262 P. 547 | Kan. | 1928
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is an action on a promissory note. The defense was that defendant signed the note for the accommodation of plaintiff. There was a trial to the jury which answered special questions and returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff has appealed, and contends that under the facts disclosed by the evidence, the defendant did not, as a matter of law, execute this note for the accommodation of plaintiff. This point was pressed by plaintiff by a demurrer to evidence and by appropriate motions at various stages of the trial.
Under the facts above set forth plaintiff contends that the court below erred in submitting to the jury the question whether S. C. Snyder signed for the accommodation of Fred Reeves, or for the accommodation of the plaintiff bank, and contends that she must be held, as a matter of law, to have signed for the accommodation of Fred Reeves. This contention must be sustained. When S. C. Snyder
It is argued that in getting additional signatures on his renewal note Fred Reeves was acting for the bank, and was therefore to be regarded as the agent of the bank in the representations he made to Mrs. Snyder which induced her to sign it. This contention lacks merit. One who desires to borrow money at a bank, or to renew an indebtedness he has there, and who goes to another to get him to sign the note with him in order that he can get the bank to accept it, acts for himself and does not act for the bank. This matter is discussed in Trust Co. v. Gill, 113 Kan. 261, 267, 214 Pac. 413, where it was said:
“Even though the creditor prepared the necessary papers and named the persons or property which he would be willing to accept for security, the act of the debtor in obtaining the security is one for his own benefit, and the debtor is not the agent of the creditor in so doing.” (Citing a number of authorities.)
It is said that Mrs. Snyder received no consideration for signing the note. That is frequently true where one signs as surety for another, but that is a question that goes to the relation of the parties as between themselves. It has no effect so far as the payee of the note is concerned. Under our negotiable instruments act all persons who sign a note as makers are primarily liable thereon. (R. S. 52-103.) The question of who is principal and who is surety as between them is of no consequence to the payee. The negotiable instruments law does not use the word “surety” in this connection. It must be held, then, as a matter of law, that Mrs. Snyder, when she signed as maker with her son and others the note dated March 1, 1921, became primarily liable to the payee therein named for the amount of the note. That -liability was not lessened by what was done in March, 1922, or subsequently.
Defendants cite and rely upon National Bank v. Williams, 117 Kan. 501, 232 Pac. 252. That case arose on the pleadings, where an entirely different set of facts was alleged from that shown by the evidence here. It was there alleged that the bank had a financial
Not much else need be said. There is no evidence to support a finding that plaintiff signed for the accommodation of the bank; the question should not have been submitted to the jury. The judgment of the court below is reversed with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff.