Swanson v. Brewster

use judicial a far more efficient re- SWANSON, Respondent, David expending additional re-

sources than hearings aimed postconviction sources right. reclaiming the constitutional More BREWSTER, Rebecca fundamentally, the record main- inquiry al., Appellants. et obligation in safeguarding tains the right present basic be with the trial No. A08-806. Transferring that responsibility court. Supreme Court of Minnesota. a trial the defendant when court disre- gards Cassidy mandate devalues Cas- June sidy. summary, I would that Fin- conclude

negan’s hospitalization Friday midtrial genuine emergency

due to a was voluntary; that the trial court’s conclu- contrary, inquiry,

sion made without erroneous; clearly

was error

was not harmless in view of the critical

stages I Finnegan of trial missed. would proceeding

also conclude that with trial in

Finnegan’s absence was an abuse dis- inquiry

cretion where into his medical sta-

tus and in continuing the difficulties

trial on Monday would have indicated very

there high was likelihood the trial place

could have taken with Finnegan

present. light of all the circumstances case, I this hold Finnegan would

was wrongly deprived right of his to be

present at his grant own trial and a new

trial.

PAGE, (dissenting). Justice join

I Meyer. the dissent Justice

ANDERSON, (dis- H., PAUL Justice

senting). join

I in the Meyer. dissent Justice Hunt, Lindquist, Reid R.

Kay Nord Lommen, Cole, Abdo, King Stageberg, & MN, P.A., Minneapolis, respondent. Genereux, Of- Genereux Law Mark S. Paul, MN; Fluegel, fice, and Wilbur W. St. MN, Office, Minneapolis, Fluegel Law appellants. Geer, Hart, Meagher & M.

William MN, curiae PLLP, for amicus Minneapolis, Lawyers Association. Minnesota Defense Laitinen, J. Stephen Hilary Loynes, appeals P. award. The court of affirmed the (cid:127) Paul, LLP, MN, King, St. Larson district court’s collateral-source determina- Underwriting amici curiae Minnesota Joint tion. We conclude dis- Association and Insurance Federation of count is a collateral source under Minn. § Minnesota. Stat. 548.251.We reverse and remand to the district court. Peterson, Peterson, Harper Paul D. & PLLC, MN; Woodbury, Craig and 0. 18, 2005, a On October motor vehicle Hudleston, Robins, Sieverding, E. Sarah by appellant driven Rebecca Brewster and LLP, & Kaplan, Minneapolis, Miller Ciresi father, appellant Christo- owned her MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Associa- Brewster, pher motorcycle collided with a for tion Justice. by respondent driven David Swanson at thе intersection of Summit Avenue and

OPINION Paul, in Snelling Avenue Saint Minnesota. H., ANDERSON, PAUL Justice. injuries Swanson sustained from the acci- primarily sought dent and medical care at David Swanson sued Rebecca Brewster Regions Hospital. Christopher and Brewster to recover dam- for ages personal injuries Swanson sus- coverage Swanson had a tained after motor vehicle owned through Christopher HealthPartners Christopher and driven Rebecca collid- Brewster had motor vehicle insurance motorcycle. A trial jury ed with was through the Farm Mutual State Automo- to determine the amount of held Swanson’s (State Farm). Company bile Insurance damages, the jury awarded Swanson acknowledged coverage HealthPartners its $62,259.30 past in medical expenses. for Swanson and notified State Farm of accordance with Minnesota’s collateral- right subroga- assert a HealthPartners’ statute, § source Minn.Stat. 548.251 any claim tion on award to Swanson.2 (2008),1 Hennepin County District specifically, More HealthPartners claimed award, part, Court reduced Swanson’s it a right had to “the reasonable value for insurer, by the amount Swanson’s medical any already claims that have been made or HealthPartners, paid to Swanson’s medical will in the future be made for medical and providers. The appealed Brewsters related been provided services have determination, arguing court’s that Swan- [Swanson].” son’s award also should have been reduced Nego- Swanson’s Medical Bills and the by the discount HealthPartners secured tiated Discount for Swanson through negotiation with providers. Swanson’s The seeking injuries Brew- treatment for the he accident, sters asserted that is a the discount collat- sustained in the in- Swanson $62,259.30 eral defined Minn.Stat. curred bills Re- § gions Hospital 548.251 and therefore the provid- court erred and other medical it negotiated- when failed deduct the In discharge obligation, ers. $1,169.80 discount damage paid amount Swanson’s in copayments Swanson original 1. injuries The Minn. Because Swanson's occurred while (2006), Stat. 548.36 was renumbered to driving motorcycle, he was the No-Fault 548.251 without 65B.46, apply. Act does not See Minn.Stat. change language. For its ease of readabili- ty, we throughout refer to the current statute opinion. $17,643.76. negligently vehicle operated ster motor HealthPartners amount, $43,445.74, forgiv- negligence was that her caused the acci- remaining injuries. providers appar- only and Swanson’s the medical dent en because their medical services to be at trial was amount ently discounted issue decided of HealthPartners. special as an insured damages. On ver- Swanson Swanson’s form, undisputed that because HealthPart- jury It is awarded dict Swanson negotiate $4,230 was able to $38,000 past pain ners and suffering, behalf, $62,259.30 entire $30,300 loss, past wage pain future and Swanson will discharged was suffering, and various amounts for by responsible for amount never be expenses health care that to- specific past dis- medical bills were which Swanson’s $62,259.30. all, jury awarded taled In counted.3 $134,789.30 to Swanson. anticipation litigation, of future State the district court received the After $10,500 for paid Farm HealthPartners verdict, Brewsters moved for a jury’s subrogation rights against HealthPartners’ under the collateral-source determination inju- for be liable Swanson’s

whoever statute —Minn.Stat. collateral-source as- released and ries. HealthPartners Specifically, § the Brewsters 548.251. Farm and the Brewsters signed State the damage the court to reduce asked rights which Health subrogation all by by contributions made Swanson’s award any against have Partners shall [sic] HealthPartners, insurer, including health legally liable for organization person negotiated discount HealthPartners se- bodily any, if M. injuries, of David providers. from Swanson’s medical cured Swanson, any ... full and benefit disagreed with the Brewsters’ The court may be offset which collateral source position only concluded litigation. We in future available $17,643.76 paid by HealthPartners was a (HealthPartners) any also release ] [ In accordance with collateral source. against claim David M. Swanson. 548.251, § subd. the court words, purchased Farm State $17,643.76 offset had to right owns HealthPartners now in by paid Swanson amount amount by any money paid HealthPart- recover premiums during the two- health if was behalf Swanson ners on Swanson’s year up to lawsuit— period leading recovering against in another successful See MinmStat. $4,570.64. subds. through tort action.4 ‍​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‍party computation, a result of this Swan- 3. As $134,789.30 award ulti- verdict was a tort action son’s commenced Swanson $13,073.12. The court Christopher mately Brewster reduced Rebecca and against Swanson costs disburse- injuries he also awarded personal for the sustained $5,309.59 accident, pre- in the amount of alleging that Rebecca Brew- ments subrogation purchased right agreements be- State Farm 3. Under certain contractual providers, securing and medical obstacle tween insurers there would be no so that agree accept a many providers amounts reduction for a collateral-source recover- reduced and to refrain from on Swanson's behalf. HealthPartners patient. Mi- ing money more from (exclud- 2(1) See Minn.Stat. Beard,. Changes Impact chael K. The those ing reductions from collateral-source Systems Care Provider Reimbursement Health subrogation which a collateral sources Damages Ex- Recovery Medical on the asserted). right has been Suits, penses Injury Am. J. Trial in Personal Advoc. $7,496.32. amount of ions. appeal- verdict interest Id. at *4-5. The Brewsters court we judgment granted The final Swanson’s favor was ed our review. $134,522.09 postverdict plus interest. appealed

