1984-1 Trade Cases 65,851
SUTLIFF, INCORPORATED, Debtor, Ellingsen-MacLean Oil
Company, Land O'Lakes Inc., and Thomas S. Utschig,
Trustee, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DONOVAN COMPANIES, INC., Kenneth Kamp, Garrow Oil
Corporation, and William Garrow, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 83-1308, 83-1499.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued Dec. 7, 1983.
Decided Feb. 9, 1984.
William J. Holloway, Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.
D. Jeffrey Hirschberg, Whyte & Hirschboeck, Milwaukee, Wis., Joseph J. Shiff, Sigman, Shiff, Janssen, Stack & Wenning, Appleton, Wis., for defendants-appellees.
Before ESCHBACH, POSNER, and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal, which raises both procedural and substantive questions, the latter under RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1961-1968) and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1-11, grows out of a dispute among five oil wholesalers in Appleton, Wisconsin: on the plaintiff side Sutliff, Inc., now bankrupt, and two of its creditоrs, Ellingsen and Land O'Lakes; on the defendant side the Donovan and Garrow companies. (The three individual parties appear to be incidental.) Since the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and no affidavits were filed in support of the motion, we must take the facts alleged in the complaint to be true for purposes of deciding this aрpeal (though, needless to say, we do not vouch for their truth), and they show the following:
Sutliff, Inc. was operated by Mrs. Sutliff, a middle-aged woman of no relevant education or training, out of her kitchen, and had total sales of about $2 million a year on which the Sutliffs netted $36,000 between them (Mr. Sutliff drove a truck for the firm). The company got into financial trouble, precipitating Mrs. Sutliff into "a state of hysteria, physiсal and mental exhaustion ..., a state of substantially diminished mental responsibility, panic and fear...." Donovan and Garrow took advantage of her mental state to persuade her to sell them oil below cost, which they resold at a profit, but below the market price, in competition with Ellingsen and Land O'Lakes. Sutliff, Inc.'s sales zoomed in one year to $59 million. Donovan and Garrow knew that by deаling with Sutliff on this basis they were driving it to inevitable ruin but they hoped to and did escape the consequences. The small cash advances they made to Sutliff persuaded Ellingsen and Land O'Lakes that Sutliff was solvent (an impression reinforced by an express representation to this effect that Garrow made to Ellingsen), so they continued to extend credit to it and were left holding the bag when the compаny finally collapsed. The plaintiffs describe this scheme of milking a company dry and leaving its creditors with uncollectible accounts receivable as a "bust-out," on which see, e.g., United States v. Crockett,
When the district judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, he also denied the plаintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint. Within ten days the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of both orders, but becoming anxious lest it not be considered a proper Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment they also filed a notice of appeal from the order dismissing the complaint. The district judge, who had not yet acted on the motion for reconsideration when thеy filed the notice of appeal, held that the notice divested him of jurisdiction to consider the motion, which he therefore dismissed. The plaintiffs then filed another notice of appeal.
The motion was a perfectly good Rule 59(e) motion, though not captioned a motion to alter or amend judgment. (Why litigants precipitate unnecessary legal issues by miscaptioning their Rule 59(e) motions baffles us--but many do. See, e.g., A.D. Weiss Lithograph Co. v. Illinois Adhesive Products Co.,
Since the plaintiffs' post-judgmеnt motion was a valid Rule 59(e) motion, the filing of the notice of appeal before the motion was acted on did not, as the district judge believed, divest him of jurisdiction to act on it. Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure says that a notice of appeal filed before the district judge acts on a Rule 59(e) motion has no effect; the judge can still act on the motion. Although the plaintiffs' first notice of appeal thus had no effect, the second notice properly brings up to us all of the district judge's orders. The filing of a proper Rule 59(e) motion suspends the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal from the final judgment until the motion is acted on. It was acted on here when the district judge dismissed it. At this point the plaintiffs had 30 days to file a notiсe of appeal from the judgment, from the order denying leave to amend the complaint entered at the same time, and from the order disposing of their Rule 59(e) motion; and they met the deadline.
