Susan Tomai-Minogue v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

jury question create a on the state law SPROUSE, Before WILKINSON and claims. SNEEDEN, Judges. Circuit

WILKINSON, Judge: Circuit

This is the latest begin variation on much-liti- A. We with a brief review the gated theme: driver’s Safety Responsibili- Motor Vehicle A interest, license. property ty 46.1-442(a) modern (1980) un- Act. Va.Code re- known pow- quires horsedrawn and steam Commissioner Division of ered societies that debated the Fifth and Motor suspend Vehicles to li- driver’s upon diversity 1. The state corporation. claims rested as well These contentions are not dis- pendent jurisdiction. alleged as puted appeal. Plaintiff Virginia resident, be a and defendant an Illinois satisfy pay damage, fails to Plaintiff offered to person who cense thirty against him within any judgment request and at him a Webster’s wrote include, “Judgment” days.2 is defined Subsequently, check for Webster $100.00. 46.1-389(c) (1980), any under Va.Code paid Farm filed claim with State and was arising or more out of $50.00 $230.90, covering repairs the cost less injury motor vehicle accident because of under the policy. deductible $100 impor- property. destruction of Most to or accident, Following the Farm (1980) ease, 46.1-443 tant to this Va.Code § sought from plaintiff reimbursement must one requires damage Webster’s claim. Plaintiff re- competent jurisdic- court of “rendered ceived notices several written but did not State, any of this other state of the respond. Eleven months the acci- after States, the Dominion Canada or United dent, subrogation State Farm forwarded its provinces.” its attorney claim to Michael Miller for collec- Safety Responsibility The Motor Vehicle plaintiff tion. Miller wrote to but likewise hearing provides prior no the Act response. received no Miller then filed suit in the of Vehicles case of Division Motor in the George’s District Court for Prince satisfy judg- suspension for failure to County, Maryland against Tomai-Minogue 46.1-437(a) (1980) ment. Va.Code autho- § on The complaint October 1982. stated thirty days by any appeal rizes an within in Washington, that the accident occurred aggrieved by an order of person the Com- D.C., plaintiff’s and listed address as Falls or requiring suspension revoca- missioner Church, Virginia. Plaintiff received notice of a license to the Circuit Court of the the Virginia of small claims action at her any City of or court of record Richmond address, and, consulting after her at- person having jurisdiction the re- where torney, appear Mary- elected not to provides, This further how- sides. section February 9, 1983, land action. On the ever, in any lie appeal shall case “[n]o Maryland judgment court entered default the of the or in which revocation license against Tomai-Minoguefor $230.90. except mandatory registration was to de- person identity the of the con- sought termine State Farm next enforcement of question identity when the is in cerned judgment Virginia provi- its in under the assume, dispute.”3 purposes We Safety Responsi- sions of the Motor Vehicle appeal, statutory language this that the bility triple copy It Act. forwarded seal reasonably could have been construed Maryland judgment Virginia of the to a encompass suspensions as well as revoca- Boone, attorney, the Walter S. who sent tions. Virginia judgment to the Division of Motor request Vehicles with the that Tomai-Mi- straight- The B. facts of this case nogue’s suspended, license be as State On forward. October Wash- DMV, Farm The Virginia had instructed. D.C., plaintiff ington, damaged struck and Act, pursuant suspended plaintiff’s to the Webster, parked belonging car to Richard June To- driver’s license effective 1983. Farm. was insured The acci- who mai-Minogue suspen- notice of building the received the dent occurred outside Tomai-Minogue and Webster worked. sion on June 13. both continues, suspension unless whether amendment was to alter 2. The otherwise intended provided, person judgment prior simply explicit original satisfies the until the law or to make gives proof responsibili- financial legislative of future No address- intent. case law 46.1-459(b) (1980). ty. Va.Code knowledge. question es the to our course, strictly Of were if statute read to This sentence was amended mandatory apply only to revocations and not 1984, inserting legislature "suspen- words suspensions, post-dep- no denial of a preceding sion or" "revocation the license.” judicial appeal presented, rivation would be as 46.1-437(a) (Cum.Supp.1984). Va.Code At the exception appeal to the full plaintiffs suspended, time license was the stat- inapplicable. only expressly appeals ute limited from a man- unclear, however, datory revocation. It judgment of a court from another state. finally bestirred To- her license Loss of attorney, Ordinarily, prior proceeding will have mai-Minogue. alerted She accident, Maryland arising from the assessed fault in turn told Miller who lacking personal jurisdic- Bell, at 91 S.Ct. at see determining juris- Miller, on the merits. tion. after and rendered wanting, suspends since neither a license diction was indeed the Commissioner When 46.1-443, nor the residence place of the accident he can pursuant to Va.Code § workplace copy or authenticated upon rest Farm and both State Maryland, proof pre-termi- notified that a prior judgment as va- Maryland judgment was Boone. has occurred.5 nation Farm’s July 1983 at State on cated case, however, Tomai-Minogue’s displays requested the Boone motion. defendant, an unusual wrinkle. Like Tomai-Minogue’s license to reinstate DMV oрportunity appear Mary- had the she circumstanc- 7,1983, explaining the July jurisdiction land court either to contest Likewise, Tomai-Minogue’s ines a letter. court fault. district ruled because September, DMV in attorney wrote plaintiff opportunity to make a had suspension to the 1983, requesting an end Maryland special appearance in to chal- copy enclosing triple seal of the order jurisdiction, process re- lenge personal Maryland judgment. It is un- vacating the quired nothing more. think this a We suspension was precisely when clear questionable argument. line of For to as- lifted, accomplished by this had been but rights procedural her as a sert matter actually September 1983. Plaintiff never process, Tomai-Minogue would be com- license, she still drove and surrendered pelled forego process rights, in other due suspension was on occasion while privilege appear in particular the not to a effect. jurisdiction lacking even minimum contacts. International Co. v. State Wash- Shoe II 154, 326 66 90 L.Ed. ington, U.S. S.Ct. first consider what Vir We cоntexts, (1945). 95 In other In ginia plaintiff. the next law afforded has found it “intolerable that one section, protec whether more we determine right should have to be sur- constitutional tion was due.4 in order to assert another.” rendered Sim- operation Virgin The normal 377, 394, States, 390 U.S. mons United Safety Responsibility ia Motor Vehicle Act (1968).6 19 1247 88 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d difficulty. poses little constitutional a Though a license We need not decide whether it is settled that driver’s opportunity for a may rely not state can on the property is a interest be foreign jurisdiction suspended hearing, special appearance some form of a without Burson, depriving as the sole basis for an individual Bell v. 402 U.S. 91 S.Ct. (1971), property right. contrary plain For 90 the Full Faith and of a 29 L.Ed.2d Const, IV, Clause, assumption, art. tiff’s evident examination of Credit § Virginia adopt, purposes Virginia the relevant law reveals Vir permits process, ginia post-depri- would have entertained a compliance with due its own private party, presumably Although a and be handled under State Farm is against any plaintiff's suit is not state directed law in the same mannеr as official, "state action" for Fourteenth jurisdiction, both infra. purposes deprivation and a "under Amendment by required color of state law” as 1983 waiver, 6. The situation differs from that of Co., present, following Lugar v. Edmondson Oil voluntarily a when one surrenders constitution- L.Ed.2d 102 S.Ct. right, al not to assert another constitutional right, an obvious bene- but secure collateral fit. could, course, dispute a as to 5. There remain whether the had been satisfied. This uphold suspension a is Maryland judgment license evident on the attack vation Butler, from Lamb v. 198 Va. in its personal jurisdiction want of (1956), recent in a S.E.2d most courts.7 deprivation of license cases decided series 46.1-437(a) ap- authorizes an Va.Code § Butler, Virginia’s highest by tribunal. aggrieved by the Com- any party peal by sought to plaintiff enjoin the Commis- to the suspension of his license missioner’s enforcing temporarily from sioner order is Only where revocation Virginia courts. revoking driver’s license. Revocation his permitted except on mandatory appeal is no provision upon rested a of the state motor Thus, identity. quеstion of the narrow making law ac- vehicle Commissioner’s determining inquiry, in whether essential mandatory where the motorist had judg- Maryland for the personal jurisdiction speeding twice been convicted of within fo- appealed in ment could twelve months. One conviction occurred in rum, of the license is whether questioned; not and was other 46.1-443 actually mandatory. Va.Code Carolina, offense occurred North mandatory a license suspension of makes proven abstract of conviction. by a court of judgment “rendered when a plaintiff speeding had been stopped unsat- competent jurisdiction” remains police, fine paid North Carolina at the in con- Reading provisions these isfied. authorities, time to local and did con- of the court ren- jurisdiction junction, subsequently, test the violation so that critical original judgment is a dering the effectively entered obli- prerequisite to the Commissioner's default, payment being the fine him court suspend license. If the gation to regarded guilty plea being as the fine man- suspension is not jurisdiction, lacked Virginia Supreme forfeited. Court of appeal datory, full remains and the holding Appeals, the North Carolina force, by any qualifica- unencumbered conviction, proceedings amounted con- tion.8 necessary it to determine the exist- sidered actually personal ex- subject courts both of matter and That ence judgment jurisdiction judg- of a for the North Carolina jurisdictional the basis amine important questions upon it ment. “The relying from another state before 7. Where judicata jurisdictional Men's may, surance Co. v. North Carolina Morris v. under between Health Ins. by reserving both to enforcement. 75 L.Ed. 1244 451, 455-56, tion has never been Thus, court subject other and has subsequently, crucial for special appearance, ^[770] 102 S.Ct. F.2d — been credit subject contrast, Assn., a defendant sued under Baldwin is bound state, however, the matter ^[29] effect when rendered jurisdiction a default and Jones, fully 1357, 1366, is not purposes full faith and Guaranty 283 U.S. matter and 91 L.Ed. 488 the basis, (1931), because the jurisdiction where the defendant makes 329 owing. A default and actually litigated. fairly and judgment of a U.S. 522, elect not is in Assn., v. Iowa State it 71 L.Ed.2d 558 in a special appearance if either Underwriters may inquire 525, personal subsequent 545, 550-51, litigated is credit dispute jurisdiction jurisdictional dispute, foreign jurisdiction jurisdictional 455 U.S. judgment (1947). Life lacking, by 51 S.Ct. rendered a appear, & requirement. court jurisdiction, personal and Accident the challenge Traveling Before 691, full 517, Nat’l As- 67 S.Ct. into has res (1982). having finally choice in an- there- ques- issue faith 705, 518, its & is a jurisdiction judgment residents of Federal Practice -, Baldwin, See them sume would intend, state statute there an unconstitutional subject competent statutory (1981). "face” appears here. so indicated. as to ter decided (1984), 111, 102 It is jurisdiction. S.Ct. at also 18 C. 84 S.Ct. the to 104 hardly cited as the dissent matter construction existence the same is entitled to full faith 283 jurisdiction be ‍​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‍determined from the S.Ct. is 1367; the foreign judgments ignore process, 242, lacking. U.S. at likely United States v. Wright, the jurisdiction, original and Underwriters, Durfee 245, dissent, interpretation judgments the whereas no such personal Procedure, that a statute 525-26, proposes, Furthermore, A. elementary principle question 11 L.Ed.2d v. any legislature forum, Miller Duke, inappositе, while Morton, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 and 51 S.Ct. at 518. void 455 and credit §§ required & E. unless to relieve its the 375 U.S. subject not be U.S. at 186 for 4430, subjecting to language resulting personal — Cooper, lack of so for the clearly (1963); could given even 4442 mat- U.S. 706, pre- 106, 1234 jur-