The Brewsters the district I. judgment, arguing court’s order only appeal issue before us on by failing classify the court erred whether a like the one negotiated-discount amount as a collateral HealthPartners with Swanson’s by failing to reduce source and Swanson’s providers is a collateral source award that amount. Brewsters under Minn.Stat. 548.251 and should the court should have re asserted therefore be deducted damage duced Swanson’s damage award. expenses entire amount medical billed Common-Law Rule Collateral-Source ($62,259.30) less Swanson’s health insur ($4,570.64). premium payments ance The When an entity individual or other than affirmed appeals court the district plaintiff a compensates a tortfeasor tort in court’s collateral-source determination injuries, her plaintiff his or the has unpublished decision. Swanson v. received a In “collateral-source benefit.” Brewster, A08-806, 511747, No. 2009 WL job benefits, donations, coverage, surance 2009). 3, *1 (Minn.App. at Mar. gratuitous examples are services of opinion, appeals In its the court of indi- Hueper collateral-source benefits. See v. Gоodrich, (Minn. 828, that it was to receptive cated the Brew- 830 1982); argument, stating Dobbs, sters’ Brew- B. the Dan The Law Torts of law, sters’ “assertion that the of a discharge Under common the col may way debt function same as an a plaintiff the lateral-source benefits receives expenditure actual of funds for purposes impact responsi of have no on a tortfeasor’s logical. bility the collateral source statute” pay damages plaintiff. was to the to The at acknowledged Id. *4. The court also component substantive of the common-law damage states, that failing to reduce awards plaintiff collateral-source rule “[A] negotiated-discount tortfeasor, amounts results from damages recover a recovery, undermining purpose although plaintiff double money has received reparation collateral-source statute. Id. But or of services from the court noted published also two a source than other the tortfeasor. The opinions, negotiated-dis- injured it had held that person benefit conferred on the count amounts are not collateral sources. the collateral source is not credited at (discussing Id. *2-3 Foust v. McFar- against liability....” tortfeasor’s land, (citation (Minn.App.2005), Hueper, rev. 314 N.W.2d at 830 omit (Minn. ted) 16, 2005); Aug. denied Tezak v. (holding pay defendant had to Bachke, 698 N.W.2d (Minn.App.2005), plaintiffs entire expenses costs (Minn. 2005)).5 24, rev. denied Aug. though provided The even a hospital plaintiffs court then affirmed the charge); district court’s de- medical free of care accord Re cision, (Second) relying prior published opin- its statement 920A -Torts 511747, appeals The acknowledged court of Mikulay, also 2009 WL at *2. court decisions, least Mikulay plaintiffs damage one of its v. Dial reduced a tort C9-89-1711, 57530, Corp., through No. 1990 WL *3 amount discounted Medicare—an 8, 1990), May (Minn.App. patient government held that amount neither the nor Swanson, required pay. discounts are collateral sources. 1990 WL at *3. a (1979).6 award. Minn.Stat. Accordingly, under common- plaintiff rule a tort subd. 3. statute allows a law collateral-source compen- actual more than the may receive party to file a requesting a motion deter- re- essentially “double sation jury mination of collateral after a sources amount — must covery” tortfeasor damages awarding returns verdict —because compensation regardless the entire plaintiff. Minn.Stat. subd. 2. compensation sources.7 Ordinari- motion, receipt Upon of such the court component to evidentiary there ly, must determine: rule well that “bars admission as (1) amounts of collateral sources that the existence of collateral evidence of been have for the benefit receipt or the of such benefits plaintiff or are otherwise available damages, irrelevant to the issue of plaintiff except as a result of losses jury.” liable to misused Scott be right those for which a has subrogation Garfield, 454 Mass. 912 N.E.2d asserted; and been (2009) J., (Cordy, concurring). ap- rule was common-law collateral-source paid, that have amounts been con- until 1986. plicable in Minnesota tributed, by, of, or on behalf forfeited members of the Legislature the Minnesota family two-year peri- immediate for the in or- passed the collateral-source immediately before the accrual of the od prevent recoveries some double der right to a action secure collateral Act Mar. ch. plaintiffs. See plaintiff source benefit receiv- 878, § Minn. Laws 878-79 a losses. ing as result of (codified 548.251); Imlay § at MinmStat. City Crystal, 453 Lake 548.251, § Minn.Stat. subd. 2. (Minn.1990) (“[T]he primary goal of directs the The collateral-source statute prevent statute] collateral-source to [the by to the award the amounts court “reduce ”). by plaintiffs.... double recoveries (1), under subdivision clause determined rule on changed statute the collateral by in the any and offset reduction award awards, essentially damage

sources and under subdivision the amounts determined plaintiff a recover providing that cannot (2).” 548.251, § clause Minn.Stat. subd. if the money damages from the defendant 3(a). rath- The court makes the reduction already compensation received plaintiff has that the court jury. than the To insure er parties third or entities. See from certain reduction, pro- the statute determines the § the Procedurally, 548.251. Minn.Stat. the informing jury from parties the recovery through hibits prevents double statute compensa- plaintiff court the has received by reduction the district post-trial a ability compensation. See to secure other 6. The Second Restatement of Torts describes rule, example, Hueper, the common-law collateral-source a 830. For "[playrnents to made or benefits conferred damage should not be tortfeasor's injured party not from other sources are plaintiff had the a tort decreased because against liability, al- credited the tortfeasor’s foresight purchase health insurance. See though they part all for cover or a of the harm Likewise, gift a if the benefit is a from id. which the tortfeasor is liable.” Restatement donor, third-party should not tortfeasor (Second) § Torts 920A. plaintiff gift made the tort from the benefit injured "the donor intended that because justification 7. The central common- gift and that the benefit party received the not tortfeasor, a is that law collateral-source rule tortfeasor.” Id. be shifted wrongdoer particular a as a who caused harm, plaintiff's from a tort should benefit (4)a entity. wage or voluntary from individual contractual or con- tion another 548.251, plan provided by 5. employers Minn.Stat. subd. tinuation or any provide other system intended to collateral-source statute Minnesota’s di- disability, a wages during period ex- rectly abrogates the common-law collater- private cept benefits received a that it a al-source rule to the extent allows disability where policy defendant, situations, certain to reduce premiums wholly paid by were a damages he owes when plaintiff. compensation other plaintiff has secured injury. But the 1. Under the only partially abrogates the com- statute, terms district court Although mon-law collateral-source rule. given reduce award amounts compensation from or entity individual plaintiff only by pursuant four traditionally than the tortfeasor other has provisions listed the statute. Minn. benefit, been considered collateral-source Stat. subds. the collateral-source statute defines the Negotiated Discounts and Other Juris- sources,”

phrase requires “collateral dictions compensation from a non-tortfeasor from a if plaintiff’s be deducted it Here, question negoti is whether a within statutory fits definition collat- ated discount obtained eral sources. The statute states: is a health insurer “collateral source” as section, purposes For “collateral this 1(2) defined subdivision collater means payments sources” related to the addressing al-source statute. Before ne question or disability in made to gotiated discounts in context of Minne plaintiff, or on the behalf sota’s collateral-source we first verdict, up to the date consider how discounts are pursuant to: jurisdictions. treated Several oth federal, state, a or local income dis- jurisdictions er have considered whether a ability Act; Compensation or Workers’ plaintiff may negotiated recover a discount public program providing or other medi- item damages. analyses as an expenses, disability payments, cal or conclusions of these courts are varied. benefits; similar jurisdictions Courts some that follow the (2) health, sickness, accident and or au- common-law collateral-source rule have tomobile liability accident insurance or a held that discount is a collateral-source provides insurance that health benefits benefit, in treating it money essence like a or income disability coverage; except by delivered to insurer a life insurance benefits available provider healthcare on an insured’s behalf. plaintiff, whether purchased the See, Mezzanotte, e.g., v. Hardi 818 A.2d others, plaintiff provided by or pay- 974, (D.C.2003). 983-85 In accordance ments pursuant made to the United with the common-law collateral-source Security Act, pension States Social or prohibition reducing rule’s a plaintiffs payments; benefit, a collateral-source these (3) a contract or a agreement group, courts have that the held discount cannot organization, partnership, corporation or against be credited the tortfeasor’s liabili provide, for, words, or ty; plaintiff reimburse the in other a may recover hospital, medical, costs of dental oth- the discount amount from the tortfeasor. services; See, er health e.g., care id. Some of these courts also

271 intro to render that are con party may that a not deavored decisions state explicitly See, legislative e.g., intent. paid that a sistent plaintiff duce evidence Frohman, (Fla. 830, 901 money v. So.2d 833 lower Goble provider care a 2005); See, v. Jubitz Or. Corp., White e.g., the amount billed. amount than (2009). DBart, 580-83 Inc., 219 P.3d v. 302 Wis.2d Leitinger (2007). 1, 18 736 N.W.2d Negotiated the Context Discounts in the No-Fault Statute jurisdictions that follow in other Courts rule common-law collateral-source yet we have not addressed the While are not negotiated discounts have said negotiated of a discount in the con- issue sources, de- and therefore allow did collateral of the collateral-source we text introduce evidence fendants the issue the context of the No- address to a money an delivers v. amount of insurer Fault Act in Stout Insurance AMCO (Minn.2002). satisfy plaintiffs Co., provider Swan- healthcare Walker, v. Stanley authority debt. See son cites Stout as for the district (Ind.2009); Robinson court’s decision. N.E.2d Bates, St.3d 857 N.E.2d Ohio Stout, pe- a motor vehicle driver hit require These courts do not at 109. destrian Jason Stout. 645 N.W.2d be deducted motor vehicle no-fault insurer driver’s award; in other plaintiffs damage from a claim, ar- expense Stout’s medical denied words, preclude plaintiff not they do the motor intentional act guing recovering a discount. accident, driver, rather than an vehicle (declin- Robinson, at 1200 857 N.E.2d injuries. In the mean- caused Stout’s Id. categorical plain- rule that a ing adopt time, Medicaid and MinnesotaCare may recover discounts tiff be- medical assistance benefits on Stout’s stating jury that “[t]he and instead half, his medical bills were discounted value of medical decide reasonable $13,167.29 pursuant to Medicaid billed, amount originally care is the fee Id. at 109- MinnesotaCare schedules. provider accepted the medical court that the no- 10. The district found between”). payment, or some amount coverage improperly fault insurer denied hold that is enti- These courts was entitled to basic eco- and that Stout expenses tled to reasonable medical insur- loss benefits from the no-fault nomic provide original “[b]oth our at 110-11. The issue for See id. er. as accepted bill and the amount rendered loss appeal was whether Stout’s court on the prove are full admissible $13,167.29 dis- the included necessity charges and reasonableness ultimately 112. held Id. at We count. hospital care.” rendered for and that it did. 1200; at Stanley, at 906 N.E.2d