Consideration of the merits logically begins with the question whether the plaintiffs' original complaint stated a claim; if so, the district court erred in dismissing it. We have concluded, with misgivings, that the complaint does state a claim under RICO. The statute is constructed on the model of a treasure hunt. You begin at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1964(c), which provides that "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" may recover treble damages from the violator. You go to section 1962, and find that it is unlawful (a) "for any person who has received any income ... from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use ... any part of such income" in the "operation of ... any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate ... commerce"; (b) "for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity ... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or any control of any [such] enterprise"; (c) "for any person employed by or аssociated with any [such] enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity"; or (d) "for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of" the previous subsections. Section 1961 defines "pattern of racketeering activity" to mean (among other things) two оr more acts in violation of various criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1341 (mail fraud) and 1343 (wire fraud); these statutes make it a crime for anyone who, "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mails, or the telephone or some other telecommunications medium, "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice...."
The complaint adequately alleges the use of the mails and the telephone for the purpose of executing the defendants' alleged scheme. But was it a scheme "to defraud" ? Read liberally, as the notice-pleading philosophy of the Federal Rules requires that it be read, see, e.g., Conley v. Gibson,
If as we believe the complaint adequately alleges a "pattern of racketeering activity" (in the special sense in which the RICO statute uses those words) directed against Sutliff, Inc., it does so even more clearly with respect to the other plaintiffs. To create a false impression of solvency in order to induce the extension of credit to an insolvent firm, as the complaint alleges the defendants did in order to induce the plaintiff oil companies to cоntinue selling to Sutliff, is to commit fraud in its commonest form as deliberate misrepresentation, by perpetrating the classic "bust-out" that has been held time and again to violate the mail and wire fraud statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Tashjian,
We must next decide whether the requirements of section 1962 are satisfied. The complaint alleges that the defendants used the income from their "racketeering activity" (that is, from the alleged mail and wire fraud) in the operation of Sutliff--concretely, that they used the money they made by reselling the oil which they were fraudulently purchasing from Sutliff to make the cash advances to Sutliff that kept the fraud going. This is a good allegation under section 1962(a). The complaint also alleges that the defendants acquired control of Sutliff by means of the fraud. As control within the meaning of the statute need not be formal--need not be the kind of control that is obtained, for example, by acquiring a majority of the stock of a corporation--see United States v. Jacobson,
The defendants point out that since no one suggests that they have any connection with organized crime the alleged fraud is remote from the concerns that gave rise to RICO. But Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more concerned to avoid opening loopholes through which the minions of organized crime might crawl to freedom than to avoid making garden-variety frauds actionable in federal treble-damage proceedings--the price of eliminating all possible loopholes. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette,
But the complaint does not state a claim under the federal antitrust laws, even though it uses antitrust language such as "predatory pricing" and "price fixing." Although the exceedingly forgiving attitude toward pleading deficiencies that was expressed by Justice Black for the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, supra,
The factual allegations in this complaint do not state an antitrust claim. From an antitrust standpoint it is as if the complaint alleged that the defendants were fences who brought oil at cut-rate prices from thieves and then resold it in competition with legitimate dealers at lower priсes than those dealers could sell their oil. This would be a species of unfair competition, like stealing a competitor's trade secret or using false advertising to divert a competitor's customers to oneself; but none of these things are antitrust violations; unfair competition, as such, does not violate the antitrust laws. Id.; Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co.,
The legislators who pаssed the Sherman Act did not make ordinary business torts federal torts for which treble damages could be recovered; no such wholesale displacement of state tort law into the federal courts was contemplated or desired, however quaint RICO may make these nineteenth-century legislators' scruples seem. Their concern, at least as it has been understood in recent cases, was with practices that by making markets less competitive hurt the people buying from or selling to the firms in those markets. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
The closest antitrust violation to anything alleged in this case would be a conspiracy among buyers to depress the price of a product that they buy by limiting the amount they buy--a conspiracy, in the language of antitrust economics, to "monopsonize." See, e.g., Mandeville Island Fаrms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
The premise of the district court's refusal to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint was that the original complaint so lacked possible merit as to make it certain that they could not statе a claim. See Fuhrer v. Fuhrer,
To summarize, the orders of the district court denying leave to file an amended complaint and denying Rule 59(e) relief from the court's final judgment of dismissal are reversed; the final judgment itself is affirmed in part and reversed in part in accordance with this opinion; and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs in this court.
SO ORDERED.
