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by using an improper factor to enhance his sentence and for failing to articulate the reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. The trial court sentenced defendant to the presumptive term of 40 years and added an additional 20 years for aggravating circumstances. Also, the Indiana sentence was ordered to be served consecutive to the federal sentence. We affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision.
A
Ind.Code § 35-38-l-7.1(b)(4) (1990) permits courts to consider whether the “imposition of a reduced sentence or suspension of a sentence arid the imposition of probation would depreciate the seriousness of the crime,” as an aggravating factor when determining the proper sentence to be imposed. However, we have stated on numerous occasions that this factor “may be used only when considering the imposition of a sentence of shorter duration than the presumptive sentence.”
Mitchem v. State,
Nevertheless, we find the enhanced sentence to be reasonable in light of the other aggravating factors that the trial court identified.
See Widener v. State,
B
Defendant also contends that since the trial court did not articulate any reasons for consecutive sentencing, the matter should be remanded to the court for an appropriate explanation. Br. of Appellant at 30. While we agree that the trial court gave no explanation for its imposition of consecutive sentences, we do not believe an explanation was necessary due to the circumstances of this case.
It is not contrary to law for a defendant’s State sentence to commence after the service of his Federal sentence.
Ridley v. State,
At the time that defendant was sentenced, Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2 (1988), was in effect. This statutory provision provides in pertinent part: “(a) ... the court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively.” We recently determined that this provision is “an express grant of authority to the trial court to impose consecutive sentences” and noted that this section has been “held to include the authority to impose a sentence consecutive to that of another jurisdiction.”
Ridley v. State,
IX
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing testimony of the complete statement given by defendant to federal authorities. Defendant contends that the court should have permitted him to introduce “evidence that Guthrie owed money to some cocaine dealers and that there was some indication that Guthrie may have been being followed by a blue van [which allegedly belongs to the cocaine dealers].” Br. of Appellant at 31. In other words, defendant seems to suggest that since incriminating portions of his statement were admitted, he was entitled to introduce the exculpatory portions of the statement as well.
Generally, a defendant who does not testify cannot introduce exculpatory statements made outside of court in order to enhance his credibility at trial.
See Canaan v. State,
The tria] judge focussed on the words “fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously with it” from Ind.Evid.R. 106 42 and the words “exclusion of relevant portions” from the McElroy case. Consequently, the court ruled “that only those portions of the statement given by [defendant] that are relevant and that relate to the context regarding his discovery of the body of Danny Guthrie will be admitted through the testimony of this police officer.” (R. at 1454-55.) The defendant’s statements regarding money that defendant contended Guthrie owed to cocaine dealers and the asserted presence of a blue van was not relevant to the discovery of Guthrie’s body. 43 As such, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to exclude this evidence.
X
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing testimony of other possible reasons for the death of Guthrie. However, defendant provides us with no citation to the record pertaining to evidence of alternate explanations of Guthrie’s death. A party must support its argument with citations to appropriate sections of the record.
See
Ind. Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7);
Wrinkles v. State,
In this argument, defendant also complains that the State performed no tests to exclude the possibility of suicide. We find no merit to this claim since defendant’s own expert testified, out of the presence of the jury, to the following:
My opinion will be to this Jury that this was not a self-inflicted gunshot wound, that there were fragments of metal in this wound and in this cadaver when it was exhumed that are unexplained, and that there was definitely room for procedures to be done to make some determinations in this investigation which were omitted at the time the investigation was done by both investigating officers and the medical examiner’s office.
(R. at 1710.) 44
XI
Defendant contends that the State did not present evidence to establish the corpus de-licti for murder. According to defendant, absent his statement, “the State could not even establish that Guthrie was dead, since he was missing and the State had found no body.” Br. of Appellant at 34. We disagree.
“A crime may not be proven solely on the basis of a confession.”
Light v. State,
We begin by noting that defendant’s statements to federal authorities did not constitute a confession. Indeed, defendant at all times proclaimed that he was innocent and only admitted to finding Guthrie dead and to having knowledge as to the whereabouts of Guthrie’s body. Nevertheless, even without defendant’s statements relating to finding Guthrie dead with a gunshot wound to the head, there was a sufficient evidence to establish corpus delicti. The medical examiner testified that Guthrie’s death was a result of a gunshot wound to the face. A firearm’s expert testified that the bullet which lulled Guthrie was fired from defendant’s 9mm gun. The medical examiner also testified that no gunpowder residue was found on the external surface of Guthrie’s bones. Although the evidence did not exclude the possibility that Guthrie committed suicide, there was sufficient evidence, both physical and circumstantial, to create a reasonable inference that a crime occurred and thus establish corpus delicti. “The independent evidence supporting the corpus delicti need not preclude every possible explanation of the circumstances.”
