110 So. 2d 380 | Miss. | 1959
The appellant, Mrs. Gladys Swartzfager, sued the appellees, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company and G. L. Martin, for damages for personal injuries which she sustained when a truck owned by the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company and driven by its employee, G. L. Martin, collided with an automobile which the appellant was driving.
The collision occurred between 2:30 and 3 o’clock on the afternoon of February 9, 1954, at the intersection of 10th Avenue and 12th Street in the City of Laurel.
The appellant complain on this appeal of the inadequacy of the verdict, and of alleged error in instructions granted to the appellees, and in the court’s rulings on evidence. We have carefully considered the appellant’s complaints as too the instructions granted to the appellees and as to the court’s rulings on evidence, and are of the opinion that they are not well founded.
The only serious question presented for our solution is whether under the facts of this case and the instruction granted under our comparative negligence statute the verdict of the jury is so inadequate as to be deemed to evince bias and prejudice, justifying reversal.
Only two eye witnesses to the occurrence testified, namely, the appellant, Mrs. Gladys Swartzfager, and the appellee, G. L. Martin. The appellant testified that 10th Avenue runs generally in a north and south direction, and that 12th Street runs generally in an east and west direction; that on the occasion in question she was driving her automobile east on 12th Street approaching the intersection of 12th Street and 10th Avenue; that as she approached the intersection she was faced by a stop sign located at the intersection; that she stopped in obedience to the stop sign and looked both to the north and to the south on 10th Avenue; that she saw nothing approaching from the north but she saw
The appellee, Gr. L. Martin, testified that at the time of the collision he was employed by the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company and was driving one of the Company’s trucks in the course of his employment, and was proceeding north on 10th Avenue in the City of Laurel; that he was running about 30 or 35 miles per hour; that he first saw Mrs. Swartzfager approaching along 12th Street when he was about 200 feet south of the intersection; that as Mrs. Swartzfager approached
It will be observed that the evidence was conflicting on the issue of negligence of the respective parties, and that under appropriate instructions this issue was submitted for the determination of the jury.
Since the appellees prosecuted no cross-appeal from the verdict and judgment of the court below, we must view as established the negligence and liability of the appellees. Dixon v. Breland, 192 Miss. 335, 6 So.2d 122.
The evidence with respect to the injuries sustained by appellant and the permanent effect thereof, and the extent of her damage is undisputed. The appellant testified that when she regained consciousness in Oates’ Clinic to which she was taken after the accident, she was “deathly sick” and nauseated; that the nausea continued for two days and nights and that she stayed in the Clinic about five days and was then permitted by the doctor to go home; that her nausea and headaches continued, and that as a matter of fact, they had continued up to the time of the trial, which was at the March 1958 term of the court, or a period of approximately four years from the date of the accident; that she was treated in the Clinic and after her return home by Dr. Charles R. Jenkins; that she was also treated
The appellant further testified that from the time of the accident to the date of the trial she continued to suffer from headaches and nausea and was wholly incapacitated to do her household work and carry on her household chores; that at the time of the accident she was 40 years of age and was in good health and was able to do her household work, but that since her injury she had had to employ household help, entailing an expense of from $15 to $18 per week. The proof further showed that neither Mrs. Swartzfager nor her husband kept an accurate account of the expenses incurred by the appellant for doctors and medical bills and treatment. There is definite proof, however, that the appellant incurred a bill of $140 to Dr. Posey, a bill of $101 to meet the doctors and hospital bill at the time she was first injured, and a bill of $127 to a Dr. Ramsey, and a bill of $76 for x-rays, making a total of $444. The proof further is definite and undisputed that she incurred an expense of $15 per week over the four-year period from the time of the accident to the date of the trial, amounting to the total sum of $3120, and that this sum added to the medical expense of $444, aggregated a total outlay by the appellant of $3564 for doctors and medical expenses and treatment and expenses for household help to the date of the trial.
