Action for personal injuries. The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the complaint. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in substance the same as the original. On motion of defendant it was stricken, and an оrder of dismissal was entered. Plaintiffs appeal.
The material facts alleged were as follows:
“That on or about 2:30 p. m. on the twelfth day of October, ' 1915, Charlotte B. Swain was riding in an Overland automobile, going east along the south side of East Sprague avenue and thаt said automobile passed over the west bridge and about two-thirds along the east bridge at the location known as Sprague avenue fill, between Arthur & Ivory streets on said East Sprague avenue, and about 65 feеt from said Ivory street, said car was then and there being operated and driven at the rate of about seven to ten miles per hour, when*617 the steering gear of the said car suddenly failed to work and the car became beyond control and suddenly turned to the right and went over the curb-stone and across the sidewalk and struck against a temporary board fence which was built and maintained by the city on the high stone wall which constitutes the south side of the said bridge and roadway. Said car at the time it struck said fence was going at the rate of about two miles per hour [in amended complaint alleged about one mile per hour], but pushed through and over said fence and said car went over the edge of said bridge and stone wall and with said plaintiff fell about thirty-five feet to the ground, greatly and permanently injuring her and smashing and destroying said car.”
This was followed by allegations of carelessness and negligence and want of ordinary care and caution on defendant’s part in maintaining a five-inch instead of a nine or ten inch curbstone and in maintaining a board fence on the south side of the bridge or fill instead of a stone, cement or iron wall or railing. Damages were demanded for personal injuries to Charlotte B. Swain in the sum of $14,000, and for injuries to the automobile in the sum оf $1,000.
Respondent moves that the appeal be dismissed for insufficiency of the notice, but since the judgment must be affirmed in any event, we pass at once to a consideration of the case on its merits.
Did the сomplaint show a violation of duty on the city’s part? Appellants assert the affirmative, citing in its support four decisions of this court which we shall briefly consider.
In Sutton v. Snohomish,
“A duty (when not expressly imposed by charter) arises to the public from the character of the powers granted to*618 keep its streets in a rеasonably safe condition for use in the ordinary modes of travel, and it is liable to respond in damages to those injured by a neglect to perform such duty.”
In Kirtley v. Spokane County,
In Einseidler v. Whitman County,
In Zolawenski v. Aberdeen,
In eaсh of these cases it will be noted that the use to which the bridge or street was being put by the person injured was the ordinary, reasonable use for which it was intended, and that the negligence causing the injury, and to which alone the injury was traceable, was failure to keep the street or bridge reasonably safe for such use. In the case before us, it is clear that, for all ordinary uses of the street reasonably to be anticipated, it was kept in a safe condition, and that, if
This case falls distinctly within the rule announced in Leber v. King County,
“The duty to put barriers upon a highway, although travel thereon be in a degree dangerous, is not absolute. The law does not require it unless the danger complained of is unusual. . . . The unusual danger noticed by the books is a danger in the highway itself. ... We take it, then, that the rule contendеd for applies only where a traveler exercising ordinary care would not expect to find danger, or where the natural or surrounding conditions would suggest protection; . . . The duty of the county is discharged if it maintаins its highways reasonably safe for ordinary travel.”
This measure of duty is in consonance with the better reasoned authorities generally.
In Herr v. Lebanon,
“A road that is in suitable condition for ordinary travel, conductеd in the ordinary manner, does not become defective because some extraordinary condition, not foreseen, arises, in consequence of which it is, for the moment, too rough or too narrow tо meet all the exigencies of the situation. Whatever is so much out of the ordinary course as not to be naturally foreseen, as a probable result of the condition of the highway, the road authorities аre not bound to provide against; and their neglect to make such provision can be neither a proximate nor a concurring cause of the injury received in consequence of such extraordinary happening.”
In Nichols v. Pittsfield,
“To impute a failure of duty on the part of a township, where it has provided a public road suitable for the ordinary use of the same, because it failed to provide for a possible contingency that might arise from the fright of a horse not connected in any manner with any defect in the roаdway, would be to impose a duty far beyond any reasonable requirements and without substantial reason therefor.”
In Kingsley v. Bloomingdale,
“Wе have held, in some cases, that circumstances might require railings, but in nó case have we gone so far as to hold that a highway or bridge required fencing, except in cases of obvious danger.”
“It was its duty to provide for the use of the bridge in the usual manner, and to guard against ordinary contingencies, or those which might be reasonably apprehended.”
In Hubbell v. Yonkers,
“The city is not an insurer of the safety of persons traveling its streets, nor is it bound to furnish an absolutely safe and perfect highway under аll circumstances.”
The decisions of this court in Teater v. Seattle,
Morris, Main, Chadwick, and Fullerton, JJ., concur.