85 Kan. 122 | Kan. | 1911
The opinion of the court was delivered by
On April 14, 1909, Sutherin and Company filed a petition to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, making Lela Diehl Chesney, the owner of the property, and her husband, F. 0. Chesney, defendants. No sum
An action is commenced by filing a petition and causing summons to be issued thereon. (Civ. Code, § 58.) A voluntary general appearance is equivalent to service. ('Civ. Code, § 68.) For the purpose of avoiding the bar of the statute of limitations an action is deemed to be commenced at the date of the summons which is served. (Civ. Code, § 19.) The filing of the petition did not begin an action against the Chesneys. Neither did the filing of the cross-petitions. No summons having been issued, and no attempt having been made to serve them in any other way, no action was commenced against them until they voluntarily appeared. The situation was the same as if the petition and the various cross-petitions had been filed on June 3. The sixty-day period then having elapsed the action was not prematurely commenced.
The case of Insurance Co. v. Bullene, 51 Kan. 764, is cited, in which it was held that where certain defendants seek to enforce their demands against a codefendant the action will be deemed to be commenced against
The case of Wood v. Dill, 3 Kan. App. 484, is instructive. In an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien the owner was served within the year allowed for the bringing of such suits. A mortgagee was not made a party within that period and it was held that the right to enforce the mechanic’s lien was lost as to him. At page 490 of the opinion the following was quoted from the case of Smith v. Hurd, 50 Minn. 503:
“As to each defendant in an action, the action is commenced and is pending only from the time of service of the summons on him or of his appearance with out service; and, where each may object that the action was not commenced within the time limited by statute, its commencement as to his objection is to be determined by the time of service on him, and not by the time of service on some other defendant. This is a rule applicable to every action, and applies as well to actions to enforce mechanic’s liens as to any others.” (p. 507.)
Although the Minnesota statutes relating to the manner of commencing an action differ from our own, and although the case from which the quotation is taken involved the question whether the action was
When an attempt has been made to procure service on a defendant and he subsequently enters an appearance. for any purpose other than to contest jurisdiction he waives all irregularities which may have attended the effort to get him into court; and when a petition is filed the action is pending iso as to charge third persons with notice, provided a summons be served or the first publication be made within sixty days. But the mere filing of pleadings against a defendant does not commence an action against him, and if no effort be made to procure actual or constructive service upon him, and he afterward appears, the action is commenced as to him when he appears.
Sutherin and Company, Randall, The Howard Electric Company, Messick and Lowe pleaded contracts with F. 0. Chesney and Lela Diehl Chesney. Hill pleaded a contract with Lela Diehl Chesney through her authorized agent, Keller. Gustafson and Pribble, The Shawnee Lumber Company and Swalwell pleaded contracts with Lela Diehl Chesney through her authorized agent, F. 0. Chesney. Personal judgments were rendered against Lela Diehl Chesney. It is asserted that there was no evidence that F. 0. Chesney had any interest in the property, and the assertion will be taken as true because it is not met by the production of such evidence in the counter abstracts. Because F. 0. Chesney did not own the property it is argued that no personal judgment could be rendered .against the owner, Lela Diehl Chesney, citing Garrett v. Loftus, 82 Kan. 556. The case cited deals with statutory authority only, and holds that the statute alone does not warrant anything as against the wife except a lien for the price of material furnished to her husband under his own contract and used by him in improving her property. It is not decided that the wife may not be bound personally by contracts made for her through agents in fact au
Two of the contractors took personal judgment against F. 0. Chesney. It is claimed that such judgments are impossible because he did not own the property improved. Very clearly he could use his own credit to obtain material or the performance of labor for the benefit of his wife’s property if he so desired.
The various allegations of agency not having been denied under oath were admitted, and the objection to the sufficiency of the proof being confined, in other respects, to the single matter stated above, it is unavailing. The correction of the record was entirely proper, under repeated decisions of this court. Other matters discussed in the briefs are not of sufficient importance to require a reversal and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.