whether the North Carolina Court had hearing rivation courts on isdiction and Butler properly question invalidity whether of the of the Mary- ' before the Court.” 95 S.E.2d at 246. personal land for absence of jur- failed, simply isdiction.10 She whether Butler must control here as well, through misunderstanding statute, although temporary revocation there genuine lack of interest or desire statute, rested equally on different it was strengthen action, her 1983 to avail her- § subject rule broad 46.1-437 § right.11 self of that precluding appeals mandatory from revoca- tions, except identity, matters of Ill effect when Butler was decided.9 why perceive We no reason Tomai-Minogue While enjoyed deprivation treat a license adequate post-deprivation courts would remedy for sus satisfy failure an accident pension license, dif- of her 1983 claim ferently from a similar requires still us to determine whether she speeding. plaintiffs assumption If had a process right pre-deprivation to a him post-depriva- 46.1-437 accorded no hearing jurisdiction on the Maryland of the hearing jurisdictional on the Virginia provides court. pre-deprivation no correct, precluded were it would also have circumstances, in these but we con Virginia Supreme Appeals Court of clude that no such hearing is constitutional addressing jurisdictional from ly issue in mandated.

Butler. dispositive is Dixon v. precedent Love, Both the statute supporting case law 431 U.S. 97 S.Ct. plainly afforded post-dep- (1977). L.Ed.2d 172 There the up- 46-416.1, heard, 9. Former Va.Code § under which the opportunity 11. In addition to the to be occurred, license revocation in Butler part was also requirement fundamental of due is "no Safety Responsibility of the Motor Vehicle calculated, reasonably tice stances, under all the circum Butler, Virginia Supreme Act. In Court of appraise parties interested Appeals appeal limiting pro- did not discuss the pendency of the action and afford them an 46.1-437, 46-424, vision of § then codified as § opportunity present objections." their Mul light prior but in of three decisions the same Co., lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust interpreting language court the relevant within 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed. 865 preceding years, altogether implausi- six it is (1950). Bell, See also 402 U.S. at 91 S.Ct. at suppose ble to that the court was unaware of its 1591; 254, 267-68, Goldberg Kelly, v. consequences. Curry, See Lamb 197 Va. 1011, 1020-21, S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1955); Joyner, 89 S.E.2d Dillon v. “The notice must be of such nature as reason 559, 583, (1951); Va. 66 S.E.2d 584-86 Scott v. ably information, convey required the and it Commonwealth, 73, 14, 191 Va. 60 S.E.2d 15-16 must afford a reasonable time for those interest Mullane, ed appearance.” to make their Curry, Both Dillon and relied on the dis- 314, (citations omitted). U.S. at 70 S.Ct. at 657 sent, prior Virginia involved convictions from We are convinced that under these circumstanc presenting of difficulty. jurisdictional in-state residents no aspects requirement es both of the notice were suppose Virgin- We will not Tomai-Minogue satisfied. prompt received intended, ia Curry, Court in Dillon and suspension written notice of the from the DMV. jurisdictional resolve sub silentio a clearly That notice informed her of the reason Only with whiсh it was not even confronted. Butler, suspension, statutory for the and cited the au which as the most recent decision is thority controlling, actually for the necessary Commissioner’s action. As To has found it mai-Minogue represented consider whether another was state's counsel lacking jurisdiction. throughout in proceedings, right these and the to a judicial hearing challenging suspension post-deprivation hearing 10. For a to be mean- easily by could have been determined consult ingful, prompt. Virginia it must also be The ing law, the statute and case we find every promise expeditiousness statute shows by requiring conveyed adequate that the notice information appeals that be taken from the Tomai-Minogue rights. to more, about her Further days. Commissioner’s order within 30 Va.Code the notice allowed event, 46.1-437(a). any plaintiff § cannot bring judicial appeal 30-day well within the challenge promptness hearing lack of of a period pursuant 46.1-437(a). Va.Code request. she did not even hearing providing summary evidentiary ordinarily an is not re- held an Illinois law following quired prior license adverse administrative ac- of a driver’s revocation suspensions for traffic with- tion. three offenses Id. though 10-year period, even a full in a remaining Nor do two Mathews only after

hearing could be had the revoca- departure. a factors command such Just here, only taken As tion had effect. Dixon, in as id. at at S.Ct. timing in Dixon was one issue suspension satisfy for failure to an acci- 1727. hearing. 431 at 97 S.Ct. at U.S. essentially dent automatic un- pre-depri- a require Since the Court did law, no der element of discre- Dixon, hearing there is likewise vation in tion left to the Commissioner. The merits mandating one here. justification for no Maryland judgment could not be questioned proceeding, resolved the motorist’s in be- The Dixon court Eldridge, ing faith and under Mathews v. U.S. full credit under the claim IV, (1976), Constitution, 1. possible 47 L.Ed.2d 18 Art. 96 S.Ct. deprivation, of: causes requires consideration for erroneous such as identity jurisdiction, mistaken and lack of First, private interest bewill are all in the post-deprivation remediable action; second, by the official affected appeаl. plaintiff By fortuity, suffered deprivation the risk of erroneous erroneous under the latter of procedures through interest such circumstances, these but we will not hold a used, value, if any, of probable and the merely statute flawed because it works a procedural safe- additional substitute in temporary singular inconvenience case. finally, the Government’s guards; Rather, according must decide we whether interest, including the function involved pre-deprivation li- to a in and the fiscal and administrative burdens cense suspension upon cases based default proce- or substitute additional judgments generally signifi- would “have requirement entail. dural reducing cant value of erro- number quoted at 424 U.S. 96 S.Ct. at at Dixon, neous deprivations.” 431 U.S. at 112-13, at at 97 S.Ct. 1727-28. 114, 97 at 1728. made S.Ct. Plaintiff has test, adopted The Mathews as Dixon showing no sus- whatsoever erroneous claims, repre- license deprivation driver’s pensions anything but rare. approach earlier sents some shift from Bell, by the which man- governmental followed at stake is interest pre-deprivation hearing, except dаted hardly inconsequential. The statute aims situations, emergency when license was financially re- ensure that ‍​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‍motorists are 542, 91 suspended. 402 at at S.Ct. sponsible satisfy promptly any will judgments against them.12 that in- While may slight parked terest where a car seem Dixon, recognized As the Court bumped, anything it is when but trivial interest private in a driver’s license is not life, injury accidents involve loss of human “so vital and essential as are social insur- motorists, property to other and extensive payments recipient may ance on which the damage. responsibility Financial statutes depend very for his subsistence.” 431 U.S. simply designed safeguard are not insur- dispar- 97 S.Ct. at 1728. We do at not companies, gener- ance but serve the more age importance driver’s the of a license merely purpose ensuring al of that those day and time. We that societal this note occurrence, responsible highway pay suspension is uncommon accidents the not an arrangements usually resulting necessity that alternative losses without the proceedings. has enforcement possible, еxpressly and that the Court cumbersome great the so Where has not been held that interest is not as to an adverse motorist, departure by opted satisfied a has require principle from the that statutory except judgments respect with reserva- not other 12. The interest is lessened jurisdiction. judgments, question default which are tion of the of case of like 1236 who suspend truly the license now and discuss the that drivers have suffered later. We decline to undercut that remedy,

