*1 mаny exactly happening That is I think here. Too what judges they other courts and feel how to know run my they frankly people’s better business than do. admit ignorance high operated to how school athletics should be problems long rule, and law involved therein. As regulation appears make to to a reasonable classification objective obtain a lawful or result struck it should not be objective permit down. Here the of the rule that not does jump a student from participant school other one to the competitive parents moving athletics without his with him appears meritorious to me to does be reasonable and This, “suspect not involve a classification.” term is latter nothing put proof more than a method used to burden party. “suspect on another To me the classification” occurs when a participate student moves to another school to in com- petitive parents moving athletics without his with him. That exactly the situation here. The evidence without shows dispute that the student’s brother wrote a letter in which he said: they “. . . If would have told he me this rule before (Plaintiff) started school I could have sent home him played any where he could have ever. I what so difficulties money every help have could send home month
my parent (sic) out.” controlling This evidence shows that his factor in move participation in athletics where he For went school. stated, the reasons I would affirm the trial court. The facts support it. Reported in E. 305 N. 2d 877.
Note. — Sumpter Johnnie Marie v. State of Indiana. January 22, 1273S261. Filed
[No. 1974] *2 Clouse, Evansville, D. appellant. John for Sendak, Attorney General, Theodore L. Diamond, Darrel K. Deputy Attorney General, appellee. for J. The petitioned State of Indiana has Court
Hunter,
for
transfer of
above cause. Defendant was
at
convicted
trial
1971, 35-30-1-1;
in a house of ill fame. IC
Ind.
(1972
Ann.
Supp.)
Appeals
Stat.
10-4220
The Court
re-
*3
versed, holding
prosecution
prove
that the
failed to
that
the
required
defеndant
awas
female —a
element of the crime
charged.
We the existing believe Court correctly applied of law when it However, reversed trial the court. we also believe existing that law is Therefore, in need of modification. granted we have presented transfer. Several other issues Appeals of Court will also be considered herein. I. It is axiomatic the criminal law that State must prove every each and charged element of beyond the offense
a reasonable bar, doubt. the case at the most i.e., fundamental element, the accused a female, affirmatively proved was not by the State. say, That is any the State failed to adduce spe- evidence cifically intended to establish the sex of the The defendant. replete record is with State, defense, references and witnesses to accused as “she” However, and “her.” no testimony documentary appears or evidence on the record State, definitively the defendant’s sex. The establishes existing proving
according law, failed in its burden of to our beyond a sex reasonable doubt. the accused’s rightly proving sex of of the defendant is burden However, upon of the State. we believe the shoulders sequence proof is in method and need revision. being generally its most obvious The sex of a human and, being look can at another human characteristic. We degree very high certainty, her his with ascertain judicial Therefore, why presiding judge couldn’t a take sex. We believe he can and should. notice of a defendant’s sex? prescribe following procedure with the conviction We wholly reality practical consistent com- such is mon sense. charged offense, an with an element
When individual an accused, is the sex of the take of which trial court will judicial notice of defendant’s sex.
judge’s finding necessarily is not conclusive of the judicial judge issue. Once the takes notice of such fact, presumption a rebuttable arises in favor of the State. say persuasion This is not to the burden of from shifts the State to the defendant. That burden How- never shifts. ever, procedure imposes the defendant burden producing evidence. legal significance succinctly
This Court has stated the presumption: nature of a “. . presumption it . of law evidence nor should is not weighed evidentiary though
be value. party jury the factfinder as it had enabling Rather, presumption the the a rule law operates it take his case to whose favor presumed. presenting without evidence of the fact *4 party challenge proof serves as a for and indicates the It forthcoming. the proof from whom such opponent must be When pro presumption the burden of has met presump however, the imposed, the office of duction thus presumption further performed; no is of has been the tion Young 258 State drops the case.” and from effect v.