45
Stevens,
Conclusion
We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.
Notes
. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (Supp.1990).
. Defendant claimed that he placed the bomb under Kramer's police car because Kramer had been " 'hounding him' on the missing person investigation of Guthrie.” (R. at 51.) As a result of placing the pipe bomb under Kramer's car, defendant was charged with the federal offenses of Attempting to Damage a Vehicle by Use of a Bomb (Title 18, U.S.Code, § 844(i)) and using a bomb in connection with a crime of violence (Title 18, U.S.Code, § 924(c)). (R. at 19.)
. We presume that because the federal charges concerned Kramer and because Kramer had knowledge of defendant’s possible role in the missing person of Guthrie, the federal plea agreement was based on defendant providing information regarding Guthrie's whereabouts.
. Defendant did not testify at trial nor is there a transcript of the defendant’s statements to federal authorities in compliance with the plea agreement. However, several of the officers present at the time defendant provided his story testified at trial as to their recollection of defendant's statements.
. Defendant found Guthrie wearing only one shoe and the other shoe about 30-40 feet from the body. (R. at 1601.)
. While providing these statements to federal authorities, defendant indicated that he thought Guthrie was working for the police. (R. at 1312.)
. The record suggests that defendant was initially incarcerated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons in Leavenworth, Kansas. (R. at 19.)
. Defendant was sentenced to serve 210 months in federal prison. (R. at 501.)
. Defendant makes a distinction between use of the word "confined" in the statute providing for the Writ and use of the word "incarcerated” in the statute providing for the IAD. Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.) defines incarcerations as "Imprisonment; confinement in a jail or penitentiary.” Confinement is defined as "State of being confined; shut in; imprisoned....” We discuss these two statutes in detail infra.
. The doctrine of res judicata is divided into two subdoctrines — claim preclusion and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Defendant asserts that both subdoctrines apply. However, because we conclude that the hearing on tire motion to quash the first Writ did not result in a final judgment on the merits, it is unnecessary to analyze the subdoctrines of res judicata.
. We also note that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Ind.Code § 35-33-10-3. (1988), serves a similar purpose. Pursuant to the Extradition Act, "it is the duty of the governor to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that State with treason, a felony, or other crime who has fled from justice and is found in this State.” Ind.Code § 35-33-10-3(2). The demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another stale must be in writing and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by an information supported by affidavit in the State having jurisdiction of the crime. Ind.Code § 35-33-10-3(3).
. Ind.Code § 35-33-10-4 (1988) defines "sending state” as "a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time he initiates a request for final disposition pursuant to Article 3 of this section or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article 4 hereof." "Receiving state” means the state in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article 3 or Article 4 of the IAD, discussed in the text infra.
. See
United States ex. rel. Esola v. Groomes,
. A Writ is a certificate "addressed to the attorney general of the United States, certifying that such defendant has been charged by indictment or information filed against him in the specified court with the offense or offenses alleged therein, and that attendance of the defendant in such court for the purpose of criminal prosecution thereon is necessary in the interest of justice and requesting the attorney general of the United States to cause such defendant to be produced in such court, under custody of a federal public servant, upon a designated date and for a period of time necessary to complete the prosecution.” Ind.Code § 35-33-10-5(2) (1988).
. Section 14 of the First Judiciary Act gave authority to
"all the * * * courts of the United States * * * to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And * * * either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. — Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessaiy to be brought into court to testify.” 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789).
Carbo v. United States,
."The writ is ... a procedural device used by a prosecutor who is actively seeking a disposition of pending criminal charges, not merely attempting to hold the defendant for some future date.”
People v. Squitieri,
. For a more detailed description of the historical evolution of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, see
Carbo v. United States,
. There are advantages and disadvantages to the State's use of either detainers or writs in obtaining prisoners in federal custody. The primary disadvantage of using a detainer is that the IAD contains the anti-shuffling provision. Use of a Writ does not present such a problem and thus when custody of a prisoner is obtained through a Writ, the prisoner may be transported back and forth between jurisdictions.
Another disadvantage of using a detainer, although minor, is that a prisoner may challenge the "legality of his delivery” to the receiving state. Ind.Code § 35-33-10-4, Art. 4(d). The statute providing for the use of Writs does not establish any such rights for the prisoner.
