Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote the opinion, in which Judge MICHAEL and Senior Judge CHAPMAN joined.
OPINION
In this antitrust action a group of retail food stores alleged that certain large dairies conspired to fix milk prices. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant dairies, finding this action to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In doing so, the court rejected the food stores’ contention that the statute of limitations had been tolled by the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Because we conclude that the district court used an improper standard to determine that the fraudulent concealment doctrine did not аpply, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. filed this action in 1993, against Valley Rich Dairy, Flav-O-Rieh, Inc., Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., Borden, Inc., and Valley of Virginia Cooperative Milk Producers Association, alleging that the dairies had conspired to fix the price of milk sold in the wholesale market in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Marlinton’s complaint followed a 1992 investigation by the United States Department of Justice into the milk industry, which had resulted in Valley Rich, Meadow Gold, and Borden pleading guilty to charges that they had rigged school milk bids. This investigation also led to the indictment and subsequent trial of three Meadow Gold officials. The three were individually charged with rigging school milk bids and with conspiring to fix the price of milk sold to commercial and institutional customers in western Virginia and southern West Virginia.
The government based its case against the Meadow Gold officials primarily on the testimony of Paul French, a former general manager of Valley Rich. French testified, under a grant of immunity, about meetings in which he and the Meadow Gold officials had conspired to fix milk prices. French stated that all meetings were in person, prearranged, and conducted away from the office in parking lots, restaurants, or private automobiles. Aware that price-fixing violated the law, French related thаt he would not discuss the subject over the telephone or if non-conspirators were present. French further testified that he would fill out his expense accounts in such a manner that no one, including his coworkers at Valley Rich, would know of his meetings with rival dairy officials. Despite this evidence, the trial of the Meadow Gold officials ended in a hung jury and the United States dropped the charges. French’s testimony, however, became the basis for Marlin-ton’s present action against the dairies.
In its complaint Marlinton alleged that the dairies’ price-fixing conspiracy continued from 1984 until 1987. Marlinton acknowledges that on its face the complaint, filed in 1993, appears to be time-barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations, § 4B of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15b), but asserts that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the limitations period. The doctrine applies, Marlinton contends, because the dairies fraudulently concealed their price-fixing conspiracy, preventing Marlinton from discovering its claim until the 1992 federal criminal action provided Marlinton notice of the claim.
After the parties conducted discovery as to whether Marlinton had standing to bring this action and whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine tolled limitations, the dairies moved for summary judgment. The district court grantеd the dairies’ motion on the ground that the statute of limitations barred Marlinton’s claim. The court ruled that Marlinton could not rely on the fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine because Marlin-ton had not provided evidence that the dairies engaged in fraudulent concealment “separate and apart” from the antitrust conspiracy itself. Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc.,
On appeal, Marlinton raises two related issues. First, it contends that the district court employed the wrong standard to determine that the fraudulent concealment doctrine did not toll the limitations period. Second, Marlinton maintains that because the court used this erroneous standard, it then incorrectly excluded French’s testimony as inadmissible hearsay. In opposition, the dairies not only assert that the district court properly granted them summary judgment on the grounds set forth in its opinion, but claim they are also entitled to summary judgment because Marlinton failed to exercise due diligence and never established its standing to bring this action.
II.
The purpose of the fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine is to prevent á defendant from “concealing a fraud, or ... committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until” the defendant “could plead the statute of limitations to protect it.” Bailey v. Glover,
In recent years, federal courts have developed different standards for determining whether antitrust plaintiffs have satisfied the first element of this test. These are denominated the “self-concealing” standard, the “separate and apart” standard, and the intermediate, “affirmative acts” standard. Pursuant to the self-concealing standard, a plaintiff satisfies the first element merely by proving that a self-concealing antitrust violation has occurred. See New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc.,
Our most recent antitrust precedent involving the application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine is Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
We rejected both arguments. As to the allegedly concealed interlocking directоrates, we explained that it was “indisputable ... that any structural interrelationship between the corporate defendants was necessarily discoverable upon simple inquiry and consultation of public records.” Pocahontas,
Focusing upon the latter language, in the present case the court below held that “the Fourth Circuit requires acts affirmatively directed at deflecting litigation” and that “[t]his standard clearly would exclude the self-concealing test as the controlling rule in this circuit.” Marlinton,
The district court properly concluded that applying the self-concealing standard in this ease would be inconsistent with Pocahontas. The self-concealing standard is only even arguably proper when deception or concealment is a necessary element of the antitrust violation, i.e., when the antitrust violation is truly self-concealing. See Hobson v. Wilson,
After rejecting the self-concealing standard, the district court stated that it was “not clear” as to which of the remaining two standards was more consistent with Pocahontas, but ultimately concluded that the “deflecting litigation” language in Pocahontas indicated a preference for the separate
Nor are we persuaded that the separate and apart standard is “better reasoned” than the intermediate, affirmative acts standard. Because almost all price-fixing conspiracies involve some affirmative acts of secrecy, the district court concluded that Congress in enacting § 4B of the Clayton Act could not have intended that the fraudulent concealment doctrine would apply to toll the limitations period in all such cases. Marlinton,
First, with regard to legislative intent, in 1955 when Congress enacted § 4B of the Clayton Act, courts applied the fraudulent concealment doctrine to all federal statutes. See Holmberg,
When Congress passed the act in question, the rule of Bailey v. Glover was the established doctrine of this court. It was presumably enacted with the ruling of that case in mind. We cannot believe that Congress intended to give immunity to those who for the pеriod named in the statute might be able to conceal their fraudulent action from the knowledge of the [victim].
