Sunoco, Inc. v. United StatesSunoco, Inc. v. United States
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00587-TCW, Judge Thomas C. Wheeler.
Decided: November
GREGORY G. GARRE, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant.
JUDITH ANN HAGLEY, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by GILBERT STEVEN ROTHENBERG, RICHARD FARBER, DAVID A. HUBBERT.
Before REYNA, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
REYNA, Circuit Judge.
This case concerns whether, under
BACKGROUND
1. Statutory Framework
Since 1932, the United States has imposed an excise tax on various types of fuel, including gasoline. See Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 617(a), 47 Stat. 169 (1932) (current version at
Pursuant to
In 1978, Congress started enacting tax incentives for renewable fuels, such as alcohol fuel blends. See Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, § 221, 92 Stat. 3174, 3185. One of these tax incentives was a reduced excise-tax rate for alcohol fuel mixtures. See Highway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097.
On October 22, 2004, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (“Jobs Act“) passed. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. In the Jobs Act, Congress sought to increase the flow of revenue to the Highway Trust Fund, but did not want to eliminate the monetary incentives for producers to blend alcohol with fuel. Congress thus restructured the relevant statutory framework in three respects: (1) it eliminated the reduced excise-tax rate for alcohol fuel blends under
By amending
The statutory changes to
2. Procedural History
Sunoco, Inc. (“Sunoco“), a petroleum and petrochemical company, blends ethanol with gasoline to create alcohol fuel
In 2013, Sunoco changed its tax position by submitting both informal and formal claims with the Internаl Revenue Service (IRS) to recover over $300 million based on excise-tax expenses for the years 2005 through 2008. Sunoco claimed that it erroneously reduced its gasoline excise tax by the amount of Mixture Credit it received, which had the effect of including the Mixture Credit in its gross income. In its view, Sunoco was entitled to deduct the full amount of the gasoline excise tax under
On February 12, 2016, the Government moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims,6 arguing that the
Jobs Act requires a two-step, or “bifurcated,” approach, in which first, the Mixture Credit reduces any excise-tax liability, and then the taxpаyer is compensated for any remaining Mixture Credit via a direct payment pursuant to
Sunoco responded with a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability, arguing that the Mixture Credit does not affect its excise-tax liability under
The COFC found the statutory scheme to be ambiguous, but agreed with the Government‘s interpretation and granted the Government‘s motion for judgment on the
Sunoco appeals. We have jurisdiction under
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the COFC‘s grant of judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Xianli Zhang v. United States, 640 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We accept the facts alleged by Sunoco as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Id. (citing Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Statutory interpretation is a legal question that we review de novo. Id. (citing Norfolk Dredging Co. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); Shoshone Indian Tribe of Wind River Reservation v. United States, 364 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
DISCUSSION
Sunoco asks this court to permit it to deduct, as a cost of goods sold, an excise-tax expеnse that it never incurred or paid. Neither the text of the Jobs Act nor its legislative history supports such a reading of the Internal Revenue Code.
A. Statutory Language
The parties agree there is no dispute as to the material facts in this case. J.A. 1044, 1085. Therefore, to determine the tax treatment of the Mixture Credit, we start with the plain language of the statute. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). Our inquiry ends there “if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.‘” Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)); Conn. Nat‘l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last.“). Whether the statutory language is unambiguous is determined by the text itself, the context in which the language is used, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992), and McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991)).
Relevant here is the interrelationship among three statutory sections of the Internal Revenue Code:
(a) Allowance of credits.—There shall be allowed as a credit—
(1) against the tax imposеd by section 4081 an amount equal to the sum of the credits described in subsections (b), (c), and (e)8 . . .
(b) Alcohol fuel mixture credit.—
(1) In general.—For purposes of this section, the alcohol fuel mixture credit is the product of the applicable amount and the number of gallons of alcohol
used by the taxpayer in producing any alcohol fuel mixture for sale or use in a trade or business of the taxpayer.