See id. Stout, we noted that under the No- In “ 858. Act, detriment Fault loss ‘economic states, Minnesota, the causing like have from the resulting accident Other of,’ consisting only among have other passed injury that statutes ” expense,’ and that the collat ‘medical partially abrogated things, common-law “ occurs, accrues not when rule. When faced with deter ‘[l]oss eral-source is in- expense are ... medical ... negotiated discounts as mining whether but added) 112 (emphasis at by plaintiffs, courts in states Id. recоverable curred.’” 65B.43, subd. 7 have Minn.Stat. (quoting collateral-source statutes that have (2000); en 65B.54 their statutes and have interpreted Id.; (2000)). see also Collins person that a in- count We concluded amount. Exch., as Farmers Ins. expenses curs medical he receives bills 244- Minn. that expenses later-negoti- for those (interpret- modify contract, ated discount does not the amount ing an specifically words, “incurred.” Id. at 113. “incurred,” word to mean that the insurer loss, pur- we concluded that Stout’s initially who denied its insured’s claim Act, poses of the No-Fault was the total amounts, must pay the billed rather than than the amount billed rather ten- his actually paid the amount the insured provider dered to care Stout’s health to medical providers). satisfy the bill because the total amount McFarland, In Foust v. one of the cases billed expenses was the amount cited to support position, Swanson his id. at 113-14. Stout. See

incurred Stout appeals the court of relied on concluded Stout We also it would conclude that courts should not ne- deduct inappropriate be a court reduce gotiated-discount amounts from a plain- Stout’s basic economic loss benefits damage tiffs award under the collateral- negotiated-discount amount because the source statute. 698 N.W.2d at As 36.8 provide No-Fault Act not did for such a noted, previously urges Swanson do us to reduction. explained We such a re- same, asking adopt reasoning tous our duction would be “inconsistent with the from Stout that a dis- hold Act’s designation of basic economic loss count is not a collateral source. Swanson benefits primary would violate the emphasizes general also proposition prohibition Act’s coordination of Stout that “if there is to be a windfall benefits.” Id. at We concluded that 113. insured, either to an insurer or to an holding a responsible no-fault insurer See go windfall should insured.” the entire amount billed “removefs] Stout, incentive delay for no-fault insurers to reasoning We conclude payment of claims in hope meritorious outcome of Stout do us to require injured person’s health insurer adopt preferred in this outcome step will her medical bills Stout, case. we interpreted the No- Id. at 114. For at a discounted rate.” Fault Act. But we dealing here are reasons, Stout that a these held we no- the collateral-source dif which is fault insurer provide must basic economic form, ferent from the No-Fault Act in injured loss benefits per- “even when purpose, and function. compensation son is entitled to for the First, same loss from a different source.” form the two statutes is id. Accordingly, no-fault insurer had different. Act part The No-Fault to compensate for the comprehensive legislative Stout entire amount scheme. The limits; up policy billed damages phrases Stout’s and words “economic loss bene- fits,” were not expense,” reduced dis- “medical and “incurred” Foust, ities,” In nego- asked a tortfeasor for collater- and relied Stout to conclude a al-source at the determination district court tiated discount not a collateral Id. source. appealed level and when district court did at 36. The also court observed that a collat- $72,481.27, damage not reduce the award negotiated for eral-source deduction dis- negotiated amount. discount 698 N.W.2d appropriate count was nоt because neither appeals explained at 35. The court that it plaintiff company his insurance nor purpose found “the both [the behind no-fault “paid” Id. those amounts. at 36. and to statutes have similar- collateral-source] Stout, pay expenses to likely Act at issue in insurer medical and the No-Fault analysis negotiate reasoning of the a discount. at issue in our here are not Instead, in this legal is flawed. While a no-fault insurer’s collateral-source statute. accident, case, liability arises time of an “payment” “collateral source” at the use is does have the immedi- at issue their instructive tortfeasor same are question responsibility pay us. ate a tort resolving before A expenses. or his health Second, purpose function bills, pays any insurer and an al- pur two statutes are different. damages tortfeasor if leged pays only “is to pose of the collateral-source statute liable. found Because tortfeasor would prevent plaintiffs,” double recoveries likely get of any benefit discount at one of the Imlay, 453 N.W.2d while litigates, he concluding whether settles or Act is to goals of the No-Fault ensure negotiated discounts are collateral promptly automobile-accident victims are encourage sources would not a tortfeasor loss, see compensated their Minn.Stat. contrast, litigate. under the no-fault 65B.42(1) (2008); § Fami Do v. American only scheme there need be determination Co., ly Insurance N.W.2d Mutual directly of which automobile insurer must (Minn.2010). end, No- To this benefits, including economic loss medi- encourages prompt payment Fault Act expenses; cal a determination of fault is Clothier, сlaims, Schmidt v. unnecessary. Reducing award (Minn.1983), making in part by in negotiated discount the collateral-source primary no-fault insurers context does not raise the same concern as in injured automobile benefits those governed by the No-Fault Act. a situation prohibiting coordination accidents form, purpose, Because the and function benefits, Stout, loss basic economic Act and of the No-Fault Stout, we were N.W.2d 112-13. different, statute are we conclude that our awards reducing damage concerned reasoning controlling in is not Stout would encour by the discount § interpretation our of Minn.Stat. 548.251. to with age no-fault automobile insurers Therefore, analysis our of Minn.Stat. insur plaintiff’s hold benefits until a and our determination of wheth- 548.251 er has with medical creditors. is a “collateral er a Stout, 645 at 114. concluded We source” under the collateral-source practice would one that such contravene interpretation focus on of the must Act, purposes the No-Fault which “ used that statute. words encourage appropriate medical ‘[t]o treatment of the auto Minnesota’s Statute and rehabilitation Collateral-Source by assuring prompt mobile accident victim Legislature enacted The Minnesota ” (quoting for such treatment.’ Id. treat- Minn.Stat. 548.251 to control the 65B.42(3)(2000)). as ment of collateral sources cases such defines argues that his dam- this. The collateral-source statute reducing Swanson “payments related negotiated-discount “collateral sources” age disability question or made engenders in a tort the same to the suit plaintiff, plaintiff’s on the behalf par- we Stout. More or concern addressed verdiсt, by pursu- dam- the date ticularly, reducing up he asserts that sickness, health, encourage to ... accident age award would tortfeasors ant liability insurance or liability litigation in or- automobile accident deny protract and that health benefits.” plaintiff provides to force a tort or his health der (2008) (“[W]ords 548.251, § § 1. phras subd. Swanson ar- Stat. 645.08 and language this the collateral- gues that es are to according construed rules unambiguous, is and ‍​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‍that grammar statute according to their common negotiated discounts are collateral Also, usage_”). approved stat “[a] points the statute. He sources under out interpreted, possi ute should be whenever “pay- sources are defined as collateral ble, give provisions.” to effect to all of its “payment” clearly asserts that ments” and Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 277. A court paid.” According means “an amount to must “read and a statute construe as a Swanson, money given exchange interpret whole and must each section in goods paid,” services is “an amount or but light surrounding sections avoid of debt is not “an amount forgiveness And, interpretations.” conflicting Id. final paid” and therefore ly, “courts should construe statute to payment. is not a Swanson concludes that unjust avoid absurd results and conse because a discount is not a pay- quences.” at Id. 278.