matter erroneous have some taking the legitimate by requiring choice averting while abuse of an administrative talking later and the first. be those process by purpose with no other delay.14 than that “the sub Dixon’s observation a public pre-deprivation interest in administrative ef Because was stantial the ficiency impeded by plaintiff’s would be availabili when required not was license hearing in pretermination every of a ty suspended, adequate post-depriva- case,” at at is existed, 431 U.S. 97 S.Ct. remedy plaintiff’s tion 1983 applicable suggest, here. as the also To prevail, claim cannot as there no has been does, jurisdic of dissent process. denial of due yield “simple would to a administrative tion inquiry,” recognize fails to that the deter IV personam jurisdiction of in is mination Notwithstanding disposition our plain- of tangled. See, quite Davis v. e.g. often St. claim, her tiff’s 1983 state law claims for Co., Paul-Mercury Indemnity 294 F.2d prosecution malicious and abuse of Cir.1961).13 (4th requirement A well, as they must be addressed rest Vehicles, agency Division of Motor merely pendent jurisdiction not also but statute, charged administering independent diversity on an basis. It pre-termination my on the hearings hold Maryland uncertain whether or personal jurisdiction is not one steries torts, apply encompass- law would to these lightly upon would force the state. we ing by State actions Farm both states. though permissible grounds Even for a parties agreement, Nor are as cases hearing might prior be confined to mistak jurisdictions from both are cited. like-We identity jurisdiction, en and want of no unnecessary it wise find to determine clairvoyance predict is needed to that mo governs, law appears which state’s for it “routinely request torists ... full principles accepted the relevant Dixon, hearings,” administrative jurisdictions materially do not both differ. delay at merely at S.Ct. action licenses, prose of their A. An for malicious loss driver’s and that the cution, spurious might process” “malicious use of it quantity appeals far out or as weigh legitimate. according Maryland By only proceeding a is called in where the civil, post-deprivation hearing, Virginia complained e.g. ensures of is v. see Wesko personam jurisdiction In over nonresident cient minimum contacts with North Carolina 13. by physical presence motorist is not limited consent, under the standard of International Shoe Co. only by 310, 316, but of fairness em- standards Washington, 66 S.Ct. bodied in of the Four- clause (1945) L.Ed. 95 for that state to Paul-Mercury Amendment. teenth Davis v. St. jurisdiction exercise over the insured. While Co., (4th Cir.1961). Indemnity 294 F.2d ultimately jurisdic- this circuit determined Davis, motorist, the insured whose residence existed, complexity 294 F.2d at Texas, purchased which an automobile analysis only emphasize involved serves to lent to her she minor son as a Marine stationed jurisdictional why inquiry the burden of the Carolina, Lejeune, Camp who at North was cov- agency rest should with an administrative policy ered under the A resident terms. hearing. pressures pre-suspension under the North Carolina was killed this automobile being permis- it while was driven with son's neglects apply part the three The dissent Judgment sion fellow Marine. default Dixon, balancing required by Mathews and test obtained the insured motorist in simply categorize seeks to cases as involv- statutory suit in North Carolina after substituted ing responsibility safety stat- or motor financial knowledge service. suit, motorist had doing, the dissent would also scuttle utes. In so company, as did her insurance elect- between this case and Bell. critical distinction not to defend. collect ed Unable to on the Bell, suspension was mandated without debtors, judgment from the the administratrix fault, prior determination of the motorist's brought against deceased's estate suit suspension only whereas here occurs after company insurance in district The cru- court. fault. question was had cial whether the insured suffi-

