108 Ky. 408 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1900
Opinion op the court by
Affirming.
The appellant issued a policy of insurance to Robert P. Knox om his life, and, being indebted to the appellee, Nettie Taylor, he assigned it to her, the indebtedness exceed
It is insisted that the twelfth clause of the policy, which we have quoted, does not render it incontestable where the insured died in consequence of his own criminal action; that the parties'did not intend by that provision of the policy to render unavailable a defense based on a violation of .law which was made a breach of the policy by its terms, hut that the provision as to the incontestable nature was .that it should not be contested for misrepresentations in securing it. The language providing that the policy should be incontestable does not restrict it to any particular grounds of contest, but it is broad and comprehensive enough to embrace any and every defense which might have been made to it before the expiration of three years. To say that it has reference to one defense, and not to another, is writing into the policy terms which the very language of it excludes. In , construing a contract, the whole must be taken together, in order
Forfeitures are not favored by the law. The insured is never permitted to select the terms used in a policy of insurance, and the rule is that in construing a, policy wherein its terms render doubtful its meaning a construction must be given which is favorable to the party insured; and, in addition thereto, if the policy contain inconsistent or contradictory provisions-, force must be given to those that sustain, rather than to those which forfeit, the contract. McMaster v. Insurance Co. (C. C.), 90 Fed., 40. Under these rules of interpretation we must conclude that it was the intention of the parties Lo the. contract that the policy was to be incontestable after three years, notwithstanding the insured might then die from his own criminal action.
In Association v. Payne (Tex. Civ. App.), 32 S. W., 1063, the policy of insurance contained a clause providing that, if the certificate should be in force for five years, it should thereafter “be incontestable for any cause except for nonpayment of dues.” The court held that suicide of the insured, after the policy had been in force five years, would not relieve the company from liability. In the case of Mareck v. Association (Minn.), 64 N. W., 68, the court had under consideration a policy substantially the same as the one here under consideration. The insured came to his death by his own hand, and the court held the incontestable clause applied, and that the company was liable on
“The tenets established for the guidance of courts in such matters are well understood, and no one is better established than that in all cases the policy must be liberally construed in favor of the assured, so as not to defeat, without a plain necessity, his claim for indemnity. And when the words used may, without violence, be given two interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss should be adopted.” In Simpson v. Insurance Co., 115 N. C., 396; (20 S. E., 517), the court was construing the incontestable feature of a policy, and said: “The quality of incontestability could, with no propriety, be predicated of this contract of insurance if it was still allowed to the insurer to dispute its liability to the insured for the amount of the insurance upon the ground
By the incontestable feature of the policy the company, in effect, said it would not refuse to pay the amount of the policy although the insured might, while sane or insane, take his own life, or if he should lose it by his own criminal action. It was not an agreement that it would pay him the amount 'of the policy if he committed suicide, or lost his life by his own criminal action, but it was an agreement that no defense should be made on that ground if he lived and continued to pay the premiums for three years. The judgment is affirmed.