475 Vogel 595, quoting 2d Commonwealth 280 E.N. Ind. 1, 17, 89, 102. (1970), A. 2d Pa. pre- procedure we represents herein the which The above time, judicial precious rebuttable In order to conserve scribe. the arises once presumption the sex of defendant’s pre- This judicial fact. judge notice of such takes prima sumption case to constitute is sufficient facie any produce defendant fails to the when thе in favor of State contrary. However, once the de- competent the evidence to introducing competent challenges presumption the fendant evidence, passes the case. presumption forever from defend- evidence, establish the State, then affirmative must beyond sex a reasonable doubt. ant’s judgment the trial court
For this Court reverse the of indulge discharge technicality appellant on and exasperate tax- judicial kind of which so antics paying public public promotes dissatisfaction with judicial system. quash petitioner
II. The her should contends that motion to fatally have been due to defectivе nature of the sustained allegations charging specific affidavit. Her are that the statute brought prosecution unconstitutional under “status,” punishes any in that it for a not for overt “crime”; unconstitutionally criminal act or that the statute is vague; Equal the statute violative Protection Clause; that the statute is Amendment. violative of the First Furthermore, argues (charging she that Count I her with quashed fame) in a ill it is house of should because (charging repugnant frequenting II Count her with place); specify period same affidavit did not alleged question of time of the The statute in reads offense. follows:
ill more acts be deemed or houses “Prostitute. — fame, or who guilty Any sexual intercourse or fame, commits female prostitution, knowing who or offers to commit one frequents and on conviction thereof same to be sodomy or lives in a hire, shall house [1] house *5 476
shall either be fined not less than one hundred dollars [$100] prisoned ment not to exceed 180 nor more 30-1-1; 345, [2] years § 1, (Ind. Ann. p. 1025; 1967, than nor more than five five Indiana women’s hundred dollars Stat. ch. days § 10-4220 [1956 23, [5] § such prison 1, years. p. [$500]; person 28.]” not [Acts Repl.]). and less IC may imprison- than two 1971, 1965, be im- 35- ch. argues Appellant imposes that the punishment statutes for a “status” than rather for overt criminal conduct. The fact legislature
the matter is that the has determined that ain house fame is a criminal offense. legislaturе The empowered proscribe conduct within State of Indiana which it deems to be criminal. (Art. 4, 22, Constitution.) Indiana The case appellant relies, Robinson v. 660, 370 U.S. California 758, easily distinguished 8 L. Ed. 2d can be from the case at In bar. Robinson a state drug statute which made addiction a criminal offense Eighth was held to be violative of the (cruel Fourteenth Amendments punishment). and unusual applied, As the statute made drug criminal the status of irrespective drugs addiction of non-use of within the state. concluded, court in essence, that no criminal act had case, occurred in the state. the Indiana statute in question proscribes criminal activity within the state. Unlike Robinson, thеre exists a between nexus the criminal act and the state.
Appellant further contends statute is unconstitu- tionally vague and, hence, offends Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth statutes, Amendment. Penal satisfy in order to process due requirements, must sufficiently explicit so adequately inform intelligence individuals ordinary consequences contemplated of their conduct. Bouie v. Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 12 Ed. L. 2d Stanley 894. State Appellant N. E. 2d argues 149. that the use of the term “house imprecise of ill fame” is too adequately inform individuals that pro- their conduct scribed reject law. categorically We this assertion. We intelligence fully knows ordinary individual of that an bеlieve Appellant meaning “house of ill fame.” appreciates bookmaking massage parlor or perhaps a speculates that be- fame.” We “house of ill considered operation could be proscribed only prostitution, they if be—but could lieve therein. statute, practiced were unconstitutional urges the statute to declare Appellant us men women and not to grounds application to its on Amend- Equal the Fourteenth Clause of Protection violates *6 ment. prevent from state does not a Equal Clause
The Protection legislative ex indulging classifications. State in reasonable 565, 297 McDonald rel. Miller v. establishing a case, In the usual E. 826. N. 2d sufficient be for the classification will rational basis constitutionality.' supra. in Miller, There are sustain its inadequate and rational will be basis test in which stances required. This judicial scrutiny is higher a standard of “suspect” only triggered scrutiny when higher standard rights no know of are involved. We classes or fundamental from right prostitute free or to be fundamental Nor, majority of prosecution prostitution. has for acts of “suspect” Supreme that sex is a the United Court held States Therefore, con prostitution statute will withstand class. showing That upon of reasonableness. muster stitutional justifying rationally it is say, “any state of facts is to if courts,” must perceived the statute demonstrated or .Corp. Maryland Savings-Share Ins Unitеd States stand. 2d 27 L. Ed. 4. 400 U.S. policy that legislature decision made a has Indiana among problem only significant females. social prostitution therefore, and, should clearly reasonable a decision Such be sustained. prostitution argues statute violates
