255 Pa. 316 | Pa. | 1917
Opinion by
John N. Kaufman applied to the Farmers’ National Bank of Somerset, Pa., for a loan of $4,000. He was told by the cashier that it would be made if the application for it would be approved by the bank’s financial committee. The application was approved, and a day or two later the cashier mailed to Kaufman, at Davids-ville — some twenty miles from Somerset — a judgment note for $4,000, payable one year after date, and on. it were two printed seals and one written by the cashier, the understanding between him and Kaufman being that there were to be two sureties on the obligation. Its blank spaces were filled in by the cashier. On the lower lefthand corner'he wrote the word “witnesses,” and, by a bracket and two crosses in his handwriting, indicated where the attesting witnesses were to sign. Kaufman returned the note by mail to the bank, bearing his signature and what purported to be those of Stephen Gindlesperger and John M. Sala, the appellees, attested by two witnesses. The bank entered judgment on the note, and, upon the petition of Gindlesperger and Sala, alleging that they had not signed it, the judgment was opened.
Kaufman, the principal on the note, was the main witness for the plaintiff and testified‘that, after he had received it, he called Gindlesperger into his home, where they both signed it; that when Gindlesperger had signed his name to it, Annie Kaufman came into the room, and, at the request of her husband, the principal obligor, signed it as an attesting witness; that he then went to the residence of David Thomas — some two and one-half miles distant from Davidsville — where he found John M. Sala, and obtained his signature to the note; that, although there were two or three men working there at the time with Sala, he did not ask either of them to witness the signature, but went back to Davidsville and called at the blacksmith shop of James Berkebile, who was familiar with the handwriting of Gindlesperger and Sala, and, at his request, signed the note as an attesting witness.
That the addition of a name as a witness to the signatures of parties to a written instrument, after its execution by them and in their absence and without their knowledge or consent, is a . material alteration of the writing, rendering it inadmissible in evidence, has long been well settled: Marshall v. Gougler, 10.S. & R. 164; Foust v. Renno, 8 Pa. 378; Henning v. Werkheiser, Id.,
If Berkebile’s signature had been procured by the bank after the note had come into its possession, it concededly could not have enforced it against the sureties: Shifter v. Mosier, supra, and why should not the act of Kaufman, under the circumstances, be regarded as the act of the bank in procuring the signature? Its cashier, with whom he negotiated the loan, prepared and sent to him the note for execution by him and two sureties. The bank’s officer, in his own hands, wrote the word “witnesses” and indicated where they were to sign. In short, the bank dealt entirely with Kaufman, and sent him the note for the purpose of having him and the sureties sign it in the presence of witnesses, and the correct conclusion of the learned court below was that, if he materially altered the obligation after the sureties had signed it, the bank, which had trusted him to see that it was properly executed, and not the sureties upon it, is bound by what he did. In this respect the case is distinguishable from Fritz v. Commissioners, 17 Pa. 130, upon which the learned counsel for appellant rely; but it may be further noted that the reason given for holding that the bond in that case had not been improperly admitted in evidence was that it had affirmatively, appeared that the witness attested the execution of the bond at the request of at least one of the obligors, in the absence of the obligee, and whether in the presence or absence of the party who objected to the admission of the obligation in evidence did not distinctly appear, owing to a failure of recollection on the part of the attesting witness. It was therefore said: “In these material circumstances the case is widely different from
Judgment affirmed.