Superior Construction Co. v. CarrSuperior Construction Co. v. Carr
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The question is whether the Lake Superi- or Court, County Division, properly denied Superior Construction Company‘s motion for change of venue in a civil suit with potential damages in excess of $10,000. We hold that
On April 4, 1989, the Carrs filed a tort action in the Lake Superior Court, County Division, against Superior Construction Company. Plaintiffs sought damages in excess of $10,000. Defendant requested a change of venue from the county pursuant to
On July 18, 1989, the trial court found that the County Division has general jurisdiction over all civil matters pursuant to
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Superior Constr. Co. v. Carr (1990), Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 805. It held, first, that
Two portions of the Indiana Code govern Superior‘s claim to an automatic change of venue:
Indiana Code § 838-5-29.5-1 (West 1988) creates the superior court in Lake County. Indiana Code
While the chapter creating the Lake Superior Court could have completely defined the terms for the creation of a unique County Division, the legislature instead chose to make additional reference to the Lake Superior Court, County Division, within the code article creating county courts generally. Indeed, those portions of the chapter on the Lake Superior Court regarding the County Division even refer specifically to the county court section of the code. -
The county court section at
The county court has the following jurisdiction:
(1) Original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases founded on contract or tort in which the debt or damage claimed does not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
(2) Original and concurrent jurisdiction in possessory actions between a landlord and tenant and original exclusive jurisdiction in actions for the possession of property where the value of the property sought to be recovered does not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
(3) Original and concurrent jurisdiction of all Class D felony, misdemeanor, and infraction cases.
(4) Original and concurrent jurisdiction of cases involving the violation of ordinances of cities, towns, or other municipal corporations.
(5) Original and concurrent jurisdiction of cases involving violations of ordinances which relate to traffic.
These courts do not allow change of venue as of right.
The Lake County exception to the general county court - statute, -
(1) An offenses and violations docket.
(2) A small claims docket for:
(A) all cases where the amount sought or value of the property sought to be recovered is three thousand dollars ($3,000) or less; the plaintiff in a statement of claim or the defendant in a counterclaim may waive the excess of his claim over three thousand dollars ($3,000) to bring it within the jurisdiction of the small claims docket; and
(B) all possessory actions between landlord and tenant in which the rent due at the time the action is filed does not exceed three thousand dollars ($3,000).
(3) A plenary docket for all other civil cases.
Before we can determine whether the defendant is entitled to a change of venue from the County Division as of right pursuant to T.R. 76, it is necessary to understand what the legislature intended by enacting two distinct code chapters con
Superior argues that the jurisdiction of the County Division in civil tort actions should be limited to cases with claimed damages of $10,000 or less. We agree. The intent of the legislature in creating the County Division was to limit the court‘s jurisdiction to those cases listed in § 38-10.5-8-1. Three different paths lead us to this conclusion: one jurisprudential, one structural, and one based on statutory language.
First, as a matter of jurisprudence, we do not decide cases upon constitutional grounds when they can be decided upon other grounds. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Scott (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 557, 559. Here, the legislature either intended to grant the County Division general jurisdiction under
Second, a structural analysis also demonstrates that the legislature intended to create a County Division with the limited jurisdiction defined in
Third, an analysis of statutory language also leads us to think that the legislature intended to limit the County Division‘s jurisdiction. “Under our rules of statutory construction, it cannot be presumed the General Assembly intended language used in a statute to be applied in an illogical manner.” State ex rel. Hatcher v. Lake Superior Court, Room Three (1986), Ind., 500 N.E.2d 737, 739. In interpreting statutes, we attempt to prevent absurdity and hardship and to advance the public convenience. P.B. v. T.D., 561 N.E.2d at 750; Walton v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 398, 398 N.E.2d 667.
As noted above, the county court statute states: “Notwithstanding section 4 of this chapter, Lake County does not have a county court. However, the county division of the superior court of Lake County shall maintain the dockets described in IC 33-
Among the dockets maintained by the county courts is a civil plenary docket.
Given that the County Division possesses the same limited jurisdiction granted to the county courts, we must ask whether the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant‘s motion for an automatic change - of - venue. Indiana - Code
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The trial court is affirmed with respect to change of venue but reversed as to the jurisdictional limit. The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions cither to cap the plaintiff‘s request for damages at $10,000 or to order the case transferred to the Lake Superior Court, Civil Division, where change of venue remains available.
DeBRULER, GIVAN, DICKSON and KRAHULIK, JJ., concur.