3 Kan. 374 | Kan. | 1865
By the Court,
Three reasons are assigned in the argument for reversing the judgment of the court below: First. The court had no jurisdiction of the parties or subject matter. Second. The motion for a new trial ought to have been sustained. Third. The demand of another trial ought to have been allowed.
II. The motion for a new trial was predicated upon three grounds: 1st. The finding of the court was not sustained by sufficient evidence. 2d. Surprise. 3d. Newly discovered testimony. Of these in the order stated: 1st. It has been repeatedly held by this court, and is the law everywhere', that a judgment of an inferior court will not be disturbed on the ground that the verdict of a jury, or finding of the court, is not sustained by sufficient evidence, if there was any testimony which, if true, would warrant the verdict or finding; any other rule of law would operate to endow this court, which was intended as a tribunal for the correction of errors of law alone, with the functions of a jury; and, in effect, convert it into a nisi prim court. Neither the present incumbents nor the members of the bar generally, it is presumed, are prepared for a judicial
That there was testimony in this case warranting the finding of the court, is too apparent for argument; not only that, it is difficult to see how any man of intelligence, on or off the bench, could have come to a different conclusion. Most of the testimony is full, circumstantial and clear upon the point in issue, while the discrepancies are much less than ought to have been expected in detailing transactions coming through a period of fifty years or more.
2d. The surprise complained of was the sudden illness of a witness. It is unnecessary to consider the question of diligence, inasmuch as the materiality of the testimony of the witness is not shown. The court had a right to know what he would swear to, in order to judge of its materiality, and was not bound to take the statement of counsel or client in that behalf The proposed testimony may have been wholly irrelevant, or entirely incompetent.
3d. The newly discovered testimony was known to the plaintiff in error before the case was submitted to the jury, and indeed before the production of the evidence was closed. At the commencement of the trial an order had been made for the separation of the witnesses, but the newly discovered evidence was not then known to the plaintiffs, and consequently the person in possession of it was not included in the order of the court. It does not appear, however, that he heard a word of the testimony of the other witnesses, or that any attempt was made to get in his testimony. Had he been offered as a witness, it may have been that the court in the exercise of its discretion, would have allowed him to be sworn, or the opposite party might have waived any objection to his testifying, which they probably would have done, the witness having been an attorney of the court. As no effort was made in
III. Chapter 1 of Title XVIII. of the Code, provides for two classes of actions concerning real property; one where suit is brought by a person in possession against a person who claims an interest adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such interest; the other where suit is brought for the possession. The latter is, by the Code, denominated “ an action for the recovery of real property,” (section 570.) No other action concerning real property is so designated by that act, and section 574, which authorizes “ another trial ” upon the demand of the defeated party, applies to this class alone. The proceeding in the court below was not “ an action for the recovery of real property,” and consequently not within the meaning of that section.
This court is therefore of opinion that the court below had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, and did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial, or in refusing the demand for another trial.
The judgment will be affirmed.