Thе controlling question in this suit to quiet title is whether the grantee in a deed *319 to real estate was a bona fide purchaser .for value.
Since at least 1923, the Appanoose Country Club (the сlub) and its corporate predecessor, Centerville Country Club, have occupied and used a parcel of real estate about an acre in size abutting the main country club grounds. During that period the parcel has been open on the country club side but fenced on the other three sides, with a gate to the adjoining farm. For a time in recent years the location of the fence at one place was altered. It was then restored. Trees have grown up along the fence line. At various times within the past 50 years, the parcel has been the site of the club pаrking lot, of a building occupied by club caterers as their dwelling, of a garage to house club machinery and equipment, and of golf cart sheds. The use of the parcel by the club has been open and continuous.
The acre was сarved out of the adjoining 96-acre farm. The owner of that farm died and left the farm to his widow, Grace Dickinson Payne. Thе country club became aware that it did not hold record title to the acre. An arrangement was made that the сlub would grant Mrs. Payne and her sister life memberships in the club in return for a quitclaim deed to the parcel. Accordingly, the club аdopted a resolution “that said Grace Dickinson Payne and Sadye Dickinson, her sister, be and they are hereby grantеd life memberships in said Centerville Country Club,” and on August 17, 1939, Mrs. Payne executed and delivered to the club a quitclaim deed to the parcel. The deed was not recorded when delivered but was apparently held by one Shutts, who at various times was а club trustee.
Mrs. Payne subsequently died. Whether her sister survives is not shown, but the parties do not make a point of that aspect of the matter.
On March 1, 1949, Mrs. Payne’s heirs sold and conveyed the 96-acre farm to Nick Swab without excepting the parсel in question. At that time the club was occupying the parcel as before. What if any inquiry Swab then made of the club as to its rights does not appear.
Apparently some dissension thereafter arose about the ownership of the parcel. Mr. Shutts decided the quitclaim deed should be recorded, and that was done on January 26, 1954. During that period the country club also gave memberships to the Swabs without charge. We think it a fair inference that the club was trying to keep the controversy from erupting into litigation. Swab eventually conveyed the farm including the parcel to his wife, and thereaftеr died. Later Mrs. Swab also died, leaving her property to plaintiff William H. Swab.
On November 30, 1968, plaintiff brought the present suit against the club to quiet the title to the parcel. The club answered. After trial, the trial court held for the club and dismissed the petitiоn. Plaintiff appealed.
Plaintiff asserts four propositions in this court. He claims, first, that he has good title if his predecessor Nick Swab obtained good title, second, that Nick Swab was a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and third and fourth (which are really the same), that Nick Swab was a purchaser without notice. We may assume without deciding that plaintiff’s first and second propositions are established, for we think, as the trial court did, that plaintiff has not shown Nick Swab was withоut notice.
The club received title by quitclaim deed. Such a deed is an effective mode of conveyancе and transfers the grantor’s title to the grantee. Code, 1971, § 558.19; Mack v. Tredway,
But to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers for value, our legislature provided in § 558.41, Code, 1971:
No instrument affecting real estate is of any validity аgainst subsequent pur *320 chasers for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless filed in the office of the recоrder of the county in which the same lies, as hereinafter provided.
Nick Swab was within § 558.41 to the extent that at the time he reсeived his deed from Mrs. Payne’s heirs, the club’s quitclaim deed was unrecorded. Since we assume Nick Swab was a purchaser for value, the question is whether he was without notice. The burden is on plaintiff so to prove. Kindred v. Crosby,
The rule in this jurisdiction, in common with numerous other states, is that possession of real estate imparts notice to the world of the rights of the possessor which reasonable and proper inquiry of the possessor would reveal. Booth v. Cady,
As plaintiff clаims, however, possession does not impart knowledge of facts which inquiry of the possessor would not reveal. Raub v. Gеneral Income Sponsors of Iowa, Inc.,
Plaintiff did not sustain his burden of proving that Nick Swab was without notice, and the trial court properly dismissed the petition.
Affirmed.