Appellant against establish- prohibitions state constitutional federal and religious guarantees of religion constitutional ment giving liberty, by Judaeo-Christian ethics the force criminal utterly Virtually this contention law. We find to be frivolous. way progeny laws are one all criminal or another ethics. We have Judaeo-Christian no intention to overrule Ten Commandments. Appellant contends that I Count of the have affidavit should quashed with, been because it was repugnant inconsistent to, charged II appellant Count affidavit. Count with fame, charged in a house appellant while Count II frequenting a house of ill fame. We concede these clearly counts are inconsistent with one another. any prejudice
we are to discern appel- unable visited lant as a of that pleading. appellant result inconsistent fact, any prejudicial fails to direct us to effect whatsoever. The only II, conviction obtained on Count and the record support discloses an abundance of evidence to that conviction. jury guilty After returned а I, verdict on Count granted state moved for and was a directed verdict of not logical guilty on II. A inconsistency Count indictment, in an which does not actual result harm i.e., to the appellant, counts, conviction on both cannot rise to the status of reversi- ble error. alleges
Appellant the affidavit was defective in that *7 specifies period neither count the time in allegedly which she frequented lived in or the house of ill Count fame. charged appellant in a house of ill July 15, Appellant fame on 1971. informs us that quash correctly anticipated “the motion to problem a which did, fact, on in arise trial.” Appellant, trial, objected at the introduction evidence of her commission of thе crime two-year period. Appellant a over position takes the that prepare adequate one is unable to an defense when the alleges affidavit the commission of an day offense one on and, trial, at evidence is admitted spanning of criminal acts two-year period. allegation a This is without merit for two First, reasons. there was substantial evidence at adduced appellant proprietress that the was in fact the resident trial July 15, Secondly, on of the house of fame 1971. there long-standing a rule of evidence the in Indiana which allows admissibility showing of evidence the con commission of a prior charged at tinuous offense times to the time the in Townsend v. State affidavit. 147 Ind. E. 47 N. Obviously, generally, 19. residence in a house of ill fame is nature, continuing very phenomenon. its Appellant III. that contends her motion to dismiss should grounds. First, argues have been sustained on two that she prior charging prostitution affidavit pending was still when present upon ap- affidavit was filed. affidavit which pellant September was was convicted filed 30, 1971, on charge day prior same Appellant was dismissed. takes position prior charge officially that the was not dismissed signed judge until the day. order book at the end of the argues, Therefore, charge prior she pending that was when present Upon аffidavit was filed. facts similar to those bar, presumed the case prior at we have was indictment charges dismissed before new were filed. Alstott v. State Alstott, E.N. 896. In an indictment day. dismissed and an affidavit filed on same Alstott ais much more extreme case than the case at bar in that rely operation the Court had to on the presumption. of a Here, we resort presumption. need not to such a The record clearly indicates prior the dismissal of the affidavit preceded filing present appel- affidavit adopt appellant’s ingenious lant was logic convicted. To hold, to honor form over substance. therefore, We charge all purposes, intents and there pending was no when present was filed. affidavit Additionally, appellant brought claims that the State “suc- prosecutions,” resulting cessive vexatious denial due Appellant process. authority proposition cites no for such a involving appellant other than cases successive trials. The jeopardy placed in this case was but one time. Double *8 important Furthermore, inapplicable. it clearly jeopardy present prior affidavit to the issued that the affidavit note to appellant. the motion was dismissed alleges special plea that her should not Appellant next IV. prostitutiоn denied, overruled and because have been jury should is unconstitutional and that statute permitted to consider determine said have been begin with, have that the statute plea. held To we in Therefore, the trial court not err did is constitutional. overruling plea, con- special which attacked the statute’s constitutionality stitutionality. Furthermore, statute of a only jury. jury’s for the The matter for the a matter is not appellant-defendant this case was whether in consideration prostitution. guilty of was improperly trial Appellant ad-
V. contends court tendency prove to another offense and evidence with mitted reputation. hearsay evidence of telephone utilities and in house in