ment, the district court’s collateral-source

determination was correct and that step any The first statutory are not Brewsters entitled further interpretation is to if determine the statute damage reduction of the award. unambiguous. is clear and Id. 277. If language unambiguous, the statute’s is we argue The Brewsters that the collateral- give plain must it its meaning. Wynkoop v. unambiguous, is source statute but assert (Minn. Carpenter, 574 N.W.2d plain meaning payment while 1998). If language ambigu the statute’s is money given, includes amounts of it also ous, the court “look outside statu amounts “written off includes or dis- tory text legislative to ascertain intent.” charged” because the words Id.; see also Minn.Stat. 645.16 pay include the concept discharging of a A meaning ambiguous statute’s if it is alternative, debt. In the the Brewsters subject to more than one reasonable inter if argue that the collateral-source statute Schroedl, pretation. 616 N.W.2d at 277. is ambiguous, legislative history Legislature statute —that the was attempt- mandate, foregoing Given the we pro- ing liability to address the insurance crisis analyze ceed to the collateral-source stat- through tort suggests negoti- reform — ute to determine meaning whether the ated discounts are collateral sources. “collateral unambiguous. sources” is Based either approach unambigu- —an specifically statute defines the term “col- ambiguous ous or statute —it the Brew- lateral “payments sources” as related to position sters’ that the district court erred disability in question made to when it failed to reduce plaintiff, behalf, or on up the discount HealthPartners pursuant date of verdict on Swanson’s behalf. ... ... insurance.” Minn.Stat. construing statute, “When our subd. The also directs goal ascertain is to and effectuate the in courts to determine “amounts of collateral legislature.” tention of the Am. Family sources have been benefit Schroedl, Group Ins. plaintiff or are otherwise available (Minn.2000). Schroedl, we declared as a result losses.” 2(1) that courts are (emphasis “to construe and Minn.Stat. words added). phrases according plain “payment” “paid” thеir ordi The words 277; nary meaning.” Id. at are nor accord Minn. not defined does the But, Law expand upon phrase “payment.” the “otherwise as Black’s Dictio- states, payment may a nary something be available.” cash; “[tjhe money other than it is or Dictionary “pay- Law defines Black’s thing other valuable so delivered in satis- (1) “[p]erformance of an ment” as both the obligation.” faction of an Black’s Law money or delivery of obligation added). Here, Dictionary 1243 (emphasis in thing accepted par- some valuable HealthPartners delivered another valuable of the and discharge obligation” or full tial thing providers to Swanson’s medical in (2) thing so money or other valuable “[t]he debt; satisfy i.e., order to obligation.” in of an delivered satisfaction providers gratuitously medical did not (9th Dictionary Law ed. Black’s $17,643.76 full agree accept to as satisfac- 2009). Heritage Dictio- American $62,259.30 in tion for Swanson’s medical (1) “[tjhe defines as act nary “payment” appears bills. It that HealthPartners and being paid,” and or the state of paying providers some type had Heri- paid.” American “[a]n understanding in exchange that for English Language tage Dictionary of its referring policyholders HealthPartners (4th 2000). to the According ed. them, they to provide would medical ser- Heritage Dictionary the word American policyholders. at a discount vices to these give in money can mean “pay” “[t]o party understanding Each such an rendered,” goods services return or gain something would valuable. The medi- give exchange goods in or (money) “[t]o have providers cal would not discounted (a services,” discharge or or settle “[t]o agreement Swanson’s bills absent an or an Id. 1291. obligation).” debt Therefore, HealthPartners. we conclude that argue The Brewsters because the a payment discount was “pay” “payment” words and include the exchange it things because involved debt, a discharging satisfying idea of or a to discharge value Swanson’s medical negotiated discount is a collateral source. obligations. bill contractual definitions, foregoing we Based ordinary with the agree Brewsters being “payment” In addition to under and plain meaning “pay” words ordinary plain meaning discharging the idea of “payment” include word, also discount satisfies satisfying But the that the or a debt. fact statutory requirements qualify the other “pay” “payment” include the words is payment as a collateral source: discharging idea of a debt does not mean disability injury ques- or in “related “payment” the payment tion” and that is made on the the word is in the used to a in- pursuant behalf Accordingly, we conduct a statute. must specifically policy. surance The statute penetrating analysis meaning more of the provides that “‘collateral sources’ means in “payment” of the word the context of payments disability related statute. question made ... on ... in- conducting analysis pursuant When such we behalf ... health ... difficulty coming little have to the con- surance.” Minn.Stat. ordinary

clusion that mean- satisfied Swanson’s medi- plain HealthPartners ing delivery money than cal debts with the word broader meaning negotiation narrow of a discount because the advocated Swan- only money giv- provided medical care to argues providers son. Swanson goods injured is a after he was the acci- exchange en services Swanson by dent Rebeсca Ac- agree caused Brewster. We with the analysis Florida court’s in cordingly, the was secured re- in it applies Goble and conclude to the in injury question. lation to the facts of this case.10 The discount secured by HealthPartners was as much a paid As the discount on benefit to whether was behalf, Supreme $17,643.76 Court of to Swanson as the HealthPart- Goble, point Florida this in addressed 901 ners tendered to pro Swanson’s medical Goble, So.2d at the Florida court viders, delivery because the of money did interpreted a collateral-source sim- satisfy alone Swanson’s medical debt. ilar to Minnesota’s9 the context of a $17,643.76 of HealthPartners tender motorcycle explained accident and that: providers medical plus discount it ne providers’ Because of con- gotiated providers with the medical re HMO, tracts tort plaintiffs] [the obligation lieved Swanson of his to pay the tort plaintiff] obligated [the was bills, total amount of his which $145,970.76, the claimants rather than $62,259.30. amounted Based on our charges $574,554.31. billed this analysis, foregoing we conclude that light, negotiated by the discounts [the through discount HealthPartners secured plaintiffs] tort HMO are as much a ben- agreements its providers with the medical plaintiff] efit to tort [the as the HMO’s type payment, payment is a is relat $145,970.76 satisfy remittance ed to Swanson’s or disability, and remaining charges on plain- tort [the on was made Swanson’s be medical bills. tiffs] pursuant half to a policy. health insurance 833; Letourneau, Id. at see also Acuar v. See Minn.Stat. subd. 1. There Va. S.E.2d fore, we the negotiated conclude that dis (“Those amounts written off are as much is unambiguously count a collateral source of a benefit ... as аre the actual cash purposes payments of the made collateral-source statu health insurance carrier to the health providers.”). care te.11 statute, passed

9. Florida’s collateral-source therefore collateral sources under its collater- " 1986, states, Nevertheless, 'Collateral sources’ means al-source statute. the dissent in- claimant, payments made made correctly special makes a claim that the con- behalf, by pursuant the claimant’s to ... justices currence three of the of the Florida health, sickness, [a]ny disability or income Supreme significance Court undermines the insurance,” and "the court shall reduce the majority’s analysis. This is not the amount of such the total of all special The supports case. concurrence amounts have which been benefit analysis of the court whole and concludes claimant, or which are otherwise avail- negotiated "[t]he contractual discounts claimant, able to the from all collateral plaintiff’s] [the tort HMO fall under the sources.” Stat. Fla. 768.76 statutory definition of 'collateral sources' that against are to be set off an award compen- correctly 10. rely dissent we asserts that Goble, satory damages.” 901 So.2d at 833 Supreme on the analysis Florida Court’s J., (Bell, specially concurring). special Goble, a case which the Florida court inter- simply points concurrence out that the result preted a collateral-source statute similar to interpretation would be the its same under important ours. But it is to note while compensatory-damages princi- common-law opinion broadly Florida written we plеs negotiated because discount sums are not opinion limit provide our use of that ana- proper damages. item of actual Id. lytical support for our conclusion discount secured HealthPart- ners majority was obtained on 11.The Swanson's behalf. The dissent’s statement Florida "ignores Legislature's specific court in Goble also concluded that use of the payments 'payments’ discounts were word in Minn.Stat. provider. Nevertheless, dis legal analysis that a Our conclusion purposes source for in by count is a collateral the courts supports used these cases statute is consistent the collateral-source in our conclusion that the Stout “substance us to urges law. Swanson our case [of the two is the same.” transactions] case, in reasoning Stout to this apply the addition, parts other of the collateral- actually ap in language but Stout some support statute that source our conclusion pears position. to contradict Swanson’s unambiguous- the term “collateral source” that argues money payments and Swanson ly includes a discount. Our fundamentally negotiated discounts are provides case law that we are to read and Stout, different; out that pointed but we statutes construe a whole. See substantively is not negotiated discount Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 277. we When money payment. from a See different read and construe the collateral-source Stout, that holding at 114. In statute as a whole sec- interpret and each by discount secured neither sections, the it money light surrounding tion payment nor a made insurer appears argument limiting be the no- that Swanson’s insurer could deducted from obligation, exрlained, meaning “money fault we the insurer’s collateral source to the forms of transac “Although the two too interpretation delivered” is narrow an differ, find important we it more tions for at least three reasons. that, standpoint of the no-fault First, pro- the collateral-source statute

insurer, substance Id. their same.” “payments vides that collateral sources are have drawn conclu Other courts similar ... pursuant ... made to ... a contract stated, purposes court sions. One “[F]or agreement or of a group, organization, rule, no rational the collateral partnership, corporation or provide, money pay distinction exists” between for, hospital, or reimburse the costs of by an of a ments made insurer on behalf medical, dental or health care ser- negoti a healthcare provider’s 1(3). vices.” Minn.Stat. subd. pursuant made contrac ated discounts issue, preliminary As a we conclude Safeway tual relationships. Lopez v. of’ word phrase “the costs modifies the Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 129 P.3d “provide” but not the word “reimburse” Haldar, (2006); also see Mitchell “pro- for.” can phrase “pay one While (Del.2005); 883 A.2d Brown v. Van services, one “pay for” health care vide” Noy, (Mo.Ct.App. 879 S.W.2d services; “reimburse” care cannot health 1994) (“[T]he expenses fact were health one must “reimburse the costs of’ material ‘taken care of Medicare is not Moreover, phrase if the care services. ly expenses paid by than insur different for,” “pay modifies “provide,” “the cost of’ part part ance or insurance with re- “reimburse” would be pursuant contract or ‘written off to a be- because there is no difference dundant agreement provider between care of health providing tween costs company.”). Courts the insurance paying for the cost of healthcare. ap foregoing interpreted cases Therefore, phrase of’ modi- “the costs plied the common-law collateral-source Because only the word “reimburse.” rule could recover fies and held only the phrase billed care “the costs of’ modifies full amount their health D-10, 1,” we have light the dissent’s is unfounded in refute assertion subd. infra by the analysis just specific language used statutory completed. ignored analysis legislature. slip op. relyWe at 18-23. on that “reimburse,” satisfy part in the able to discount this clause stat- use that word Therefore, “provision” debt. we conclude ute demonstrates medical, $43,445.74negotiated or other hospital, dental is a is a collateral source. Minn. collateral source because it was “otherwise care services 1(3). Therefore, available” Swanson. we Stat. Legislature intended that the conclude Third, interpreta- we conclude that our broadly interpreted

