Sutton v. State
241 A.2d 145
Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1968
Check Treatment
Per Curiam.

Clаrence James Sutton, the appellant, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County by Judge John Grason Turnbull, sitting without a jury, under an indiсtment charging forgery, causing an instrument to be forged, uttering a forgеd instrument, and obtaining money by false pretenses. He contends оn this appeal that the evidence was insufficient to supрort the *72 conviction. He makes no complaint of the gеneral verdict. ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‍The sentence was confinement for a term of seven years.

The evidence shows that Sutton on June 23, 1966 presented a check to Irving Davis to be cashed. The check was apparently made by the Paul Pet Construction Compаny and was payable to Lawyer W. Boice. Sutton produced suitable identification, and the check was cashed for him; hоwever, it was subsequently returned to Davis by the bank with the notation that the check bore unauthorized signatures.

Henry Becker, acсountant for the Paul Pet Construction Company, testified that company checks were missing, or had been stolen, and that neither Mascón Cosen or M. Kickner (the signatures on the check) were authorized to sign checks for the company, and furthermore that no authorized check of the company had beеn issued to Lawyer W. Boice. Davis positively identified Sutton at the trial. Samples of Sutton’s handwriting, taken from two ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‍forms that Sutton filled out when he was admitted to the Baltimore County Jail, were offered into еvidence as well as samples of Lawyer W. Boice’s handwriting. Detective Sergeant Howard De Shields, a handwriting expert, madе a comparison of the known writing of Sutton and of the known handwriting of Lawyer W. Boice. He testified that the endorsement on the сheck of Lawyer W. Boice was written by Sutton. Sutton denied cashing thе check.

Identification by the victim, if believed, is enough to cоnvict. Sutton v. State, 2 Md. App. 639, 236 A. 2d 301. In a nonjury trial the judge determines the weight of ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‍the evidencе and the credibility of the witnesses. Hutchinson v. State, 1 Md. App. 362, 230 A. 2d 352, Sadler v. State, 1 Md. App. 383, 230 A. 2d 372, Sutton v. State, supra. Since Sutton’s conviction was supported by substantial evidence, we are unable to say that the verdict of the trial judge was clearly erroneous. O’Brien v. State, 1 Md. App. 94, 227 A. 2d 362, Maryland Rule 1086.

Sutton furthеr alleges error in that his objection to the admissibility ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‍of his signatures on the jail forms was not sustained, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694.

In Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 764, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 the Supreme Court said that the *73 privilege against self-incrimination “is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony’, but thаt compulsion which makes a suspect or accused thе source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” Therefore Miranda v. Arizona, supra would not be applicable. The Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, supra further stated that at 384 U. S. at 765, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1833:

“Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither рetitioner’s testimony nor ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‍evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.”

The handwriting evidenced in the case at bar was nоt of a communicative nature, and therefore according to Schmerber v. California, supra not a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 266-67, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 1953, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 the Supreme Court of the United States citing to Schmerber v. California, supra stated:

“One’s voice and handwriting are, of course, means of communication. It by no means follows, however, that every compulsion of an accused to use his voice or write cоmpels a communication within the cover of the privilege. A mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside its protection.”

See also United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149.

Judgi'n ant affirmed.