1237 194-95, 529, Graetzel, 192, quoting Owens v. Inc., 321 A.2d 149 G.E.M., 272 Md. 265, (1926). 689, A. several ele Md. 132 267 (1974), requires proof of See also 531 1) (similar Giant, that a These are: 152 S.E.2d at 276 prevail. standard ments to by the de prosecution). instituted proceeding was for criminal prior flaw insti fendant; proceeding was 2) that the is that State Farm plaintiff’s obviously case cause; 3) that the probable probable try without had to collect tuted cause from malice; 4) Tomai-Minogue damages was instituted proceeding suffered on in favor of terminated proceeding claim, subrogation that its insured’s because action; 5) present plaintiff in the every there was reason to believe special damages sustained plaintiff legitimate. debt was Hooke prior proceeding. a result of the as entirely Farm thus acted within its 610, Corp., Md.App. 42 Equitable v. Credit rights bringing against a civil suit To- 110, (1979); Herring 113 v. Citi A.2d 402 mai-Minogue. only proce- error Its Co., 517, Md.App. 21 Trust zens Bank & one, selecting dural forum without denied, 272 Md. A.2d cert. 321 person, jurisdiction over this is (1974). 212 Pyles, also Gaut v. 742 See injury plaintiff to the irrelevant sustained. (1971); 646-47 Gi 181 S.E.2d Va. probable bring cause to the under- Lack of 207 Pigg, Inc. v. Va. Virginia, ant of lying action cannot be inferred from noth- (1967); Wiggs v. Farm 152 S.E.2d 275 ing jurisdictional more than a error. Had (1964); er, 205 Va. 135 S.E.2d brought proper against State Farm suit 58 F.2d Surety Page, National Co. Tomai-Minogue Virginia, she would have (4th Cir.1932); Jurispru 12A Michie’s consequences suspen- suffered the same dence, Malicious Prosecution § pay sion of her license had she refused to damages entail some ar Special anything, only her debt. If State Farm person, property, seizure of rest of the wrong injured by bringing itself suit ordinarily re injury which would not other thereby postponing jurisdiction, collection Hooke, A.2d at in all civil actions. sult Moreover, Farm of its claim. when State 113; Surety, 58 F.2d at 148. As National mistake, promptly of its it moved learned suming purposes of this action to vacate the and reinstate the requi a license constitutes the seizure of every opportunity at license. Plaintiff had damages, nonetheless think special we site present evidence of the nefarious trial to a directed verdict for defendant speculates, which the dissent motives about prosecution clаim was plaintiff’s malicious manifestly failed to do so. We will yet she present proper, plaintiff failed because simple procedural mistake to be allow probable cause for evidence that sufficient prosecution into a malicious elevated wanting.15 action was Proba State Farm’s underlying claim are un- the merits of the defined as “a cause in a civil action is ble questioned.16 in the exist ground reasonable belief process, under B. Abuse of of facts as would ence of such a state law, spe is a proceed Maryland and institution of the suit or both warrant distinct from malicious 321 A.2d at cies of tort action ings complained Herring, of.” Malice, electing nogue By a claim with legal employed to file $100. in mali- sense claims, damages, requires prosecution no distinct the remainder of his he cious his insurer for proba- proof may want of necessarily subrogated but be inferred from to State Farm his 114; Giant, Hooke, 402 A.2d at Tomai-Minogue, ble cause. from under recover that sum Thus, we need not consider that S.E.2d at 276. pre-existing Even if insuranсe contract. ques- directly, and focus instead on the element intended To- there were evidence that Webster probable tion of cause. mai-Minogue’s payment represent full $100 his loss—and there is not—Web- satisfaction of suggestion that State Farm had 16. The dissent's portion compromise the insured ster could not against Web- because no claim his insurer with- his loss to the detriment of contrary principles of had settled is to basic ster Farm's consent. out State anything did not settle insurance law. Webster personal Tomai-Mi- his claim other than 1238 making martyr. While mali while of process. Tomai-Minogue of

prosecution or use portraits institution of Yet such must be from prosecution concerns drawn cious own imaginations. but without more than our for its ostensible result Plaintiff process cause, opportunity is the process every of had at probable present abuse trial to regularly any issued of improper use of otherwise evidence “motives exasperation, of contemplated by frustration, or vengeance in a manner not even the process ... in v. Peck Iron far after its issuance. Ross offices of removed employees law (4th Co., Cir. agents” 264 F.2d the State Metal of Farm Mutual Insur- & 1959); so, at 189. The es Herring, demonstrably 321 A.2d ance Co. She failed to do 1) process why of are: judge elements of abuse and that the district sential is directed 2) in a willful act purpose; ulterior verdict defendant. In system for our of law, in the process proper use of the not juries the not entitled to consider regular proceeding. Palmer supporting course of tale of without woe evidence. Ford, Wood, 471 A.2d Inc. v. 298 Md. trial, court At characterized this case (1984); Sanders, 189 Mullins v. trivia,” as “a to monument one that 54 S.E.2d Proof Va. brought.” have one “should never been probable origi absence of cause for of sense, spoke hastily. the court too Trivial unnecessary, proceeding Herring, is nal occasion, disputes do, on principles raise of required at A.2d nor is it show sense, import. larger constitutional In the process maliciously. was issued Mul however, share the trial we court’s frustra- lins, 54 S.E.2d at 121. misunderstanding, tion that this at junсtures several one of could have objective bringing State Farm’s informally, way been resolved has made its Maryland, request its civil suit and then to court. conceded that suspension ing plaintiff’s of license Vir entirely damage Webster’s car was plaintiff’s ginia, compel payment was to her fault. debt to State Farm was precisely purpose This is of the debt. evidently legitimate, company and the tried procedures question. process Civil state going without Yet to collect it to court. designed may to aid debt collection be em energy expended could not be ployed object contemplated for the law plaintiff answering any one of let- four incurring the an abuse without threat of Farm ters from State could be mustered process Suspension suit. driver’s li pursue 1983 suit this cense where an accident is out judgment ‍​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‍Appeals. standing under the statute is man ifestly intended to creditor enable the bring can not Whether one a lawsuit is satisfy judgment, suspension his for the is always one the same as whether paid. once the lifted It is that, Perhaps enough should. it is to note irrelevant, purposes for an abuse of worse, better and modern con- claim, brought process that State Farm suit tours of owe as much con- wrong jurisdiction, since action of dispute temporary attitudes toward resolu- sort, prosecution, this unlike malicious does country’s journey from as to this horse validity concern itself with the through to the rails automobile. original process. Because no unlawful court’s district defend- Ross, object,” F.2d at “collateral ant is present, a directed for defend verdict AFFIRMED. plaintiff’s ant abuse of proper. SPROUSE, Judge, dissenting: Circuit

V court, respectfully dissent. The district tempting pursue It would be extent the majority opinion, and to some large denigrate Tomai-Minogue’s course dissent and cast a insur- lawsuit company piece, company pursuit ance as the villain of the insurance as a of triv-

