52 N.J. Eq. 642 | New York Court of Chancery | 1894
The contest in this case is between two females, each of whom ■.claims to have been the wife of one Harvey Carley during his
It is clear beyond all question that the money must be awarded to the person who was Harvey Carley’s wife at the time of his death. The claim of each defendant rests on that ground and on that ground only. Neither claim has any other foundation. Now, while it is true that the Boyal Arcanum refused to issue a certificate to Mary, and never, therefore, became bound by a written promise to pay her anything, yet it would seem to be entirely clear, as an obvious dictate of justice, if such refusal was wrongful and Mary was, in fact, Harvey’s lawful wife when he applied to have the certificate changed from a person who was not his wife to the person who was, that such refusal should not be allowed to defeat the just right of the true wife. Equity, under such circumstances, would consider that Mary was, in right and justice, the owner of the certificate, in obedience to the maxim that that shall be considered as done which ought to have been done; The fact, then, that no written promise has
The effect which must be given by the judicial tribunals of one state to the judicial proceedings of a sister state is prescribed by federal law. The constitution of the United States ordains that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the judicial proceedings of every other state, and also that congress may prescribe the effect which judicial proceedings had in one state shall be given in each of the others. Congress, in the exercise of this power, after prescribing, how such proceedings shall be authenticated to render them admissible in evidence, has declared that when so authenticated they “shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are taken.” Rev. Stat. (U. 8.) p. 170 § 90S. While the constitutional provision and federal statute just mentioned have been the subject of much discussion and considerable contrariety of judicial opinion, still certain results have been reached which may now be said, in the language of Chief-Justice Beasley, “ to possess the stability of rules of law. Among them may be pláced the proposition that the judgments of other states are not like domestic judgments, conclusive on the point of jurisdiction. When a decision, pronounced extra territorium, is put in controversy, it is competent, as a defence, to show that the adjudging tribunal had no jurisdiction over the person or the subject-matter. * * * The question of jurisdiction in such cases is
No attempt has been made on the part of Mary to show want of jurisdiction in the Colorado court over either Harvey or the subject-matter of the suit he instituted in Colorado. By instituting his suit there, as a citizen of that state, for the purpose of having his marriage dissolved, Harvey voluntarily placed' himself in a position where he became not only unalterably subject to the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment he invoked, but also where he would be conclusively bound, until reversed,
But it is charged that the judicial action just mentioned was procured by fraud. How, the only proof produced in support of this charge is an admission made in the state of the case that Harvey’s attorney, in moving the vacation of the decree and the dismissal of the suit, acted without Harvey’s authority or knowledge. But, giving this admission its utmost force, it is manifest that it does not prove fraud •, in fact, it is not sufficient to raise even a suspicion of fraud. The most it does is to accuse Harvey’s attorney of having exceeded his authority. This may be true, and yet the conduct of the attorney may have been not only free from the least ta'int of fraud, but highly honorable. Whether the accusation is true or false cannot be decided in the present state of the case, for there is nothing whatever before the court which tends to show why Harvey’s attorney made the motions, which it is charged he made without authority and in violation of his duty, other than the following facts: It appears by the record of the Colorado suit that Harvey’s attorney gave notice, on the 1st day of October, 1891, to the attorney of Sarah, that on the 3d day of the same month he would move the court for a speedy trial of the cause; that such motion was made on the 3d, and the court made an order that Harvey might proceed with the trial of his cause; Sarah failed to appear and defend ;
But suppose the attorney, in moving the vacation of the decree, violated his duty and intended to commit a fraud on his client, does that fact, standing alone, show that the act of the court in vacating the decree -was procured by fraud ? It cannot be believed in the absence of proof that the Colorado court vacated its decfee merely and solely because Harvey’s attorney moved its vacation. According to the general, if not the uni
But suppose there was sufficient evidence in the case to convince this court that the Colorado court had been deceived and induced to do what it would not have done if no deception had been used, could this court, in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction under interstate law, deny all effect to the action of the Colorado court in setting aside the decree of divorce and dismissing suit, and then adjudge that, by force of such judicial action here, the suit was reinstated in the Colorado court and full force and effect restored to the decree of divorce? This court, as already stated, may deny full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of a sister state, when it is proved that they are the product of fraud, but the question here goes far deeper and is of much wider import. It is this, can this court, on being convinced that a court of a sister state has been misled by deception, reinstate- in that court a suit which that court has dismissed, and resurrect and give life and vigor to a judgment which that court has nullified? This court, in my judgment, has no such power. To do so would not be merely denying faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of a sister state, but it would be an attempt to pronounce here, in a judicial proceeding once pending in a court of a sister state, such judgment as this court believes that court, on the facts before this, would pronounce. This court would thus attempt to give force and effect here to a judgment which that court has not pronounced. In my judgment, no tribunal, other than the one in which the divorce suit was
The conclusion is that the money in controversy must be awarded to Sarah. She is also entitled to costs.