Section 6427(e) grants an interest-free payment to taxpayers of an amount equal to the Mixture Credit, when alcohol, biodiesel, or alternative fuels are used to produce a mixture. Section 6427(e) states in relevant part
(e) Alcohol, biodiesel, or alternative fuel.—Except as provided in subsection (k)—
(1) used to produce a mixture.—If any person produces a mixture described in section 6426 in such person‘s trade or business, the Secretary shall pay (without interest) to such person an amount equal to the alcohol fuel mixture credit . . . with respect to such mixture.
. . . .
(3) coordination with other repayment provisions.—No amount shall be payable under paragraph (1) or (2)9 with respеct to any mixture or alternative fuel with respect to which an amount is allowed as a credit under section 6426.
Section 6426(a)(1) explicitly provides that the “credit,” i.e., the Mixture Credit, is applied “against” the gasoline excise tax imposed under
Sunoco argues that a “credit” under
Section 9503 only reinforces this reading of
Sunoco contends that this language shows Congress did not intend the Mixture Credit to reduce excise-tax liability because the Treasury would not “receive” the amount of tax offset by the Mixture Credit. Sunoco‘s argument fails for a number of reasons. First, the statute explicitly states that for
Sunoco contends that where Congress intended a credit to reduce a taxpayer‘s excise-tax liability, it explicitly said so. Specifically, Sunoco points to
B. Legislative History
The plain meaning of the statute is clear—the Mixture Credit is a credit, not a payment, which must first be used to decrease a taxpayer‘s gаsoline excise-tax liability before receiving any payment under
Sunoco relies on a single sentence from the lеgislative history to show that Congress intended the Mixture Credit to be a payment of excise-tax liability, as opposed to a reduction in that liability: “[t]he credit is treated as a payment of the taxpayer‘s tax liability received at the time of the taxable event.” Conference Report, at 304. But other relevant portions of the Conference Report belie Sunoco‘s position: “In lieu of the reduced excise tax rates, the provision provides that the alcohol mixture credit provided under section 40 may be applied against section 4081 excise tax liability.” Id. (describing the Mixture Credit as “a benefit equivalent to the reduced tax rates“); see also id. at 308 (“These payments are intended to provide an equivalent benefit to replace the partial exemption for fuels to be blended with alcohol and alcohol fuels being repealed by this provision.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the tax benefit of the Mixture Credit is a reduction in excise-tax liability intended to match the excise-tax rate reduction in place prior to the enactment of the Jobs Act.
In addition, the only payments contemplated by Congress refer to those made to the taxpayer under
Payments with respect to qualified alcohol fuel mixtures
To the extent the alcohol fuel mixture credit exceeds any section 4081 liability of a person, the Secretary is to pay such person an amount equal to the alcohol fuel mixture credit with respect to such mixture. These payments are intended to provide an equivalent benefit to replace the partial exemption for fuels to be blended with alcohol and alcohol fuels being repealed by the provision.
Id. at 304; see also id. at 308. The Conference Report further states that “if the person has no section 4081 liability, the credit is totally refundable.” Id. at 308; see also id. at 303. Thus, Congress intended for any payment of the Mixture Credit to go to the taxpayer only if the taxpayer‘s excise-tax liability is zero. The legislative history is therefore at odds with Sunoco‘s position and supports the plain reading of the statute—that the Mixture Credit must first be applied to reduce any
The reason for this is simple: a taxpayer can claim either an excise-tax benefit, i.e., the Mixture Credit, or an income tax benefit, but not both. See id. at 304 (“The benefit obtained from the excise tax credit is coordinated with the alcohol fuels income tax credit.“);
Sunoco wishes to treat the Mixture Credit as a deductible expense because it considers the Mixture Credit as a payment of its tax liability. But Sunocо never incurs a cost equal to the Mixture Credit. Such a method of accounting would result in an overall lower taxable income, resulting in a windfall to Sunoco. We have already established that Congress does not generally allow taxpayers to receive a tax benefit twice. Nor has Sunoco shown that Congress intended the Jobs Act to increase excise-tax subsidies for fuel blenders. Sunoco has failed to show that the legislative history extraordinarily contradicts the plain reading of the Jobs Act.
CONCLUSION
In light of the plain language of the Jobs Act, we conclude that the
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.