13 Ga. App. 329 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1913
Mrs. Blackshear sued the Supreme Ruling of the Fraternal Mystic Circle on a benefit certificate upon the life of her deceased husband, for $2,000. The defendant pleaded that it was a fraternal beneficiary order as defined in the Civil Code, Title 2, Chapter 2, Article 9, Section 7 (§§ 2866-2877); that the deceased came to his death by his own hand; that the certificate provided, as one of its conditions, that each member should comply with “the constitution, laws, rules, and requirements of the Supreme Ruling of'" the Fraternal Mystic Circle, now in force .or as they may be amended or altered,” and that the insured had agreed in his application for membership that the constitution and by-laws were a part of the contract as fully as if they were set forth at length therein. One of the by-laws provides that in the event that a member commits suicide within the first twenty years of his membership, whether the act be voluntary or involuntary, conscious or unconscious, or whether the insured be sane or insane at the time, or if the insured die from the effect of any drug administered by himself, then'the beneficiaries of such member shall be entitled to only one twentieth of the amount of the death benefit stated in- the benefit certificate, for each year of the membership of the insured. It was uncontradieted that the insured himself inflicted the wound which caused his" death. The case was tried by the eourt, sitting without a jury, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, for the amount of the certificate. The defendant moved for a new trial upon the general grounds, 'and also upon the ground that “the court erred in holding that, the constitution and laws and by-laws of the defendant were not binding on the plaintiff -.because they were not attached to the certificate sued on,” the defendant insisting that it is a fraternal beneficiary order and, as such, -is exempt from the provisions of the law requiring by-laws to be attached to the certificate .or policy of insurance. There was sufficient ev-idbnce to authorize the court to ifind that the insured was insane at the time he killed himself; that he was a member of a “Subordinate Ruling” in Macon, Ga.; that the contract was in force at the time of his death; that the age of the insured was
The plaintiff in error asks that we review the ruling of this court stated in paragraph 6 of the decision in the case of Heralds of Liberty v. Bowen, 8 Ga. App. 325 (68 S. E. 1008). The same request is made by counsel not employed in the present case, but. having cases involving the same point, who were granted special permission to file briefs. The present ease is controlled by the-ruling of the Supreme Court in Fraternal Life & Accident Association v. Evans, 140 Ga. 284 (78 S. E. 915), in which it was. held that fraternal beneficiary orders are governed exclusively by the provisions of the Second Title, Article 9, Chapter 2, Section 7 of the Civil Code (§§ 2866-2877), and are, by the provisions of' § 2869, exempt from the provisions of § 2471, requiring life and fire insurance policies which refer to the application for insurance- or to the constitution, by-laws, or other rules of the company, to-contain or have attached thereto a copy of the same, in order to-authorize the introduction of such constitution, by-laws, or rules in evidence, as a part of the policy. The trial judge, therefore, erred in holding that the constitution, by-laws, rules, and requirements. of the Supreme Ruling of the Fraternal Mystic Circle were-inadmissible for the reason that they did not appear in the certificate of membership and were not attached thereto by copy as an exhibit. It is not necessary to review the ruling in the case of Heralds of Liberty v. Bowen,, because the point here presented was not involved when that case was before- this court. This is plain from the wording of paragraph 3 of the decision, in which we held that “an association which issues policies of insurance,, but, so far as, appears, has-, no ritual nor any initiation, can. not be legally classed as a fraternal beneficial association under the- laws, of Georgia, and may. he treated as an ordinary insurance company.” That ruling related especially to the matter of ser.yi.ee, upon which