Evidence question appellant’s name were introduced over appellant’s position objection. appellant’s It is evi said separate namely goes proving keeping dence offense— (see (Ind. 85-1-88-2, IC house of Stat. Ann. fame — hightly prejudicial and that said evidence is §10-4217)) Layton authority, appellant As cites and inadmissible. 52, 221 proposi N. E. 2d State proved one crime cannot be in order tion that to establish proposition agree. crime. fully another we distinct With this Layton contemplates the rule v. State far Layton in the case at different situation than bar. is concerned sеparate admission evidence of distinct with the independent crimes —ones which must be established evi evi words, other both offenses different dence. In stand on dentiary require proof. principle bases and different designed Layton enunciated in the introduction combat question. prove (“He the offense offenses other before; burglarized therefore, *9 a week he be a house must burglary ease.”) guilty case, In this of of in evidence goes prove keep- appellant’s the utilities in name to the both — ing living in mere fact that of and a house of ill fame. The goes prove the to an offense other the one evidence than chаrged tendency immaterial, long is so as evidence has a charged prove disprove to the offense. admitting
Appellant court contends that the trial erred in reputation reputation evidence of of the and the defendant’s position, the question. appellant’s house which in The with concur, hearsay we is the of rank to such admission question prove fame, that the in in house a house of fact appellant prostitute, appellant’s and that was in violated fact right guaranteed by to confrontation as the Amendment Sixth to the United States Constitution and Article 13 of the Indiana Constitution. right two-pronged to has confrontation beеn held to be a
right. right contemplates It both the to wit- cross-examine right
nesses and the have the trier fact assess of the Page demeanor of those witnesses. Barber v. right U.S. the to con- 719. frontation, like most guarantees, constitutional absolute. not fact, In Supreme there are a multitude United of States Court cases major hearsay exceptions which have held that the do not offend the hearsay Confrontation Clause. Established exceptions become, large measure, have exceptions in the Confrontation Clause itself. relationship McCormick states the hearsay between the rule and the Confrontation as Clause follows: similarity “The underpinnings hearsay to the rule provisions is evident. the late 1700’s when confrontation general were first included in rights, American bills of against rule hundred hearsay A hearsay accepted England had been for years, equally but it was circumstances well established might under certain admitted. be appraisal purpose may be that the American fair of
provisions guarantee was to the maintenance in criminal principle hearsay rule, eases the hard-won without of of exceptions been accepted abandoning which had not prac- especially forbidding questioned fairness, but depositions accused. using absence taken in the tice This abandoned of of, later complained and was had been much last by statute. English judges forbidden Amendment, Clause, appears the Sixth it While the exceptions, in fact it provision
in terms makes has no may departures allow- That so been construed. not completely course, they not, coincide mean that able does rule, hearsay becomes a conclusion that those of the by State hearsay aspect measured more evident when the stand- confrontation and the constitutional rules ard evidence Supreme than one on more In fact Court federal. hearsay rejected idea that expressly hаs occasion rule ways right simply different are of confrontation stating thing. Nevertheless, instances same under traditional the item evidence admissible an concepts held been to violate hearsay has confrontation *10 stood hand, clause not right rare. the the has On other are admissibility of the barrier liberalization solid (2nd 252, p. hearsay.” Evidence, 606-607 McCormick on emphasis.) ed.) (Our hearsay exceptions In order for not to offend the Confronta- Constitutions, the United States and Indiana tion Clause of hearsay possess evidence must “indicia substantial (California ‘reliability’” (1970), v. Green 399 U.S. 26 Ed. L. 489. recognize reputation exception
Two Indiana old cases as an Betts, 375; hearsay et al. v. to the rule. State Ind. 93 Ind. Schultz State 161 E. 5. N. exception not such can we do believe an light pass in constitutional muster of the above dis inherently of no cussion. can conceive evidence more We suspect reputation evidence than based on statements of simply There re declarants. is no “indicia of out-of-court liability” fact, anything, un if there is an indicia of —in safeguards reliability. There are no built-in the case of in former, testimony party-opponent. or admissions of a sworn We, therefore, justification exception can see no for such an rights an integrity if we maintain the accused’s are tо reputation do not hold that evidence is in confrontation. We Such evidence is admissible for all instances inadmissible. party purposes the character impeachment or when only reputation introduced in issue. We hold that evidence of guilt inadmissible. In the case as substantive evidence of reputation at introduced to establish bar evidence of was erroneously trial consequently admitted guilt was and reversible error not constitute However, such does court. there abundant are convinced that in We error this case. establishing the house existence of a independent evidence appellant’s residence therein. record of ill fame and following to the evidence most favorable State: discloses arrest, appellant property (1) day of her owned the On rests; question the house name; (2) her The utilities were in belongings large (3) Appellant admitted that hers; were first-floor bedroom testimony
