158 Pa. 204 | Pa. | 1893
Opinion by
The plaintiff sought and obtained in the court below the rescission of a contract made by him with Mrs. Morgan for the purchase of her farm near Remington station on the Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Railroad. The ground on which his right to relief was placed was that the execution of the contract by him had been induced by fraudulent misrepresentations, made to him by Mrs. Morgan’s agents, particularly by her husband and John E. Glass, largely through J. C. Williams, who was a co-purchaser of the land and whose interest therein was now held by the plaintiff. The master found that the negotiations were conducted between Williams and Morgan ; and that the representations made by Morgan and Glass to him were repeated by Williams to Sutton, and induced the purchase by him. He finds that several of these representations were in fact false. Among them are the following: The thirty-four acres lying between the railroad and the river, amounting to nearly one third of the farm, were represented as suitable for building lots, and above the reach of ordinary floods. The master finds that most of this land could be made suitable for building only by filling. It was represented that extensive railroad yards were being opened in the immediate neighborhood of this farm, and that there was at the time these
The learned judge who sat as chancellor in this case differed from the master in relation to the character of the representations made by Morgan. He found the fact to be that Morgan had no reasonable ground for belief that the shops of the railroad company were about to be removed, or that a syndicate of men connected with the company had been formed for the purchase of his wife’s farm, or that he had been offered by such men, or any one on their behalf, the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars or any other sum for it. He further found that the representations made by Glass to Williams in regard to the same subjects, viz., the removal of the shops, the existence of the syndicate, and the offer on its behalf of seventy-five thousand dollars for the farm, were false ; that Glass knew them to be untrue when he made them; and that they were made to
This appeal from the decree so made requires us to examine the evidence so as to determine whether the conclusions of the master, or of the court below, should be adopted. This examination we have made, and we are led by it to concur with the learned judge in his findings and conclusions. The master found that Sutton agreed to pay more than twice the actual value of. the farm; that he did this under the belief that the representations, made to Williams and communicated by him, were true; and that these representations were not true. The learned judge concurs in these findings, and so far there is no room for doubt. The evidence however sustains the judge in the further finding that both Morgan and Glass knew their statements, in regard to the removal of the shops, the existence of the syndicate of men connected with the railroad, and the offer of seventy-five thousand dollars by that syndicate for the farm, were not true; and that these statements were made to raise delusive expectations of gain, and to hasten the making of a purchase by Williams and the' person whom he represented. It is said that Williams should have inquired for himself, and that his opportunities of obtaining information were just as good as those of Morgan. This may be. Prudence should have led him and his “financial man ” Sutton, to test the truth of the glowing statements made by Morgan and Glass, but it did not. They fell easily into the trap which was set, with some skill and some effrontery, for them ; but their neglect, or want of prudence, cannot justify the falsehood or fraud of those who practiced upon their credulity. The doctrine of contributory negligence cannot be invoked by the defendants to save them from liability for mis
We think the learned judge was right in his view of this case, and his decree, so far as it relates to the rescission of the contract, the return of the money paid and the cancellation of the mortgage, is affirmed. For his gross carelessness the plaintiff ought to lose his costs'. No bill of costs will be taxed for the plaintiff.