Suzаnne LANGDON, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Calista Springer, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patricia SKELDING, Cynthia Bare, Marianne Udow, Laura Champagne, and Ted Forrest, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 11-2353.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
April 17, 2013.
OPINION
BERNICE B. DONALD, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Suzanne Langdon brought a
I. BACKGROUND
In 2008, seventeen-year-old Calista Springer died of asphyxiation when she was unable to escape a house fire because her father and step-mother, Anthony and Marsha Springer (or “the Springers“), had chained her to a bed.1 Prior to this incident, the St. Joseph County Child Protective Service (“CPS“), a division of the State of Michigan Department of Human Services (“MDHS“), had developed an extensive record on Calista that dated back to 1995 when Calista was three-years-old.
CPS received many child abuse complaints concerning Calista over the years. The earliest werе two complaints in 1995 that she had extremely high levels of lead in her blood and that the Springers were not responding to preventative treatment for the lead poisoning. CPS received another two complaints in 1997, one alleging that Anthony hit Calista in the face giving her a bloody lip, which Marsha confirmed, and one that Calista had untreated second-degree burns and that Marsha had hit her in the face and given her a bloody nose because Calista stuck out her tongue. In 1999, an employee of Michigan‘s Community Mental Health Services reported that Calista was being restrained to her bed, a chair, or a pole in the kitchen by means of a belt or ropes.2 In 2000, a school official twice reported that Calista had bruises, was kicked by Anthony, and that she was being locked in her bedroom at night, forcing her to wеt the bed. In 2001, someone complained that Marsha was mentally abusing Calista by threatening to put her in foster care and by saying she hoped Calista would die. After each complaint, CPS rejected the case for further investigation.
Finally, in 2004, a series of three complaints triggered an investigation. A teacher, a deputy, and a neighbor all filed complaints alleging that Calista was chained to her bed at night, that she went days without eating, that Marsha assaulted her and slammed her head into the floor, and that Marsha would not let her bathe or use hygiene products. CPS investigator Patricia Skelding interviewed Calista and her sister Courtney, both of whom confirmed that Calista was being chained to her bed, and Calista sought Skelding‘s help. Skelding did not investigate the chains, but warned the Springers that they would present a danger in case of а fire. Skelding found that there was “insufficient evidence to prove neglect or abuse” and closed the investigation with the approval of her supervisor, Cynthia Bare. She noted that she could “only hope” the restraints were “necessary for [Calista‘s] own protection,” but she also expressed that she was “uncomfortable” with Calista‘s treatment
The last known report was filed in 2005. A school official reported that Calista was still being chained to her bed and beaten, that she was not being fed, and that she wore the same clothes to school for days at a time. Bare spoke to a school counselor who told her that this was the “same old story” in which Calista was “seeking attention” and Bare rejected the case for further investigation. That same year, the Springers removed Calista from public school in favor of home-schooling. Calista‘s home caught fire in 2008, and indeed, she died while chained to the bed.
On October 7, 2010, Suzanne Langdon, Calista‘s grandmother, filed a
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, for judgment on the pleadings. On September 30, 2011, the district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that Langdon had not alleged viable due process claims and the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Langdon filed a timely appeal.
II. Standard of Review
Whether the district court‘s decision amounts to a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) or a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), we review both de novo. Handy-Clay v. Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2004). At this stage, we must accept the plaintiff‘s factual allegations as true and determine “whether [she] undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of [her] allegations that would entitle [her] to relief.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dep‘t of Children‘s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). Although we must read the complaint generously, the plaintiff must allege more than mere labels and conclusions; “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Likewise, while we are required to accept as true all well-pleaded facts, we do not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id. at 556-57.
III. Analysis
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). We have the discretion to decide whether to address qualified immunity or the underlying claim of a constitutional deprivation first, considering the circumstances of the particular case. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
A. Substantive Due Process Claim
Nothing in the Due Process Clause requires a state to protect citizens from invasion against personal security by private actors. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Nor does it impose an affirmative obligation on states to render aid. Id. at 195-96. The purpose of substantive due process is “to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other.” Id. at 196. This, of course, means that there may be no recourse against the government in circumstances as tragic as those presented here.
In DeShaney, a four-year-old child was severely beaten and rendered comatose by his father after local officials had received complaints of abuse but had decided not to remove the child from his father‘s home. Id. at 191-93. The Court held that the plaintiff had not alleged a due process claim against the local officials because the Due Process Clause is “a limitation on the State‘s power to act, nоt a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security” or a right of government aid. Id. at 195-96, 203. Therefore, the Due Process Clause
This court, however, has recognized a “state-created-danger” exception to the DeShaney rule in which a state may be held liable under the Due Process Clause when the state either creates or increases the risk that a person will be exposed to private acts of violence. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1066; see also Ewolski v. Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 509 (6th Cir. 2002). To establish a violation, the plaintiff must do more than show a causal connection between the state action and the private act of violence or negligence; she must identify an affirmative state action that is so egregious as to be “arbitrary in the constitutional sense” and “shocks the conscience.” Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 510. To state a claim under the state-created-danger theory, a plaintiff must allege:
- an affirmative act by the state which either created or increased the risk that the plaintiff would be exposed to an act of violence by a third party;
- a special danger to the plaintiff wherein the state‘s actions placed the plаintiff specifically at risk, as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large; and
- the state knew or should have known that its actions specifically endangered the plaintiff.