1239 required suspension of a charac- driver’s li- disagree both with the rights. I ial after an accident of her suit and cense unless the licensee of the nature terization the control- majority’s construction of financiаl responsibility pay established I can- law. ling principles of constitutional might any judgment result from Love, v. agree that Dixon not damages caused the accident. The (1977), denies L.Ed.2d 172 52 97 S.Ct. licensee, although reasoned that the Court opportuni- right pre-deprivation to a her the pre-deprivation entitled to a full hear- Maryland judgment ty to show ing, pre-deprivation entitled to a in- was pro- Virginia statute nor that the was void to the quiry “limited determination wheth- adequate op- Tomai-Minoguewith an vided possibility judg- er there is a reasonable hearing. I post-deprivation for a portunity being ments in the amount claimed ren- in district court erred feel that the also the licensee.” 402 at dered U.S. ac- prosecution dismissing her malicious 540, 91 S.Ct. at 1590. tion. in did not overrule The court Dixon Bell. contrary, approval it cited with To the I. “fully distinguishable].” and found Dix- pre- entitled to some Tomai-Minogue was on, 431 at 97 S.Ct. at 1728. It is U.S. the va- deprivation opportunity to have true, majority, as stated in Maryland judgment con- lidity inquiry license revocation cases our must sidered. process” focus on “how much due is rе- heavily on Dixon v. majority relies majority quired in these cases. The also that the fourteenth for its conclusion Love in correctly notes that Dixon the court in plays only a limited role amendment determining criteria in used Mathews I resolving Tomai-Minogue’s grievance. question. majority What the over- this protection for hold- agree that due looks, however, that Dixon involved rev- finely licenses is structured ers of driver’s safety ocation of a driver’s license vio- Supreme deci- as a result of the Court’s lations, pains empha- and the took Court Burson, 402 in and Bell v. sions Dixon might that the result have been differ- size 535, 91 29 L.Ed.2d 90 U.S. S.Ct. if the revocation had been for financial ent however, think, majority mis- Dixon, purposes. 431 responsibility U.S. impact those and their construes decisions 114-15, no at 97 S.Ct. at 1728-29. There is my The essential basis of on this case. Tomai-Minogue’slicense question that majority is its fail- disagreement with responsi- financial pursuant to the revoked appreciate that considered ure to Dixon bility Virginia’s sections of Motor Vehicle of a license for violation of road revоcation through 46.1- 46.1-417 Code. Sections revocation safety laws while Bell involved provides for 441.2 of the Code responsibility financial for violation of as reckless revocation for violations such Court, adopting laws. The for revocation of driving, drunken Eldridge, U.S. Mathews mentally incapacitated indi- the licenses of (1976), 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 bal- S.Ct. driving safe- of which relate viduals—all 112-13, Dixon, at ancing test however, 46.1-442, seq., are ty. Section et 1727-28, recognized primary S.Ct. at provisions requiring responsibility financial importance public interest road satisfy judgments. revocation for failure comparative im- safety minimized the brief, in its this As State Farm states “[i]n laws responsibility portance of financial case, to enforce the State Farm decided against the erroneous balanced through Virginia financial re- an automobile. The to drive 46.1-442- sponsibility statutes Va.Code requiring rule left intact the Bell likewise, emphasizing majority, 443.” The right to heard for pre-deprivation some against To- proceeding the nature of the In Bell the type latter of revocation. mai-Minogue, states: Georgia statute court considered district objective bringing public conclude that Farm’s its We interests Maryland, request- present and then under the circumstances of this civil suit sufficiently plaintiff’s weighty license in case visible and ing suspension of compel payment summary for State make its Virginia, initial was decision predecision effective without a precisely This is plaintiff’s debt. hearing. administrative procedures ques- in purpose of the state designed aid process debt tion. Civil Dixon, 114-15, 431 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at employed object for the may be collection (citation omitted). 1728-29 and footnote incurring contemplated by law without It would take straining considerable of an abuse of suit. the threat conjure much of a difference in interest the an Suspension of a driver’s license where public might in providing security have for outstanding judgment accident is under contingent (as a judgment collection of manifestly intend- Virginia statute is statute) Georgia in the and in ensuring that satisfy the creditor to his ed to enable judgment the final actually was collected suspension for the is lifted judgment, (as statute). Virginia in Essentially, judgment paid. once the embody public the two statutes the same interest. The Court in Bell did not Georgia considered in consid- The statute Bell public er that interest sufficient to responsibility financial override required proof of pre-deprivation a licensee’s some judgment, while the statute before consideration. procedures created revocation we consider in their collec- judgment to aid creditors agree majority with the requiring degree That in does not tions. difference pre-deprivation hearings full in these cases rationale, application alter of the Bell un- impose intolerable burden Dixon, requiring pre-de- disturbed some administration of the motor vehicle laws opportunity termination when license is certainly and would throw the Mathews revoked as an aid to collection. Supreme scales out-of-balance. The sharp The Court has made a dis- Bell, however, recognized this in even be- process requirements tinction between due adopted fore it crite- Dixon Mathews fоr revocations based on convictions for resolving ria for driver’s license revocation safety brought violations and those about one, In opportuni- cases. cases like this party solely to assist one to an accident in ty appropriate to have the administrator Court, damage collecting judgments. The meaningfully consider the void criteria, discussing the three Mathews might be sufficient. Given some concise emphasized important the most one objection readily provided by a licensee implicated governmental in Dixon was the notice, by adequate pre-deprivation alerted “public interest —in that case interest an administrator could decide the issue safety highways, on the roads and simple inquiry. administrative See Bell prompt safety removal of a hazard.” Burson, v. at at S.Ct. explained: The Court further 1590. fully distinguishes This factor Bell v.

