SUPERB MOTORS INC. et al., Plaintiffs, -against- ANTHONY DEO et al., Defendants.
23-CV-6188 (JMW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
June 26, 2025
WICKS, Magistrate Judge
APPEARANCES:
Emanuel Kataev
Sage Legal LLC
18211 Jamaica Avenue
Jamaica, NY 11423
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Superb Motors Inc., Team Auto Sales LLC and Robert Anthony Urrutia
Jeffrey Benjamin
The Linden Law Group, PC
250 Park Avenue
Ste 7th Floor
New York, NY 10177
Defendants Anthony and Sarah Deo, Dwight Blankenship, Marc Merckling, Michael Laurie, Car Buyers NYC, Inc., Gold Coast Cars of Syosset LLC, Gold Coast Cars of Sunrise LLC, Gold Coast Motors Automotive Group LLC, Gold Coast Motors of LIC LLC, Gold Coast Motors of Roslyn LLC, Gold Coast Motors of Smithtown LLC, UEA Premier Motors Corp.
Harry R. Thomasson
3280 Sunrise Highway, Ste Box 112
Wantagh, NY 11793
Defendant Appearing Pro Se
No appearances by other Parties
On May 22, 2025, and May 23, 2025, this Court issued Orders on Deo Defendants’1 Third Motion for Contempt (ECF No. 225) and Superb Plaintiffs2 (“Superb” or “Plaintiffs“) Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 280). (See ECF Nos. 279, 286; Electronic Order dated 5/23/2025.) Now before the Court is Superb Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration and moving papers on rulings that this Court made within those Orders (ECF Nos. 292-94), Harry Thomasson‘s Opposition (ECF No. 299), Deo Defendants’ Opposition (ECF No. 300), and Superb Plaintiffs’ Reply (ECF Nos. 303-04). For the reasons that follow, Superb Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 292) is DENIED.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Motions for reconsideration may be filed pursuant to
Even if considered, a motion for reconsideration “is appropriate when the moving party can demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court.” Herschaft v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 139 F. Supp. 2d 282, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Notably, “a party may not advance new facts, issues, or arguments not previously presented to the Court on a motion for reconsideration.” Superior Site Work, Inc. v. NASDI, LLC, No. 14-cv-01061 (ADS)(SIL), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77453, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017) (internal quotations omitted); see also Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (noting that a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple). Put simply, a reconsideration motion is not appropriate to simply secure a “do-over.” See Schansman v. Sberbank of Russia PJSC, No. 19-CV-2985 (ALC)(GWG), 2025 WL 1288670, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2025) (collecting cases) (Parties are “barred from making for the first time in a motion for reconsideration an argument it could readily have raised when the underlying issue was being briefed but chose not to do so.“)
All that said, reconsideration is warranted only when: (i) the moving party points to an intervening change in controlling law, (ii) newly available evidence is identified, (iii) clear error is established, or (iv) reconsideration is necessary to avoid a manifest injustice. See Cho v. Blackberry Ltd., 991 F.3d 155, 170 (2d Cir. 2021); Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (same); T.Z. v. City of New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (same). Moreover,
Reconsideration “must be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid duplicative rulings on previously considered issues.” In re Bouka, 654 F. Supp. 3d 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 178 F. Supp. 3d 181, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)). Thus, “[a] narrow application of the rule not only ‘helps [] to ensure the finality of decisions,’ but also ‘prevent[s] the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters.‘” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Metro. Bank & Tr. Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
Keeping these principles in mind, the Court considers the instant motion.
DISCUSSION
Superb Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of this Court‘s (i) May 23, 2025 Order (see ECF No. 286) that denied Superb Plaintiffs’ renewed “Emergency Order” to show cause to modify the preliminary injunction to permit them to sell the remaining injuncted vehicles, and (ii) May 22, 2025 Order finding Superb Plaintiffs in contempt for failure to provide odometer readings as previously ordered by the Court (ECF No. 279 at 9-10). (ECF No. 292.) Within this Motion, Superb Plaintiffs seek related or ancillary relief, which the undersigned addresses accordingly.