(4) had There was direct witnesses had prostitutes on numerous sexual relations in the house with appellant occasions, occasions, these each one of and on them the door and let in. answered foregoing reasons, judgment of
For all the the trial hereby part, court aifirmed and we also remand cause the trial court for determination оf defendant’s pursuant procedures sex to the The trial court set out herein. any appropriate should take all remedial action to correct findings record, judgment. the trial *11 Arterburn, concurs; C.J., Givan, J., opinion in the concurs remand; disagrees procedural Prentice, con- J., but with granting curs in the of transfer and affirmance of the trial judgment only, opinion; J., DeBruler, with court’s dissents opinion. with
Opinion Concurring Dissenting in Part — in Part opinion majority except Prentice, J. I concur in the of concept presumption insofar it a of a rebuttable announces judge talcing judicial ap- arising notice. This trial from the litigants quandary to if leave the in a proach would where the has been taken and as to “burden such notice when legitimate Assuming sex a producing evidence” that of lies. legislative respect com- classification with to basis for (a accept activity proposition I mercialization sexual which of special only difficulty) in the absence of a considerable presentation plea some evidence the defendant’s or the of alleged indictment, affidavit sex is other than that in the absurd, me, require the offer evidence it is to to State to sanity, condition of without the issue. I liken it to the requiring crime there no intent to commit a which can be charge crime, Upon of such a the State not mens rea. required sanity, prove the defendant’s unless the defendant places proof I the matter the matter issue. would treat of sex in manner. such cases the same grant judgment and affirm the
I transfer would trial court.
Dissenting Opinion majority that I must dissent J. I find from the DeBruler, agree since I with its construction in this case cannot crimes presumption in all where an element of the offense is defendant, the sex of the and because believe statute this Equal the Due Process and violates both Protection Clauses of the Constitution. opinion majority
In its identifies the “most fundamental element” crime sex as the then this defendant and proceeds proof to reliеve from State element creating judicial presumption. criminal cases court extremely presumption reluctant create a should be carrying the jury. has the effect of State’s case to the Legislature has included as one of the the crime elements of being 1971, 35-80-1-1, 10-4220, at IC defined Burns presumption the defendant be A a female. in effect abrogates responsibility prove State’s this element of contrary legal principles the crime is to one of the basic of our
485 every required prove to namely, the be State system; Legislature. by defined of a crime element pre necessity overriding create to a there is no Mоreover simple for femininity matter is a It sumption here. of proving defendant of the the sex carry of its burden to State same point in the introducing evidence on affirmative crime are established. of the other elements which manner 870, E. (1971), 166, 272 N. 2d State In Howard v. testimony this of the direct accepted as sufficient Court opinion of sex lay her the defendant’s as to non-expert witness charged. highly It is crime element of the that was an when today difficulty any have more unlikely should State person time did at the of the identifying than it the sex of and arrested has been observed The accused Howard decision. around, subjected search transported often tо officers, by police subjected jail to in an person, taken to and quarters and of required prison belongings to don ventory and personal of (and channels official in these garb. that some It inevitable trial) readily witness to State at available as therefore render of the accused to observation have made sufficient will opinion the accused. to the sex of or her admissible his finding be sufficient to warrant a of sex which would Evidence cheaply readily, guilt beyond doubt is therefore a reasonable obviously I cannot conceive available to State. particular legitimate why any we should treat reasons legisla differently any than other element of the crime specified required tively elements to be established by affirmative evidence. record punishes agree statute, appellant that this also fame, frequenting violates house of ill
