82 Ind. 1 | Ind. | 1882
Action by the appellee against the appellant. Issue; trial; finding and judgment for the plaintiff.
The complaint alleges that “ the defendant is a mutual, fraternal and benevolent order, incorporated by the Commonwealth of Kentucky,” (by an act) “ approved March 20th, 1876, to promote benevolence, morality, science and industry throughout the United States. °The objects of the said corporation are to unite fraternally all acceptable white men of every profession, business and occupation; to give all possible moral and material aid in its power to its members and those depending upon them; to promote benevolence and charity by establishing a widows’ and orphans’ benefit fund, from which, on satisfactory evidence of the death of a member of the corporation, a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars is to be paid to his family, or as he may direct; to provide for creating a fund for the relief of sick and distressed members, etc.; that by its constitution and by-laws (a printed copy of which is filed herewith, etc.,) the highest death benefit to be paid the family of a deceased member is two thousand dollars; that said association is a secret society, having' three degrees, known as Infancy, Youth and Manhood; that the defendant herein is the supreme authority in said order, and has control of all the grand and subordinate lodges of the order as shown by its constitution and by-laws aforesaid ; that the system of the order required that a person becoming' a member, on receiving the degree of Manhood, should deposit the sum of one assessment with the financial reporter of his lodge, and that when a death occurred in the order, if there is less than two thousand dollars in the supreme treasury, an assessment is made upon the entire membership of the order throughout the United States; that said assessments, are collected in the following manner, viz.: each subordinate lodge collects from each of its members in good standing the
“That according to by-law No. 15 of the defendant, it is provided, in section two (2), that two thousand dollars shall be the highest amount paid by this order on the death of a brother. This sum shall be paid on the death of every full rate member, and one thousand dollars on the death of every half rate member; that said Levi Abbott was a full rate member. Law No. 22 of the defendant’s constitution and laws, and section 4, provides as follows: ‘ Each applicant shall direct, in his application, to whom he desires his death benefit to be paid,’ etc.; that said Levi (Doc) Abbott, in accordance with said law, directed his benefit to be paid to this plaintiff; that immediately after the said Levi (Doc) Abbott’s death, the defendant was furnished by this plaintiff with notice of his (Levi’s) death, and all the requirements of the de
The defendant demurred to the complaint for want of sufficient facts, but the demurrer was overruled. It then answered, first, by general denial; and, second, recapitulating and admitting most of the facts alleged in the complaint, but averring that “ the plaintiff ought not to recover anything in this action, for the reason that long prior to the death of said Levi Abbott said defendant adopted as one of the laws and rules governing her and the subordinate lodges thereof, in the payment of assessments, an order that it should be the duty of each subordinate lodge, upon the receipt of a notice from the supreme reporter of an assessment, to cause the said assessment called for in the treasury to be immediately forwarded to the supreme treasury, and that any lodge failing, neglecting, or refusing to forward the same within thirty days from the date of said notice, should stand suspended, and that if a death should occur in said lodge during such suspension, no death benefit should be paid: Provided, that a member in good standing, holding an unexpired withdrawal card, should be exempt from said law, a copy of which rule and law is filed herewith and made a part hereof; that said rule and law, for more than a year immediately prior to, and at the time of, the death of said Levi Abbott, had been, and still was, in full force and effect.
“That on the -day of -, 1880, an assessment was
To this paragraph of answer, the plaintiff demurred for want of sufficient facts, and the demurrer was sustained.
It is insisted by the appellant, that the complaint was bad, as not showing any cause of action against the appellant; that no action will lie against it to recover the money claimed, but that “ the only remedy is by mandate against the supreme officers to compel them to issue an order against the fund for the amount due the plaintiff.”
We, however, do not concur in that view of the question. The by-law number 15, as stated in the complaint, imposes on the appellant an obligation to pay the money as provided for therein, which may be enforced by an action against the appellant.
There are some other minor objections made to the complaint, which need not be specially noticed, as that it is uncertain in several respects. We think the complaint states substantially enough facts to entitle the plaintiff to recover,
We come to what seems to us to be the main question in the case, viz.: Was the second paragraph of answer good ?. We are of opinion that it was not, and, therefore, that the demurrer to it was correctly sustained.
The “order” made by the defendant, and relied upon as a defence, in relation to the forwarding of assessments by the subordinate lodges to the supreme treasury, provides that “any lodge failing, neglecting or refusing to forward the same within thirty days from the date of said notice, shall stand suspended, and that if a death occur in said lodge during such suspension, no death benefit shall be paid,” etc.
This order contemplates the restoration of the delinquent lodge on the payment, after suspension, of the required assessment, for it prohibits the payment of benefits when death occurs during such suspension.
Now, the question arises, what is meant by the words, “ if a death occur in said lodge during such suspension, no death benefit shall be paid ? ”
Is it meant by the provision to cut off absolutely, as forfeited, all right to death benefits of a member in good standing, who dies during the suspension of his lodge, and who was not in default in the payment of his dues or otherwise, because his lodge was in default at the time of his death, though his lodge afterwards pays up and is restored ?
This would be a harsh construction, and one that can not be adopted, if the provision admits of any other reasonable interpretation. Forfeitures are not favored in law, and instruments will be so construed as to avoid them, if it can be done without doing violence to the language employed. See the case of Schunck v. Gegenseitiger Wittwen und Waisen Fond, 44 Wis. 369, a case very much like the present.
We think the provision, fairly construed, means that where a death occurs during the suspension of the subordinate lodge,
This construction seems to us to be reasonable and well calculated to carry out the general purpose of the defendant’s organization.
When a subordinate lodge is thus suspended, no death benefits are to be paid on behalf of members dying during the suspension. This is astrong incentive to the delinquent lodge to respond to the calls upon it and be restored. When restored, the rights to death benefits, which'were suspended with the suspension of the lodge, are restored with its restoration.
The answer in question is clearly bad, inasmuch as it shows that the subordinate lodge, of which Levi Abbott was a member, was restored within a few days after his death.
A motion for a new trial was made on the ground that the finding was contrary to law, and not sustained by the evidence. The motion was correctly overruled.
The judgment below is affirmed, with costs.