On May 20, 2025, Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the May 9, 2025 Order without providing the Court with any overlooked matters. (ECF No. 271.) Specifically, the undersigned wrote:
Plaintiffs seek a ‘do-over’ on the eve of their deadline to deliver the Injuncted Superb Vehicles to the Deo Lot. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that the Court overlooked the potential damage that could occur by the Deo Defendants holding the Vehicles. Contrary to that assertion, the Court provided clear direction and imposed certain conditions to preserve the parties’ assets at the last Conference. As to the ‘newly available evidence’ that Plaintiffs submit, this still does not provide a long-term solution. Specifically, Plaintiffs state that they ‘have negotiated a deal with the landlord of the Hartford Lot for the Superb Injuncted Vehicles to remain there until the closing date, currently scheduled for June 9, 2025, and thereafter to
either remain at the Hartford Lot pending a deal with the purchaser of the Hartford Lot, or to be moved less than fifteen (15) miles away to 223 Broad Street, Bristol, CT 06010 (the ‘New Premises‘) subject to the Superb Plaintiffs’ agreement with the landlord for the New Premises.’ These proposed modifications are not concrete and are subject to the agreements of two third parties, the New Premises landlord or the new purchaser of the Hartford Lot. Absent here is evidence that would reasonably alter the undersigned‘s conclusion at the previous Conference.
(Electronic Order May 21, 2025.) So, the undersigned denied that motion. (Id.)
On May 21, 2025, Counsel for Deo Defendants filed a notice of appearance. (ECF No. 276.) On May 22, 2025, Mr. Thomasson requested that the Vehicles be delivered with the keys, title documents and by 6:00pm on May 23, 2025, which this Court granted. (ECF No. 277; Electronic Order dated 5/22/2025.)
Approximately twenty-four hours before the deadline to deliver the Vehicles, Plaintiffs filed an “Emergency MOTION for Order to Show Cause to permit the sale of the remaining Superb Injuncted Vehicles owned.” (ECF No. 280.) Due to the timeframe and nature of this application, the undersigned held a virtual hearing to provide Plaintiffs with an opportunity to be heard. (See Electronic Order dated 5/23/2025.) To summarize this proceeding, the undersigned asked that Plaintiffs articulate the irreparable harm they would suffer if the motion were denied. Without addressing irreparable harm, Plaintiffs focused instead on the cost of relocating the Vehicles. (See ECF No. 290.) Notably, Plaintiffs were afforded from May 9, 2025 to May 23, 2025 to make arrangements and learn of the costs. With that, the undersigned denied the application stating, “the grounds urged to modify the injunction - the cost to move vehicles and the threat that Plaintiffs will be in contempt - does not establish irreparable harm sufficient to modify the Injunction which was modified on May 9, 2025.” (Electronic Order dated 5/23/2025; ECF No. 290.) That same day, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal. (ECF No. 285.)5 In sum,
As an initial matter, the undersigned recognizes that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the instant motion while an appeal is pending before the Second Circuit. See Shomo v. Eckert, 755 F. Supp. 3d 344, 347 (W.D.N.Y. 2024) (“Normally the filing of a notice of appeal would divest this Court of jurisdiction, . . . but a timely motion under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) typically means that any subsequent notice of appeal does not become effective until the order disposing of the motion under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) is entered[.] . . . This principle has been extended to Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions filed after an appeal has been taken. “); Martinez v. Hasper, No. 15-CV-5724 (EK)(LB), 2022 WL 118720, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2022) (collecting cases) (“District courts in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York have generally concluded that they have jurisdiction to resolve timely filed motions under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) even where a notice of appeal is filed before one of those motions.“)
I. Reconsideration
Here, although the Superb Plaintiffs do not inform the Court the Rule under which reconsideration is sought, the Court reviews this motion under Local Rule 6.3, and
Local Rule 6.3 states “a notice of motion for reconsideration must be served within 14 days after the entry of the court‘s order being challenged,” which is complied with here. See Loc. Civ. R. 6.3. Likewise, under
Having determined that proper procedure was followed, the Court proceeds to analyze the merits of the motion. “The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict: ‘reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.‘” Cuomo v. Off. of the New York State Att‘y Gen., 727 F. Supp. 3d 231, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Moreover,
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
As for Superb Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Court overlooked any facts regarding this Court‘s finding of contempt, that is incorrect. Indeed, Superb Plaintiffs decided to ignore Deo Defendants’ arguments on the three missing odometer readings in their Opposition papers and focused primarily on the issue of whether additional miles were placed on the vehicles. (ECF Nos. 227-28.) Given that the Court was not offered any opposition to the failure to provide the three odometer readings, an Order was issued finding Superb Plaintiffs in contempt for failure to provide odometer readings. (ECF No. 279 at 9-10.) Now, Superb Plaintiffs in the eleventh hour inform the Court that it “overlooked the fact the Superb Plaintiffs previously reported to this Court that the 2016 F150 was repossessed in March 2024 such that they could not submit odometer readings by January 2025.” (ECF No. 293 at 5.) Superb Plaintiffs point to ECF No. 157-1 at 74 n. 9, where Superb Plaintiffs stated “[f]or example, one Injuncted Superb Vehicle bearing VIN No.: 1FTEW1EF1GFB67420 was recently repossessed by a repo company because the Deo Defendants never paid the outstanding lien on it, which they obtained as a trade-in[.]” (Id. at 1.) The Court now takes judicial notice that Superb Plaintiffs in a footnote on an unrelated filing indicated this fact over a year ago in their Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law in Support of Their Motion for Modify the Preliminary Injunction. (See ECF No. 157.) However, nowhere in opposition to the contempt motion was that raised. Plaintiff‘s suggestion that the Court should undertake the role of a truffle hog in search of facts not raised is rejected. See Tyson v. Town of Ramapo, 17-CV-04990 (PMH), 2023 WL 3044623, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2023) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs or the record“). Thus, the Court did not overlook any facts that were provided, presented or argued in Superb Plaintiffs’ Opposition.
Therefore, under either Rule (Local Rule 6.3 or Federal Rules 59(e) and 60(b)), Superb Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is denied with the Court acknowledgement that the F-150 has been repossessed, which does not change the outcome of the earlier contempt Order.
Next, Plaintiffs write to the Court stating “because Team is a party to this case, and since Superb was found to have established irreparable harm due to its closure to permit the sale of the vehicles it owns, Team should similarly be found to have established irreparable harm due to its closure in March 2025 such that this Court should reconsider its May 23, 2025 denial of the Superb Plaintiffs’ Order to show cause and permit the vehicles Team owns to similarly be sold.” (ECF No. 293 at 6.) In Superb‘s supporting papers, they outline the status of the Vehicles. Currently, there are thirteen vehicles remaining from the thirty because: (i) twelve vehicles were recently sold pursuant to this Court‘s May 8, 2024 Order allowing for the sale (ECF No. 172), (ii) two vehicles were also sold by Nissan without as alleged Superb‘s involvement, (iii) two more vehicles, specifically the two flatbed trucks were repossessed and sold by non-party Next Gear Capital Inc., again as alleged without Superb‘s involvement and (iv) the 2016 Ford F-150 was likewise repossessed by non-party LendBuzz Funding in March of 2024. (ECF No. 294 at ¶¶ 61-97.) Plaintiffs have now clarified that the remaining thirteen Vehicles are owned by Team Auto Sales LLC, a party to this case, whereas prior to this there were Vehicles owned by non-parties. (Id. at ¶¶ 97-102.) Although this is news to the Court and considered new evidence, this is not something that the undersigned overlooked. Put simply, when the Court denied the sale of the remaining Superb Injuncted Vehicles multiple times, Plaintiffs never laid out the status of the Vehicles as it chose to now, three reconsideration motions later. See City of Austin Police Ret. Sys. v. Kinross Gold Corp., 957 F. Supp. 2d 277, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[a] party is barred from making for the first time in a motion for reconsideration an argument it could readily have raised when the underlying issue was being briefed but chose not to do so.“)
