SURETTE et al. v. HENRY COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS.
A15A0218
Court of Appeals of Georgia
DECIDED JUNE 10, 2015.
773 SE2d 416
BRANCH, Judge.
The Hames Law Firm, Adam M. Hames, for appellant. Richard A. Mallard, District Attorney, Benjamin T. Edwards, Assistant District Attorney,
John and Marla Surette appealed their residential property valuation for the year 2011 to the Superior Court of Henry County. That court eventually signed a consent order and judgment between the Surettes and the Henry County Board of Tax Assessors that expressly established the value of the Surettes’ property as $153,000 for that year and for 2012 and 2013, as well, but subject to certain statutory law:
[T]he parties have expressly agreed, as indicated by their respective signatures hereto, that as of January 1, 2011, the fair market value of the real property and all improvements thereon . . . for tax purposes was $153,000.00. . . . By further agreement and stipulation of the parties and subject to the provision of
OCGA § 48-5-299 (c) , the fair market value for January 1, 2012 and January 1, 2013, shall be $153,000.
Nevertheless, two years later the Surettes sought to aрpeal the 2013 valuation established by the consent order on the grounds that the value of the property had fallen significantly since the time of that order. The Board of Assessors concluded that the 2013 value should remain at $153,000, and it certified the Surettes’ appeal to the Board of Equalization, which affirmed the decision of the Board of Assessors. The Surettes thеn appealed to the Superior Court of Henry County, but the Board of Assessors moved to dismiss based on the 2011 consent order and judgment. The superior court granted the motion “due to Plaintiffs’ prior stipulation of value entered in [the earlier consent order].” The Surettes appeal the dismissal of their appeal. We affirm.
“On appeal, we review a trial court‘s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss de novo.” Liberty County School Dist. v. Halliburton, 328 Ga. App. 422, 423 (762 SE2d 138) (2014) (citation omitted). “In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, an appellate court must construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the appellant with all doubts resolved in the appellant‘s favor.” Ewing v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 652, 653 (2) (642 SE2d 100) (2007) (punctuation and footnotes omitted).
1. The Surettes obviously agreed in a consent order that the value of the property for 2011, 2012, and 2013 would be $153,000. Without an exemption or exception to that agreement, the Surettes are bound to what they agreed to.
Parties to stipulations and agreements entered into in thе course of judicial proceedings are estopped from taking positions inconsistent therewith, and no litigant will be heard to complain unless it be made plainly to appear that the consent of the complaining party was obtained by fraud or mistake.
Wright v. Stuart, 229 Ga. App. 50, 51 (1) (494 SE2d 212) (1997) (citation and punctuation omitted).
2. The Surettes argued below and argue on appeal that the consent order was obtаined in part by fraud because counsel for the appellee told them that they could appeal in the years following the 2011 tax year if their property lost significant valuе. The Surettes, however, did not introduce any admissible evidence to support this assertion in response to the motion to dismiss. Moreover, the terms of the consent judgment and the meaning of
3. In their remaining argument, the Surettes contend they are entitled to challenge
Real property, the value of which was established by an appeal in any year, that has not been returned by the tаxpayer at a different value during the next two successive years, may not be changed by the board of tax assessors during such two years for the sole purpose of changing the vаluation established or decision rendered in an appeal to the board of equalization or superior court. . . .
When interpreting relevant statutes, we look to the plain meaning of the statutes; “[w]here the language of an Act is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but is forbidden.” Cullum v. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 243 Ga. App. 865, 866 (534 SE2d 535) (2000) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Ad valorem tax returns must be filed between January 1 and April 1 of each year. See
The Surettes contend that their appeal оf the 2013 assessment constitutes a “return” for the 2013 tax year. But the Surettes filed their appeal on May 3, 2013, outside of the time required to file returns; they did not include the declaration required in a return; and their appeal did not state the fair market value of the property. It is clear from the facts and the relevant law that the Surettes filed an appeal of the county assessment, not a return, for the tax year 2013. Under Georgia law, when a taxpayer fails to file a return for one tax year, he or she shall be deemed to have returned thе property for the same value as the preceding year:
Any taxpayer of any county who returned or paid taxes in the county for the preceding tax year and who fails to return his property for taxation for the current tax year as required by this chapter shall be deemed to have returned for taxation the same property as was returned or deemed to have been returned in the preceding tax year at the same valuation as
the property was finally determined to be subject to taxation in the preсeding year. . . .
Because the Surettes did not file a return for 2013, they are deemed to have returned their property for the value from 2012, which was the same value from 2011, i.e., $153,000. Thus, the Surettes did not trigger the exception found in
Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P. J., and Miller, J., concur.
DECIDED JUNE 10, 2015.
The Roberts Law Firm, John A. Roberts, for appellants.
LaTonya N. Wiley; Powеr-Jaugstetter, Patrick D. Jaugstetter, for appellee.