word be be- tion of the collateral-source statute effectu- that the provision cause the statute states Legislature. ates the intention of the See a of health care services is collateral § 645.16. said that Minn.Stat. We have the though delivery source even it is not the of Legislature specifically to intended abro- money plaintiff, plaintiffs “to the the gate in part common-law collateral- behalf.” by “preventing] rule double recov- 2(1) Second, many Imlay, and 3 of the eries in See subdivisions circumstances.” specifically in- 453 at 331. In passing collateral-source statute collat- statute, district court reduce the dam- Legislature struct a eral-source ended age plaintiffs. “collateral sources that have certain double recoveries for 548.251, § paid plaintiff been for the benefit of the or See Minn.Stat. subds. 1-3. plaintiff.” Though Legislature are to the specifically othemise available exclud- (em- 548.251, 2(1), § Minn.Stat. subds. ed some traditional collateral-source bene- added). fits, phasis gifts family members, The phrase “otherwise such as defining available” indicates from the statute’s definition collateral sources, 548.251, phrase “money § “collateral sources” de- see Minn.Stat. subds. 2(2), 3, a creditor” specifically payments livered to is too narrow because it included provision suggests pursuant this of the statute that made to a plaintiff plain- money sources can payments policies, collateral be tiffs health insurance see Minn. 1(2). 548.251, § plain or can be otherwise available. con- Stat. We subd. lan- interpretations guage clude that other would ren- of the statute demonstrates that Legislature der words super- “otherwise available” while the to maintain intended and conflict fluous with rule that a the common-law rule in give gifts, Legislature statute be construed “to effect to all instances of familial provisions.”12 abrogate its See Minn.Stat. intended 645.16. the rule instances The discount HealthPartners coverage plaintiffs health insur- 1(2). providers ‍​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‍Swanson’s medical on his ance. “paid” Regions behalf was not not any principle as a Swanson has offered tender, money but it why Legislature was “otherwise avail- reason would treat able” to Swanson because Swanson types comрensation— was two insurer words, interpretation appears party 12. An alternative only er a third is contribution rendering avoid super- "otherwise available” collateral source under the statute if it occurs fluous—that collateral sources "otherwise before a verdict is issued. We conclude that money available” refers to a tender that is interpreting collateral that are "oth- sources yet available to the has not but been "money erwise available” to mean that has physically interpretation this delivered. But yet delivered” been is unreasonable be- provisions is inconsistent with other cause, according money to the collateral-source statute and is flawed be- yet has not delivered time of been cause collateral source "made collateral-source determination —which oc- plaintiff, plaintiff's up or on the behalf post-verdict curs be collateral —cannot verdict,” to the date See Minn.Stat. source. added). (emphasis subd. 1 In oth- money pay- money would recover a sum of on a discounts and based words, differently. portion of his medical bills that he never ments — explained Legis- why has not and never will pay. Swanson have to More- over, allow reduc- damage-award lature would bills might the medical themselves money pays amounts of an insurer tions not be a true measure of the reasonable health care services on the injury. value of -Swanson’s commen- One behalf, allow reduc- damage-award but not points ter out that negotiated discounts negotiated by an insurer tions discounts asks, are now common “If most [medi- care on the for health services in the сal]'providers community accept the behalf. ‘paid same or similar in full charge’ satis- claims, faction of their can it still be hon- asserts that an application

Swanson estly suggested charge’ the ‘billed common-law collateral-source rule is Beard, 457; supra, reasonable?” see in this he appropriate instance because (“Current- Stanley, also 906 N.E.2d at 857 prudence to secure foresight had the ly, relationship charges between premiums and he for paid health insurance ”). at costs is ‘tenuous best.’ The conse- that in turn policy with HealthPartners quence interpretation ap- of Swanson’s him to receive services. allowed discounted pears Leg- to contravene intent of the Legislature provided plain- But the that a by requiring islature Brewsters to coverage health insurance is a collat- tiffs for compensate Swanson a loss he did not purposes eral source for of the collateral- suffer, by permitting recovery.” “double even aware though source statute it was Again, given Legis- our conclusion that the for that plaintiffs premiums that often to abrogate lature intended the common- insurance. See Minn.Stat. law collateral-source rule in cases of health 1(2). accounted Legislature subd. And benefits, insurance see Minn.Stat. 2(2) premium payments for subdivisions 1(2), § 548.251, it would be inconsis- requiring and 3 of the district courts tent to allow to make deductions re- courts offset collateral-source by an health money paid of an award by duction the amount but not for the an insur- insurers amounts premiums by or the that Accordingly, negotiates er discounts. plaintiffs family. it that appears Because interpreting we conclude Legislature abrоgate the intended to collater- to include discounts as in cases common-law collateral-source rule consistent intention al sources is with the from a health plaintiffs of benefits derived Legislature. it policy, insurance would be absurd to allow result collateral-source deductions argues interpreta- Swanson that broad by in- money paid health is phrase tion of the “collateral sources” surer but not for amount an insurer because inappropriate the collateral-source negotiates as discount.13 derogation statute is in of the common law are consequences interpreting and therefore we to construe stat- strictly, limiting applica- statute to mean are discounts ute the statute’s Legisla- Minn. instances not collateral sources as defined tion to those where expressly clearly Stat. 548.251 would that Swanson declares or indicated be ture opin- ing paragraph completely The dissent's our is read and in con- characterization of holding text, applies ion as "the statute 'in cases of through excerpt rather than used plaintiff's from a in- benefits derived the dissent. ” forego- policy' surance refuted when the it the common abrogated law rule. See cluded discount should Renovations, LLC, Rosenberg Heritage not be deducted from a damage award. (Minn.2004). Though N.W.2d But provide support these cases do not it strictly is true that we must construe the the dissent’s assertion that our decision collateral-source statute because it is in “represents a minority distinct view.” We law, derogation of the common see id. at do not believe that the fairly dissent can 327-28, it is also true that we should not so categorize opinion our as a “distinct minor- narrowly construe statutes that we disre ity” because interpreting we are a law gard Legislature’s intent, Maust v. different from the being interpreted law Maust, 135, 139, 222 Minn. by the 16 courts cited the dissent. Our construction of stat The dissent also explain fails to note and ute harmony must be sensible and in lists, 15 of the 16 cases it the courts Maust, purpose. the statute’s interpreted and applied the common-law Minn. at 540.14 rule, collateral- collateral-source statute designed to ad earlier, explained statute. As dress instances when a party third —such common-law collateral-source rule states government, as the company, collateral sources not be deduct- or an organization discharges a tort — ed from a damages award. plaintiffs medical debts whether a mon Courts these 15 cases determined that ey payment or otherwise. See Minn.Stat. money given to a medical provider by a l(l)-(3). We conclude party third discounts are that the Legislature clearly indicated that both collateral sources and are recoverable it abrogate intended to the common-law plaintiff. Though we have never be- collateral-source rule in instances com fore question, addressed the foregoing we pensation by plaintiffs insurer, acknowledge that it possible that we including discounts by that in could have come to a similar conclusion as surer and secured on the behalf. these 15 if courts Minnesota still followed Rosenberg, See 685 N.W.2d at 328. We the common-law collateral-source rule cannot and should not scope lessen the entirety. here, its But this is not the case beyond statute Legislature what the because Minnesota no longer strictly ad- Maust, intended. 139, 222 Minn. at heres to the common-law collateral-source N.W.2d at 540. entirety. 1986, rule in its our Legisla- The dissent “deny[ asserts that to ] passed ture a collateral-source statute that plaintiff the benefit of a insur- modifies the common-law collateral-source ance represents a distinct minori- rule, and we interpret must that statute to ty view among state courts that have con- applies see how it in this case. sidered the issue.” at D-8. Infra effort support statement, this dis- sixteenth case cited the dissent sent cites several juris- cases from other was decided Oregon Supreme White, dictions in which other 212, courts have eon- Court. 347 Or. 219 P.3d 566. Maust, 14. In Maust v. we explained: legislature. tion of the The strict construc- pushed tion should not be to the extent Although a rule of strict construction is nullifying applied purpose beneficial of the stat- derogation statute in ute, law, lessening scope plainly common it should nevertheless intended be con- sensibly given strued harmony to be thereto. with the statute, 139, purpose (citation so as to 222 Minn. at advance and 23 N.W.2d at 540 omitted) (internal render purpose omitted). effective such quotation and the inten- marks damage tiffs award under collateral- but a collateral-source Oregon has decided, that insurance ben- statute. These cases were specifically provides it source damage from a decided, deducted may efits not be rely on a case that was before 578, 580; Or.Rev.Stat. award. See id. at collateral-source statute was Minnesota’s the Minnesota Because 31.580 enacted. provides oppo- jury that The dissent also nоtes site, helpful case is not Oregon $62,259 damage fairly found that a negotiated discounts determining whether adequately compensates Swanson for dam- from a be deducted should expenses, argues past age award Minnesota.15 second-guess we are not free find- cases cited Similarly, the Minnesota at in an ing. D-ll. The dissent Infra Kron, Dahlin v. dissent, 232 Minn. footnote, earlier at D-7 n. cites infra Dyson (1950), N.W.2d Robinson, 857 N.E.2d Ohio Schmidt, 129, 140, 109 260 Minn. explains original that both an case (1961), dispositive are not amount accepted medical bill and the when Minneso- they because were decided full payment prove could be used to the common-law collateral- ta followed value of reasonable medical services. i.e., entirety, rule in its before source attempting if it is dissent is mistaken the collateral- Legislature passed when jury considered the mon- suggest Further, we note that the statute. in full ey accepted satisfaction Ince v. Aetna Health Eighth Circuit case original bill to determine the Swanson’s (8th Inc., 672, 676 Management, 173 F.3d reasonableness of the cost Dah- Cir.1999), by the dissent cites quoted services, juries in or that future Dahlin, Dyson, lin as its authority. While cases could determine reasonableness and Ince correctly state that intro- damage amounts if the defendant past medical ex- damages measure of money duces the amount of used to dis- of the ser- the reasonable value penses is charge original medical bill. Under received, support they provide do not vices Minnesota’s collateral-source negotiated that a dis- for the conclusion not informed of the plain- jury from a shall be “[t]he not be deducted count should damages specifiс actual cated to the items uses the terms "strained” 15. dissent ly fact finder's verdict.” disregard” our included within the in reference to "blatant[] Supreme A.2d at 172. The Connecticut analysis. We the terms are 838 do believe Court, "construing] attempting avoid analysis. appropriate to describe our More over, pur way that would thwart its terms statute in we find the dissent's use of these specifically pose” "only payments inappropriate given the concluded particularly dis to be damages corresponding includ with items cases at D-8 5 sent’s use of several n. infra jury's verdict be deducted as provide questionable support [can] ed in the at best Kramer, dam sources from the economic collateral its conclusion. Neither Jones 177; Oden, (2004), ages Id. at In award.” 838 A.2d 170 Allstate Conn. cf. Rudnick, (Fla. ("[0]nly at N.Y.S.2d 661 N.E.2d 761 So.2d 289 surance Co. v. actually 2000), payments that Chemung County those collateral source Oden v. Industri nor particular category of awarded eco Agency, replace a Development 87 N.Y.2d al (1995), may the in be used to reduce address nomic loss N.Y.S.2d 661 N.E.2d 142 Jones, court jured’s judgment.”) The Connecticut the issue of discounts. Jones, address discounts. example, whether Connecti did not the issue was Allstate, 177.; So.2d "requires see also 838 A.2d cut's collateral-source statute pay (holding potentially pay that benefits at 293 trial court to deduct all collateral sources); damages are not collateral plaintiff’s able in the future ments from the economic Oden, award, 661 N.E.2d at payments 637 N.Y.S.2d only those that were allo or $61,089.50 maining obligation, collateral sources or fu- the total existence of may which not be ture benefits of “collateral sources that have plaintiff.” tо the Minn.Stat. payable paid been for the benefit of [Swanson] 548.251, § subd. 5. are otherwise available to [Swanson]” $61,089.50 for purposes Minn.Stat. properly purposes “collateral sources” for of the statute, lateral-source MinmStat. 548.251 statute, Minnesota collateral-source Minn. (2008), beyond plain which extends Stat. 548.251. therefore hold We that the meaning to a discount between district court erred its collateral-source company insurance and his classify determination because it failed to providers. interpret “payments” medical I the amount which Swanson’s medical according plain ordinary to its mean- providers discounted Swanson’s medical ing to exclude the amount of a write-off bills as a collateral source. Because of Thus, paid. that no one has I would hold Swanson’s accident with Rebecca Brew- injured plaintiff procured who ster, expenses Swanson’s medical totaled coverage is entitled to the bene- $62,259.30. copayments After of discount, fit of the not the tortfeasor who $1,169.80, $61,089.50 in charges remained. injury. caused the money Because HealthPartners deliv- ($17,643.76) action, ered to the providers personal injury In a the measure combined with damages past expenses of ($43,445.74) fully satisfied Swanson’s re- the reasonable value medical services

