Svartz v. Town of FallsburgSvartz v. Town of Fallsburg
Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Bradley, J.), entered April 1, 1996 in Sullivan County, which granted defendant Town of Fallsburg’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.
Plaintiffs complaint, supplemented by her bill of particulars, alleges that she sustained personal injuries on November 18, 1993 when she fell as the result of having stepped into a pothole located in Woodland Townhouse Road (hereinafter the Road) within 500 feet of Karmel Road in the Town of Falls-burg, Sullivan County. After issue was joined, defendant Town of Fallsburg moved for summary judgment on the ground that it had not received prior written notice of the defective condition in the Road as was required by its local law.
Without accompanying measurements, we do not agree with the Town that the photograph conclusively establishes that the subject pothole was located within the first 250 feet of the Road. Thus, the only undisputed proof regarding the location of the pothole is that it was within 500 feet of Karmel Road which raises the possibility that plaintiff’s accident may or may not have occurred on Town property since the Town admits that it owned the portion of the Road beyond the first 250 feet. Accordingly, we will consider the Town’s motion in relation to both possibilities.
The fact that the pothole may have been located within that portion of the Road that the Town did not own does not necessarily insulate it from liability (see, Alberti v Rydill,
If the pothole was between 250 feet and 500 feet from Karmel Road, then plaintiff was required to prove that the Town had received prior written notice that brought the pothole’s existence to the Town’s attention (see, Weinreb v City of New York,
For these reasons, we conclude that summary judgment in the Town’s favor was not warranted. We are further persuaded that such relief was inappropriate due to the fact that plaintiffs representative was denied access to the Town’s maintenance records which could have provided her with relevant information on the issue of the Town’s control and maintenance of the Road (see, Campbell v City of New York,
Lastly, since the deficiencies in plaintiff’s notice of claim were cured at the General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing by her testimony and the photograph of the accident scene, we see no reason to dismiss the complaint on the ground of inadequate notice, particularly as there is no indication that plaintiff intended to mislead or confuse the Town (see, Poitier v New York City Hous. Auth.,
Casey, Peters, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and motion denied.
Notes
The Town’s written notice statute provides: “No civil action shall be maintained against the Town * * * for damages or injuries to person * * * sustained by reason of any highway * * * being defective, out of repair, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed unless written notice of such * * * condition