The primary advantage to the State of utilizing detainers is that a uniform procedure under the IAD exists and both sending and receiving states (and the federal government) must comply with the procedures. On the other hand. Writs can only be issued to obtain custody of defendants confined in federal prison. See Ind.Code § 35-33-10-5 (permitting the use of Writs only for prisoners confined in federal prisons or institutions). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that state courts lack jurisdiction to issue Writs to order the production, or otherwise interfere, with prisoners in federal custody. Ableman v. Booth,62 U.S. 506 , 523-24,21 How. 506 ,16 L.Ed. 169 (1859). This principle has been reaffirmed on several occasions. See Comm. of Puerto Rico v. Perez Casillas,624 F.Supp. 822 , 830 n. 5 (D.P.R.1985). However, the federal government may, based on principles of comity, honor state-issued Writs. See Ponzi v. Fessenden et al.,258 U.S. 254 , 261-62,42 S.Ct. 309 ,66 L.Ed. 607 (1922); People v. McLemore,411 Mich. 691 ,311 N.W.2d 720 , 721 (1981); Runck v. State,497 N.W.2d 74 , 80 n. 3 (N.D.1993). This is apparently what happened here.
Another advantage of using detainers is that they can be lodged against a prisoner relatively easily because they can be filed by either a prosecutor or law enforcement official and do not need to be authorized by a court. Writs, on the other hand, can only be issued by a court in which the criminal action against the prisoner is pending.
. There have been only a handful of cases where the State has used a Writ as the exclusive means of obtaining temporary custody of a prisoner confined in a federal prison. In none of these cases did the defendant challenge the validity of the Writ.
See, e.g., Shropshire v. State,
. See the following cases which were decided before
United States v. Mauro,
.Defendant relies on
Webb v. State,
. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
. Indiana Const. art. I, § 12 provides, in part: "Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.”
. Ind.Crim.Rule 4(C) provides:
No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of this arrest on such charge, whichever is later, except where a continuance was had on his Motion or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of the congestion of the court calendar....
. Defendant does not advise us as to when he was transported to Indiana and does not direct our attention to an order contained in the record providing for his transfer. The record does contain defendant’s September 19, 1995, Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition requesting this Court to dismiss defendant's case with prejudice which stipulates that defendant was brought to the State of Indiana on November 9, 1992. (R. at 243.) Although we denied defendant’s Petition, we presume the facts set forth in the Petition are correct.
. We also note that defendant's speedy trial rights in Indiana do not commence until he is within the jurisdiction and exclusive control of Indiana authorities.
See
text in part III-A-1 and
Heflin
v.
State,
. We note that the court did set trial within 70 days as required by Ind.Crim.Rule 4(B).
. Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to quash the second writ. (R. at 135.)
. The trial date was set within the 70 days contemplated by Crim.Rule 4(B). Because defendant did not re-assert his desire for a speedy trial, this was not required. See Wheeler v. State, 662 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (“When a defendant requests an indefinite continuance and later becomes dissatisfied that his trial has not been reset, he must take some affirmative action to notify the court that he now desires to go to trial to reinstate the running of the time period.").
. In the Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition, defendant claimed (1) the anti-shuffling provision of the IAD had been violated and (2) defendant's right to a speedy trial under Indiana Crim.Rule 4(C) had been violated. (R. at 245-46.)
. Detective Kramer observed and listened to defendant’s statements via a closed circuit televi *104 sion located in the interrogation room.
. One of the detectives testified that defendant’s attorneys informed at least him that they had advised defendant of his rights. (R. at 715-16.)
. According to defense counsel, the prosecutor made it clear that they were not interested in pursuing charges relating to the bombing incident and marijuana cultivation or trafficking. (R. at 607.)
. See part XI, infra, concluding that the State was able to present independent evidence of corpus delicti.
. See
Everroad,
. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the *107 place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
. Officer Barney is employed by the Servier County Sheriffs Department in the State of Utah where the search and seizure took place.
. A subpoena duces tecum "may command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, documents, or tangible things designated therein; but the court, upon motion made promptly and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith.” Ind.Crim.R. 2; Ind. Trial Rule 45(B).
. Ind.Code§ 35-50-6-3(a) (1988) provides:
A person assigned to Class I earns one (1) day of credit time for each day he is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.
. We note that "[w]hen multistate charges have been filed against [a defendant], he has the burden on appellate review to establish that his out-of-state confinement was a direct result of the criminal charges which were also filed against him by another state.”
Cohen v. State,
. Indiana Evidence Rule 106 provides:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require at that time the introduction of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously with it. (emphasis added).
. Defendant was provided some latitude in that he was permitted to cross-examine Detective Kramer in order to presenl defendant’s statements that Guthrie was "involved [in] business deals that went bad in connection with saddles and horses and livestock ...and that Guthrie had re-ignited a partnership with defendant in connection with marijuana cultivation. (R. at 1429.)
.This testimony was actually elicited on cross-examination by the State, but the witness offered similar evidence on direct examination by defendant. (R. at 1707.)
.
“A
dead body alone is not proof of the corpus delicti in a homicide case; but an identified dead body with marks of violence thereon or surrounding circumstances that would indicate the deceased did not die from natural causes established prima facie that a homicide has been committed and the corpus delicti.”
Stevens v. State,