283 Kron, that health care expenses provid 232 Minn. medical Dahlin v. See received. (1950). 833, 312, 320, compensation 837 We off 45 N.W.2d ers wrote constitute injured party tortfeasor). required have never source collateral to medical services the full value of paid have multiple We have noted rationales those to be liable for for the tortfeasor the common-law collateral-source rule. Schmidt, 260 v. Dyson services. a plaintiff One rationale is that when has (1961) 140, 262, 129, 269 109 N.W.2d Minn. benefit, example, by for a purchas- recoverability in that “the test of (noting insurance, reimbursed ing he “should be depend does not damages” Minnesota get a wind- and the tortfeasor should not medical bills have “whether or upon Hueper, fall.” at 830. 314 N.W.2d We Court paid”). Eighth As the Circuit been explained that insurance cover- also have observed, law has “Minnesota Appeals injured “is not a fact which ing party injured party that an long provided has liability lessens the defendant for the ‘reason may recover from a tortfeasor Solberg Willys- received, Minneapolis tort.” v. of medical services able value’ Co., 10, 12, 224 177 Minn. N.W. injured acquired Knight if the ser party even (1929); 271, Aetna Health for less.” Ince v. 272 accord Donohue v. Acme vices (8th Inc., 672, Co., F.3d 676 Cir. Mgmt., 173 214 Heating Roofing Sheet Metal & 1999). 424, 426, 618, 8 N.W.2d Minn. (stating escape ‍​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‍that a defendant “cannot collateral-source

Under the common-law liability wrong for his because of insur- rule, plain all of a the fact that some or protection ance” carried for the paid by an expenses tiffs medical were In the context of an insurance plaintiff). independent prevent source does not write-off, the collateral-source rule dictates recovering same medi plaintiff from those of the reduced benefit Imlay expenses cal from tortfeasor. See not the solely plaintiff,” “inures City Crystal, Lake 453 N.W.2d (Minn.1990). injury. The collateral-source caused the tortfeasor who Hoff- contexts, variety in a includ applies Leichtfuss, rule man v. Wis.2d proceeds, employment ben ing “insurance put, Simply servicеs, efits, gifts money or medical luxury “Wrongdoers are not allowed the advantages.” tax welfare benefits injured’s on the basis of the a discount Goodrich, Hueper v. 314 N.W.2d having secured insurance good fortune (medical (Minn.1982) provided services Fred Lane or other financial assistance.” see, Tassel v. charge); e.g., free of Van Lane, 1 Lane Goldstein Trial & Scott Co., Ins. 296 Minn. Horace Mann (3d 2009). § 2:106 ed. Technique (1973) (in 188-89, 348, 352-53 the reach of The issue here concerns Elec., surance); Local Int’l Union of Minnesota’s Mach. v. Mass. Mut. Radio & Workers § The collateral-source Minn.Stat. 548.251. Co., 455, 459, 165 Ins. 282 Minn. Life by allow- changed the common law (1969) (donated blood); 234, 236-37 N.W.2d damages a tortfeasor to reduce a ing 140, 109 at Dyson, 260 Minn. plaintiff received the amount benefits). (workers’ compensation 269 enumer- certain “collateral sources” ap rule also common-law collateral-source in the statute. See Minn.Stat. ated in the context of a dis plies 548.251, (defining § 1 “collateral See, e.g., Acuar v. count of medical bills. sources”). 316, Specifically, we must deter- Letourneau, S.E.2d 260 Va. 531 (2000) of a portions of mine whether (explaining 322-23 284 statutory

medical bill falls within the defi- gates the common-law collateral-source nition of “collateral sources.” rule. The enumeration of four categories of collateral in sources the statute neces

The collateral-source statute defines sarily excludes other collateral sources not “collateral “payments sources” as related listed. See Nelson v. Productive Alterna disability question or in made tives, Inc., (Minn. 715 N.W.2d 457 plaintiff, or on the behalf 2006) verdict, (explaining up statutory to the date of the canon of pursu- or ant to”: construction that thе expression of one another). thing is the federal, state, exclusion of or For local income