Dr. Charles R. Jenkins testified that he was connected with Oates’ Clinic and was at the Clinic on the occasion when Mrs. Swartzfager was brought there following the accident. He said that he observed her and that she was dazed and mentally confused and did not know where she was and was unable to give a history as to how she had gotten hurt; that he examined her and had x-rays of her taken, and the x-rays were negative as to a fracture of the skull. He said that he found a contusion on the right side of her head, and a contusion of
Mrs. Swartzfager was treated by Dr. Siegrist, who also recommended that she consult a specialist. On the recommendation of the appellant’s brother-in-law, Dr. Jimmy Swartzfager, the appellant consulted Dr. H. Tharp Posey, an outstanding neuropsychiatrist of the City of New Orleans. Dr. Posey treated the appellant from the 13th day of March 1957, through October 1957. He said that he first saw the appellant and examined her on March 13, 1957, and that at that time she gave him a history of having been involved in an accident in February 1954, and of her subsequent suffering from headaches, pain in the neck, dizziness, asthenia, loss of
The doctor further testified that he finally recommended that she return to her home and submit herself to the care of her local physician and have him supervise the medication and treatment which he would furnish the local physician. Dr. Posey explained that he did this for the reason that appellant’s trips from Laurel to New Orleans were so upsetting to her that they were becoming injurious and he felt that it was to the interest
It will be observed from the foregoing undisputed testimony that the appellant as a result of the collision suffered a serious brain injury which is permanent and renders her incapacitated to perform her usual labors and chores, and that she will continue to suffer headaches and nausea as a result of such injury for an indefinite period of time. It will be noted that the appellant’s actual outlay for doctors and medical expenses and for the hire of household help over the period from the date of the collision to the time of the trial in March 1958 amounted to the total sum of $3564, and that this exceed by the sum of $564 the amount of the jury verdict. It will be further noted that the damages awarded by the jury are wholly inadequate to compensate for future expenses for doctors’ bills and medical treatments and household help, and for appellant’s past and future pain and suffering, and that such substantial items of damages appear not to have been taken into consideration by the jury.
Considering the serious and permanent injuries which appellant has sustained, her actual financial outlay for medical and doctors bills and household help to the date of the trial, and expenses which she must necessarily incur in the future for doctors’ and medical treatment and household help, and her pain and suffering endured and to be endured in the future, we think that the award of $3,000 was grossly disproportionate to any contributory negligence which the jury may have found attributable to the appellant. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the verdict is so grossly inadequate as to justify the conclusion that it is either the result of prejudice or a failure on the part of the jury to properly evaluate the appellant’s injury and damages in relation to any
A question similar to the one here involved was presented to this Court in the case of Lee v. Reynolds, 190 Miss. 692, 1 So. 2d 487. In that case the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages to himself and his automobile which were sustained when he was struck by the defendant’s car on the highway. The plaintiff sustained serious injuries. There was an instruction under our comparative negligence statute. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $100. This Court, in reversing the lower court’s judgment because of the inadequacy of the award said: ‘ ‘ The question presented, therefore, is whether, under the facts and in view of an instruction under our comparative negligence statute (Code 1930, Sec. 511) the verdict is so inadequate as to evince prejudice justifying reversal.” .
The Court, after detailing the injuries of the plaintiff, further said: “When the extent of the injury, with the resultant pain and suffering, is considered and the property damage and other losses are computed conservatively by any standard, it must necessarily and fairly total an amount, as to which an award of only one hundred dollars would be grossly disproportionate to any contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff. . . . Regardless of the degrees of negligence properly attributable to the respective parties, we have no hesitancy in declaring the verdict to be so grossly inadequate as to evince prejudice; and if not the result of prejudice, it is due to an inadequate estimate of the total injuries suffered, or to an unjust appraisal of the degree to which the plaintiff’s negligence, if any, contributed to such injuries. ’ ’
What was said in the case of Lee v. Reynolds, supra, is particularly applicable to the case at bar. We have accordingly concluded that the judgment of the court below should be and it is affirmed as to liability and
Affirmed as to liability and reversed and remanded for trial on issne of damages only.