Id. at 445,
Furthermore, the adoption of the intermediate, affirmative acts standard would not “gut” the antitrust statute of limitations. Not all antitrust violations typically involve acts of secrecy or concealment. For example, attempts to monopolize in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2 and cases of interlocking directorates or officers in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 19, do not typically involve secrecy or concealment. The four-year limitations period would generally apply to these actions without any equitable tolling. Indeed, contrary to the suggеstion of the district court, application of this intermediate standard would not necessarily even result in equitable tolling in cases involving allegations of antitrust violations, like price-fixing, that are usually secret. In those cases plaintiffs would still be required to pursue their claims with due diligence and the failure to demonstrate such diligence would prevent them from establishing the third element of the fraudulent concealment test. Thus, upon examination, adoption of the intermediate, affirmative acts standards would not result in the problems that concerned the court below.
Conversely, the intermediate standard offers several significant advantages over the separate and apart standard that were not
The balance of equities also favors adoption of the intermediate standard. Statutes of limitation are “vital” and “favored in the law” to protect defendants from stale or fraudulent claims. See Wood v. Carpenter,
To hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful and secure.
Bailey,
Through the statute of limitations Congress has chosen to confer on an accused wrongdoer the benefit of repose once the limitations period has passed. However, the equitаble doctrine of fraudulent concealment recognizes that this benefit should not be available to a wrongdoer who takes undue advantage of the statute by attempting to conceal his conduct. The fact that such concealment occurs at the time of the wrong itself rather than after-wards does not make the wrongdoer any more deserving of the statute’s protection.
Allan Construction,
Accordingly, the district court erred in applying the separate and apart standard rather than the intermediate, affirmative acts standard. The latter is consistent with Pocahontas and has significant advantages over the separate and apart standard. Moreover, our holding here is in accord with the weight of authority. Those of our sister circuits that have addressed the question in published opinions have either expressly or implicitly rejected the separate and apart standard and held instead that affirmative acts in furtherance of a conspiracy provide sufficient evidence of fraudulent concealment to establish the first element of the fraudulent conceal
Moreover, the principal authority upon which the court below and the dairies rely, the district court’s decision in Western Paving, is hardly compelling. A panel of the Tenth Circuit initially reversed that decision. Western Paving,
In addition, the district court’s analysis in Western Paving is based on a misreading of prior case law. The Western Paving court relied on Board of Education v. Admiral Heating & Ventilation, Inc.,
For all of these reasons, we conclude that to satisfy the first element of the fraudulent concealment test, Marlinton must provide evidence of affirmative acts of concealment by the dairies. Those acts, however, need not be separate and apart from the acts of concealment involved in the antitrust violation; rather, Marlinton’s proof may include acts of concealment involved in the alleged antitrust violation itself.
III.
We now turn to the hearsay issue. Marlinton based its antitrust suit primarily on Paul French’s testimony concerning alleged meetings with rival dairy officials to fix milk prices. In addition to supporting its core antitrust claim, Marlinton offered the testimony as evidence that the dairies had fraudulently concealed this claim. The district court assumed, for the purpose of its admissibility ruling, that French was unavailable to testify in person at the civil trial. Conceding that French’s testimony from the criminal trial was hearsay, Marlinton contended that three exceptions to the hearsay rule applied to permit it to introduce the testimony: first, the exception for prior testimony (Fed.R.Evid.804(b)(l)); second, the exception for statements against interest (Fed. R.Evid.804(b)(3)); and third, the residual hearsay exception (Fed.R.Evid.804(b)(5)). The district court was not persuaded that any exception applied and concluded that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay.