disability example, gifts or Compensation Workers’ and charitable contributions Act; or other public program providing are not included in statutory definition medical expenses, disability payments, of “collateral sources.” See Minn.Stat. benefits; or similar § Additionally, subd. 1. the collat (2) health, sickness, accident and or eral-source statute only upon touches automobile liability accident insurance or “payments.” Id. When the collateral- insurance that provides health benefits implicated, statute is not the com disability or income coverage; except mon-law applies. collateral-source rule life insurance benefits available to the ah, Michael K. Steenson et Minnesota plaintiff, whether purchased by the Liability Practice —Products Law 13.8 provided by others, or pay- ments pursuant made to the United We must decide this case whether the Act, States Social Security pension or collateral-source statute extends to gap payments; between the amount pro- billed medical (3) a contract or agreement of a viders and the amount paid by a health group, organization, partnership, or cor- insurer. Our primary goal statutory poration for, provide, pay or reim- interpretation give is to effect to the intent medical, burse the costs of hospital, den- Legislature. Auto Owners Ins. Co. services; tal or other health care (Minn.2008). Perry, v. 749 N.W.2d (4) a contractual voluntary wage We construe “according words to their plan provided continuation by employers common approved usage.” Minn.Stat. or any system intended to provide 645.08(1) (2008). “Generally, statutes wages during period of disability, ex- derogation of the common law are be cept benefits private received from a strictly Rosenberg construed.” Heritage disability policy where the Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d premiums wholly were (Minn.2004). Under long-established our plaintiff. statutory construction, rules of we will not subd. 1. The collater- construe a statute altering “as the common al-source statute procedure sets forth a law further than language of the stat- which a party in a civil may request action clearly ute necessarily requires.” Kel- that the district court determine and de- Co., ly v. First Minneapolis Trust duct “amounts of collateral sources that 215, 217, Minn. (1929); 226 N.W. have been paid for the plain- benefit of the Co., Family accord Do v. Am. Mut. Ins. tiff or are otherwise plain- available (Minn.2010) (inter- tiff as a result of losses.” Minn.Stat. statute). preting collateral-source § 548.251,subd. 2. As the majority acknowledges, majority acknowledges the col The that statutes lateral-source only partially statute derogation abro of the common law are to be construed, delivery blatantly disregards something ments” as the of valu yet strictly money other than in satisfaction of an statutory interpretation able principle of this obligation word interpretation “payments” does not adopts expansive and —the goes encompass paid satisfy an amount not to interpretation “payments” —an only The ordinary meaning obligation. thing of the word that Health- beyond the paid.” The Partners delivered to Swanson’s medical as “payments” “[a]n satisfy Dictionary providers the En- Swanson’s debt was Heritage American 2000). (4th $17,643. $17,643 only thing The Thе is the Language 1292 ed. glish qualifies “payment” under the statute as a majority relies on a strained construction question and reach the conclusion that related to the made “payments” payment a on the behalf. See MinmStat. “the discount was things Treating subd. 1. a write-off— exchange it involved the because paid “pay an amount no one has a discharge of value —as rely logic I ment” defies both and common sense. obligations.” contractual would bill reasoned, ordinary meaning Supreme of the As the Ohio Court has plain and write-off, it pays “an amount “Because no one can “payments” to mean word possibly payment any a is not not constitute and hold that tortfeasor paid” dis- benefit from a collateral source.” Robin entitled to benefit from Bates, her dam- son v. Ohio St.3d 857 N.E.2d count of a medical bill reduce 1195, 1200(2006).3 under Minnesota’s collateral-source ages statute.2 event, express there is no decla- majority’s ration or clear indication Minnesota’s applying

But even Legisla- statute that the “pay word interpretation strained —the majority Although my disagreement available’ to Swanson.” The rea fundamental 1. majority interpretations concerns its construction of sons that other of "collateral "payment” in a that modifies the term render the words "otherwise sources” would law, I also note there is no the common superfluous. Simply because the available” evidence in the record of contract between applica words “otherwise available” have no Regions. Consequently, HealthPartners do tion here does not mean that the words not majority speculate ap- "[i]t is left to meaning have in other situations in other pears that HealthPartners and the medical Supreme The Florida Court has contexts. type understanding providers had some interpreted the words "otherwise available” exchange referring that in for HealthPartners statute to mean in Florida's collateral-source them, policyholders they provide would its already paid have been "those benefits that policy- at a discount to these medical services owing.” presently due Allstate that are holders.” Rudnick, (Fla. Ins. Co. v. 761 So.2d 2000). applying the collateral-source 2. reduces the district court determines then Supreme the view that 3. The Ohio Court takes jury "amounts of collateral sources “[bjoth original medical bill rendered have been for the benefit of the accepted ad as full are the amount otherwise available to the or are prove the reasonableness and ne missible to (em plaintiff.” Minn.Stat. cessity charges medical and rendered for added). phasis majority concedes that Robinson, hospital 857 N.E.2d at care.” supposedly discount—while Walker, 1200; Stanley v. N.E.2d accord "payment” not under subdivision 1—"was (Ind.2009). appeal This does 857-58 money Regions tender” under 'paid' to negotiat admissibility at of a involve the trial majority suggests subdivision value the reasonable ed discount to establish scope falls within the of the collater of medical services. statute because "it was ‘otherwise al-source 286 McFarland, 24, abrogate (Minn.App 698 36 the common-law N.W.2d

ture intended (Minn. 2005). .2005), 16, Aug. rev. involving negotiated discounts denied rule in cases Leg If the a behalf. secured on majority analysis relies on of a clearly plain intended that had islature Supremе the Florida Goble v. Court tiff not the amount of a recover Frohman, 830, (Fla.2005), 901 833 So.2d damages, of tort part discount as concluded that contractual dis- which a could have limited Legislature expressly fits within statute’s count the Florida def- recovery expenses “to the sources, but it sig- inition collateral actually paid actually incurred that at three of the seven nificant least claimant, by or of the whichever on behalf justices limiting that case believed lower,” as an bill in amount is unsuccessful damages to the amount ac- Legisla a of the recent session Minnesota tually was consistent Florida’s 1310, 8,§ ture S.F. 86th Minn. proposed. law, (Bell, J., id. at spe- common 833-34 Furthermore, pub Leg.2009. previous Only justice cially concurring).4 one ex- the court opinions, appeals lished consis pressed contrary point a of view. Id. tently (Lewis, J., concluded discounts concurring). 835-36 Further- more, do not “collateral un denying constitute sources” the benefit of See, Bachke, e.g., der the Tezak v. repre- statute. insurance discount 37, (Minn.App.2005), 41-42 minority among 698 distinct view sents state (Minn. 2005); 24, Aug. rev. denied Foust v. courts have considered issue.5 1135, (Miss.2002); limiting plaintiffs recovery 4. Other courts So.2d 1139-40 Brown v. 667, actually paid Noy, (Mo.Ct.App. to the amount have used similar 879 676 Van S.W.2d See, 1994); 212, e.g., reasoning. Corp., Moorhead v. Ches White v. 347 Or. 219 Crozer Jubitz 786, Ctr., 156, 566, Davis, (2009); ter 564 Pa. A.2d 789- Med. 765 P.3d 580-83 Haselden v. 481, 293, (concluding injured party (2003); 91 that the S.C. 353 579 S.E.2d 294-95 Harbert, 510, recovering should the amount be limited Papke v. 738 N.W.2d 535-36 v. Letourneau, actually paid (S.D.2007); 180, for the medical services and Acuar 260 Va. noting "paid" by 316, (2000); that the write-off was not S.E.2d 531 322 v. Koffman source); 31, 201, Auth. Leichtfuss, collateral Hous. 635, 246 Wis.2d Hanif v. County, Cal.App.3d (2001). 200 246 Yolo Cal. According Kentucky 208-13 to the 192, (1988) (concluding Court, Rptr. 194-95 suggest Supreme “it is absurd proper damages the amount measure the tortfeasor should receive benefit from a services). actually paid for medical arrangement” contractual between an insurer provider. Baptist care and health Healthcare rationales, Miller, 676, Employing majority Sys., (Ky. various Inc. v. 177 S.W.3d 683 2005). many courts that have considered the issue have While of these courts are fol injured plaintiff lowing concluded that an is entitled the common law collateral-source rule, full to recover the amount of reasonable med "around half the have states abolished charged, expenses including speci ical la amounts or limited collateral source rule for See, Dobbs, claims," e.g., Safeway Lopez ter written v. The Law off. fied Dan B. Torts Stores, 487, Inc., 198, majority's 212 Ariz. 129 P.3d 496 1059 In contrast (2006); Haldar, 32, here, approach v. have Mitchell 883 A.2d 40 other courts construed (Del.2005); Mezzanotte, narrowly pre Hardi v. 818 A.2d statutes 974, Marrero, See, (D.C.2003); e.g., 248 985 Olariu v. serve common law. Jones v. 824, 121, Kramer, 170, (2001); 336, Ga.App. 549 267 A.2d S.E.2d 123 Conn. 838 177-78 81, Rudnick, Bynum (2004); Magno, v. 106 101 P.3d Allstate Ins. 761 So.2d Hawai'i Co. v. 1149, Foster, (2004); 289, (Fla.2000); Chemung County 293 v. 1160-62 Wills v. 229 Oden 1018, 26, 81, Agency, Ill.2d 323 Ill.Dec. 892 N.E.2d Dev. N.Y.2d 637 Indus. 87 Louisiana, (N.Y. (2008); 144 N.Y.S.2d N.E.2d Bozeman 1995). (La.2004); only "recognizing] So.2d 705-06 v. Gar those Scott altera field, clearly that are 454 Mass. N.E.2d tions common law Stores, Frierson, statute,” (2009); expressed language of the Wal-Mart Inc. v. in the

