| Ala. | Dec 15, 1882
A contract of insurance is defined as “ an agreement by which one party, for a consideration (which is usually paid in money, either in one sum, or at different times during the continuance of the risk), promises to make a certain payment of money, upon the destruction or injury of something in which the other party has an interest. In fire insurance and marine insurance, the thing insured is property; in life or accident insurance, it is the life or health of a person.” Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149" court="Mass." date_filed="1870-10-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/commonwealth-v-wetherbee-6416145?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6416145">105 Mass. 149. The instrument in writing upon which this suit is founded, and which is set out in full in the complaint, entitled a “ Knight’s Benefit Certificate,” has the elements and characteristics of a contract of life insurance. It purports to have been issued by the “ Supreme Commandery of the Knights of the Golden Buie,” which is averred to be a corporation, created and organized under a law of the State of Kentucky. The commandery thereby promises, on the death of the husband of the appellee, to pay her two thousand dollars, in consideration of the husband having become a member of the order, and having paid the fee for admission to membership, and of his payment in the future of all assessments levied and required by the supreme command-ery, upon the condition that he remained a member of the order, in good standing, and complied with all the laws then of force, or subsequently enacted. These are the essential elements of a contract of life insurance, made by a mutual insurance company with one of its members. Life is the risk, and death is the event upon which the insurance money is payable. There is not, as, in ordinary contracts or policies, a stipulation for the payment of premiums fixed and certain in amount, at the inception of the risk, and at periods, definitely appointed, during its continuance. The payment of the fee for admission to membership, and of the assessments levied and required by the commandery, are the equivalent of premiums, and form the pecuniary consideration of the contract. The condition expressed, that the assured shall remain a member of the order in good standing, observing its laws, is the expression of that which is implied in all insurance of members by mutual companies. The members of such companies are presumed to know the charter and by-laws, and to contract in reference to
The plea interposed does not deny the death of the assured; or that while living he paid the assessments levied and required by the supreme commandery; or that, at the time of death, he was a member of the order in good standing. The averments are, that he came to his death by taking his own life, and that, at the time of the issue of the certificate, there was a general law of the association, rendering it a condition upon which a certificate could issue, and upon which its benefits could be realized, that the member to whom, or upon whose life it was issued, should comply with the “ general laws of the order then in existence, or which might thereafter be enacted;” that the present certificate was issued and was by the assured accepted in writing, “subject to the laws of the order now in force, or which may hereafter be enacted by the supreme com-mandery.” On its face the certificate recited, among other things, that any violation of “ the requirements of the laws now in force, or hereafter enacted, governing the order or this class, shall render this certificate null and void.” And in another place it is recited as a condition upon which the obligation of the certificate depends: “ The full compliance with all the laws of the oi’der now in force, or that may hereafter be enacted.” The plea further avers the enactment or adoption of a law, by the terms of which a certificate of this class was forfeited, if the member, whether sa/ne or insane, should take his own life; the enactment of which was subsequent to the issue of the certificate. The point of controversy is, whether this law, by force of the recitals and stipulations to which we have referred, enters into and forms part of an antecedent certificate, avoiding it in the event a member, whether sane or insa/ne, should take his own life.
The certificate is silent as to the consequence, if the member whose life was assured should die by his own hands; and the by-laws of the association, or order, when the certificate was issued, contained no provision declaring in that event an avoidance or forfeiture of the certificate. We are not aware that it has anywhere been expressly decided, that voluntary- self-destruction by one whose life was insured, and of whose sanity there was no question, would avoid the contract of insurance or rather, would not fall within its risk, though in that event there was not expressed an exception to the liability of the insurer. The authorities generally seem to proceed upon the tacit or expressed concession or admission, that such is the law. In Moore v. Woolsey, 4 Ell. & Black. 243, Lord Campbell, said: “ If a man insures his life for a year, and commits suicide within the year, his executors can not recover upon the policy; as the owner of a ship who insures hef for a year, can not recover upon the policy, if within the year he caused her. to be sunk; a stipulation that, in either case, upon such an event, the-
A contract of life insurance is simpler in form, in the relative rights and duties of the insurer and the assured, and differs in many respects from marine, or from fire insurance; yet, the general principles applicable to marine, or fire insurance are applied, so far as consistent with the nature and obligations of the contract, to the contract of life insurance. In all contracts of insurance, there is an implied understanding or agreement that the risks insured against are such as the thing insured, whether it is property, or health, or life, is usually subject to, and the assured can not voluntarily and intentionally vary them. Upon principles of public policy and morals, the fraud, or the criminal misconduct of the assured is, in contracts of
The doctrine asserted in Fmvntlenroy’s case, that death by the hands of public justice, the punishment for the commission of crime, avoids a contract of life insurance, though it is not so expressed in the contract, has not, so far as we have examined, been questioned, though the case itself may have led to the very general introduction of the exception into policies. The samp, considerations and reasoning which support the doctrine, seem to lead, of necessity, to the conclusion, that voluntary, criminal self-destruction, suicide, as defined at common law, should be implied as an exception to the liability of the insurer, or, rather, as not within the risks contemplated by the parties, reluctant as the courts may be to introduce by construction or implication exceptions into such contracts, which usually contain special exceptions. An express contract to pay the insurance money to the assured, in the event he committed suicide, an increased premium being paid because of the risk, there could be but little, if any, hesitancy in repudiating as offensive to law and good morals. The fair and just interpretation of a contract of life insurance, made with the assured, is, that the risk is of death proceeding from other causes than the voluntary act of the assured, producing, or intended to produce it; and especially of a contract made by an association or organization, with one of its members, the objects and purposes of which is, that the members will contribute to, and bear each other’s losses, or the losses of those dependent upon them. The extinction of life by disease, or by accident, not suicide, voluntary and intentional, by the assured, while in his senses, is the risk intended; and it is not intended that, without the hazard of loss, the assured may safely commit crime. — Bliss on Life Insurance, §§ 242-3.