Cartwright v. Marine City, 336 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2003). Langdon argues that the state-created-danger exception applies here because the dangers to Calista were so obvious that the defendants’ failure to act reflects deliberate indifference that inсreased the risk of harm.
We have explained that a failure to act does not satisfy the affirmative-act prong. Cartwright, 336 F.3d at 493. For example, while releasing private information is an affirmative act, failing to remove a child from a foster home is an not affirmative act under the state-created-danger exception. Id. (citing Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1067; Reed v. Knox Cnty. Dep‘t of Human Servs., 968 F. Supp. 1212, 1220-22 (S.D. Ohio 1997)). Our disposition in Cartwright further explains this point. There, the police picked up an intoxicated man who was walking along the highway to give him a ride and later left the man at a convenience store where they arrested a prisoner. Id. at 489. The intoxicated man was run over by a truck along the same highway an hour later. Id. We held that this, too, was merely a failure to act. Id. at 493. “The question is . . . whether he was safer before the state action than he was after it.” Id.
Here, we cannot say that the state took an affirmative action that made Calista lеss safe. Langdon‘s allegations in the complaint that the defendants “made matters worse for Calista and increased the danger she was already subjected to by her parents” is conclusory and certainly cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. She argues on appeal that the defendants’ decision to close the investigation in the face of such obvious dangers was an affirmative act that amоunted to an endorsement of the Springers’ private acts thereby emboldening them, but we are not convinced. The facts alleged merely show that the defendants did not do enough to investigate the complaints of abuse, and this is a mere failure to act. The Springers regularly chained Calista to the bed before the CPS investigation and continued doing so afterward. Nothing the state did increased the dangеr, so we are bound by our decision in Cartwright to conclude that the state-created-danger exception does not apply here. Dismissal of the substantive due process claim was proper.
The right of procedural due process only imposes procedural constraints when government decisions deprive a person of certain life, liberty, and property interests that are рrotected under the Due Process Clause. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). To establish a violation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she had one of these protected interests; (2) she was deprived of this protected interest; and (3) the state did not afford her adequate procedural rights prior to depriving her of the interest. Women‘s Med. Prof‘l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006). Thus, as a threshold matter, Langdon must first establish that she—or in this case, the decedent, Calista—possessed a protected liberty or property interest. Wojcik v. Romulus, 257 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2001). Only after identifying such a right do we consider “whether the deprivation of that interest contravened the notions of due process.” Id.
Property interests are not created by the Constitution, but rather “are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Baird, 438 F.3d at 611 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)); see also Wojcik, 257 F.3d at 609. “[E]xplicitly mandatory language” is required to create such an interest. Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1185 (6th Cir. 1995). Langdon argues that Michigan law imposes a mandatory duty on CPS employees to file a petition with the court once it concludes that a child is being abused, creating a property interest protected by procedural due process. The pertinent stаtute provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) The department shall submit a petition for authorization by the court . . . if 1 or more of the following apply:
(a) The department determines that a parent, guardian, or custodian, or a person who is 18 years of age or older and who resides for any length of time in the child‘s home, has abused the child or a sibling of the child and the abuse included 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(iii) Battering, torture, or other severe physical abuse.
The Michigan statute mandates a process based on a substantive predicate, not a particular outcome. We have noted before that “[s]tate-created procedural rights that do not guarantee a particular substantive outcome are not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, even where such procedural rights are mandatory.” Childers, 71 F.3d at 1185. In Childers, we considered whether a similar Kentucky child-welfare statute created a protected interest in state action. Id. at 1185-86. The relevant provision read:
Upon receipt of a report of an abused, neglected or dependent child pursuant to this chapter, the cabinet as the designated agency or its delegated representative shall initiate a prompt investigation, take necessary action and shall offer protective services toward safeguarding the welfare of the child.
Id. (quoting
Additionally, the substantive predicate is discretionary, not mandatory. For the mandatory language requiring CPS to file a petition with the court to apply, CPS must first make a finding that a parent has abused the child with “[b]attering, tоrture, or other severe physical abuse.”
III. Conclusion
While this case is undeniably tragic, Langdon has not alleged facts that would establish that the defendants violated Calista‘s substantive or procedural due process rights. Accordingly, the district court‘s dismissal of her civil rights complaint is AFFIRMED.