We review the district court’s evidentiary. rulings for abuse of discretion. Persinger v. Norfolk & Western Ry.,
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) permits the introduction of “[t]estimony given as a witness at another hearing .... if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil actiоn or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.” Recently, we noted that “[w]hen reviewing the admissibility of evidence pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1),” we focus “on the similarity of motives between the predecessor in interest and the one against whom the [testimony] is now offered.” Horne v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
The district court reasoned that the defendants’ sole motive for questioning French’s testimony in the criminal trial had been to show that the conspiracy never happened, but that the dairies’ motive in the ease at hand, in acсordance with the “separate and apart” standard, would be to show either that the conspiracy never happened or that if it did happen, any acts of secrecy committed were in furtherance of, rather than separate and apart from, the conspiracy. Marlinton,
Although we have in this case adopted the intermediate, affirmative acts standard, rather than the self-concealing standard, we nonetheless believe that French’s testimony is admissible. This is so because to be admissible under Rule 804(b)(1), the party against whom the testimony was admitted in the prior proceeding need only have had a “similar motive,” not an “identical motive,” to the party in the second proceeding. United States v. Salerno,
Because the defendants’ motive in questioning French in the criminal case was substantially similar to the dairies’ motive in this civil action, French’s testimony, assuming he is unavailable to testify, is admissible under Rule 804(b)(1).
IV.
In summary, we here hold: (1) because this case does not involve an inherently self-concealing antitrust violation, the intermediate, affirmative acts standаrd should be used to determine if Marlinton has satisfied the first element of the fraudulent concealment test and (2) if unavailability is demonstrated, French’s testimony is admissible under Rule 804(b)(1). We have thus addressed the rationale underlying the district court’s opinion. The parties raise a number of other issues, which the district court did not reach and which we decline to consider in the first instance. Consequently, our holdings here do not necessarily mean that Marlinton is entitled to a trial on its antitrust claim.
Indeed, our holdings do not even eliminate the dairies’ statute of limitations defense. Marlinton still must demonstrate that it has presented sufficient evidence to satisfy all three elements of the fraudulent сoncealment test. We do note that with regard to the third element of that test, the due diligence requirement, it is possible for a plaintiff to satisfy that element without demonstrating that it engaged in any specific inquiry. If the plaintiff establishes that it was not (and should not have been) aware of facts that should have excited further inquiry on its part, then there is nothing to provoke inquiry. See Taylor v. Meirick,
Also still unresolved is Marlinton’s standing.
Rather, the determination of whether a plaintiff has standing to bring an antitrust action requires analysis of numerous factors including:
the risk of duplicative recovery by multiple antitrust claimants; the extent to which the claim is based upon speculative, abstract, or impractical measures of damages; the causal connection between the alleged violation and the harm suffered; and the relationship of thе injury alleged to the forms of injury about which Congress was concerned when it created a private remedy.
Pocahontas,
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. We do note that the district court misread Pocahontas to the extent that it found that we "excluded” the possibility of adopting the self-concealing standard in all antitrust cases. If an antitrust violation were demonstrated to be in its very nature deceptive, i.e., concealment was an element of thе offense rather than merely a method of hiding it, then application of the self-concealing standard might well be appropriate. The State of Maryland, joined by a number of other states, has filed an amici curiae brief suggesting that “[b]id-rigging is inherently a secret endeavor. If procurement officers knew that bids were rigged, they would reject the conspirators’ bids and bidriggers would be subject to criminal prosecution and civil treble damage litigation.” There is some support for this theory in the case law. See Hendrickson Bros.,
. In fact, the legislative history of § 4B suggests that in enacting it Congress knew and approved of the applicability of the fraudulent concealment doctrine in antitrust cases. Thus, while the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee who reported the bill opposed an amendment (which ultimately failed) requiring that the limitations period run from discovery in all cases, he assured his colleagues that even without the amendment, "[i]n the case of fraud or conspiracy the statute of limitations only runs from the time of discovery." 101 Cong.Rec. 5133 (1955) (emphasis added).
. See United States v. Licavoli ,
. Furthermore, it appears that the defendants in the criminal trial did in fact cross-examine French concerning alleged acts of concealment involved in the conspiracy. For example, as to
. Marlinton has alleged sufficient injury to provide it standing to bring this action. Whether it can offer sufficient evidence to present a factual question as to these allegations is a question to be addressed by the district court on remand.