a female It is a fundamental due the Due Process Clause. element Legislature must process enacted that criminal statutes so prohibited1 be and cannot clearly define behavior problem vagueness “house of ill fame” term 1. The response majority’s emphasized by issue. treatment of this imprecise may appellant’s of ill that “house fame” is contention broadly engaging defined as to include citizеns who are not health, safety, inimicable to the or welfare in activities morals Jersey State. Lanzetta New 306 U.S. 888; Kirtley L. Ct. 83 Ed. v. State Ind. 59 S. Legislature may 175, 84 N. 2d 712. While the E. be assumed regulate power to have the commericalized sexual conduct *13 overly it in a is cannot do so manner ill which broad defined. or part That of statute with which we are concerned here subjects year prison a nothing to five a defendant term for residing building. more than in a No certain other than act living required. status a is of in certain location More- Legislature over, our has pro- enacted numerous laws which specific hibit acts of commercialized sexual conduсt and which encompass perhaps every may conceivable act which be deemed purview problem. within of The remainder of Burns 10-4220, punishes committing offering the acts of or to § com- sodomy acts of sexual intercourse mit or In hire. addition operate this statutes which State has make it crime a to or manage (IC prostitution 1971, of house 35-1-83-2, being 10-4217), Burns to induce prostitute a female to become § 1971, being (IC 35-1-87-1, Burns 10-4218), or to share the § earnings prostitute (IC 1971, being of a 35-30-6-1, Burns 10-4226). There is no need for the State § to make the status of in a house of fame a crime when it has readily available these alternative precise and more laws designed speсific punish are acts. Supreme
The United States Court opinion in a unanimous Papachristou case City Jacksonville 405 156, 839, 110, U.S. 92 Ct. city S. L. 2d Ed. considered a who, among ordinance which declared one pursuits, other places massage parlors such bookmaking include operations majority places may that meaning states these be within the only phrase, practiced therein”, fame” is in this Court not if prostitution, statute, “but as described were clearly implying thus term “house of ill places prostitution place. restricted to where takes 279, the case of State v. 79 N.E.2d Griffin specifically held that the term “house of ill fame” includes only additionally prostitution bawdy houses of but houses and gaming houses. “frequenting fame” to spent houses of ill habitually his time days ninety jail. vagrant subjected him to abe vague, overbroad that such an ordinance was court found society harmful to which were not made activities criminal portion under 10-4220 in themselves. believe that Burns § analoguous here is the ordinance found consideration Papaehristou. majority’s appellant’s
Lastly, I treatment of believe the equal protection opinion its claim also erroneous. only majority upholds criminality limitation statute’s conjecturing frequent who houses of ill fame females Legislature policy decision, “that must have made a significant only among prostitution problem fe- is a social Actually companion statute found at 35-1- males”. IC 87-2, being 10-4219, male Burns makes it crime for a Obviously frequent person to or visit a house of ill fame. Legislature majority’s assumption has decided only significant importance this behavior social when by females the same committed is erroneous since behavior *14 by made criminal in males. another statute when undertaken my view, problem however, In this not end the raised does by Equal in terms statutes Protection Clause since subjects frequents 10-4219 Burns a male who a house of § sixty jail, days ill fame to a misdemeanor sentence of punishes while Burns 10-4220 the same crime cоm- when by felony prison mitted female as two sentence of years. to five agree majority Supreme
I with the the United States legislation yet creates Court has not found purely suspect hence classes on the status of sex to be and subject judicial scrutiny. (1971), 404 Reed v. Reed to strict 251, not L. 2d 225.2 This does 71, 92 Ct. 30 Ed. U.S. S. 1764, (1973), 93 S.Ct. four Frontiero v. Richardson 2. impliedly justices were held to on sex found that classifications based 71, by suspect Reed v. Reed 404 U.S. 92 the decision in 251, 225. 30 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 488 however,
mean,
non-suspect
that classifications of a
are
nature
any
required not
meet
standard of
all.
reasonableness at
finding
gave
In
preference
that a State statute which
in ad-
ministering estates to male
over
survivors
female survivors
again
was unconstitutional
the court
reiterated that:
“A
must rest
reasonable,
arbitrary,
classification ‘must be
not
and
ground
to
having
some
of difference
a fair
object
legislation,
substantial
all
relation
so
alike.’
”
persons similarly
circumstanced shall
be treated
Court found a statute which
that males were auto
matically committed to an institution
criminally
for the
insane
they
guilty
when
were
not
found
of a
violent crime
reason
insanity,
acquitted
while
similarly
females
were
afforded
hearing,
commitment
to be
repugnant
a classification
Equal Protection
Morgan
Clause.
believe that
is stare decisis
proposition
State for the
that differentiation in the
disposition
sentencing
of those found in need of commit
ment or incarceration cannot be
purely
made
on the basis of
sex. See also
Commonwealth
v. Daniel
430 Pa.
400;
A.
243
2d
Brown,
Lamb v.
456
(10th Cir., 1972);
F.
2d
U.S. ex
York,
rel. Robinson
(D.
Supp.
281 F.
1968).
Conn.,
respectfully
For these reasons I
opinion
dissent from the
majority.
*15
Reported in