228 F. 217 | W.D. Pa. | 1915
This suit is before the court upon bill and answer. The bill sets forth that the plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Virginia; that he is the owner of certain real estate in the city of Pittsburgh,-which is subject to and liable to taxation for municipal and local purposes, including the maintenance of public schools; that the defendant is an organized board or body of persons appointed by the judges of the court of common pleas of Allegheny county, Pa., and authorized by an act of Assembly to represent the school district of Pittsburgh in its corporate capacity, which said school district was constituted a municipal corporation by an act of the General Assembly of the state of Pennsylvania, approved the 18th day of May, 1911 (P. L. 309); that by said act of Assembly, among the powers conferred upon the defendant, was a power of taxation, and of creating indebtedness by virtue of which the real estate of the plaintiff and others may be charged with the payment of certain sums of money; that the defendant, pretending to exercise the discretion of ascertaining the amount of funds required for the maintenance of schools, has, within the limitations provided by the said act of Assembly, undertaken to levy, assess, and diPect the collection of taxes as they see proper, and to borrow money upon tire credit of such taxing power, without a vote of the people; that the said tax is not in the nature of a special assessment wherefrom the plaintiff and others would have a right to appeal, or wherein they would have their day in court, but is a general tax, unconditional and absolute in its nature, in default of payment of which property may be seized in execution and the plaintiff and other taxables may be liable to imprisonment; that defendant is without right or authority to levy a school tax for the reason that the said act of Assembly is unconstitutional, in offending against the Constitution of the United States, section 4 of article 4, which guarantees to every state a republican form of government, and in further offending against the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that said law abridges the privileges ánd immunities of citizens of the United States, and may have the effect of depriving the plaintiff and other taxpayers of property and liberty, without due process of law.
The bill prays for an injunction to restrain the defendant from levying a school tax and for general relief.
By reference to that case it is found that the Supreme Court had before it the questions as to whether the School Code was in violation of any provision of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, and the special constitutional questions raised in this case. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided all the questions against the contention of the plaintiff in the bill. The decision of that court that the act of Assembly does not violate the terms of the Constitution of Pennsylvania should be accepted by this court as conclusive upon that particular question. It is, of course, not conclusive upon this court upon the questions whether the Code is in contravention of the Constitution of the United States.
“The total animal school tax levy, made in any one year by any school district, * * * shall not be less ‘than five nor more than six milis on the dollar of the total assessment of all property assessed and certified for taxation therein.”
After quoting that section, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania proceeds to state: •
“Practically the Legislature itself has fixed the tax levy at a maximum of six mills, and simply leaves to Its agents the privilege of collecting not less than five mills in any one year. This cannot properly bo objected to as un-repuWican or as an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an unrepresentative body.”
There is another remedy which the taxpayer may have in Pennsylvania, and that is by a bill in equity to restrain the collection of taxes illegally assessed against his property, for Pennsylvania has not yet applied to its citizens the strict, rule of the United States that taxes must be paid in the first instance, after which, under certain-conditions, suits may be instituted to recover the same.
Without further elaboration, it is sufficient to state that this court finds nothing which would justify the plaintiff in believing that any of his constitutional rights have been invaded.
The bill must be dismissed.