This case raises a straightforward question of law: Is the physical contact requirement of the defendant’s motor vehicle insurance policy unenforceable as a perversion of the aims of the uninsured motorist statute, G. L. c. 175, § 113L? The plaintiff brought a complaint for breach of an insurance contract. The case is here on the plaintiffs appeal from the denial of her motion for summary judgment and the granting of the defendant’s cross motion for same. The judge below construed G. L. c. 175, § 113L, to preclude recovery under the plaintiff’s policy for *172 a hit-and-run accident absent physical contact with the plaintiff’s automobile. We granted direct appellate review. We reverse.
The facts are stipulated. On September 30, 1978, the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle on County Street in Attleboro when an automobile coming from the opposite direction forced her off the road into a guardrail. 1 The operator or owner of the other car was not identified. There was no physical contact between the unidentified vehicle and the plaintiff’s automobile.
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was insured under a motor vehicle policy issued by the defendant. The uninsured vehicle section of the policy contained the following limitation:
“Some autos are uninsured. Some accidents involve unidentified hit and run autos. Under this Part, we will pay damages for bodily injury to people injured or killed in certain accidents caused by uninsured or hit and run autos. We will pay only if the injured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of the uninsured or hit and run auto. We will only pay for hit and run accidents if the owner or operator of the auto causing the accident cannot he identified and there was physical contact with the hit and run auto” (emphasis supplied).
The defendant insurer asserts that, because the limiting endorsement is clear and unambiguous, there can be no basis to construe that language in favor of the insured. Contrast
Slater
v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
The insurer claims, however, that the policy limitation of coverage of “hit and run” accidents to those involving physical contact with the insured’s vehicle comports with the denotation of “hit-and-run” as used in G. L. c. 175, § 113L. 2 The insurer presses the point that the words “hit- and-run” in the statute must be read literally to mean actual physical сontact. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the expression “hit-and-run” does not necessarily import actual physical contact. She cites both lexical and other statutory uses of the term to buttress her argument that the defendant’s policy exclusion unlawfully restricts the purpose of the uninsured motor vehicle statute: to provide the availability of compensation for bodily injury or death caused by a tortfeasor who is uninsured. Although the judge endorsed the plaintiff’s reasoning, he concluded that the statutory language is to be read literally so as to require a physical contact, a “hit.” The judge further concluded that any change in the effect of the statutory language is for the Legislature.
The question sub judice, a matter of first impression in the Commonwealth, has been considered by numerous оther jurisdictions. Our review of those cases indicates that the
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defendant’s position is no longer supported by the majority of the courts, nor is it sustained by a proper view of legislative intent. The judge below relied on
Clark
v.
Regent Ins.
Co., S.D. (1978) (
More persuasive thаn the numbers, however, is the rationale of the latter group of decisions. All have considered and rejected the very basis upon which the judge below decided for the defendant. First, none of these courts has limited the undefined term “hit-and-run” to require physical contaсt. Also, our survey of both current and dated dictionaries produced only one which built the notion of a striking into its definition of “hit-and-run.” American heritage Dictionary of the English Language 625 (1969).
7
In all
*176
other lexical and decisional construction, “hit-and-run” is uniformly “synonymous with a car involved in an acсident causing damages where the driver flees from the scene.”
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v.
Novak,
An additional aspect of the principle of statutory construction is that statutory words are to be given their usual and ordinary mеaning considered in light of the aim to be accomplished by the Legislature.
Nantucket Conservation Foundation, Inc.
v.
Russell Management, Inc.,
The defendant postulates that the physical contact endorsement serves to prevent fraudulent claims by requiring of the claimant tangible proof of collision with an uninsured vehicle. This argument succumbs to the overriding purpose of the legislation. Furthermore, elimination of this arbitrary physical contact requirement does not diminish the plaintiff’s burden to prove that the accident actually did occur as she says. 9 We adopt the emerging and better reasoned view
*178 of the claimant’s evidentiary burden, epitomized in the words of the Flоrida court:
“The argument that the policy requirement of physical contact is reasonable is fallacious. The only reason for such a requirement is to prove that the accident actually did occur as a claimant may say it did. This is a question of fact to bе determined by the jury, or the judge if demand for jury trial is not made. If the injured party can sustain the burden of proof that an accident did occur, he should be entitled to recover, regardless of the actuality of physical contact. If twenty witnesses will swear they saw the acсident happen, their testimony should not be deemed worthless, as it would be under the decision here for review.” Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co.,249 So. 2d 429 , 430 (Fla. 1971).