The by-laws, or general law, adopted by the commandery, subsequent to the issue of the certificate, so far as it declares a forfeiture or avoidance of the certificate, in the event a member, who is sane, takes his life, is not objectionable upon the ground that it varies or impairs existing contracts. It adds no new term or condition to the contract; it relieves the associar
The plea, consequently, attaching to its words their known legal signification, when used in, or'applied to contracts of life insurance, imports voluntary, intentional deprivation of self-existence by the assured while in his senses. The omission of the word willful, as descriptive of the self-destruction, did not render the plea demurrable. If that word had been added, or any similar word, evidence 'of an intentional, not of an accidental self-destruction, would have met the averment. Evidence of no other than an intentional act will satisfy the present averment. Such an act being shown, if it is intended to excuse it, because of the mental unsoundness of the assured at the time of its commission, the fact, the matter of excuse, ought to have been replied by the plaintiff. The presumption of law is in
Policies of life insurance usually contain an exception of the liability of the insurer, in the event of the self-destruction of the assured. There is a contrariety of decision as to the effect of the exception ; whether it embraces any and every act of intentional self-destruction, or only suicide, criminal self-destruction. The preponderance of authority points to the conclusion that it refers soley to sioicide.-Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, supra; Phadenhauer v. Germania Life Ins. Co., supra; DeGogorza v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 65 N.Y. 232" court="NY" date_filed="1875-05-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/de-gogorza-v--knickerbocker-life-ins-co-3618906?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3618906">65 N. Y. 232; Bliss on Life Ins. §§ 225-238.
With a view of excepting from the operation of the policy any intended self-destruction, whether the assured is sane or insane at the time of its commission, insurance companies are in the habit of inserting in policies a provision, the equivalent of that expressed in the law of the association now under consideration. The exception as to the insane has been supported, and it is said to be as much the right of the insurer to stipulate for exemption from liability in the event of intentional self-destruction by the insane, as to stipulate for an exemption Lom liability because the-hazard of loss is increased from the fact of the assured engaging in occupations perilous to life, or taking up residence in an unhealthy climate.-Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1876-12-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/bigelow-v-berkshire-life-insurance-89376?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="89376">93 U. S. 284. In this respect, the law adds a new term to the contract, relieves the association from an existing liability, and lessens the value and security of the certificate to the assured.
It is not claimed that there is an inherent power in the association, by the adoption of a by-law, to work such radical changes in its existing contracts. The power is derived from,, and depends upon the stipulations of the contract at the time it was made. The stipulations are expressed in varying terms, and several of them import no more than would be implied— the observance by the assured of the requirements of the association, such requirements as were reasonable, and intended to promote the harmony of the association, and the purposes and objects for which it was formed. They import also obedience to the by-laws, so far as reasonable, consistent with the charter and law of the land. We do not construe them as reserving,, or as intended to reserve to the association the power to change or avoid its contracts, to lessen its responsibilities, or to divest its members of rights. This is not the proper office of a bylaw ; and from the general expressions to which we are referring,, it can not be fairly presumed or intended that it was contemplated to affect the members by other than such by-laws, as it was-
In consequence of the settled doctrine, that the charter of a corporation,' whether private or eleemosynary, not instituted as part of the machinery of government, but for the private benefit or purposes of the corporation, is a contract between the ■State and the corporators, protected by the constitution of the United States from repeal, or alteration, or impairment by subsequent legislation, it has become usual, either by constitutional provision, or by a general law, or by reservation in the charter, to clothe the legislative power of the State with full capacity, at pleasure, to alter, modify, or repeal the charter. The power being reserved, its exercise can not of course be said to impair the obligation of the grant. — Ang. & Ames on Corporations, § 767; Cooley on Con. Lim. 340. The power is reserved by, and is a part of the grant, and that it may be exercised, is a condition upon which the grant of corporate existence and franchises is accepted.
The members of associations, created for purposes and ob
Without pursuing the discussion of the question, we are of -opinion that the parties intended the certificate should be subject to the laws of the association adopted subsequent to its issue — laws, which if they had been of force at the time of the issue, would have entered into, and formed part of it. It is the concurring assent of the parties, that engrafts the law upon the certificate, giving it an operation it would not have otherwise.
The Circuit Court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the plea, and its judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.