Sweat v. StateSweat v. State
COBB, Presiding Justice, for the Court.
¶ 1. On certiorari, we review the Court of Appeals’ judgmеnt that affirmed in part the trial court‘s dismissal of the post-conviction relief motion filed by Joe Earl Sweat, but reversed and remanded for resentencing due to the trial court‘s improper suspension of a portion of Sweat‘s twenty-year sentence. Sweat v. State, 910 So.2d 12 (Miss.Ct.App.2004). We agree that the sentencing order was incorrect under this Cоurt‘s recent decisions and the statutory scheme for resentencing prior convicted felons, but we do not agree that it is necessary to remand for resеntencing. We hold that in accord with the provisions of
FACTS
¶ 2. On June 10, 2002, Joe Earl Sweat, a prior-convicted felon, pled guilty in the Itawamba County Circuit Court to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. His plea was accepted, and he was sentenced to twenty years in the custody of MDOC, with twelve years suspended and five years of post-release supervision. Sweat later filed a motion seeking post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed that motion. On Novembеr 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in part. However, by a 5-4 vote, it held “that the trial court erred when it suspended a portion of Sweat‘s twenty year sentеnce.” Sweat, 910 So.2d at 15. It further held that only the trial court has authority to modify the sentence, because “sentencing is the exclusive prerogative of the trial courts” and concluded it must vacate the sentence and remand to the trial court for entrance of a proper sentencing order. Id.
ANALYSIS
¶ 3. The relevant portion of Sweat‘s sentencing order reads as follows:
IT IS, therefore ordered and Adjudged by the Court that the Defendant be and he/she is hereby sentenced to serve а term of twenty years in custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections at a facility to be designated by said department, that twelve years of said sentence shall be and the same is hereby suspended and that the defendant shall be placed under post-release supervision upon the release from the term of incarceration
for a period of five years pursuant to Mississippi Code section 47-7-34 and said sentence is based upon the following cоnditions....
The Court of Appeals read §§ 47-7-33 and -34 to conclude that the circuit court did not have the authority to suspend the imposition of Sweat‘s sentence, because he had been previously convicted of a felony. Thus, the Court of Appeals remanded so that his sentence could be modified. This reading is not in linе with recent decisions by this Court.
¶ 4. The two statutes serve completely different purposes. Miller, 875 So.2d at 199.
¶ 5. We have held that, while
¶ 6. The present case is factually similar to Miller. In Miller, the defendant was incarcerated for one year and then released for ten years of supervised probation. Miller, 875 So.2d at 196. In that case we held that Miller‘s sentence should be mоdified so that he serves the statutory maximum of five years of “supervised” post-release supervision and five years of “unsupervised” post-release supеrvision. Id. at 200. Here, it is clear that the trial court sentenced Sweat under
¶ 7. The Court of Appeals held that any error, even one such as the present one, must be remanded to the trial court for resentencing. We now hold that it does not, and that we may resentence a convicted defendant without remanding tо the trial court in cases where the error is caused by a misapplication of a sentencing statute. The Court of Appeals cites Wallace v. State, 607 So.2d 1184, 1188 (Miss.1992), for the principle that sentencing of a criminal defendant is the sole prerogative of the trial court. However, Wallace and its progeny are distinguishable from the present cаse. In Wallace, the appellant, a criminal defendant, sought to have his sentence reversed because it violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment Id. at 1188.
¶ 8. This case does not present the same question but is in line with United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863 (5th Cir.1998). The Fifth Circuit admitted that in most cases it is required to
¶ 9. We have hеld that generally, where a convicted defendant receives an illegal sentence, the sentence must be vacated and the case remandеd to the trial court for resentencing because the defendant suffered prejudice. See Robinson v. State, 836 So.2d 747 (Miss.2002). The Court of Appeals has recently held that there is no prejudice suffered when a defendant receives an illegally lenient sentence. Edwards v. State, 839 So.2d 578, 580-81 (Miss.Ct.App.2003). Further, when the error benefits the defendant in the form of a more lenient sentence, it is harmless error. Chancellor v. State, 809 So.2d 700, 702 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). The law which relieves defendants from the burden of an illegal sentence applies to situations where the defendant is forced to suffеr a greater sentence rather than the luxury of a lesser sentence. Id. We agree with the Court of Appeals and therefore adopt its apprоach. Our holding today will not force Sweat to suffer incarceration for a period of time longer than he was legally obligated. It merely requires a modifiсation of the terms of the sentence. The total sentence is within the statutory maximum for the crime for which he was convicted. The unsupervised-seven-year рeriod does not cause Sweat to suffer a burden but rather is a luxury compared to the fact that he could have remained incarcerated during that time. Therefore, he has suffered no prejudice from the sentence of the trial court, and thus it does not require us to remand the case for resentencing.
CONCLUSION
¶ 10. For these reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court‘s judgment. We rеnder judgment here that Sweat will remain incarcerated for eight years as ordered by the trial judge; at that time he will be released under
¶ 11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE ITAWAMBA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON, GRAVES, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTIC