162 F. 301 | 9th Cir. | 1908
This appeal is taken from a decree of the Circuit Court sustaining a demurrer to and dismissing the appellant’s bill. The following is the substance of the bill: On January 20, 1905, the appellee, while in the appellant’s employment, received a bodily injury. On March 6, 1905, he entered into an agreement with the appellant, whereby he released all claim of damages for the injury. The appellant’s copy of the instrument of release has been accidentally destroyed, and the appellant has no written evidence to establish its terms. The appellee pretends to have a copy, and he falsely pretends that the same contains a stipulation that the appellant will pay the appellee the wages ($3 per day) which he was receiving at the time of the injury during the period of his disablement, and he pretends that he is permanently disabled. The appellee asserts, and, unless restrained by injunction, will continue from time to time to assert, his right to have and receive from the appellant his full wages during the period of his disablement, and will, unless restrained, harass and imperil the appellant by a suit or suits in which the said false copy of the agreement will be exhibited and relied upon. The appellant cannot defend against such claim unless the writing defining the terms of the agreement as made shall be restored, and the terms thereof established. The prayer is that the appellee be enjoined from asserting, in any court or otherwise, a claim or demand under said pretended contract and that the true contract be expressed and restored,- and the pretended copy be surrendered for cancellation. It is not alleged in the bill that the ap-pellee has brought an action, or that he threatens an action on the alleged pretended agreement, but both parties to the suit admit in their briefs in this court that such an action has been commenced.
The cancellation of written instruments is one of the recognized grounds of equitable jurisdiction which does not depend upon the inadequacy of the legal remedy, but courts of equity will in general refuse to exercise the jurisdiction when the legal remedy by action or defense is plain, adequate, and complete. Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, 20 L. Ed. 501; Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 373, 21 L. Ed. 174. Thus the jurisdiction will be sustained in cases where the instrument has been obtained by fraud, and is a cloud upon title, or where the instrument is negotiable and the putting it into circulation would be a fraudulent act, or where there is danger of loss of evidence which constitutes the defense if the adverse party delays his action. But the jurisdiction will not be exercised in a suit to cancel a nonnegotiable instrument to which defense may be made in an action at law thereon, unless particular facts are alleged which show that such a defense will be inadequate. The decided weight of authority is that the mere ordinary danger of losing evidence to establish the defense, even where no action at law has as yet been brought upon the instrument, is not of itself sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction. In the present case we-have the admission of both the parties to the suit that an action is now pending, in which an immediate determination of the question in controversy may be' had.
A case in point is Insurance Company v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, 20 L. Ed. 501, in which a suit was brought by an insurance company to ob
The decree is affirmed.