192 F. 453 | 3rd Cir. | 1912
Action was brought in the court below by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error (hereinafter called the defendant), to recover, as beneficiary in a certain benefit certificate issued by the defendant to Otho Milton Lfartzell, as a member of one of its councils, the sum of $3,000, covenanted to be paid upon the death of the said Hartzell to the said beneficiary, such certificate being dated the 12th day of September, 1908. The defendant is a beneficial association, with the fraternal and secret features common to such organizations. The certificate sued upon was one issued upon the surrender of a prior certificate, for the same amount, dated the 10th day of April, 1890, in which the wife of the insured was named
“Section 47.'iA. The taking of Iris own life by a member within five years from and including file date of Ms initiation, whether lie be then sane or insane, shall cancel and render null and void the benefit certificate and terminate all rights and privileges of all persons thereunder and under his membership in the order.-’
On August 1, 1908, this section was amended by adding to it the following paragraph:
“The talcing of his own life by a member, whether he be then sane or insane, after five years from the date of his initiation, and within five years from and including the date of his changing from a lower to a higher certificate, shall cancel and render null and void the benefit certificate, to the extent of the increased amount of the benefit, and terminate the rights of all persons thereto.”
It is not disputed that, under the stipulation contained in the benefit certificate, that the insured must “comply with the laws, rules and regulations now governing the said council and fund, or that may hereafter he enacted by the Supreme Council to govern said council and fund,” the amendments above quoted would apply to and modify the contract sued upon, if they were applicable thereto. But it is obvious that neither of these by-laws apply to the case in hand. The first does not, because Hartzell’s death by his own hand took place 18 years after his initiation as a member of the society, and the second does not, because the new certificate issued hy the society was not a change from a lower to a higher amount of insurance. We therefore cannot agree to the proposition urged on the part of the appellee, if the question could be raised on this record, that “where a life insurance company or a beneficial society fixed a period in its policy, certificate or by-laws, within which, if the insured commit suicide, the policy or certificate should be avoided, death of the insured by suicide after the expiration of such period does not constitute a defense to an action on the policy.”
By the amendment to the by-laws, 'it is provided (as we are given to understand is now the case in most, if not all, life insurance policies) that, if the insured commit suicide within a stated period after the taking out of the certificate or policy, the insurer shall not be liable, and this, whether the irisured at the time be sane,, or insane. This provision has become common, doubtless for the obvious reason that thereby there will be measurably removed the temptation to take out a certificate or policy with the intent to anticipate the natural occurrence of death, in order to the sooner achieve some ultimate disposition of the insurance money. By this provision, if the insured takes his own life within the period named, there is no question of sanity or insanity to be determined, because the contract in effect stipulates that, under such circumstances, there shall be no liability, whatever the condition of the insured "might have been as to sanity or insanity. It would seem necessarily to follow that cases of suicide, after the expiration of this prescribed period, must be governed by the general law of the contract to which we have above alluded, and the liability of the insurer will depend upon the sanity or insanity of the insured.
The court below, however, properly ignored these by-laws, and the contention of the plaintiff founded thereon, and submitted to the jury the only issue raised 'in the trial of the case, viz., whether the insured was sane or insane when he took his own life An instruction prayed for by the defendant, that on all the evidence the verdict should be for the defendant, was refused. The jury returned a verdict for the full amount for the plaintiff, and the defendant filed a motion' for judgement non obstante veredicto, which the court refused and ordered judgment -on the verdict. To the judgment thus entered, the defendant has sued out this writ of error.
Disregarding all other assignments of error than the one founded
There are two letters in evidence, written by Flartzell on the morning of the day on which he committed suicide; one to Mr. Orpin, the proprietor of the hotel, one to Mr. De Forrest, apparently an intimate friend, whom he asked to attend to everything connected with his death and funeral, and another to his attorney in Pittsburgh, written on April 16th, three days before his death. The tone, style and substance of these letters, so far from suggesting insanity, strongly sup
Upon a careful examination of all the evidence, both written and oral, disclosed by this record, we are of opinion that there is nothing from which a jury could justifiably have found that O. M. Hartzell, the insured, was insane at the time of his death.
The judgment below must therefore be reversed, and a judgment non obstante veredicto entered for the defendant.