287 rejection ey. payments” of a Minnesota’s collateral- majority justifies its majority source relies on by rea cases “payments” narrow construction jurisdictions applying from other the com “in construction is soning that a “broader” negotiat mon-law collateral-source rule to purpose.” statute’s harmony with the Lopez Safeway ed discounts. v. Maust, 135, 139, 222 23 Minn. Maust Stores, Inc., 198, 487, 212 Ariz. 129 P.3d (citation omitted) (1946) 537, 540 N.W.2d (2006); Haldar, 495 Mitchell v. 883 A.2d оmitted). (internal But marks quotation 32, (Del.2005); Noy, 40 Brown v. Van 879 legislative consider- purpose we do not 667, (Mo.Ct.App.1994).7 S.W.2d 676 statutory language is clear. when the majority’s analysis ignores Legisla Sons, Mousing, Inc. v. 777 Hentges S.M. & specific “payments” ture’s use of the word (Minn.2010) 228, (citing 232 Minn. N.W.2d § 548.251,, in Minn.Stat. to define 645.16(1)-(4) (2008)).6 Moreover, Stat. By holding “collateral sources.” majority asserts that although the “in applies cases of benefits de abrogate Legislature clearly intended from a plaintiffs rived health insurance collateral-sourcq rule in the common-law majority effectively policy,” rewrites coverage, in prior of insurance instances the definition of “collateral broadens have construed the collateral- cases we benefits, encompass sources” to .insurance narrowly to exclude certain source statute payments rather than insurance as the in coverage namely forms of insurance — language of the statute dictates. N.J. Cf. connected to the tortfeasor. See surance (West 2010) (defin §Ann. 15-97 Stat. 2A: Do, (holding 779 at 860 that “liabil collateral ing sources as “benefits for made a tortfeasor’s auto ity payments injuries allegedly incurred from a collateral source mobile insurer are not tortfeasor”); joint than a source other Or. purposes of the collateral source stat (defining Rev.Stat. 31.580 collat Co., ute”); Family v. Am. Mut. Ins. Dean eral sources terms “benefits” and (Minn.1995) (holding providing that a court not deduct liability pay that “a tortfeasor’s benefits; in from a verdict life insurance trigger ment” does not the collateral- benefits; retirement, disability surance statute). benefits; pension and federal So plan benefits). no concluding Security Noting that there is distinction сial this dis payments, tinction “negotiated and “mon between benefits between discounts” ute,” Supreme Supreme explained: the Idaho Court nonetheless Connecticut Court "The derogation plaintiff recover that statutes in of the com held that cannot rule type "it strictly be seen to amount of the write-off because mon law are construed can designed continuity was policy [the statute] and stabil of windfall that serve same McKinley, system prevent.” Dyet v. 139 Idaho ity legal as the doctrine of stare in the (2003) (citation omitted) Jones, P.3d decisis in relation to case law.” omitted); (citation omitted) (internal (internal quota quotation marks accord A.2d at 177 Mich., omitted). 292 A.D.2d Kastick v. U-Haul Co. tion marks of W. (N.Y.App.Div. 740 N.Y.S.2d disregard 6. We “the letter of the also cannot 2002). pretext pursuing law ... under the Notwithstanding majority's reliance on spirit.” courts 645.16. Other cases, ultimately op- negoti they denying plaintiff these all reach the benefit of majority transparent posite as the and hold ated have been more conclusion analysis. example, that a is entitled to recover their For while acknowl edging "technically negotiated discount in a tort is not a amount of a that write-off 496; Mitchell, Lopez, action. See 129 P.3d from collateral source within 40; Brown, 879 at 676. meaning stat 883 A.2d at S.W.2d [Idaho's] collateral source Oregon Supreme windfall, Court has concluded the tortfeasor receives a because that write-offs should not Medicare be de damages pay the tortfeasor must are under Oregon’s ducted from verdict col reduced as the result of pro statute, reasoning that lateral-source ‍​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‍“the injured party: cured exempted judicial legislature deduс argument underly- The that there is no ‘benefits’; Security it not tion Social did ing obligation plaintiff ” Security ‘payments.’ exempt Social and, therefore, amount of the write-offs White, 219 P.3d at 576. should not be allowed to addition, majority justifies its de- debt, benefit from non-existent falls allowing that cision on the basis Swanson reasoning because the effect of this re- to recover the amount of the in a sults diminution of the tortfeasor’s compensate discount him “for a would loss liability vis-a-vis insured victim when he did not suffer.” This strictly is not compared with the same lia- tortfeasor’s majority true. suggests While bility vis-a-vis an uninsured victim. “might medical bills not be a true same, Assuming is the a tort- measure of the reasonable value of Swan- liability both, feasor’s an insured and injury,” son’s the reasonable value of the victim, uninsured should be the same: jury. medical services was issue for the the full extent of the medical in- bills $62,259 jury found that “fairly would curred. adequately compensate” and Swanson for Ass’n, v. La. Auto Risk Griffin Sheriffs his past expenses. jury’s 802 So.2d 715 (La.Ct.App.2001); ac finding challenged appeal, has been White, cord 219 P.3d at (explaining not free to second-guess we are excluding write-offs from a decision. recovery anomaly” “creates the that a tort- Finally, interpreting in the collateral- liability feasor have more limited if majority focuses on the insured). injured person In other policy goal preventing a so-called “dou words, liability similarly situated recovery” injured ble for an plaintiff.8 depend defendants should not “on the rela However, majority does not address fortuity tive the manner which each even mention the resulting windfall to the expenses are financed.” at-fault tortfeasor. Under the common DBart, Inc., Leitinger v. 302 Wis.2d law, we have never favored a windfall ato 1, 10 736 N.W.2d at expense injured tortfeasor of an I Accordingly, would construe the collat- party, Hueper, see narrowly eral-source statute in favor of the statutory our require rules construction continuation of the common law interpret us to the collateral-source statute accordance plain ordinary with the consistent with the continuation of the meaning “payments.” of the word language common law absent clear I would to the contrary, Acquisition “payments” Shaw hold that Co. Bank the collateral- River, (Minn. Elk source statute does not to a negoti- extend 2002). As a Louisiana explained, court has ated discount between an insurance corn- discussing amounts, Letourneau, discount providers.” health care Acuar v. Virginia Supreme Court has noted that 260 Va. 531 S.E.2d the "amounts written off are as much of a (explaining wrongdoer that "[t]he cannot injured party] paid benefit for which [the con reap the benefit of a contract for which the payments sideration as are the actual cash wrongdoer paid compensation”). no made his health insurance carrier to the plain ordinary meaning on the providers. This result based and medical pany payments as set forth subdivision 1 that the benefit ensures explanatory provision and the of subdivi injured party inures —the sion that collateral sources include cover- procured the insurance party amounts available to the plain “otherwise the tortfeasor who caused age—not unambiguous, tiff.” Because the statute is injury. necessary it is neither nor appropriate to go beyond the words of the statute to PAGE, (dissenting). Justice purpоse determine the of the law. See Meyer. join I in the dissent of Justice (2008); § Minn.Stat. 645.16 Toth v. Ara son, (Minn.2006); 441-42 DIETZEN, (concurring). Justice Halvorson, 253, 256, Peterson v. 200 Minn. the result reached agree I (1937) (concluding that 273 N.W. underlying with its majority, disagree but plain when the statute is “too to admit of whether a analysis. At issue is the court power view” is without by a health plaintiffs obtained change plain language of the statute source” as defined insurer is a “collateral omitted) (citation (internal quotation 548.251, (2008), § by Minn.Stat. subd. omitted)); marks Simon v. Milwaukee cf. view, my statute. the collateral-source Co., 378, 385, Ins. 262 Minn. Auto. Mut. straightforward ques- presents this case (concluding that statutory tion of construction. unambigu contract is when “insurance subdivi- Minnesota Statutes ous, language given used must be its 1, provides that collateral sources are sion ordinary meaning,” and usual and the related to the or disabili- “redraft an insurance con “payments court not guise tract under the of strict construction ty question plaintiff, made to the to reach a result would [the court] up behalf to the date of the history of the “(2) prefer”). Consequently, the health, verdict,” pursuant accident rule, common-law sickness, insur- or automobile accident jurisdictions are not case law from other liability provides insurance that ance view, my majority’s necessary. disability cover- or income benefits these matters constitutes consideration of 2, which sets forth the age.” Subdivision dicta. determining “collateral procedure

sources,” provides is also relevant. It filed,

if the court shall deter- a motion is of collateral sources

mine the “amounts

that have been for the benefit

plaintiff or are otherwise available STAUNTON, Michael Jon of losses.” Minn.Stat. plaintiff as result petitioner, Appellant, 2(1) (2008). concludes, majority agree, and I unambiguously providеs the statute Minnesota, Respondent. STATE of negotiated-discount plain amounts a No. A09-782. provider tiff a medical but does is billed Supreme Court of Minnesota. because the June plain a discount on provider “collateral sources” under tiffs behalf are conclusion is 548.251. This the dissent notes Given 2(1). 548.251, required by subd. As admissibility of a dis subd. the district case, in this it is count is not an issue also court on also offset the remand should proper the context dissent’s as $61,089.50-by amount — sertion note that the collateral-source $4,570.64, the total Swanson’s health suggests that while evidence of the premium payments insurance for the two- incurred medical bills year period immediately before this action. admissible, of what a in evidence Accordingly, the court on district remand behalf, plaintiffs surer on a and the should damage reduce Swanson’s billed, than fact that it is less the amount $56,518.86. the amount of by jury. cannot be considered See Minn. 5; Leiting Stat. see also Reversed and remanded to the district er, (explaining at 14 court. though allowing a rule the admission of DIETZEN, regarding Concurring, evidence of the amount of mon J. ey actually satisfy used to a medical bill is PAGE, Dissenting, MEYER and JJ. appealing, the evidence would confuse jury, plaintiffs attempts and the explain ANDERSON, part, BARRY, Took no G. compromised payment would necessar J. ily lead existence of collateral MEYER, (dissenting). Justice source). I respectfully Contrary dissent. to our conclude that negotiated-discount We longstanding statutory rules of interpreta- a plaintiff amounts —amounts is billed require tion that a strict construction of provider but does not because law, in abrogation statutes of the common provider negotiat- majority adopts expansive interpre- ed a discount on the behalf—are “payments” tation of the word in the col-

Case Details

Case Name: Swanson v. Brewster

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Jun 30, 2010

Citation: 784 N.W.2d 264

Docket Number: A08-806

Court Abbreviation: Minn.