See generally A. Widiss, supra at 156-157.
As to the defendant’s argument that the Insurance Commissioner’s approval of the policy provision evinces the Legislature’s intent to incorporate a physical contact restriction, the Commissioner’s approval is “hardly persuasive where, as here, the endorsement so clearly limits coverage in violation of a statute.”
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v.
Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund.,
The summary judgment for the defendant is set aside. We remand to the Superior Court for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the question of liability and for further proceedings on the question of damages. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c),
So ordered.
Notes
The plaintiff alleged the following injuries: broken nose, fractured rib, concussion, leg and body lacerations, permanent disfigurement, as well as medical expenses and pain and suffering.
General Laws c. 175, § 113L, as amended by St. 1973, c. 380, provides in relevant part: “No policy shall be issued or delivered in the commonwealth with respect to a motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer registered in this state unless such pоlicy provides coverage in amounts or limits prescribed for bodily injury or death for a liability policy under this chapter, under provisions approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles, trailers, or semitrailers and hit-and-run motor vehicles, trailers or semitrailers because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom” (emphasis supplied). A subsequent amendment (St. 1980, c. 532, §§ 1, 2) does not affect this case.
For this statutory pattern, some courts have accepted the theory that insurance contract provisions for hit-and-run coverage only where there is physical contact go beyond the statutory requisite to provide covеrage against uninsured motorists and hence are valid as not being in derogation of expressed legislative policy. See, e.g.,
Balestrieri
v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co.,
Our research reveals that the following nine States have inserted a physical contact or colliding requirement into their uninsured motor vehicle statute: Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(b)(A) (West Supp. 1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-407.1(b)(2) (Supp. 1980); Iowa Code Ann. § 516A.1 (West Supp. 1981); Miss. Code Ann. § 83-11-103 (Supp. 1980); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 690B.020 (1979); N.Y. Ins. Law § 617 (McKinney 1966); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(3)b (Supp. 1979) (statute requires “collision between motor vehicles”); S.C. Code § 56-9-850 (1977); W. Va. Code § 33-6-31 (e)(iii) (Supp. 1980).
The Clark court included Minnesota in its listing.
Clark
v.
Regent Ins. Co.,
S.D. , n.3 (1978) (
The statutory underpinnings of these decisions diverge into two patterns: (a) those which designate hit and run drivers explicitly, and (b) statutes which refer to unknown or uninsured motorists. Category (a) includes:
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v.
Abramowicz,
Compare American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 625 (1969) (hit-and-run: “designating or involving the driver of a motor vehi *176 cle who drives on after striking a pedestrian or another vehicle”), with The Random House Dictionary 426 (Concise ed. 1980) (hit-and-run: “guilty of leaving the scene of an accident caused by a vehicle driven by oneself”) and Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 392 (1958) (hit-and-run: “That hits and runs away; — orig. and esp. used of motor-vehicle drivers who flee after being involved in an accident”).
General Laws c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), as amended through St. 1975, c. 156, § 1, establishes criminal penalties for “whoever without stopping and making known his name, residence and the register number of his motor vehicle goes away after knowingly colliding with or otherwise causing injury to any other vehicle or prоperty.”
General Laws c. 260, § 4B, as amended by St. 1954, c. 107, in relevant part prescribes the statute of limitations for hit-and-run tort actions: “Actions of tort for bodily injuries or for death or for damages to property against the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, thе operator of which failed to make himself or said owner known at the time of the accident or incident out of which such actions arise may ... be commenced within six months after the plaintiff learns of the identity of the defendant” (emphasis supplied).
The specter of fraudulent claims raisеd by the defendant has not been persuasive to this court in other contexts. In eliminating the requirement of physical contact for recovery in negligence actions alleging emotional
*178
distress, this court has reasoned that “[t]he fact that some claims might be manufactured . . . cannot justify the wholesale rejection of all claims.”
Dziokonski
v.
Babineau,