Burson, supra, “only pur- where the II. pose” Georgia of the statute there under provide statute does not security consideration was “to obtain post-deprivation hearing. pay any judgments from which to resulting majority the licensee from the concedes that Tomai-Mi- accident____ contrast, nogue process protec- the Illinois was entitled to due opines sufficiently pro- at statute issue instant case is but that she is designed keep post-deprivation off the roads those tected after unwilling It then drivers who unable or driver’s license was revoked. respect safety Virginia statutory traffic rules and the concludes that provided others. opportunity scheme her an at identity person involved. Our an- hearing to show post-deprivation such a void, negative. swer to this is Maryland judgment time. I at that her license restored to have There is no review under section 46-424 Tomai-Mi- my opinion that indicated have mandatory, the revocation was ex- pre-deprivation to some nogue was entitled cept identity. on the assuming the moment opportunity but 192 Va. at 66 S.E.2d at pro- hearing could post-deprivation that a years Four later the court decid- to which she all the due vide her Curry, ed 197 Va. Lamb S.E.2d entitled, that the Vir- persuaded I am (1955). A driver’s license hаd been provide does not statutory scheme ginia revoked combination within a post-depri- constitutionally adequate even period driving of a reckless twelve-month hearing. vation speeding and a conviction. The conviction 46.1-437(a) (1980) Virginia Code section mandatory requiring provisions revocation provides: for these two offenses became effective any lie in case which appeal shall No underlying after convictions. The both registra- the license or revocation of the revocation, mandatory the driver contested mandatory except to determine contending applied post it that was ex facto concerned identity person the the of Virginia him in violation of the Constitu- in dis- question identity of is the when Virginia tion. The court refused to consid- pute. validly presented er the merits of even Virginia of has twice Supreme The argument, holding constitutional the predeces- language considered identical considering was limited to issues of court directly and each time has held sor statutes identity. Approving previous language its permitted be treated only issues that the Dillon, expressed in it went on to state: hearings are issues post-deprivation in such mandatory Under the certain and lan- identity of the licensee. relating to the guage authority 46-424 and the of Joyner, 192 Va. In Dillon v. supra, it is clear that Joyner, Dillon v. (1951), license the driver whose S.E.2d presented sought by to be the issues validity of revoked contested the had been Curry appeal on this could not be con- driving. reckless predicate conviction for by The character of sidered the court. 46.1-437(a), the Like section section con- he convicted the offenses for which was in Dillon read: strued appeal under inquiry limited the on any lie in case in which appeal No shall identity. one of The demurr- 46-424 to registra- of the license or the revocation sustained and the er should have been mandatory except to determine tion was appeal dismissed. identity person concerned the of the identity question is dis- when Butler, majority relies on Lamb v. The pute. (1956), sup- 198 Va. 95 S.E.2d position Virginia Supremе port its Virginia The court said: 46.1-437(a) interpret ‍​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‍section Court would presented issue now The narrow personal question allow a on the person, license to drive whether whose jurisdiction. quick answer to that is by motor vehicle has been revoked any not construe or make that Butler did of the Division of Motor Commissioner language on the of that sec- observation Vehicles, upon on based convictions two tion, di- Curry whereas Dillon and were driving reckless within offenses holdings very question we con- rect months, can raise the twelve consecutive holdings squarely contrary to the validity judgments of the of the question sider— position by majority. Apparent- taken under section proceeding in a instituted ly, court considered the facts of the Code of 46-424 face, by statutory not controlled on their Butler judgments are valid in- limiting language, perhaps because it question is no as to the where there question volved the of whether a conviction single course of a year the Divi- rate, even existed. At it sion of Motor was decided Vehicles will eighty ninety statutory rеports outside the context of the lan- thousand of con- victions guage limiting appeal furnished to it in the issues on to iden- the form of by abstracts the clerks tity, of the and the definitive cases on that lan- courts throughout the Commonwealth. guage, The ab- Curry, Dillon and were not even stracts conviction presumed to be mentioned in Butler. correct, they and if are valid on their With respect, majority all also think the face as case, was true in the instant term art confuses venerable with ele- Commissioner cannot their va- mentary proceedings concerning the deter- lidity. personal jurisdiction. mination of The sec- S.E.2d at 583. The tions of the motor laws with which again Court said in Butler: repeatedly we deal refer judgments integrity judicial competent “rendered jurisdic- a court of would be set at stake if judgments valid majority tion.” Under this the believes on their faces should be voided ac- could have shown that tions of administrative officers or Maryland “competent” court was not opinions of executives or officers of the personally because shе was not before it. government they to the effect that are Virginia Legislature This attributes to the invalid. encompass the intent concept of in personam jurisdiction into the term. Un- 95 S.E.2d at 247. derstandably, the issue has not been fre- True, the burden of administration is one quently litigated, but the normal reference factor weigh Mathews due phrase of the competent jurisdic- “courts of balancing test. As the United States Su- tion” is to subject courts which have mat- preme Dixon, Court held in both Bell and jurisdiction. Morton, ter United v. States however, it important is but one of several

— -,---, 104 S.Ct. majority factors. The concedes that in the 2772-73, (1984). 81 L.Ed.2d 687-88 A face of implicit administrative burdens legislature expression uses a word in its important function, this governmental usually understood express- sense unless it private citizen is post- entitled to at least a an contrary. es intention to the American deprivation hearing in satisfaction of his Company Patterson, Tobacco v. view, rights. In my the Vir- 63, 68, 102 S.Ct. 71 L.Ed.2d 748 ginia legislature Virginia Supreme and expression There is no such in Court have deferred too much to the these statutes. and, Stаte’s administrative burden in this area, discrete have overlooked the constitu- I share with the majority apparent tional license holders to capable sense that a legislature such as post-deprivation even a hearing. that of Virginia simply the State of purposefully not have enacted a scheme whereby its citizens could lose their driv- III. ers’ license on the basis of a void Tomai-Minoque should have been allowed entered in juris- a minor court of another pursue her malicious myriad diction. In the might of details that prosecution claim.

be administered in policing over-the-road drivers, however, even the most consci- Finally, I think the district court erred legislature entious guilty could be of an directing Tomai-Minogue’s a verdict on ma- oversight. The reason here is administra- prosecution licious majority claim. The ac- expediency. tive As curately underpin- summarized the factual Court said in nings Dillon: necessary to sustain this claim but embarrassment, fear, “probable Farm had suffered cha- that State concluded deprived grin long aсcepted of a citizen Tomai- bring against their action cause” rights. jury might A constitutional as “a Probable cause is defined Minogue. worthy large her considered case of a have of such ground belief reasonable That, however, damage award. should institution facts as would warrant state of left to prerogative been have re- of.” complained proceedings suit or agree sponsibility jury. I with the Co., 21 Trust Herring v. Citizens Bank & feeling practically universal that federal (1974) 321 A.2d Md.App. frequently courts Graetzel, 149 Md. overburdened — (quoting Owens litigation frivolous that frivolous liti- (1926)). —and 696, 132 A. 265 gation summarily should be treated and I defeat place, first think it would In the imposed I appropriate. sanctions do probable purpose of the definition however, not, castigation associate with the concept of “state of to limit cause majority the district court and the cast relating only to the substan- facts” to facts bringing this action. Farm controversy. tive merits not think this is a frivolous case. do She against Tomai- independent claim had no may well have felt that the only to what- Minogue subrogated was—it rights her constitutional was intentional. Webster, insured, had ever claim its might Many It have been. constitutional may claim against He have had no her. principles have from resolution of evolved steps against and State Farm took no egregious violations. We should be less An claims experienced this. ascertain using to criticize our citizens for fed- slow administrator, nevertheless, instructed purposes they courts for the eral action attorney pursue compliant designed or to limit were access courts even a law student her which concepts preconceived on hierarchical lack of have known was void for should rights. personal regarding personal jurisdiction. The suit candidly Tomai-Minogue be sure ad- To occurring an in the District accident in fault. She struck car mitted Webster’s pursued Maryland against Columbia was in The size parking lot and caused a dent. jury could have resident. A gauged may and her the dent dereliction all of this to lack of inferred that amounted which, repair bill in from the size pursue The prоbable cause to the action. repair these times of inflated automobile practices now an- sometimes deviant bills, damage represents minor indeed. yet is not justice-of-the-peace system cient it, damage The extent of or absence memory not alert so in that we are blurred however, only of a was the start scenario in other possibility to of these practices that, first, eventually developed innocent at re- systems. large A and judicial minor fairly Tomai-Mi- serious intrusion on into certainly spected company like Farm State rights. despite Tomai- nogue’s This was practices would not countenance such attempt rectify her Minogue’s error. But who is to pursuit of small claims. finding spent time Web- She considerable frustra- exasperation, if motives of know him, and, paid him having found ster tion, vengeance, might not surface even or damages. he She that asked $100 employees far offices of removed Webster for the thought she settled with juries to agents. These are matters for damage. relationship Farm had no State determine. Tomai-Minogue. only right it Tomai-Minogue suffered anywhere is true It had to her was would have sue damage. out-of-pocket monetary subroga- by no great right assigned to it Webster’s however, salesper- Webster, however, was, right no real estate had She tion. car, who, needing perhaps Tomai-Minogue; her lost two he had settled with son, sue She her. opportunity commissions. months’ brought

State Farm thus action in Jr., Sylvester VAUGHNS, Maryland Tomai-Minogue, a known J. his father friend, Sylvester and next Virginia resident with no connections to the J. VAUGHNS; Wheatfall, by Toika E. her Maryland, State of for an accident that friend, father and next Walter E. occurred in the District of Columbia. This Brooks, Wheatfall; Jr., by James R.L. pursued suit and was filed friend, his father and next James R.L. which, course, Maryland court had no Brooks; Reginald Wiggs, his father power personal to effectuate valid service. friend, Wiggs; Regi- and next Hosca D. significance The district court attached Jackson, Jr., by nald A. his father and respond Tomai-Minogue’sfailures to to let- friend, Reginald Jackson; next A. Den- Maryland ters from Farm’s office State Ligón, by ise A. her and father next pay demanding that she fact $200 also —-a friend, Jr.; Ligón, Carolyn Dennis J. opinion. She, the majority alluded to in Gilmore, by friend, her father next however, obligation Farm, no had State Gilmore; Sterling Williams, K. John A. even had not communicated with its friend, his father and next John J. lay persons insured. She did what most Williams, individually and on behalf of done—she her have consulted law- persons similarly situated; all other yer. lawyer correctly told her Eller; Jesse Alexander Martha Street even if the claim meritorious—which it Eller; Lynch; Marjo- Brendan Edward would be invalid. Lynch; not— rie Phillip Elaine Kenneth suggest Farm and trial court Whittemore; Whittemore; Bette Ann jumped she should have into her car and Dinerman; Arthur Emanuel Janet Avin Maryland hastened to order enter a Dinerman; Sampson; Morris Edward special appearance in the state court. That Sampson; Ray- Thelma Olinda William Leer; suggests legal to me simply Leer; fantasy a bad Margaret mond Street Leo Chabot; Chabot; designed primarily Paul laws are for the Wanda Maxine Eugene Spaulding; protection John Bernadine companies of insurаnce and bill Spaulding; Lane National Association collectors. received a rudi- for the Advancement of Colored Peo- mentary lecture our Constitution when ple, George’s County Chapter, Prince she lawyer called her every she had Unincorporated Association; Mr. thoughts be secure that she Newman; and Mrs. Thomas Robert and could not be on a collection harassed mat- Williams; Delores J. Mr. and Mrs. ter spite, incompetence, whether out of Sterling; Glenn J. and John Flor- intrusion, feel, other basis. Such Rosser, Appellees, ence is sufficiently protected by serious to be the due clause of the fourteenth

amendment, and she should allowed to BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE pursue her section 1983 and state law COUNTY; James GEORGE’S A. Gola- claims State Farm. to, President of the Board Education George’s County;

of Prince and Ches- Whiting; Goldsmith; ter E. Joanne T. Johnson; Mills; Rodney Dr. W. Sue V. Robertson; Righton Dr. J. Jesse J. Warr, Williams; Jr.; Phyllis E. Ruth S. Wolf; Members of the Board of Edu- George’s County ‍​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‍cation of Prince Hassel, Superintendent Dr. Carl W. George’s County; Schools Prince Grenchik; Josephine Thomas John Grenchik; Joseph Snarich Thomas Grenchik; Grenchik; Martin James Donkis; Shirley Donkis; Robert Grace

Case Details

Case Name: Susan Tomai-Minogue v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 19, 1985

Citation: 770 F.2d 1228

Docket Number: 84-1582

Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.