As to the merits of the motion for reconsideration made under either Local Rule 6.3 and Federal Rules 59(e) and 60(b), there are no grounds to change or modify the Court‘s earlier Order. See Loc. Civ. R. 6.3 (“There must be served with the notice of motion a memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which the moving party believes the court has overlooked.“); see Blue Castle (Cayman) Ltd. v. Jones, No. 2:24-CV-953 (NJC)(ARL), 2025 WL 51215, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2025) (“Plaintiff has not identified any intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, mistake, or the need to correct clear error that would warrant reconsideration under Rules 59, 60, or Local Rule 6.3.“) Since “[r]econsideration of a court‘s previous order is an ‘extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources[,]” the court declines the instant motion. Levitant, 2019 WL 5853438, at *1 (quoting Parrish v. Sollecito, 253 F. Supp. 2d 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). This is because the motion fails to identify how the Court overlooked facts that would change the previous outcome. See Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257 (“The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.“); B & R Supermarket, Inc. v. Visa Inc., No. 17-CV-2738 (MKB), 2025 WL 510041, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
II. Other Requested Relief
Plaintiffs include other varied requests within the instant motion.
First, Plaintiffs seek a stay pending the Second Circuit‘s decision on appeal. (ECF No. 293 at 3.) The Court finds this request reasonable and thus grants a stay pending resolution of the appeal from the Order. See Mills v. Everest Reinsurance Co., 771 F. Supp. 2d 270, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“When issuing a certificate of appealability, the court also has the discretion to stay the proceedings; such stay is not automatic, however.“) In connection with this request, Plaintiffs further ask that if the Second Circuit denies the appeal or the Order affirmed, that they receive an extension of two weeks from that date to arrange for the delivery of the Vehicles. (ECF No. 293 at 3.) The stay issued herein will remain in effect for five days following decision entered by the Second Circuit to enable compliance.
Second, Plaintiffs aver that the Court erred in making a determination that Superb encumbered the Vehicles when they entered into the “Surrender Agreement” in January of this year with Nissan. (Id.) Plaintiffs cite a provision within that Agreement for the proposition that no encumbrance occurred due to a carve out, which states,
The Parties hereby agree that nothing within this Possession and Surrender Agreement addresses, disposes of, or otherwise changes the legal status, possession, or location of the Enjoined Vehicles. The Parties agree that NMAC and Obligors reserve all rights with respect to the Enjoined Vehicles, to be determined at a later date and after either (a) the injunction has been lifted, or (b) another order from a court of competent jurisdiction directs disposition of the Enjoined Vehicles.
(Id.) (emphasis in original). When the Court issued a ruling on Nissan‘s Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 229), the undersigned reviewed this provision and determined that this was an encumbrance. In simple words, Plaintiffs by signing this agreement far after the entry of the
Third, Plaintiffs discuss the sales of the Vehicles by Nissan and Next Gear Capital Inc., to set forth that they were not part of these actions. (ECF No. 293 at 4.) The Court declines to address these at this juncture as there will be anticipated motions by the parties for the merits of both the sale of the twelve Superb Injuncted Vehicles as well as the sales conducted by third parties as indicated in Oppositions to this Motion and the Motion to Transfer Funds to Escrow. (See ECF Nos. 299-301.)
For the reasons stated herein, Superb Plaintiff‘s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 292) is DENIED, and a stay of the May 23, 2025, Order concerning relocation of the Vehicles is granted through and including five days after decision is entered by the Second Circuit.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
June 26, 2025
SO ORDERED:
/s/ James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge