25 F.3d 702 | 8th Cir. | 1994
Patrick Sweeney, a Ladue police officer, appeals from the district court’s
On August 12, 1991, Lisa Jones, a Ladue Police Department communications officer, quit her job and accused unidentified supervisors of sexual harassment. Shortly after her resignation, Jones released the City of Ladue and its employees from any claims in connection with her former employment. However, because Jones refused to name the persons responsible for sexually harassing her, Ladue officials continued to investigate her allegations. During this investigation, officials learned that Jones and Patrick Sweeney were romantically involved and were living together. When officials questioned Sweeney about Jones’ resignation, he denied their relationship and denied any knowledge about sexual harassment occurring within the Ladue Police Department. The Mayor of Ladue terminated Sweeney on October 7, and Jones filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) a few weeks after his discharge.
Sweeney alleged that he was unlawfully terminated in retaliation for his relationship with Jones, a person engaged in protected activity under Title VII and the MHRA. Sweeney claimed that he was untruthful during the investigation because he feared being accused of sexual harassment. In response, the Mayor stated that she fired Sweeney because he lied during the Jones investigation and because of numerous work-related and off-duty improprieties.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Weber v. American Express Co., 994 F.2d 513, 515 (8th Cir.1993). When a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “Although summary judgment should seldom be granted in employment discrimination cases; if the plaintiff fails to establish a factual dispute on each element of the prima facie case, summary judgment is appropriate.” Weber, 994 F.2d at 515-16 (citations omitted).
Both Title VII and the MHRA prohibit employers from retaliating against employees who oppose an unlawful employment practice or who assist others in asserting their employment rights. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.-070(2) (1994). “In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation [under Title VII], the plaintiff has to show that (1) [ ]he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that adverse employment action occurred; and (3) that there is a causal connection between the two.” Sherpell v. Humnoke School Dist. No. 5, 874 F.2d 536, 540 (8th Cir.1989).
Sweeney argues that the close temporal proximity (less than two months) between Jones’ protected activity and his discharge demonstrates that the two are causally
Sweeney challenges the credibility of the Mayor’s reasons for his discharge and argues that his personnel file was reviewed only after Jones made her allegations and that some of the complaints against him were several years old. Sweeney ignores the fact that his record was reviewed after he lied during a departmental investigation. His reliance on Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981), is misplaced because in Womack, the plaintiffs admission and subsequent denial of his involvement in police brutality were inextricably linked to his then-pending suit for discriminatory discharge. Id. at 1297. In this case, Sweeney’s hinderanee of the sexual harassment investigation is obviously not part of the protected activity. Moreover, his untruthfulness during the investigation was the culmination to a litany of other legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination. See White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 985 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir.1993) (finding no genuine issue of fact regarding either discriminatory intent or the credibility of the employer’s reasons for its decisions). Because Sweeney has failed to sustain his burden of showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
. The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
. These complaints include: disobeying departmental rules about off-duty assignments; driving at an excessive rate of speed without emergency lights; failing to report his lunch break location; failing to a log a police call the Mayor made; behaving immaturely and rudely; and allegedly striking one Lisa Jones’ children.
. "Our analysis is the same for both the state and federal claims because decisions under the various federal employment discrimination statutes are applicable and authoritative under the Missouri Human Rights Act as well as federal law." Finley v. Empiregas, Inc., 975 F.2d 467, 473 (8th Cir.1992) (quotation omitted).
. Like the district court, we assume without deciding that Title VII would prohibit retaliation against an employee because of a close friend's protected activity.